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||CORPUS THOMISTICUM Sancti Thomae de Aquino
|| <a name = "c1"><b>Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI</b>
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|| ON THE DEFINITION OF 'TERM', AND OF THE DIVISION OF IT IN GENERAL
||Expositio libri Peryermeneias
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||[80293] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 3
|| (i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: 'Terminum voco in
quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse'.
|| All those who deal with logic aim to show that arguments are put together from propositions and propositions out of terms. Wherefore, a term is nothing other than a neighbouring part of a proposition. For in defining a term Aristotle (<i>Prior Analytics I</i>) says 'I call a 'term', that into which a proposition is analysed, such as a predicate and what it is predicated of, either by putting [terms] together to say what is the case (<i>esse</i>), or by separating them, to say what is not the case' [N1].
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||Deinde cum dicit: circa compositionem etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de intellectu; secundo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de assimilatione vocum ad intellectum; ibi: <b>nomina igitur</b> ipsa et verba et cetera. Ad ostendendum igitur quod intellectus quandoque est sine vero et falso, quandoque autem cum altero horum, dicit primo quod veritas et falsitas est circa compositionem et divisionem.
|| (ii) Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum habendam oportet aliquas divisiones terminorum praecognoscere.
|| But although every term is, or could be, part of a proposition, yet not all terms are of the same nature, and for that reason, in order to have a complete acquaintance with terms, we must gain a preliminary acquaintance with some of the divisions of terms.
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||Ubi oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium intelligentia: in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiusque rei quidditatem sive essentiam per seipsam, puta quid est homo vel quid album vel quid aliud huiusmodi. Alia vero operatio intellectus est, secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et dividit. Dicit ergo quod in hac secunda operatione intellectus, idest componentis et dividentis, invenitur veritas et falsitas: relinquens quod in prima operatione non invenitur, ut etiam traditur in III de anima.
|| (iii) Est autem sciendum quod sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermenias, triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta, tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus.
|| Now it is to be known that, according to Boethius on <i>On Interpretation I</i>, just as discourse is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived ([the last] only having being in the intellect) so the term is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived.
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||[80294] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 4
|| (iv) Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest.
|| A written term is part of a proposition written down on some corporeal thing, which is seen by the corporeal eye, or can be seen.
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||Sed circa hoc primo videtur esse dubium: quia cum divisio fiat per resolutionem ad indivisibilia sive simplicia, videtur quod sicut in simplicibus non est veritas vel falsitas, ita nec in divisione. Sed dicendum est quod cum conceptiones intellectus sint similitudines rerum, ea quae circa intellectum sunt dupliciter considerari et nominari possunt. Uno modo, secundum se: alio modo, secundum rationes rerum quarum sunt similitudines.
|| (v) Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali.
|| A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the corporeal ear.
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||Sicut imago Herculis secundum se quidem dicitur et est cuprum; in quantum autem est similitudo Herculis nominatur homo. Sic etiam, si consideremus ea quae sunt circa intellectum secundum se, semper est compositio, ubi est veritas et falsitas; quae nunquam invenitur in intellectu, nisi per hoc quod intellectus comparat unum simplicem conceptum alteri.
|| (vi) Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, dicit nullius esse linguae, quia tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius.
|| A conceived term is an intention or affection of the soul naturally signifying or co-signifying something, suited to be a part of a mental proposition and suited to stand for [<i>supponere</i>] the same thing. Wherefore these conceived terms and the propositions put together from them are those mental words that the blessed Augustine (<i>De Trinitate</i> XV), says are not of any language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be spoken outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.
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||Sed si referatur ad rem, quandoque dicitur compositio, quandoque dicitur divisio. Compositio quidem, quando intellectus comparat unum conceptum alteri, quasi apprehendens coniunctionem aut identitatem rerum, quarum sunt conceptiones; divisio autem, quando sic comparat unum conceptum alteri, ut apprehendat res esse diversas. Et per hunc etiam modum in vocibus affirmatio dicitur compositio, in quantum coniunctionem ex parte rei significat; negatio vero dicitur divisio, in quantum significat rerum separationem.
|| (vii) Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret.
|| Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but because utterances are imposed to signify the same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing, so that, with the utterance assigned to signify something signified by the concept in the mind, if what that concept signified changed, by that very fact what the utterance itself signified would change, without any new [signification] being fixed.
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||[80295] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5
|| (viii) Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt 'earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae'. Sic etiam intendit Boethius quando dicit voces significare conceptus. Et universaliter omnes auctores, dicendo quod omnes voces significant passiones vel sunt notae earum, non aliud intendunt nisi quod voces sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae primario importantur, quamvis aliquae voces primario importent passiones animae seu conceptus, quae tamen secundario important alias animae intentiones, sicut inferius ostendetur.
|| The Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul'. Thus also Boethius intends the same thing, when he says that utterances signify concepts. And, universally, all authors, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul - although some utterances primarily convey affections of the soul or concepts, which other intentions in the soul still convey secondarily, as will be shown below.
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||Ulterius autem videtur quod non solum in compositione et divisione veritas consistat. Primo quidem, quia etiam res dicitur vera vel falsa, sicut dicitur aurum verum vel falsum. Dicitur etiam quod ens et verum convertuntur. Unde videtur quod etiam simplex conceptio intellectus, quae est similitudo rei, non careat veritate et falsitate.
|| (ix) Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum.
|| And just as what was said about utterances in respect of affections, or intentions, or concepts, is to be held, for now, in the same way proportionally, concerning things that are written down in respect of utterances.
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||Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. de anima quod sensus propriorum sensibilium semper est verus; sensus autem non componit vel dividit; non ergo in sola compositione vel divisione est veritas. Item, in intellectu divino nulla est compositio, ut probatur in XII metaphysicae; et tamen ibi est prima et summa veritas; non ergo veritas est solum circa compositionem et divisionem.
|| (x) Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque.
|| Now among these terms, some differences are found. One is that the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition. From which there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can change what it signifies by being interpreted, but a term that is conceived does not change its significance by interpretation.
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||[80296] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6
|| (xi) Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo.
|| Still, for the sake of pedants, it should be known that 'sign' is taken in two ways. In one way, for everything that, when apprehended, causes something else come into cognition, although it does not cause the mind to come to a primary cognition of it, just as is shown elsewhere, but to an actual one after its customary one. And in this way, an utterance does naturally signify, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, just as also a hoop [N2] signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not talking about 'sign' here in such a general way.
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||Ad huiusmodi igitur evidentiam considerandum est quod veritas in aliquo invenitur dupliciter: uno modo, sicut in eo quod est verum: alio modo, sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum. Invenitur autem veritas sicut in eo quod est verum tam in simplicibus, quam in compositis; sed sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum, non invenitur nisi secundum compositionem et divisionem. Quod quidem sic patet.
|| (xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est
signum naturale.
|| In another way 'sign' is taken for that which causes something come into cognition and is suited to stand for it, or to be added to such a thing in a proposition. Of such a sort are <i>syncategoremata</i> and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, as an expression is. And taking the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is a natural sign of nothing.
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||[80297] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 7
|| <a name = "c3"><b>CAP. 3. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI INCOMPLEXI</b>
|| ON THE DIVISION OF THE NON-COMPLEX TERM
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||Verum enim, ut philosophus dicit in VI Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus. Unde de quocumque dicatur verum, oportet quod hoc sit per respectum ad intellectum. Comparantur autem ad intellectum voces quidem sicut signa, res autem sicut ea quorum intellectus sunt similitudines.
|| (1) Visa aequivocatione istius nominis 'terminus' prosequendum est de divisionibus termini incomplexi. Unde non solum terminus incomplexus dividitur in terminum prolatum, scriptum et conceptum, sed etiam singula membra consimilibus divisionibus subdividuntur. Nam sicut vocum quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam sunt verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam participia, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones, et consimiliter est de scriptis, sic intentionum animae quaedam sunt
nomina, quaedam verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones.
|| Having seen the equivocation in the name 'term', the divisions of the non-complex term is to be investigated. Wherefore the non-complex term is not only divided into the spoken, written and conceived term, but each branch is also subdivided according to similar divisions. For, just as certain utterances are names, certain are verbs, certain ones are of other parts of speech - since certain ones are pronouns, certain are participles, or adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions (and similarly for things that are written), so of intentions of the soul, certain are names, certain are verbs, certain are of other parts of speech. For certain are pronouns, certain ones are adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions.
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||Dicuntur tamen res aliquae verae vel falsae per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, non essentialiter vel formaliter, sed effective, in quantum scilicet natae sunt facere de se veram vel falsam existimationem; et secundum hoc dicitur aurum verum vel falsum. Alio autem modo, res comparantur ad intellectum, sicut mensuratum ad mensuram, ut patet in intellectu practico, qui est causa rerum. Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum, in quantum attingit ad rationem artis; falsum vero, in quantum deficit a ratione artis.
|| (2) Utrum autem participiis vocalibus et scriptis correspondeant in mente quaedam intentiones a verbis distinctae potest esse dubium, eo quod non videtur magna necessitas talem pluralitatem ponere in mentalibus terminis.
|| But there may be a doubt whether to spoken and written participles there correspond certain intentions in the mind, distinct from verbs, seeing that there does not seem to be a great necessity to suppose such a plurality of mental terms.
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||[80298] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8
|| Nam verbum et participium verbi sumptum cum hoc verbo 'est' semper videntur in significando aequivalere. Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis vel aliam causam consimilem accidentalem, quia quidquid per omnia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo conceptuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet, ita videtur quod distinctio inter verba vocalia et participia non est propter necessitatem expressionis inventa, propter quod videtur quod non oportet participiis vocalibus distinctos conceptus in mente correspondere. Et de pronominibus posset esse consimilis dubitatio.
|| For a verb and the participle of the verb taken with the verb 'is' always seem to be equivalent in signifying. On which account, just as the multiplication of synonymous names is found not on account of the necessity of signification, but rather for the sake of decoration of speech or another similar accidental cause. For whatever is signified by [several] synonymous names could be sufficiently expressed by one of them, and therefore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of synonyms. Thus it seems the distinction between spoken verbs and participles is not found on account of the necessity of expression. On which account, it seems that there do not have to be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to spoken participles. And of pronouns there could be a similar doubt.
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||Et quia omnia etiam naturalia comparantur ad intellectum divinum, sicut artificiata ad artem, consequens est ut quaelibet res dicatur esse vera secundum quod habet propriam formam, secundum quam imitatur artem divinam. Nam falsum aurum est verum aurichalcum. Et hoc modo ens et verum convertuntur, quia quaelibet res naturalis per suam formam arti divinae conformatur. Unde philosophus in I physicae, formam nominat quoddam divinum.
|| (3) Est autem inter nomina vocalia et mentalia differentia, quia quamvis omnia accidentia grammaticalia quae conveniunt nominibus mentalibus etiam nominibus vocalibus sint convenientia, non tamen e converso, sed quaedam sunt communia tam istis quam illis, quaedam autem sunt propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis, quia quaecumque conveniunt vocalibus, et scriptis et e converso.
|| Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names, because, although all the grammatical accidents appropriate to mental names are also appropriate to spoken names, yet it is not conversely so. Rather, certain [grammatical accidents] are common as much to the latter as to the former, others however are proper to spoken and written names. For whatever belong to the spoken also belong to the written, and conversely.)
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||[80299] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 9
|| (4) Accidentia communia nominibus vocalibus et mentalibus sunt casus et numerus. Sicut enim istae propositiones vocales `homo est animal', 'homo non est animalia' distincta habent praedicata quorum unum est numeri singularis et aliud pluralis, ita propositiones mentales quarum una mens ante omnem vocem dicit quod homo est animal et alia dicit quod homo non est animalia distincta habent praedicata quorum unum potest dici numeri singularis et aliud pluralis.
Similiter sicut istae propositiones vocales 'homo est homo' et 'homo non est hominis' habent distincta praedicata variata per casus, sic proportionaliter dicendum est de propositionibus in mente correspondentibus.
|| The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and number. For, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is an <i>animal</i>' [and] 'A man is not <i>animals</i>' have distinct predicates, of which one is singular and the other plural, so the mental propositions - by one of which the mind, before any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other of which it says that a man is not animals - have distinct predicates, one of which can be said to be in the singular number, and the other in the plural.
Similarly, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is a man' and 'A man is not <i>of</i> a man' have distinct predicates, varied through case, so proportionally it is to be said of the corresponding propositions in
the mind.
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||Unde et philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae quod veritas est solum in mente, sicut scilicet in cognoscente veritatem. Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est aliud quam iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse: quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus non cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo vel dividendo per suum iudicium. Quod quidem iudicium, si consonet rebus, erit verum, puta cum intellectus iudicat rem esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem quando dissonat a re, puta cum iudicat non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est.
|| (5) Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis sunt genus et figura. Talia enim accidentia nominibus propter necessitatem significationis non conveniunt. Unde et aliquando accidit quod duo nomina sunt synonyma et tamen sunt generum diversorum et aliquando diversarum figurarum, propter quod talem multiplicitatem non oportet naturalibus signis tribuere.
Unde quaecumque pluralitas et varietas talium accidentium, quae potest competere nominibus synonymis, potest convenienter a mentalibus amoveri.
|| Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender and form [N3]. For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the necessity of signification. Thus also it sometimes happens that two names are synonyms and still are of diverse genders and sometimes in different forms, on account of which we do not have to attribute such a multiplicity to natural signs.
Wherefore any plurality and variety of such accidents which can belong to synonymous names can appropriately be set aside in the case of mental [terms].
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||Deinde cum dicit: nomina igitur ipsa et verba etc., manifestat quod dixerat de similitudine vocum ad intellectum. Et primo, manifestat propositum; secundo, probat per signum; ibi: <b>huius autem signum</b> et cetera. Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod, cum solum circa compositionem et divisionem sit veritas et falsitas in intellectu, consequens est quod ipsa nomina et verba, divisim accepta, assimilentur intellectui qui est sine compositione et divisione; sicut cum homo vel album dicitur, si nihil aliud addatur: non enim verum adhuc vel falsum est; sed postea quando additur esse vel non esse, fit verum vel falsum.
|| (6) De comparatione autem, an conveniat solis nominibus ad placitum institutis, posset esse difficultas, quam tamen quia non est magnae utilitatis pertranseo. De qualitate posset esse consimilis difficultas, quam alias pertractabo in sua radice.
|| (6) Now concerning comparison, there can be a difficulty about whether it belongs only to names assigned an interpretation. Which I pass over, nonetheless, because it is of no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality, which I shall treat of in detail elsewhere.
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||[80302] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 12
|| (7) Per praedicta autem potest studiosus evidenter perpendere quod quamvis aliquando ex sola variatione accidentium terminorum, scilicet casus, numeri et comparationis, propter tamen rem significatam, potest propositio una verificari et alia falsificari, hoc tamen numquam accidit propter genus et figuram.
|| Now, through what has been said above, the keen student can evidently consider that, although sometimes by variation alone of the accidents of the terms (namely, case, number and comparison), one proposition can be verified and another one falsified, on account of the thing signified, nevertheless this never happens with gender and declension.
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||Nec est instantia de eo, qui per unicum nomen veram responsionem dat ad interrogationem factam; ut cum quaerenti: quid natat in mari? Aliquis respondet, piscis. Nam intelligitur verbum quod fuit in interrogatione positum. Et sicut nomen per se positum non significat verum vel falsum, ita nec verbum per se dictum. Nec est instantia de verbo primae et secundae personae, et de verbo exceptae actionis: quia in his intelligitur certus et determinatus nominativus. Unde est implicita compositio, licet non explicita.
|| Quamvis enim frequenter ad congruitatem orationis habendam oportet aspicere ad genus, - haec enim est congrua 'homo est albus' et haec incongrua 'homo est alba', quod ex sola diversitate generis oritur -, tamen supposita congruitate nihil refert cuius generis vel cuius figurae sit subiectum vel praedicatum. Sed certe, cuius numeri vel casus sit subiectum vel praedicatum, ad sciendum an propositio sit vera vel falsa oportet aspicere. Haec enim est vera 'homo est animal' et haec falsa 'homo est animalia', et sic de aliis.
|| For, even though you often have to respect gender for the agreement of speech (for example, 'Homo est albus' agrees, and 'Homo est alba' does not, and this comes about from a diversity of gender alone), still, assuming agreement, it is of no consideration of what gender or declension is the subject or predicate.
But certainly we have to make out of which number or case the subject or predicate has, to know whether the proposition is true or false. For 'a man is an animal' is true, and 'A man is animals' is false, and so for other cases.
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||Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., inducit signum ex nomine composito, scilicet Hircocervus, quod componitur ex hirco et cervus et quod in Graeco dicitur Tragelaphos; nam tragos est hircus, et elaphos cervus. Huiusmodi enim nomina significant aliquid, scilicet quosdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum; et ideo non est verum vel falsum, nisi quando additur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur iudicium intellectus.
|| (8) Et sicut nominibus vocalibus et scriptis quaedam sunt accidentia propria, quaedam communia illis et mentalibus, consimiliter de verborum accidentibus est dicendum. Communia sunt modus, genus, numerus, tempus, persona.
De modo patet, nam alia oratio mentalis comrespondet isti orationi vocali Socrates legit et isti alia utinam Socrates legeret. De genere patet, nam alia oratio mentalis correspondet isti orationi vocali 'Socrates amat' et isti 'Socrates amatur'. Verumtamen in mente non sunt nisi tria genera, nam deponentia et communia vocalia non sunt propter necessitatem significationis inventa, cum verba communia aequivaleant activis et passivis et deponentia neutris vel activis, et ideo non oportet talem pluralitatem in verbis mentalibus ponere.
|| And just as there are certain accidents that are proper to spoken and written names, and certain that are common also to mental names, a similar thing is to be said about the accidents of verbs. The common ones are mood, voice [<i>genus</i>], number, tense, and person.
Concerning mood it is clear. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates read' and another to 'Would that Socrates read!'. It is clear with voice. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates loved' and another one to 'Socrates is loved'. Nevertheless there are just three voices in the mind, for spoken deponents and common verbs are not found on account of the necessity of signification, since common verbs are equivalent to active and passive ones, and deponent ones to middle ones and active ones. And for that reason we do not have to suppose such a plurality in mental verbs.
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||[80304] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 1
|| (9) De numero etiam patet, nam distinctae orationes mentales correspondent istis 'tu legis', 'vos legitis'. Idem patet de tempore, nam istis 'tu legis', 'tu legisti' distinctae orationes mentales correspondent. Hoc idem patet de persona, ut istis 'tu legis', 'ego lego' aliae correspondent.
|| Concerning number it is also clear, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'they read'. The same is clear with tense, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'You read [present]' [and] 'You read [past]'. The same is clear about person. For example, different [mental expressions] correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'I read'.
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||Postquam philosophus determinavit de ordine significationis vocum, hic accedit ad determinandum de ipsis vocibus significativis. Et quia principaliter intendit de enunciatione, quae est subiectum huius libri; in qualibet autem scientia oportet praenoscere principia subiecti; ideo primo, determinat de principiis enunciationis; secundo, de ipsa enunciatione; ibi: <b>enunciativa vero</b> non omnis et cetera.
|| (10) Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones ex hoc convincitur quod omni orationi vocali correspondet alia mentalis in mente, et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis quae sunt propter necessitatem significationis impositae sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondenter sunt distinctae. Propter quod sicut nomina vocalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones sunt necessariae diversis propositionibus et orationibus vocalibus, ita quod impossibile est omnia exprimere per nomina et verba solum quae possunt per illa et alias partes exprimi, sic etiam distinctae partes consimiles sunt necessariae mentalibus propositionibus.
|| But that we have to suppose such mental names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions can be proved from the fact that to every spoken expression there corresponds another mental one in the mind, and for that reason, just as those parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed because of the necessity of signification are distinct, so also the corresponding parts of the mental proposition are distinct. On which account, just as spoken names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions are necessary for diverse spoken propositions and expressions - so that it is impossible to express alone everything by means of names and verbs that can be expressed through those, together with the other parts of speech – so, also, similar distinct parts are necessary for mental propositions.
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||Circa primum duo facit: primo enim, determinat principia quasi materialia enunciationis, scilicet partes integrales ipsius; secundo, determinat principium formale, scilicet orationem, quae est enunciationis genus; ibi: <b>oratio autem</b> est vox significativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, determinat de nomine, quod significat rei substantiam; secundo, determinat de verbo, quod significat actionem vel passionem procedentem a re; ibi: <b>verbum autem</b> est quod consignificat tempus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, definit nomen; secundo, definitionem exponit; ibi: <b>in nomine enim</b> quod est equiferus etc.; tertio, excludit quaedam, quae perfecte rationem nominis non habent, ibi: <b>non homo vero</b> non est nomen.
|| (11) Accidentia autem propria verbis institutis sunt coniugatio et figura. Tamen quandoque verba diversarum coniugationum possunt esse synonyma et similiter verba diversae figurae.
|| The accidents proper to instituted verbs are conjugation and 'form' [inflection]. Yet sometimes verbs in different conjugations can be synonymous, and similarly verbs of divese form.
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||[80305] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 2
|| (12) Per praedicta potest studiosus faciliter advertere quomodo proportionaliter de aliis partibus orationis et earum accidentibus est dicendum.
|| (12) From what has been said, the keen student will easily recognize what there is to be said, proportionally, about the other parts of speech and their accidents.
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||Circa primum considerandum est quod definitio ideo dicitur terminus, quia includit totaliter rem; ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est extra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat; nec aliquid aliud est infra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio conveniat.
|| (13) Nec miretur aliquis quod dico aliqua nomina et verba esse mentalia, sed prius legat Boethium super Perihermenias , et hoc ibidem inveniet. Et ideo quando Aristoteles tam nomen quam verbum definit per vocem, accipit ibi nomen et verbum magis stricte, scilicet pro nomine et verbo vocali.
|| Nor should anyone wonder that I say that some names and verbs are mental, but he should first read Boethius on the <i>De interpretatione</i>, and he will find it there. And for that reason, when Aristotle defines the name, just as the verb, through 'an utterance', he takes there 'name' and 'verb' strictly, i.e., for a spoken name and verb.
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||[80306] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 3
|| <a name = "c12"><b>CAP. 12. QUID EST INTENTIO PRIMA ET QUID SECUNDA ET QUOMODO DISTINGUUNTUR AB INVICEM</b>
|| WHAT A FIRST INTENTION IS, & WHAT A SECOND IS, AND IN WHAT WAY THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER
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||Et ideo quinque ponit in definitione nominis. Primo, ponitur vox per modum generis, per quod distinguitur nomen ab omnibus sonis, qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam, ut dicitur in II de anima. Additur autem prima differentia, scilicet significativa, ad differentiam quarumcumque vocum non significantium, sive sit vox litterata et articulata, sicut biltris, sive non litterata et non articulata, sicut sibilus pro nihilo factus. Et quia de significatione vocum in superioribus actum est, ideo ex praemissis concludit quod nomen est vox significativa.
|| (1) Et quia dictum est in praecedenti capitulo quod quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam secundae intentionis, et ignorantia significationum vocabulorum multis est errandi occasio, ideo incidenter videndum est quid sit intentio prima et quid secunda, et quomodo distinguuntur.
|| (1) And because it was said in the preceding chapter that certain names are of first intention and certain of second intention, and ignorance of the significations of words is the occasion for error for many, for that reason it is to be seen, incidentally, what is a first intention and what a second, and in what way they are distinguished.
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||[80307] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 4
|| (2) Est autem primo sciendum quod intentio animae vocatur quiddam in anima, natum significare aliud.
Unde, sicut dictum est prius, ad modum quo scriptura est secundarium signum respectu vocum, quia inter omnia signa ad placitum instituta voces obtinent principatum, ita voces secundaria signa sunt illorum quorum intentiones animae sunt signa primaria. Et pro tanto dicit Aristoteles quod voces sunt 'earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae'.
|| (2) And first it is to be known that we call an 'intention of the soul' a certain thing in the soul, suited to signify another thing.
Wherefore, as was said before, regarding the way in which an inscription is a secondary sign in respect to an utterance (because among all the signs given an interpretation, utterances hold first place), so utterances are secondary signs of those things of which intentions of the soul are the primary signs. And Aristotle says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'the marks of affections that are in the soul.'
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||Sed dicendum quod artificialia sunt quidem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in genere autem accidentium ex parte formae: nam formae artificialium accidentia sunt. Nomen ergo significat formam accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. Cum autem in definitione omnium accidentium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod, si qua nomina accidens in abstracto significant quod in eorum definitione ponatur accidens in recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi.
|| (3) Illud autem exsistens in anima quod est signum rei, ex quo propositio mentalis componitur ad modum quo propositio vocalis componitur ex vocibus, aliquando vocatur intentio animae, aliquando conceptus animae, aliquando passio animae, aliquando similitudo rei, et Boetius in commento super Perihermenias vocat intellectum.
|| (3) Now that which exists in the soul which is a sign of a thing, from which a mental proposition is put together, as regards the manner in which in which a spoken proposition is put together out of utterances, is sometimes called an 'intention of the soul', sometimes a 'concept of the soul', sometimes an 'affection of the soul', sometimes a 'similitude of a thing'. In his commentary on the <i>De interpretatione</i>, Boethius calls it an 'understanding'.
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||Si qua vero nomina accidens significant in concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur materia, vel subiectum, quasi genus, et accidens, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus curvus. Si igitur nomina rerum artificialium significant formas accidentales, ut concretas subiectis naturalibus, convenientius est, ut in eorum definitione ponatur res naturalis quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella est lignum figuratum, et similiter quod nomen est vox significativa. Secus autem esset, si nomina artificialium acciperentur, quasi significantia ipsas formas artificiales in abstracto.
|| Unde vult quod propositio mentalis componitur ex intellectibus: non quidem ex intellectibus qui sunt realiter animae intellectivae, sed ex intellectibus qui sunt quaedam signa in anima significantia alia et ex quibus propositio mentalis componitur.
|| Wherefore he would have it that a mental proposition is put together out of <i>understandings</i>. Not, of course, out of the understandings which are really of the soul understanding, but rather out of the understandings that are certain signs in the soul, which signify other things, and from which a mental proposition is put together.
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||[80309] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 6
|| (4) Unde quandocumque aliquis profert propositionem vocalem, prius format interius unam propositionem mentalem, quae nullius idiomatis est, in tantum quod multi frequenter formant interius propositiones quas tamen propter defectum idiomatis exprimere nesciunt. Partes talium propositionum mentalium vocantur conceptus, intentiones, similitudines et intellectus.
|| (4) Wherefore, whenever someone utters a spoken proposition, first he forms within him a mental proposition that does not belongs any language, to the extent that many often form propositions within them that nevertheless they do not know how to express, because of a defect of their language. The parts of such mental propositions are called 'concepts', 'intentions', 'similitudes' and 'understandings'.
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||Tertio, ponit secundam differentiam cum dicit: secundum placitum, idest secundum institutionem humanam a beneplacito hominis procedentem. Et per hoc differt nomen a vocibus significantibus naturaliter, sicut sunt gemitus infirmorum et voces brutorum animalium.
|| (5) Sed quid est illud in anima quod est tale signum?
|| (5) But what is it in the soul that is such a sign?
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||[80310] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 7
|| (6) Dicendum quod circa istum articulum diversae sunt opiniones. Aliqui dicunt quod non est nisi quoddam fictum per animam. Alii, quod est quaedam qualitas subiective exsistens in anima, distincta ab actu intelligendi. Alii dicunt quod est actus intelligendi.
|| (6) It is to be said that there are different opinions about this issue. Some say that it is nothing but a certain thing made up by the soul. Others, that it is a certain quality subjectively existing in the soul, distinct from the act of understanding. Others say that is the act of understanding.
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||Quarto, ponit tertiam differentiam, scilicet sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. Sed videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. Sed dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. Primo quidem, ipsum tempus, secundum quod est res quaedam, et sic potest significari a nomine, sicut quaelibet alia res. Alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore.
|| Et pro istis est ratio ista quia 'frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora'. Omnia autem quae salvantur ponendo aliquid distinctum ab actu intelligendi possunt salvari sine tali distincto, eo quod supponere pro alio et significare aliud ita potest competere actui intelligendi sicut alii signo. Igitur praeter actum intelligendi non oportet aliquid aliud ponere.
|| And on behalf of these, there is the reason that it is useless to bring about through several things what can be brought about through fewer'. Now all things which are saved by supposing that there is something distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without such a distinct thing, in that to stand for one thing and to signify another can belong just as much to the act of understanding as to another sign. Accordingly, we do not have to suppose there anything else besides the act of understanding.
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||Substantia autem secundum se considerata, prout significatur per nomen et pronomen, non habet in quantum huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur, sed solum secundum quod subiicitur motui, prout per participium significatur. Et ideo verbum et participium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen et pronomen. Tertio modo, potest considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur per adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et huiusmodi.
|| (7) De istis autem opinionibus inferius perscrutabitur, ideo pro nunc sufficiat quod intentio est quiddam in anima, quod est signum naturaliter significans aliquid pro quo potest supponere vel quod potest esse pars propositionis mentalis.
|| (7) And we will closely examine these opinions below. For that reason, let it be sufficient for now that an intention is a certain thing in the soul, which is a sign naturally signifying something for which it can stand for, or which can be part of a mental proposition.
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||[80311] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 8
|| (8) Tale autem signum duplex est. Unum, quod est signum alicuius rei quae non est tale signum, sive significet tale signum simul cum hoc sive non, et illud vocatur intentio prima; qualis est illa intentio animae quae est praedicabilis de omnibus hominibus et similiter intentio praedicabilis de omnibus albedinibus et nigredinibus et sic de aliis.
|| (8) Now such a sign is twofold. One, that is a sign of some object which is not such a sign, whether it signifies such a sign together with it or not. And this is called a 'first intention'. Of such a kind is an intention of the soul that is predicable of all men, and similarly the intention [that is] predicable of all whitenesses and blacknesses, and so on.
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||Quinto, ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, scilicet a toto nomine; comparatur tamen ad significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. Quod ideo est, quia significatio est quasi forma nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam totius, sicut manus separata ab homine non habet formam humanam. Et per hoc distinguitur nomen ab oratione, cuius pars significat separata; ut cum dicitur, homo iustus.
|| (9) Verumtamen sciendum est quod 'intentio prima' dupliciter accipitur: stricte et large. Large dicitur intentio prima omne signum intentionale exsistens in anima quod non significat intentiones vel signa praecise, sive sit signum stricte accipiendo 'signum' pro illo quod sic significat quod natum est supponere in propositione pro suo significato sive sit signum large accipiendo 'signum', illo modo quo dicimus syncategorema significare.
|| (9) Nevertheless, it is to be known that 'first intention' is taken in two senses: broadly and strictly. Broadly, every intentional sign existing in the soul which does not signify intentions or signs precisely is called a 'first intention', whether it is a 'sign', taking sign strictly for that which signifies so that it is suited to stand for what it signifies in a proposition, or whether it is a 'sign', taking sign broadly in that manner in which we say that syncategoremata signify.
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||[80312] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 9
|| Et isto modo verba mentalia et syncategoremata mentalia et coniunctiones et huiusmodi possunt dici intentiones primae. Stricte autem vocatur intentio prima nomen mentale, natum pro suo significato supponere.
|| And in this manner, mental verbs and mental syncategoremata and conjunctions and things of this kind can be called 'first intentions'. But strictly, what is called a 'first intention' is the mental name that is suited to stand for what it signifies.
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||Deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc., manifestat praemissam definitionem. Et primo, quantum ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum ad tertiam; ibi: <b>secundum vero placitum</b> et cetera. Nam primae duae particulae manifestae sunt ex praemissis; tertia autem particula, scilicet sine tempore, manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu de verbo.
|| (10) Intentio autem secunda est illa quae est signum talium intentionum primarum, cuiusmodi sunt tales intentiones 'genus', `species' et huiusmodi. Sicut enim de omnibus hominibus praedicatur una intentio communis omnibus hominibus, sic dicendo 'iste homo est homo', 'ille homo est homo', et sic de singulis, ita de illis intentionibus quae significant et supponunt pro rebus praedicatur una intentio communis eis, sic dicendo 'haec species est species', 'illa species est species', et sic de aliis. Similiter sic dicendo 'lapis est genus', 'animal est genus', 'color est genus', et sic de aliis, praedicatur una intentio de intentionibus, ad modum quo in talibus 'homo est nomen', 'asinus est nomen', 'albedo est nomen' praedicatur unum nomen de diversis nominibus.
|| (10) Now a 'second intention' is one that is a sign of such first intentions, of which sort are intentions such as 'genus', 'species', and the like. For just as one intention common to all men is predicated of all men by saying 'Yonder man is a man', 'That man is a man', and thus of each individually, so of those intentions that signify and stand for things, one intention common to them is predicated of them by saying 'this species is a species', 'that species is a species', and so on. Similarly, by saying 'stone is a genus', 'animal is a genus', 'colour is a genus', and so on, one intention is predicated of intentions in the manner by which in 'man is a name', 'donkey is a name' 'whiteness is a name', one name is predicated of diverse names.
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||Cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis, quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. Et inde est quod pars nominis compositi, quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem conceptionis compositae, a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. Sed oratio significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde pars orationis significat partem conceptionis compositae.
|| (11) Et ideo sicut nomina secundae impositionis significant ad placitum nomina primae impositionis, ita secunda intentio naturaliter significat primam. Et sicut nomen primae impositionis significat alia quam nomina, ita prima intentio significat alias res quam intentiones.
|| (11) And for that reason, just as names of second imposition signify names of first imposition according to an interpretation, so a second intention naturally signifies one of the first. And just as a name of first imposition signifies other things than names, so a first intention signifies other things than intentions.
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||[80313] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 10
|| (12) Potest etiam dici quod intentio secunda potest accipi stricte pro intentione quae significat praecise primas intentiones, vel large pro intentione quae significat intentiones et signa ad placitum instituta, si tamen sit aliqua talis.
|| (12) It can also be said that 'second intention' can be taken strictly for an intention that signifies precisely first intentions, or broadly for an intention which signifies intentions and interpreted signs, if there is still some such thing.
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||Deinde cum dicit: at vero non etc., ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus simplicibus, sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus pars nullo modo est significativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secundum apparentiam; sed in compositis vult quidem, idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen pars eius significat, ut dictum est de nomine equiferus. Haec autem ratio differentiae est, quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu; nomen vero compositum imponitur a composita conceptione, ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius significet.
|| <a name = "c13"><b>CAP. 13. DE DIVISIONE NOMINUM ET TERMINORUM IN AEQUIVOCA, UNIVOCA ET DENOMINATIVA, ET QUID EST AEQUIVOCUM ET QUOT MODIS DICITUR</b>
|| ON THE DIVISION OF NAMES AND TERMS INTO EQUIVOCAL, UNIVOCAL AND DENOMINATIVE, AND WHAT 'EQUIVOCAL' IS, AND IN HOW MANY WAYS IT IS SAID
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||[80314] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 11
|| (1) Sequitur post praedicta tractare de divisione terminorum ad placitum institutorum quae est per aequivocum, univocum et denominativum. Quamvis enim Aristoteles in Praedicamentis tractet de aequivocis, univocis et denomniativis, tamen ad praesens intendo tantum de univocis et aequivocis tractare, quia de denominativis dictum est superius.
|| After the above, [we must] treat the division of interpreted terms by equivocal, univocal and denominative. Now, although Aristotle in the <i>Categories</i> treats of equivocals, univocals and denominatives, still, for now, I aim to treat only of univocals and equivocals, because denominatives were discussed above.
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||Deinde cum dicit: secundum placitum etc., manifestat tertiam partem praedictae definitionis; et dicit quod ideo dictum est quod nomen significat secundum placitum, quia nullum nomen est naturaliter. Ex hoc enim est nomen, quod significat: non autem significat naturaliter, sed ex institutione.
|| (2) Est autem primo sciendum quod sola vox vel aliud signum ad placitum institutum est aequivocum vel univocum, et ideo intentio animae vel conceptus non est aequivocus nec univocus proprie loquendo.
|| It is to be known first, that only an utterance or another sign given an interpretation is equivocal or univocal, and, for that reason, an intention of the soul, or concept, is neither equivocal nor univocal, properly speaking.
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||Et hoc est quod subdit: sed quando fit nota, idest quando imponitur ad significandum. Id enim quod naturaliter significat non fit, sed naturaliter est signum. Et hoc significat cum dicit: illitterati enim soni, ut ferarum, quia scilicet litteris significari non possunt. Et dicit potius sonos quam voces, quia quaedam animalia non habent vocem, eo quod carent pulmone, sed tantum quibusdam sonis proprias passiones naturaliter significant: nihil autem horum sonorum est nomen. Ex quo manifeste datur intelligi quod nomen non significat naturaliter.
|| (3) Est autem vox illa aequivoca quae significans plura non est signum subordinatum uni conceptui, sed est signum unum pluribus conceptibus seu intentionibus animae subordinatum. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles quando dicit nomen commune esse idem, sed rationem substantialem esse diversam, hoc est, conceptus vel intentiones animae, cuiusmodi sunt descriptiones et definitiones et etiam conceptus simplices, sunt diversi, tamen vox una est.
|| Now that utterance is 'equivocal' when, signifying several things, is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but rather is one sign subordinated to several concepts or intentions of the soul. And this is what Aristotle means when he says that the common name is the same but the definition of the substance [N4] is diverse. That is, the concepts or intentions of the soul, such as descriptions and definitions and even simple concepts, are diverse, yet the utterance is one.
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||[80315] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 12
|| Hoc expresse patet de dictione diversorum idiomatum, nam in uno idiomate imponitur ad significandum illud idem quod significatur per talem conceptum et in alio imponitur ad significandum illud idem quod significatur per alium conceptum, et ita pluribus conceptibus seu passionibus animae subordinatur in significando.
|| This is plainly obvious concerning an expression that belongs to different languages. For in one language it is imposed to signify that same thing signified through one concept, and in the other it is imposed to signify that same thing signified through another concept. And so it is subordinated in signifying to several concepts or passions of the soul.
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||Sciendum tamen est quod circa hoc fuit diversa quorumdam opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod nomina nullo modo naturaliter significant: nec differt quae res quo nomine significentur. Alii vero dixerunt quod nomina omnino naturaliter significant, quasi nomina sint naturales similitudines rerum. Quidam vero dixerunt quod nomina non naturaliter significant quantum ad hoc, quod eorum significatio non est a natura, ut Aristoteles hic intendit; quantum vero ad hoc naturaliter significant quod eorum significatio congruit naturis rerum, ut Plato dixit.
|| (4) Tale autem aequivocum est duplex. Unum est aequivocum a casu, quando scilicet vox pluribus conceptibus subordinatur, et ita uni ac si non subordinaretur alteri et ita significat unum ac si non significaret aliud, sicut est de hoc nomine 'Socrates', quod imponitur pluribus hominibus.
|| Now such an equivocal [term] is of twofold. One is equivocal by accident, namely, when an utterance is subordinated to several concepts and thus to the one as if it were not subordinated to the other, and signifies one as if it did not signify the other. Just as it is concerning the name 'Socrates', which is imposed on several men.
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||Nec obstat quod una res multis nominibus significatur: quia unius rei possunt esse multae similitudines; et similiter ex diversis proprietatibus possunt uni rei multa diversa nomina imponi. Non est autem intelligendum quod dicit: quorum nihil est nomen, quasi soni animalium non habeant nomina: nominantur enim quibusdam nominibus, sicut dicitur rugitus leonis et mugitus bovis; sed quia nullus talis sonus est nomen, ut dictum est.
|| (5) Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinatur uni conceptui et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad aliquid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem imponitur illi alteri, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine 'homo'.
|| The other is equivocal by design, when an utterance is first imposed on some thing or things and is subordinated to one concept, and afterwards, on account of some similitude of the first thing signified to something other than that, or for some other reason, it is imposed on that other thing, in a way that it would not be imposed on the other unless because it was first imposed on the first thing. Just as it is with the name 'man'.
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||[80316] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 13
|| Primo enim imponebatur ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu 'animal rationale', postea autem utentes, videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quandoque hoc nomine 'homo' pro tali imagine, ita quod nisi hoc nomen homo fuisset primo impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponerent hoc nomen homo ad significandum vel standum pro tali imagine; et propter hoc dicitur 'aequivocum a consilio'.
|| For it was first imposed to signify all rational animals, so that it was imposed to signify everything contained under the concept 'rational animal'. But afterwards, the ones using it, seeing a similitude between such a man and the image of a man, sometimes used the name 'man' for such an image, so that unless the name 'man' had first been imposed on men, the name 'man' would not be used or imposed for signifying or standing for such an image. And on this account, it is called 'equivocal by design'.
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||Deinde cum dicit: non homo vero etc., excludit quaedam a nominis ratione. Et primo, nomen infinitum; secundo, casus nominum; ibi: <b>Catonis autem</b> vel Catoni et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod non homo non est nomen. Omne enim nomen significat aliquam naturam determinatam, ut homo; aut personam determinatam, ut pronomen; aut utrumque determinatum, ut Socrates.
|| (6) 'Univocum' autem dicitur omne illud quod est subordinatum uni conceptui, sive significet plura sive non. Tamen proprie loquendo non est univocum nisi significet vel natum sit significare plura aeque primo, ita tamen quod non significet illa plura nisi quia una intentio animae significat illa, ita quod sit signum subordinatum in significando uni signo naturali, quod est intentio seu conceptus animae.
|| Now all that which is subordinated to one concept is called 'univocal', whether it signifies several things or not. Yet, properly speaking, it is not 'univocal' unless it signifies, or is suited to signify, several things equally firstly, yet in such a way that it does not signify those several things unless it is because one intention of the soul signifies those, so that it is a sign subordinated in signifying to one natural sign that is an intention or concept of the soul.
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||Quia tamen significat per modum nominis, quod potest subiici et praedicari, requiritur ad minus suppositum in apprehensione. Non autem erat nomen positum tempore Aristotelis sub quo huiusmodi dictiones concluderentur. Non enim est oratio, quia pars eius non significat aliquid separata, sicut nec in nominibus compositis; similiter autem non est negatio, id est oratio negativa, quia huiusmodi oratio superaddit negationem affirmationi, quod non contingit hic. Et ideo novum nomen imponit huiusmodi dictioni, vocans eam nomen infinitum propter indeterminationem significationis, ut dictum est.
|| (7) Talis autem divisio non tantum competit nominibus sed etiam verbis et universaliter cuilibet parti orationis, immo etiam sic quod aliquid potest esse aequivocum eo quod potest esse diversarum partium orationis, puta tam nomen quam verbum vel tam nomen quam participium vel adverbium, et sic de aliis partibus orationis.
|| (7) But such a division not only belongs to names, but also to verbs, and in general to any part of speech whatever. Indeed, something can even be equivocal in that it can belong to diverse parts of speech. (Consider, both a name and a verb, or both a name and a participle or an adverb, and so on for other parts of speech).
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||[80317] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 14
|| (8) Est autem intelligendum quod ista divisio terminorum per aequivocum et univocum non est simpliciter per opposita, ita quod haec sit omnino falsa 'aliquod aequivocum est univocum', immo vera est, quia vere et realiter eadem vox est aequivoca et univoca sed non respectu eorundem, sicut idem est pater et filius, non tamen respectu eiusdem, et idem est simile et dissimile non tamen eidem per idem.
|| (8) Now it has to be understood that this division of terms into equivocal and univocal is not simply by opposites so that 'Some equivocal is univocal' is wholly false. By contrast, it is true. For the same utterance is truly and really equivocal and univocal, but not in respect of the same [things], for example, the same person is a father and a son, yet not with respect to the same person, and the same thing is like and unlike, but not the same thing in the same respect.
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||Deinde cum dicit: Catonis autem vel Catoni etc., excludit casus nominis; et dicit quod Catonis vel Catoni et alia huiusmodi non sunt nomina, sed solus nominativus dicitur principaliter nomen, per quem facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid significandum. Huiusmodi autem obliqui vocantur casus nominis: quia quasi cadunt per quamdam declinationis originem a nominativo, qui dicitur rectus eo quod non cadit. Stoici autem dixerunt etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici sequuntur, eo quod cadunt, idest procedunt ab interiori conceptione mentis. Et dicitur rectus, eo quod nihil prohibet aliquid cadens sic cadere, ut rectum stet, sicut stilus qui cadens ligno infigitur.
|| (9) Unde si sit aliqua dictio diversorum idiomatum, manifestum est quod potest esse univoca in utroque idiomate. Unde ille qui sciret alterum idioma tantum, nullam propositionem in qua poneretur distingueret, scienti tamen utrumque idioma est aequivoca. Unde scientes utrumque idioma in multis casibus distinguerent propositiones in quibus talis dictio poneretur, et ita idem terminus est uni univocus et alteri aequivocus.
|| Wherefore, if there is some expression that belongs to different languages, it is manifest that it can be univocal in both languages. Wherefore, the one who knew only one language would distinguish no proposition in which the word occurred. Yet to one knowing both languages, it is equivocal. Wherefore, those who know both languages would in many cases distinguish propositions in which such an expression occurred. And thus the same term is univocal to one [person] and equivocal to another.
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||[80318] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 15
|| (10) Ex praedictis colligi potest quod non semper univocum habet unam definitionem, quia non semper proprie definitur. Et ideo quando Aristoteles dicit quod est et ratio substantialis eadem accipit rationem pro intentione animae ut tamquam primario signo vox subordinatur.
|| (10) From the above it can be gathered that a univocal term does not always have one definition because it is not always properly defined. And for that reason, when Aristotle says that [univocals are those for which the name is in common] and the definition of the substance the same, he takes 'definition' for the intention of the soul to which the utterance is subordinated as if to a primary sign.
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||Deinde cum dicit: ratio autem eius etc., ostendit consequenter quomodo se habeant obliqui casus ad nomen; et dicit quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est eadem et in aliis, scilicet casibus nominis; sed in hoc est differentia quod nomen adiunctum cum hoc verbo est vel erit vel fuit semper significat verum vel falsum: quod non contingit in obliquis. Signanter autem inducit exemplum de verbo substantivo: quia sunt quaedam alia verba, scilicet impersonalia, quae cum obliquis significant verum vel falsum; ut cum dicitur, poenitet Socratem, quia actus verbi intelligitur ferri super obliquum; ac si diceretur, poenitentia habet Socratem.
|| (11) Est autem sciendum quod 'univocum' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large, pro omni voce vel signo ad placitum instituto correspondente uni conceptui; aliter accipitur stricte, pro aliquo tali praedicabili per se primo modo de aliquibus quibus est univocum, vel de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem.
|| Now it is to be known that 'univocal' is taken in two ways, namely broadly, for every utterance or sign given an interpretation, corresponding to one concept. In another way it is taken strictly, for some such thing predicable through itself [<i>per se</i>] in the first way of some things to which it is univocal, or of a pronoun indicating some thing.
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||[80319] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 16
|| (12) Terminus autem denominativus, ad praesens, dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet stricte, et sic terminus incipiens sicut abstractum incipit et non habens consimilem finem et significans accidens dicitur terminus denominativus, sicut a 'fortitudine' 'fortis', a 'iustitia' 'iustus'. Aliter dicitur large terminus habens consimile principium cum abstracto, sed non consimilem finem, sive significet accidens sive non, sicut ab 'anima' dicitur 'animatus'.
|| But 'denominative term', can for now be taken in two ways: namely strictly, and in this way a term that begins as an abstract [term] begins but does not have a similar ending and signifies an accident is called a 'denominative term'. For example, 'strong' from 'strength', 'just' from 'justice'. In another way, a term having a beginning as an abstract one, but not a similar ending, whether it signifies an accident or not, is broadly called [a 'denominative term'] . For example, 'besouled' is so-called from 'soul'.
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||Sed contra: si nomen infinitum et casus non sunt nomina, inconvenienter data est praemissa nominis definitio, quae istis convenit. Sed dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod supra communius definit nomen, postmodum vero significationem nominis arctat subtrahendo haec a nomine. Vel dicendum quod praemissa definitio non simpliciter convenit his: nomen enim infinitum nihil determinatum significat, neque casus nominis significat secundum primum placitum instituentis, ut dictum est.
|| (13) Et haec de divisionibus terminorum sufficiant. Aliqua autem in praedictis omissa inferius supplebuntur.
|| (13) Let these things suffice for the divisions of terms. Now, some things omitted in the above will be filled in below.