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== Work ==
== Work ==
=== Realism ===
Scotus is generally considered to be a [[Philosophical realism|realist]] (as opposed to a [[nominalist]]) in that he treated universals as real. He attacks a position close to that later defended by [[Ockham]], arguing that things have a common nature - for example the humanity common to both Socrates and Plato.
=== Univocity of Being ===
He followed [[Aristotle]] in asserting that the subject matter of metaphysics is "being qua being" (''ens inquantum ens''). Being in general (''ens in communi''), as an univocal notion, was for him the first object of the intellect. Metaphysics includes the study of the transcendentals, so called because they transcend the division of being into finite and infinite and the further division of finite being into the ten Aristotelian categories. Being itself is a transcendental, and so are the "attributes" of being — "one", "true", and "good" — which are coextensive with being, but which each add something to it.
The doctrine of the univocity of being implies the denial of any real distinction between [[essence]] and [[existence]]. Aquinas had argued that in all finite being (i.e. all except God), the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. Scotus rejected the distinction. We can conceive of what is is to be something, without conceiving it as existing. Scotus denied this. We should not make any distinction between whether a thing exists (''si est'') and what it is (''quid est''), for we never know whether something exists, unless we have some concept of what we know to exist <ref>''Opus Oxoniense'' I iii 1-2, quoted in Grenz p.55</ref>
=== Categories ===
The study of the Aristotelian categories belongs to metaphysics insofar as the categories, or the things falling under them, are studied as beings. (If they are studied as concepts, they belong instead to the logician.) There are exactly ten categories, according to orthodox Aristotelianism. The first and most important is the category of [[Substance theory|substance]]. Substances are beings in a primary sense, since they have an independent existence (''entia per se''). Beings in any of the other nine categories, called [[Accident (philosophy)|accidents]], exist in substances. The nine categories of accidents are quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, position, and state (or ''habitus'').
=== Individuation ===
Duns elaborates a distinct view on [[hylomorphism]], with three important strong theses that differentiate him. He held: 1) that there exists [[matter]] that has no form whatsoever, or prime matter, as the stuff underlying all change, against [[Aquinas]] (cf. his ''Quaestiones in Metaphysicam'' 7, q. 5; ''Lectura'' 2, d. 12, q. un.), 2) that not all created substances are composites of form and matter (cf. ''Lectura'' 2, d. 12, q. un., n. 55), that is, that purely spiritual substances do exist, and 3) that one and the same substance can have more than one substantial form — for instance, humans have at least two substantial forms, the soul and the form of the body (''forma corporeitas'') (cf. ''Ordinatio'' 4, d. 11, q. 3, n. 54). He argued for an original principle of [[individuation]] (cf. ''Ordinatio'' 2, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-6), the "[[haecceity]]" as the ultimate unity of a unique individual (''haecceitas'', an entity's 'thisness'), as opposed to the common [[Nature (philosophy)|nature]] (''natura communis''), feature existing in any number of individuals. For Scotus, the axiom stating that only the individual exists is a dominating principle of the understanding of reality. For the apprehension of individuals, an intuitive cognition is required, which gives us the present existence or the non-existence of an individual, as opposed to abstract cognition. Thus the human soul, in its separated state from the body, will be capable of knowing the spiritual intuitively.
=== Formal distinction ===
Like other realist philosophers of the period (such as Aquinas and [[Henry of Ghent]], Scotus recognised the need for an intermediate distinction that was not merely conceptual, but not fully real or mind-dependent either. Scotus argued for an [[Formal distinction | formal distinction]] (''distinctio formalis a parte rei''), which holds between entities which are inseparable and indistinct in reality, but whose definitions are not identical. For example, the personal properties of the [[Trinity]] are formally distinct from the Divine essence. Similarly, the distinction between the 'thisness' or ''haecceity'' of a thing is intermediate between a real and a conceptual distinction<ref>Honderich p. 209</ref>. There is also a formal distinction between the divine attributes and the powers of the soul.
=== Voluntarism ===
Scotus was an Augustinian theologian. He is usually associated with [[voluntarism]], the tendency to emphasize God's will and human freedom in all philosophical issues. The main difference between [[Aquinas]]' rational theology and that of Scotus' is that Scotus believes certain predicates may be applied univocally — with exactly the same meaning — to God and creatures, whereas Aquinas insisted that this is impossible, and that only analogical predication can be employed, in which a word as applied to God has a meaning different from, although related to, the meaning of that same word as applied to creatures. Duns struggled throughout his works in demonstrating his univocity theory against Aquinas' analogy doctrine.
=== Existence of God ===
The existence of God can be proven only ''a posteriori'', through its effects. The Causal Argument he gives for the existence of [[God]] is particularly interesting and precise. It says that an infinity of things that are essentially ordered is impossible, as the totality of caused things that are essentially caused is itself caused, and so it is caused by some cause which is not a part of the totality, for then it would be the cause of itself; for the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on anything belonging to that totality. The argument is relevant for Scotus' conception of metaphysical inquiry into being by searching the ways into which beings relate to each other.
=== Immaculate Conception ===
Perhaps the most influential point of Duns Scotus' theology was his defense of the [[Immaculate Conception]] of [[Blessed Virgin Mary|Mary]]. At the time, there was a great deal of argument about the subject. The general opinion was that it was appropriate, but it could not be seen how to resolve the problem that only with [[Jesus|Christ's]] death would the stain of [[original sin]] be removed. The great philosophers and theologians of the West were divided on the subject (indeed, it appears that even [[Thomas Aquinas]] sided with those who denied the doctrine, though some [[Thomism|Thomists]] dispute this). The [[feast of the Immaculate Conception|feast day]] had existed in the East since the seventh century and had been introduced in several dioceses in the West as well, even though the philosophical basis was lacking. Citing [[Anselm of Canterbury]]'s principle, "''potuit, decuit, ergo fecit''" ([[God]] could do it, it was appropriate, therefore he did it), Duns Scotus devised the following argument: Mary was in need of redemption like all other human beings, but through the merits of Jesus' [[crucifixion]], given in advance, she was conceived without the stain of original sin. God could have brought it about (1) that she was never in origin sin, (2) she was in sin only for an instant, (3) she was in sin for a period of time, being purged at the last instant. Whatever of these was more excellent should probably be attributed to Mary <ref>''Ordinatio'' III, d.3, q.1</ref>. This apparently careful statement provoked a storm of opposition at Paris, and suggested the line 'fired France for Mary without spot' in the famous poem "Duns Scotus's Oxford", by [[Gerard Manley Hopkins]].
This argument appears in [[Pope Pius IX]]'s declaration of the [[dogma]] of the Immaculate Conception. [[Pope John XXIII]] recommended the reading of Duns Scotus' theology to modern theology students.
===Logic===
The authenticity of Scotus' [[Logic | logical works]] has been questioned. Some of the logical and metaphysical works originally attributed to him are now known to be by other authors. There were already concerns about this within two centuries of his death, when the sixteenth-century logician [[Jacobus Naveros]] noted inconsistencies between these texts and his commentary on the ''Sentences'', leading him to doubt whether he had written any logical works at all <ref>Ashworth 1987</ref>. The Questions on the Prior Analytics (''In Librum Priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Quaestiones'') were also discovered to be mistakenly attributed <ref>R.P.E. Longpre</ref>.
Modern editors have identified only four works as authentic: the commentaries on Porphyry's [[Isagoge]], on Aristotle's [[Categories (Aristotle) | Categories]], [[On Interpretation]] (in two different versions), and on [[Sophistical Refutations]], probably written in that order. These are called the <i>parva logicalia</i>. These are dated at around 1295, when Scotus would have been in his late twenties, working in Oxford.
== Influence ==
== Influence ==