Changes

If I make the mark of deduction the fact that it reduces the number of terms, as it moves from the grounds to the end of an argument, then I am due to devise a name for the process that augments the number of terms, and thus prepares the grounds for any account of experience.

If I make the mark of deduction the fact that it reduces the number of terms, as it moves from the grounds to the end of an argument, then I am due to devise a name for the process that augments the number of terms, and thus prepares the grounds for any account of experience.

What name hints at the many ways that signs arise in regard to things?  What name covers the manifest ways that a map takes over its territory?  What name fits this naming of names, these proceedings that inaugurate a sign in the first place, that duly install it on the office of a term?  What name suits all the actions of addition, annexation, incursion, and invention that instigate the initial bearing of signs on an object domain?  In the interests of a "maximal analytic precision" (MAP), it is fitting that I should try to sharpen this notion to the point where it applies purely to a simple act, that of entering a new term on the lists, in effect, of enlisting a new term to the ongoing account of experience.  Thus, let me style this process as "adduction" or "production", in spite of the fact that the aim of precision is partially blunted by the circumstance that these words have well-worn uses in other contexts.  In this way, I can isolate to some degree the singular step of adding a term, leaving it to a later point to distinguish the role that it plays in an argument.

What name hints at the many ways that signs arise in regard to things?  What name covers the manifest ways that a map takes over its territory?  What name fits this naming of names, these proceedings that inaugurate a sign in the first place, that duly install it on the office of a term?  What name suits all the actions of addition, annexation, incursion, and invention that instigate the initial bearing of signs on an object domain?  In the interests of a "maximal analytic precision", it is fitting that I should try to sharpen this notion to the point where it applies purely to a simple act, that of entering a new term on the lists, in effect, of enlisting a new term to the ongoing account of experience.  Thus, let me style this process as "adduction" or "production", in spite of the fact that the aim of precision is partially blunted by the circumstance that these words have well-worn uses in other contexts.  In this way, I can isolate to some degree the singular step of adding a term, leaving it to a later point to distinguish the role that it plays in an argument.

As it stands, the words "adduction" and "production" could apply to the arbitrary addition of terms to a discussion, whether or not these terms participate in valid forms of argument or contribute to their mediation.  Although there are a number of auxiliary terms, like "factorization", "mediation", or "resolution", that can help to pin down these meanings, it is also useful to have a word that can convey the exact sense meant.  Therefore, I coin the term "obduction" to suggest the type of reasoning process that is opposite or converse to deduction and that introduces a middle term "in the way" as it passes from a subject to a predicate.

As it stands, the words "adduction" and "production" could apply to the arbitrary addition of terms to a discussion, whether or not these terms participate in valid forms of argument or contribute to their mediation.  Although there are a number of auxiliary terms, like "factorization", "mediation", or "resolution", that can help to pin down these meanings, it is also useful to have a word that can convey the exact sense meant.  Therefore, I coin the term "obduction" to suggest the type of reasoning process that is opposite or converse to deduction and that introduces a middle term "in the way" as it passes from a subject to a predicate.

=====1.3.5.3.  A Fork in the Road=====

=====1.3.5.3.  A Fork in the Road=====

<blockquote>

On "logical semblance" — The concepts "individual" and "species" equally false and merely apparent.  "Species" expresses only the fact that an abundance of similar creatures appear at the same time and that the tempo of their further growth and change is for a long time slowed down, so actual small continuations and increases are not very much noticed (— a phase of evolution in which the evolution is not visible, so an equilibrium seems to have been attained, making possible the false notion that a goal has been attained — and that evolution has a goal —).

(Nietzsche, The Will to Power S521, 282).

<p>On "logical semblance" &mdash; The concepts "individual" and "species" equally false and merely apparent.  "Species" expresses only the fact that an abundance of similar creatures appear at the same time and that the tempo of their further growth and change is for a long time slowed down, so actual small continuations and increases are not very much noticed (&mdash; a phase of evolution in which the evolution is not visible, so an equilibrium seems to have been attained, making possible the false notion that a goal has been attained &mdash; and that evolution has a goal &mdash;).</p>

| align="right" | &mdash; Nietzsche, ''The Will to Power'', [Nie, S521, 282]

It is worth trying to discover, as I currently am, how many properties of inquiry can be derived from the simple fact that it needs to be able to apply to itself.  I find three main ways to approach this issue, the problem of inquiry's self-application, or the question of its reflexivity:

It is worth trying to discover, as I currently am, how many properties of inquiry can be derived from the simple fact that it needs to be able to apply to itself.  I find three main ways to approach this issue, the problem of inquiry's self-application, or the question of its reflexivity:

=====1.3.5.4.  A Forged Bond=====

=====1.3.5.4.  A Forged Bond=====

<blockquote>

The form counts as something enduring and therefore more valuable;  but the form has merely been invented by us;  and however often "the same form is attained", it does not mean that it is the same form - what appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the "form".  As if a type should be attained and, as it were, was intended by and inherent in the process of formation.

(Nietzsche, The Will to Power S521, 282).

<p>The form counts as something enduring and therefore more valuable;  but the form has merely been invented by us;  and however often "the same form is attained", it does not mean that it is the same form - what appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the "form".  As if a type should be attained and, as it were, was intended by and inherent in the process of formation.</p>

| align="right" | &mdash; Nietzsche, ''The Will to Power'', [Nie, S521, 282]

A unity can be forged among the methods by noticing the following connections among them.  All the while that one proceeds deductively, the primitive elements, the definitions and the axioms, must still be introduced hypothetically, notwithstanding the support they get from common sense and widespread assent.  And the whole symbolic system that is constructed through hypothesis and deduction must still be tested in experience to see if it serves any purpose to maintain it.

A unity can be forged among the methods by noticing the following connections among them.  All the while that one proceeds deductively, the primitive elements, the definitions and the axioms, must still be introduced hypothetically, notwithstanding the support they get from common sense and widespread assent.  And the whole symbolic system that is constructed through hypothesis and deduction must still be tested in experience to see if it serves any purpose to maintain it.