Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 10====

====Excerpt 10.  Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| The October remarks [i.e. those in the above paper] made the

<p>The October remarks [i.e. those in the above paper] made the proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality, of which the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself to allow of an indubitable determinate interpretation, while the [latter] turns over to the interpreter the right to complete the determination as he please.</p>

| proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.:

 

| indefiniteness and generality, of which the former consists in

<p>It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;  but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe &mdash; not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth" &mdash; that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.  Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question of pragmaticism.</p>

| the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself to allow of an

 

| indubitable determinate interpretation, while the [latter]

<p>The October remarks, with a view to brevity, omitted to mention that both indefiniteness and generality might primarily affect either the logical breadth or the logical depth of the sign to which it belongs. It now becomes pertinent to notice this.  When we speak of the depth, or signification, of a sign we are resorting to hypostatic abstraction, that process whereby we regard a thought as a thing, make an interpretant sign the object of a sign.</p>

| turns over to the interpreter the right to complete the

 

| determination as he please.

<p>It has been a butt of ridicule since Molière's dying week, and the depth of a writer on philosophy can conveniently be sounded by his disposition to make fun of the basis of voluntary inhibition, which is the chief characteristic of mankind.  For cautious thinkers will not be in haste to deride a kind of thinking that is evidently founded upon observation &mdash; namely, upon observation of a sign.</p>

 

| It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign

<p>At any rate, whenever we speak of a predicate we are representing a thought as a thing, as a ''substantia'', since the concepts of ''substance'' and ''subject'' are one, its concomitants only being different in the two cases.  It is needful to remark this in the present connexion, because, were it not for hypostatic abstraction, there could be no generality of a predicate, since a sign which should make its interpreter its deputy to determine its signification at his pleasure would not signify anything, unless ''nothing'' be its significate.</p>

| should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;  but the

 

| explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe --

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.448, n. 1</p>

| not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe,

</blockquote>

| embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which

| we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth" -- that all this

| universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively

| of signs.  Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the

| question of pragmaticism.

| The October remarks, with a view to brevity, omitted to mention that

| both indefiniteness and generality might primarily affect either the

| logical breadth or the logical depth of the sign to which it belongs.

| It now becomes pertinent to notice this.  When we speak of the depth,

| or signification, of a sign we are resorting to hypostatic abstraction,

| that process whereby we regard a thought as a thing, make an interpretant

| sign the object of a sign. It has been a butt of ridicule since Molière's

| dying week, and the depth of a writer on philosophy can conveniently be

| sounded by his disposition to make fun of the basis of voluntary inhibition,

| which is the chief characteristic of mankind.  For cautious thinkers will

| not be in haste to deride a kind of thinking that is evidently founded

| upon observation -- namely, upon observation of a sign. At any rate,

| whenever we speak of a predicate we are representing a thought as

| a thing, as a 'substantia', since the concepts of 'substance' and

| 'subject' are one, its concomitants only being different in the two

| cases.  It is needful to remark this in the present connexion, because,

| were it not for hypostatic abstraction, there could be no generality of

| a predicate, since a sign which should make its interpreter its deputy to

| determine its signification at his pleasure would not signify anything,

| unless 'nothing' be its significate.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1

</pre>

====Excerpt 11====

====Excerpt 11====