Changes

{| align="center" cellspacing="6" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->

{| align="center" cellspacing="6" width="90%" <!--QUOTE-->

|

|

But such terms though conceivable in one sense — that is intelligible in their conditions — are yet impossible.  You never can narrow down to an individual.  Do you say Daniel Webster is an individual?  He is so in common parlance, but in logical strictness he is not.  We think of certain images in our memory — a platform and a noble form uttering convincing and patriotic words — a statue — certain printed matter — and we say that which that speaker and the man whom that statue was taken for and the writer of this speech — that which these are in common is Daniel Webster.  Thus, even the proper name of a man is a general term or the name of a class, for it names a class of sensations and thoughts.  The true individual term the absolutely singular ''this'' & ''that'' cannot be reached.  Whatever has comprehension must be general. (Peirce 1866, "Lowell Lecture 7", CE 1, 461).

<p>But such terms though conceivable in one sense &mdash; that is intelligible in their conditions &mdash; are yet impossible.  You never can narrow down to an individual.  Do you say Daniel Webster is an individual?  He is so in common parlance, but in logical strictness he is not.  We think of certain images in our memory &mdash; a platform and a noble form uttering convincing and patriotic words &mdash; a statue &mdash; certain printed matter &mdash; and we say that which that speaker and the man whom that statue was taken for and the writer of this speech &mdash; that which these are in common is Daniel Webster.  Thus, even the proper name of a man is a general term or the name of a class, for it names a class of sensations and thoughts.  The true individual term the absolutely singular ''this'' and ''that'' cannot be reached.  Whatever has comprehension must be general.</p>

 

<p>(Peirce 1866, Lowell Lecture 7, CE 1, 461).</p>

|}

|}