12,080
edits
Changes
update
<font size="3">☞</font> This page belongs to resource collections on [[Logic Live|Logic]] and [[Inquiry Live|Inquiry]].
'''Inquiry''' is any proceeding or process that has the aim of augmenting knowledge, resolving doubt, or solving a problem. A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.
'''Inquiry''' is any proceeding or process that has the aim of augmenting knowledge, resolving doubt, or solving a problem. A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.
For ease of reference, Figure 1 and the Legend beneath it summarize the classical terminology for the three types of inference and the relationships among them.
For ease of reference, Figure 1 and the Legend beneath it summarize the classical terminology for the three types of inference and the relationships among them.
{| align="center" cellpadding="8" style="text-align:center"
|
<pre>
<pre>
o-------------------------------------------------o
o-------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1. Elementary Structure and Terminology
Figure 1. Elementary Structure and Terminology
</pre>
</pre>
|}
In its original usage a statement of Fact has to do with a deed done or a record made, that is, a type of event that is openly observable and not riddled with speculation as to its very occurrence. In contrast, a statement of Case may refer to a hidden or a hypothetical cause, that is, a type of event that is not immediately observable to all concerned. Obviously, the distinction is a rough one and the question of which mode applies can depend on the points of view that different observers adopt over time. Finally, a statement of a Rule is called that because it states a regularity or a regulation that governs a whole class of situations, and not because of its syntactic form. So far in this discussion, all three types of constraint are expressed in the form of conditional propositions, but this is not a fixed requirement. In practice, these modes of statement are distinguished by the roles that they play within an argument, not by their style of expression. When the time comes to branch out from the syllogistic framework, we will find that propositional constraints can be discovered and represented in arbitrary syntactic forms.
In its original usage a statement of Fact has to do with a deed done or a record made, that is, a type of event that is openly observable and not riddled with speculation as to its very occurrence. In contrast, a statement of Case may refer to a hidden or a hypothetical cause, that is, a type of event that is not immediately observable to all concerned. Obviously, the distinction is a rough one and the question of which mode applies can depend on the points of view that different observers adopt over time. Finally, a statement of a Rule is called that because it states a regularity or a regulation that governs a whole class of situations, and not because of its syntactic form. So far in this discussion, all three types of constraint are expressed in the form of conditional propositions, but this is not a fixed requirement. In practice, these modes of statement are distinguished by the roles that they play within an argument, not by their style of expression. When the time comes to branch out from the syllogistic framework, we will find that propositional constraints can be discovered and represented in arbitrary syntactic forms.
The three kinds of inference that Peirce would come to refer to as ''abductive'', ''deductive'', and ''inductive'' inference he gives his earliest systematic treatment in two series of lectures on the logic of science: the [[Harvard University]] Lectures of 1865 and the [[Lowell Institute]] Lectures of 1866. There he sums up the characters of the three kinds of reasoning in the following terms:
The three kinds of inference that Peirce would come to refer to as ''abductive'', ''deductive'', and ''inductive'' inference he gives his earliest systematic treatment in two series of lectures on the logic of science: the [[Harvard University]] Lectures of 1865 and the [[Lowell Institute]] Lectures of 1866. There he sums up the characters of the three kinds of reasoning in the following terms:
{| align="center" cellpadding="4" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->
|
<p>We have then three different kinds of inference:</p>
<p> Deduction or inference ''[[a priori and a posteriori (philosophy)|à priori]]'',</p>
<p> Induction or inference ''[[à particularis]]'', and</p>
<p> Hypothesis or inference ''[[à posteriori]]''.</p>
<p>(Peirce, "On the Logic of Science" (1865), CE 1, 267).</p>
|}
Early in the first series of lectures Peirce gives a very revealing illustration of how he then thinks of the natures, operations, and relationships of this trio of inference types:
Early in the first series of lectures Peirce gives a very revealing illustration of how he then thinks of the natures, operations, and relationships of this trio of inference types:
{| align="center" cellpadding="4" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->
|
<p> If I reason that certain conduct is wise
<br>because it has a character which belongs
<br>''only'' to wise things, I reason ''à priori''.</p>
<p> If I think it is wise because it once turned out
<br>to be wise, that is, if I infer that it is wise on
<br>this occasion because it was wise on that occasion,
<br>I reason inductively [''à particularis''].</p>
<p> But if I think it is wise because a wise man does it,
<br>I then make the pure hypothesis that he does it
<br>because he is wise, and I reason ''à posteriori''.</p>
<p>(Peirce, "On the Logic of Science" (1865), CE 1, 180).</p>
|}
We may begin the analysis of Peirce's example by making the following assignments of letters to the qualitative attributes mentioned in it:
We may begin the analysis of Peirce's example by making the following assignments of letters to the qualitative attributes mentioned in it:
The converging operation of all three reasonings is shown in Figure 2.
The converging operation of all three reasonings is shown in Figure 2.
{| align="center" cellpadding="8" style="text-align:center"
|
<pre>
<pre>
o---------------------------------------------------------------------o
o---------------------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 2. A Thrice Wise Act
Figure 2. A Thrice Wise Act
</pre>
</pre>
|}
One of the styles of syntax that Aristotle uses for syllogistic propositions suggests the composite symbols that geometers have long used for labeling line intervals in a geometric figure, and it comports quite nicely with the Figure that we have just drawn. Specifically, the proposition that predicates X of the subject Y is represented by the digram 'XY' and associated with the line interval XY that descends from the point X to the point Y in the corresponding lattice diagram. In this wise we make the following observations:
One of the styles of syntax that Aristotle uses for syllogistic propositions suggests the composite symbols that geometers have long used for labeling line intervals in a geometric figure, and it comports quite nicely with the Figure that we have just drawn. Specifically, the proposition that predicates X of the subject Y is represented by the digram 'XY' and associated with the line interval XY that descends from the point X to the point Y in the corresponding lattice diagram. In this wise we make the following observations:
The common proposition that concludes each argument is AC. Introducing the symbol "⇒" to denote the relation of logical implication, the proposition AC can be written as C ⇒ A, and read as "C implies A". Adopting the parenthetical form of Peirce's alpha graphs, in their ''existential interpretation'', AC can be written as (C (A)), and most easily comprehended as "not C without A". In the context of the present example, all of these forms are equally good ways of expressing the same concrete proposition, namely, "contributing to charity is wise".
The common proposition that concludes each argument is AC. Introducing the symbol "⇒" to denote the relation of logical implication, the proposition AC can be written as C ⇒ A, and read as "C implies A". Adopting the parenthetical form of Peirce's alpha graphs, in their ''existential interpretation'', AC can be written as (C (A)), and most easily comprehended as "not C without A". In the context of the present example, all of these forms are equally good ways of expressing the same concrete proposition, namely, "contributing to charity is wise".
:* Deduction could have obtained the Fact AC from the Rule AB, 'benevolence is wisdom', along with the Case BC, 'contributing to charity is benevolent'.
:* Deduction could have obtained the Fact AC from the Rule AB, "benevolence is wisdom", along with the Case BC, "contributing to charity is benevolent".
:* Induction could have gathered the Rule AC, after a manner of saying that 'contributing to charity is exemplary of wisdom', from the Fact AE, 'the act of earlier today is wise', along with the Case CE, 'the act of earlier today was an instance of contributing to charity'.
:* Induction could have gathered the Rule AC, after a manner of saying that "contributing to charity is exemplary of wisdom", from the Fact AE, "the act of earlier today is wise", along with the Case CE, "the act of earlier today was an instance of contributing to charity".
:* Abduction could have guessed the Case AC, in a style of expression stating that 'contributing to charity is explained by wisdom', from the Fact DC, 'contributing to charity is done by this wise man', and the Rule DA, 'everything that is wise is done by this wise man'. Thus, a wise man, who happens to do all of the wise things that there are to do, may nevertheless contribute to charity for no good reason, and even be known to be charitable to a fault. But all of this notwithstanding, on seeing the wise man contribute to charity we may find it natural to conjecture, in effect, to consider it as a possibility worth examining further, that charity is indeed a mark of his wisdom, and not just the accidental trait or the immaterial peculiarity of his character — in essence, that wisdom is the 'cause' of his contribution or the 'reason' for his charity.
:* Abduction could have guessed the Case AC, in a style of expression stating that "contributing to charity is explained by wisdom", from the Fact DC, "contributing to charity is done by this wise man", and the Rule DA, "everything that is wise is done by this wise man". Thus, a wise man, who happens to do all of the wise things that there are to do, may nevertheless contribute to charity for no good reason, and even be known to be charitable to a fault. But all of this notwithstanding, on seeing the wise man contribute to charity we may find it natural to conjecture, in effect, to consider it as a possibility worth examining further, that charity is indeed a mark of his wisdom, and not just the accidental trait or the immaterial peculiarity of his character — in essence, that wisdom is the ''cause'' of his contribution or the ''reason'' for his charity.
As a general rule, and despite many obvious exceptions, an English word that ends in '-ion' denotes equivocally either a process or its result. In our present application, this means that each of the words 'abduction', 'deduction', 'induction' can be used to denote either the process of inference or the product of that inference, that is, the proposition to which the inference in question leads.
As a general rule, and despite many obvious exceptions, an English word that ends in ''-ion'' denotes equivocally either a process or its result. In our present application, this means that each of the words ''abduction'', ''deduction'', ''induction'' can be used to denote either the process of inference or the product of that inference, that is, the proposition to which the inference in question leads.
One of the morals of Peirce's illustration can now be drawn. It demonstrates in a very graphic fashion that the three kinds of inference are three kinds of process and not three kinds of proposition, not if one takes the word 'kind' in its literal sense as denoting a ''genus'' of being, essence, or substance. Said another way, it means that being an abductive Case, a deductive Fact, or an inductive Rule is a category of relation, indeed, one that involves at the very least a triadic relation among propositions, and not a category of essence or substance, that is, not a property that inheres in the proposition alone.
One of the morals of Peirce's illustration can now be drawn. It demonstrates in a very graphic fashion that the three kinds of inference are three kinds of process and not three kinds of proposition, not if one takes the word ''kind'' in its literal sense as denoting a ''genus'' of being, essence, or substance. Said another way, it means that being an abductive Case, a deductive Fact, or an inductive Rule is a category of relation, indeed, one that involves at the very least a triadic relation among propositions, and not a category of essence or substance, that is, not a property that inheres in the proposition alone.
This category distinction between the absolute, essential, or monadic predicates and the more properly relative predicates constitutes a very important theme in Peirce's architectonic. There is of course a parallel application of it in the theory of sign relations, or semiotics, where the distinctions among the sign relational roles of Object, Sign, and Interpretant are distinct ways of relating to other things, modes of relation that may vary from moment to moment in the extended trajectory of a sign process, and not distinctions that mark some fixed and eternal essence of the thing in itself.
This category distinction between the absolute, essential, or monadic predicates and the more properly relative predicates constitutes a very important theme in Peirce's architectonic. There is of course a parallel application of it in the theory of sign relations, or semiotics, where the distinctions among the sign relational roles of Object, Sign, and Interpretant are distinct ways of relating to other things, modes of relation that may vary from moment to moment in the extended trajectory of a sign process, and not distinctions that mark some fixed and eternal essence of the thing in itself.
====Abduction====
====Abduction====
: ''Main article : [[Abductive reasoning]]''
: ''Main article : [[Abductive reasoning]]''
Now let any two of these statements be Givens (their order not mattering), and let the remaining statement be the Conclusion. The result is an ''argument'', of which three kinds are possible:
Now let any two of these statements be Givens (their order not mattering), and let the remaining statement be the Conclusion. The result is an ''argument'', of which three kinds are possible:
{| class=wikitable cellpadding="4"
{| align="center" cellpadding="4"
|-
|-
! !! Deduction !! Induction !! Abduction
! !! Deduction !! Induction !! Abduction
|- style="border-top:1px solid #999;"
|- style="border-top:1px solid #999;"
|-
|-
| ''Given'' || Rule || Case || Rule
| ''Premiss'' || Rule || Case || Rule
|-
|-
| ''Given'' || Case || Result || Result
| ''Premiss'' || Case || Fact || Fact
|-
|-
| ''Conclusion'' || Result || Rule || Case
| ''Conclusion'' || Fact || Rule || Case
|}
|}
Deduction encompasses, of course, the classical [[syllogism]].
====Deduction====
: ''Main article : [[Deductive reasoning]]''
: ''Main article : [[Deductive reasoning]]''
====Induction====
====Induction====
: ''Main article : [[Inductive reasoning]]''
: ''Main article : [[Inductive reasoning]]''
====Analogy====
====Analogy====
The classic description of [[analogy]] in the syllogistic frame comes from Aristotle, who called this form of inference by the name ''paradeigma'', that is, reasoning by way of example or through the parallel comparison of cases.
The classic description of analogy in the syllogistic frame comes from Aristotle, who called this form of inference by the name ''paradeigma'', that is, reasoning by way of example or through the parallel comparison of cases.
<blockquote>
{| align="center" cellpadding="4" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->
We have an Example [παραδειγμα, analogy] when the major extreme is shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third. ([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.24).
|
</blockquote>
<p>We have an Example [παραδειγμα, analogy] when the major extreme is shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third. (Aristotle, "Prior Analytics", 2.24).</p>
|}
Aristotle illustrates this pattern of argument with the following sample of reasoning. The setting is a discussion, taking place in Athens, on the issue of going to war with Thebes. It is apparently accepted that a war between Thebes and Phocis is or was a bad thing, perhaps from the objectivity lent by non-involvement or perhaps as a lesson of history.
Aristotle illustrates this pattern of argument with the following sample of reasoning. The setting is a discussion, taking place in Athens, on the issue of going to war with Thebes. It is apparently accepted that a war between Thebes and Phocis is or was a bad thing, perhaps from the objectivity lent by non-involvement or perhaps as a lesson of history.
<blockquote>
{| align="center" cellpadding="4" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->
For example, let ''A'' be 'bad', ''B'' 'to make war on neighbors', ''C'' 'Athens against Thebes', and ''D'' 'Thebes against Phocis'. Then if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that war against neighbors is bad. Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, for example, that war by Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad, and war against Thebes is war against neighbors, it is evident that war against Thebes is bad.([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.24, with minor alterations). </blockquote>
|
<p>For example, let ''A'' be 'bad', ''B'' 'to make war on neighbors', ''C'' 'Athens against Thebes', and ''D'' 'Thebes against Phocis'. Then if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that war against neighbors is bad. Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, for example, that war by Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad, and war against Thebes is war against neighbors, it is evident that war against Thebes is bad. (Aristotle, "Prior Analytics", 2.24, with minor alterations).</p>
|}
Aristotle's sample of argument from analogy may be analyzed in the following way:
Aristotle's sample of argument from analogy may be analyzed in the following way:
Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration of Aristotle's example of 'Example', that is, the form of reasoning that proceeds by Analogy or according to a Paradigm.
Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration of Aristotle's example of 'Example', that is, the form of reasoning that proceeds by Analogy or according to a Paradigm.
{| align="center" cellpadding="8" style="text-align:center"
|
<pre>
<pre>
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 3. Aristotle's 'War Against Neighbors' Example
Figure 3. Aristotle's "War Against Neighbors" Example
</pre>
</pre>
|}
In this analysis of reasoning by Analogy, it is a complex or a mixed form of inference that can be seen as taking place in two steps:
In this analysis of reasoning by Analogy, it is a complex or a mixed form of inference that can be seen as taking place in two steps:
==Example of inquiry==
==Example of inquiry==
Examples of inquiry, that illustrate the full cycle of its abductive, deductive, and inductive phases, and yet are both concrete and simple enough to be suitable for a first (or zeroth) exposition, are somewhat rare in Peirce's writings, and so let us draw one from the work of fellow pragmatician [[John Dewey]], analyzing it according to the model of zeroth-order inquiry that we developed above.
Examples of inquiry, that illustrate the full cycle of its abductive, deductive, and inductive phases, and yet are both concrete and simple enough to be suitable for a first (or zeroth) exposition, are somewhat rare in Peirce's writings, and so let us draw one from the work of fellow pragmatician John Dewey, analyzing it according to the model of zeroth-order inquiry that we developed above.
<blockquote>
{| align="center" cellpadding="4" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->
A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something ''suggested''. The pedestrian ''feels'' the cold; he ''thinks of'' clouds and a coming shower. (John Dewey, ''How We Think'', pp. 6-7).
|
</blockquote>
<p>A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something ''suggested''. The pedestrian ''feels'' the cold; he ''thinks of'' clouds and a coming shower. (John Dewey, ''How We Think'', pp. 6–7).</p>
|}
===Once over quickly===
===Once over quickly===
===Looking more closely===
===Looking more closely===
====Seeding hypotheses====
====Seeding hypotheses====
Figure 4 gives a graphical illustration of Dewey's example of inquiry, isolating for the purposes of the present analysis the first two steps in the more extended proceedings that go to make up the whole inquiry.
Figure 4 gives a graphical illustration of Dewey's example of inquiry, isolating for the purposes of the present analysis the first two steps in the more extended proceedings that go to make up the whole inquiry.
{| align="center" cellpadding="8" style="text-align:center"
|
<pre>
<pre>
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 4. Dewey's 'Rainy Day' Inquiry
Figure 4. Dewey's "Rainy Day" Inquiry
</pre>
</pre>
|}
In this analysis of the first steps of Inquiry, we have a complex or a mixed form of inference that can be seen as taking place in two steps:
In this analysis of the first steps of Inquiry, we have a complex or a mixed form of inference that can be seen as taking place in two steps:
Figure 5 schematizes this way of viewing the 'analogy of experience'.
Figure 5 schematizes this way of viewing the 'analogy of experience'.
{| align="center" cellpadding="8" style="text-align:center"
|
<pre>
<pre>
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 5. Analogy of Experience
Figure 5. Analogy of Experience
</pre>
</pre>
|}
In these terms, the 'analogy of experience' proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then deducing a Fact, its applicability to a current experience, as in the following sequence:
In these terms, the ''analogy of experience'' proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then deducing a Fact, its applicability to a current experience, as in the following sequence:
Inductive Phase:
Inductive Phase:
==References==
==References==
* [[Dana Angluin|Angluin, Dana]] (1989), "Learning with Hints", pp. 167–181 in David Haussler and Leonard Pitt (eds.), ''Proceedings of the 1988 Workshop on Computational Learning Theory'', MIT, 3–5 August 1988, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1989.
* [[Dana Angluin|Angluin, Dana]] (1989), "Learning with Hints", pp. 167–181 in David Haussler and Leonard Pitt (eds.), ''Proceedings of the 1988 Workshop on Computational Learning Theory'', MIT, 3–5 August 1988, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1989.
* [[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", [[Hugh Tredennick]] (trans.), pp. 181–531 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[Heinemann (book publisher)|William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1938.
* Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (May 2001), "Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities", ''Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization, Theory, and Society'' 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284. [http://org.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/2/269 Abstract].
* Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (September 18, 1999), "Organizations of Learning or Learning Organizations : The Challenge of Creating Integrative Universities for the Next Century", ''Second International Conference of the Journal ''Organization'' '', ''Re-Organizing Knowledge, Trans-Forming Institutions : Knowing, Knowledge, and the University in the 21st Century'', University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/integrat.htm Online].
* [[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", [[Hugh Tredennick]] (trans.), pp. 181–531 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[Heinemann (book publisher)|William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1938.
* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), "Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15(1), pp. 40–52. [http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Online].
* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15, 40–52. [http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Eprint].
* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (June 1992), "Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry", ''The Eleventh International Human Science Research Conference'', Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.
* Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (May 1991), "An Architecture for Inquiry : Building Computer Platforms for Discovery", ''Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Technology and Education'', Toronto, Canada, pp. 874–875. [http://home.m04.itscom.net/hhomey/tmp-a.html Online].
* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (January 1991), "Exploring Research Data Interactively : Developing a Computer Architecture for Inquiry", Poster presented at the ''Annual Sigma Xi Research Forum'', University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, TX.
* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (August 1990), "Exploring Research Data Interactively. Theme One : A Program of Inquiry", ''Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Applications of Artificial Intelligence and CD-ROM in Education and Training'', Society for Applied Learning Technology, Washington, DC, pp. 9–15.
* [[Cornelius F. Delaney|Delaney, C.F.]] (1993), ''Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce'', University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.
* [[Cornelius F. Delaney|Delaney, C.F.]] (1993), ''Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce'', University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.
* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1910), ''How We Think'', [[D.C. Heath]], Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1991.
* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1910), ''How We Think'', [[D.C. Heath]], Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1991.
* Dewey, John (1938), ''Logic: The Theory of Inquiry'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938. Reprinted as pp. 1–527 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12: 1938'', Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), [[Ernest Nagel]] (intro.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.
* Dewey, John (1938), ''Logic: The Theory of Inquiry'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938. Reprinted as pp. 1–527 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12 : 1938'', Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), [[Ernest Nagel]] (intro.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.
* [[Susan Haack|Haack, Susan]] (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
* [[Susan Haack|Haack, Susan]] (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry : Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
* [[Norwood Russell Hanson|Hanson, Norwood Russell]] (1958), ''Patterns of Discovery, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* [[Norwood Russell Hanson|Hanson, Norwood Russell]] (1958), ''Patterns of Discovery, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* [[Vincent F. Hendricks|Hendricks, Vincent F.]] (2005), ''Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression'', Automatic Press / VIP, New York, NY. ISBN 87-991013-7-8
* [[Vincent F. Hendricks|Hendricks, Vincent F.]] (2005), ''Thought 2 Talk : A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression'', Automatic Press, New York, NY.
* [[Cheryl J. Misak|Misak, Cheryl J.]] (1991), ''Truth and the End of Inquiry, A Peircean Account of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[Cheryl J. Misak|Misak, Cheryl J.]] (1991), ''Truth and the End of Inquiry, A Peircean Account of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[Charles Peirce (Bibliography)|Peirce, C.S., Bibliography]].
* [[Charles Peirce (Bibliography)|Peirce, C.S., Bibliography]].
* [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, C.S.]], (1931–1935, 1958), ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1–6, [[Charles Hartshorne]] and [[Paul Weiss (philosopher)|Paul Weiss]] (eds.), vols. 7–8, [[Arthur W. Burks]] (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Cited as CP volume.paragraph.
* [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, C.S.]], (1931–1935, 1958), ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1–6, [[Charles Hartshorne]] and [[Paul Weiss (philosopher)|Paul Weiss]] (eds.), vols. 7–8, [[Arthur W. Burks]] (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Cited as CP volume.paragraph.
* [[Robert C. Stalnaker|Stalnaker, Robert C.]] (1984), ''Inquiry'', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* [[Robert C. Stalnaker|Stalnaker, Robert C.]] (1984), ''Inquiry'', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
==See also==
==Syllabus==
===History===
===Focal nodes===
{| cellspacing="4"
* [[Inquiry Live]]
* [[Logic Live]]
===Peer nodes===
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry Inquiry @ InterSciWiki]
* [http://mywikibiz.com/Inquiry Inquiry @ MyWikiBiz]
* [http://ref.subwiki.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry @ Subject Wikis]
* [http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry @ Wikiversity]
* [http://beta.wikiversity.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry @ Wikiversity Beta]
===Logical operators===
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}
* [[Exclusive disjunction]]
* [[Logical conjunction]]
* [[Logical disjunction]]
* [[Logical equality]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Logical implication]]
* [[Logical NAND]]
* [[Logical NNOR]]
* [[Logical negation|Negation]]
{{col-end}}
===Related topics===
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}
* [[Ampheck]]
* [[Boolean domain]]
* [[Boolean function]]
* [[Boolean-valued function]]
* [[Differential logic]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Logical graph]]
* [[Minimal negation operator]]
* [[Multigrade operator]]
* [[Parametric operator]]
* [[Peirce's law]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Propositional calculus]]
* [[Sole sufficient operator]]
* [[Truth table]]
* [[Universe of discourse]]
* [[Zeroth order logic]]
{{col-end}}
===Relational concepts===
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}
* [[Continuous predicate]]
* [[Hypostatic abstraction]]
* [[Logic of relatives]]
* [[Logical matrix]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Relation (mathematics)|Relation]]
* [[Relation composition]]
* [[Relation construction]]
* [[Relation reduction]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Relation theory]]
* [[Relative term]]
* [[Sign relation]]
* [[Triadic relation]]
{{col-end}}
===Concepts and topics===
===Information, Inquiry===
{{col-begin}}
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}
{{col-break}}
* [[Curiosity]]
* [[Inquiry]]
* [[Dynamics of inquiry]]
* [[Dynamics of inquiry]]
* [[Information theory]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Semeiotic]]
* [[Logic of information]]
* [[Logic of information]]
* [[Philosophy of science]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Descriptive science]]
* [[Normative science]]
{{col-break}}
{{col-break}}
* [[Pragmatic maxim]]
* [[Pragmatic maxim]]
* [[Pragmatic information]]
* [[Truth theory]]
{{col-end}}
{{col-end}}
===Essays and projects===
===Related articles===
* [[Introduction To Inquiry Driven Systems]]
{{col-begin}}
* [[Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems]]
{{col-break}}
* [[Inquiry Driven Systems : Inquiry Into Inquiry]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information Semiotic Information]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Futures_Of_Logical_Graphs Futures Of Logical Graphs]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Propositional_Equation_Reasoning_Systems Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems]
{{col-break}}
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_:_Introduction Differential Logic : Introduction]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Propositional_Calculus Differential Propositional Calculus]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_and_Dynamic_Systems_2.0 Differential Logic and Dynamic Systems]
{{col-break}}
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems Inquiry Driven Systems : Inquiry Into Inquiry]
{{col-end}}
==Document history==
==Document history==
Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]], under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.
Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]], under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/ InterSciWiki]
* [http://mywikibiz.com/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://mywikibiz.com/ MyWikiBiz]
:* [http://www.wikinfo.org/index.php/Inquiry Inquiry] @ [http://wikinfo.org/index.php/Main_Page Wikinfo].
* [http://forum.wolframscience.com/showthread.php?threadid=595 Inquiry], [http://forum.wolframscience.com/ NKS Forum]
* [http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://semanticweb.org/ SemanticWeb]
* [http://wikinfo.org/w/index.php/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://wikinfo.org/w/ Wikinfo]
* [http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://en.wikiversity.org/ Wikiversity]
* [http://beta.wikiversity.org/wiki/Inquiry Inquiry], [http://beta.wikiversity.org/ Wikiversity Beta]
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inquiry&oldid=71880922 Inquiry], [http://en.wikipedia.org/ Wikipedia]
[[Category:Artificial Intelligence]]
[[Category:Artificial Intelligence]]
[[Category:Charles Sanders Peirce]]
[[Category:Computer Science]]
[[Category:Computer Science]]
[[Category:Critical Thinking]]
[[Category:Critical Thinking]]
[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Pragmatics]]
[[Category:Pragmatics]]
[[Category:Pragmatism]]
[[Category:Relation Theory]]
[[Category:Science]]
[[Category:Semantics]]
[[Category:Semantics]]
[[Category:Semiotics]]
[[Category:Semiotics]]
[[Category:Systems Science]]
[[Category:Systems Science]]