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− | The '''logic of information''', or the ''logical theory of information'', considers the information content of logical signs — everything from bits to books and beyond — along the lines initially developed by [[Charles Sanders Peirce]]. In this line of development the concept of information serves to integrate the aspects of logical signs that are separately covered by the concepts of [[denotation]] and [[connotation]], or, in roughly equivalent terms, by the concepts of [[extension]] and [[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]]. | + | The '''logic of information''', or the ''logical theory of information'', considers the information content of logical [[semiotics|signs]] — everything from bits to books and beyond — along the lines initially developed by [[Charles Sanders Peirce]]. In this line of development the concept of information serves to integrate the aspects of logical signs that are separately covered by the concepts of [[denotation]] and [[connotation]], or, in roughly equivalent terms, by the concepts of [[extension]] and [[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]]. |
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| Peirce began to develop these ideas in his lectures "On the Logic of Science" at [[Harvard University]] (1865) and the [[Lowell Institute]] (1866). Here is one of the starting points: | | Peirce began to develop these ideas in his lectures "On the Logic of Science" at [[Harvard University]] (1865) and the [[Lowell Institute]] (1866). Here is one of the starting points: |
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− | <blockquote>
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| <p>Let us now return to the information. The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous [[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]]. That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the [[extension (semantics)|extension]] of the term. For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &tc. — which make up the comprehension of ''man''. Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.</p> | | <p>Let us now return to the information. The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous [[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]]. That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the [[extension (semantics)|extension]] of the term. For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &tc. — which make up the comprehension of ''man''. Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.</p> |
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| <p>Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension. And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of ''information''. (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467).</p> | | <p>Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension. And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of ''information''. (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467).</p> |
− | </blockquote>
| + | |} |
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| ==References== | | ==References== |
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| ==See also== | | ==See also== |
− | {| | + | |
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| + | {{col-begin}} |
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| * [[Information theory]] | | * [[Information theory]] |
| * [[Inquiry]] | | * [[Inquiry]] |
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| * [[Pragmatic theory of information]] | | * [[Pragmatic theory of information]] |
| * [[Pragmatic theory of truth]] | | * [[Pragmatic theory of truth]] |
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| + | {{col-break}} |
| * [[Pragmaticism]] | | * [[Pragmaticism]] |
| * [[Pragmatism]] | | * [[Pragmatism]] |
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| * [[Semeiotic]] | | * [[Semeiotic]] |
| * [[Semiosis]] | | * [[Semiosis]] |
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| + | {{col-break}} |
| * [[Semiotics]] | | * [[Semiotics]] |
| * [[Semiotic information theory]] | | * [[Semiotic information theory]] |
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| * [[Sign relational complex]] | | * [[Sign relational complex]] |
| * [[Triadic relation]] | | * [[Triadic relation]] |
− | |}
| + | {{col-end}} |
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| ==External links== | | ==External links== |