Changes

To reflect on the properties of complex and higher order sign relations with any degree of clarity it is necessary to arrange a clearer field of investigation and a less cluttered staging area for analytic work than is commonly provided.  Habitual processes of interpretation that typically operate as automatic routines and uncritical defaults in the informal context of discussion have to be selectively inhibited, slowed down, and critically examined as objective possibilities, instead of being taken for granted as absolute necessities.

To reflect on the properties of complex and higher order sign relations with any degree of clarity it is necessary to arrange a clearer field of investigation and a less cluttered staging area for analytic work than is commonly provided.  Habitual processes of interpretation that typically operate as automatic routines and uncritical defaults in the informal context of discussion have to be selectively inhibited, slowed down, and critically examined as objective possibilities, instead of being taken for granted as absolute necessities.

In other words, an apparatus for critical reflection does not merely add more mirrors to the kaleidoscopic fun-house of interpretive discourse, but it provides transient moments of equanimity, or balanced neutrality, and a moderately detached perspective on alternative points of view.  A scope so limited does not by any means grant a God's Eye View, but permits a sufficient quantity of light to consider how the original array of sights and reflections might have been created otherwise.

In other words, an apparatus for critical reflection does not merely add more mirrors to the kaleidoscopic fun-house of interpretive discourse, but it provides transient moments of equanimity, or balanced neutrality, and a moderately detached perspective on alternative points of view.  A scope so limited does not by any means grant a god's eye view, but permits a sufficient quantity of light to consider how the original array of sights and reflections might have been created otherwise.

Ordinarily, the extra degree of attention to syntax that is needed for critical reflection on interpretive processes is called into play by means of syntactic operators and diacritical devices acting at the level of individual signs and elementary expressions.  For example, quotation marks are used to force one type of “semantic ascent”, causing signs to be treated as objects and marking points of interpretive shift as they occur in the syntactic medium.  But these operators and devices must be symbolized, and these symbols must be interpreted.  Consequently, there is no way to avoid the invocation of a cohering interpretive framework, one that needs to be specialized for analytic purposes.

Ordinarily, the extra degree of attention to syntax that is needed for critical reflection on interpretive processes is called into play by means of syntactic operators and diacritical devices acting at the level of individual signs and elementary expressions.  For example, quotation marks are used to force one type of “semantic ascent”, causing signs to be treated as objects and marking points of interpretive shift as they occur in the syntactic medium.  But these operators and devices must be symbolized, and these symbols must be interpreted.  Consequently, there is no way to avoid the invocation of a cohering interpretive framework, one that needs to be specialized for analytic purposes.

The best way to achieve the desired type of reflective capacity is by attaching a parameter to the interpretive framework used as an instrument of formal study, specifying certain choices or interpretive presumptions that affect the entire context of discussion.  The aesthetic distance needed to arrive at a formal perspective on sign relations is maintained, not by jury rigging ordinary discussion with locally effective syntactic devices, but by asking the reader to consider certain dimensions of parametric variation in the global interpretive frameworks used to comprehend the sign relations under study.

The best way to achieve the desired type of reflective capacity is by attaching a parameter to the interpretive framework used as an instrument of formal study, specifying certain choices or interpretive presumptions that affect the entire context of discussion.  The aesthetic distance needed to arrive at a formal perspective on sign relations is maintained, not by jury-rigging ordinary discussion with locally effective syntactic devices, but by asking the reader to consider certain dimensions of parametric variation in the global interpretive frameworks used to comprehend the sign relations under study.

The interpretive parameter of paramount importance to this work is one that is critical to reflection.  It can be presented as a choice between two alternative conventions, affecting the way one reflexively regards each sign in a text:  (1) as a sign provoking interest only in passing, exchanged for the sake of a meaningful object it is always taken for granted to have, or (2) as a sign comprising an interest in and of itself, a state of a system or a modification of a medium that can signify an external value but does not necessarily denote anything else at all.  I will name these options for responding to signs according to the aspects of character that are most appreciated in their net effects, whether signs for the sake of objects, or signs for their own sake, respectively.

The interpretive parameter of paramount importance to this work is one that is critical to reflection.  It can be presented as a choice between two alternative conventions, affecting the way one reflexively regards each sign in a text:  (1) as a sign provoking interest only in passing, exchanged for the sake of a meaningful object it is always taken for granted to have, or (2) as a sign comprising an interest in and of itself, a state of a system or a modification of a medium that can signify an external value but does not necessarily denote anything else at all.  I will name these options for responding to signs according to the aspects of character that are most appreciated in their net effects, whether signs for the sake of objects, or signs for their own sake, respectively.

The first option I call the ''object convention'', recognizing it as the natural default of informal language use.  In the ordinary language context it is the automatic assumption that signs and expressions are intended to denote something external to themselves, and even though it is quite obvious to all interpreters that the medium is filled with the appearances of signs and not with the objects themselves, this fact passes for little more than transitory interest in the rush to cash out tokens for their indicated values.

The first option I call the ''object convention'', recognizing it as the natural default of informal language use.  In the ordinary language context it is the automatic assumption that signs and expressions are intended to denote something external to themselves, and even though it is quite obvious to all interpreters that the medium is filled with the appearances of signs and not with the objects themselves, this fact passes for little more than transitory interest in the rush to cash out tokens for their indicated values.

The object convention, as appropriate to an introduction that needs to begin in the context of ordinary discussion, is the parametric choice that was left in force throughout the treatment of the A and B example.  Doing things this way is like trying to roller skate in a buffalo herd, that is, it attempts to formalize a fragment of discussion on a patchwork of local scales without interrupting the automatic routines and default assumptions that prevail on a global basis in the informal context.  Ultimately, one cannot avoid stumbling over the hoofprints ("...") of overly cited and opaquely enthymemic textual deposits.

The object convention, as appropriate to an introduction that needs to begin in the context of ordinary discussion, is the parametric choice that was left in force throughout the treatment of the A and B example.  Doing things this way is like trying to roller skate in a buffalo herd, that is, it attempts to formalize a fragment of discussion on a patchwork of local scales without interrupting the automatic routines and default assumptions that prevail on a global basis in the informal context.  Ultimately, one cannot avoid stumbling over the hoofprints (“…”) of overly cited and opaquely enthymematic textual deposits.

The second option I call the "sign convention", observing it to be the treatment of choice in programming and formal language studies.  In the formal language context it is necessary to consider the possibility that not all signs and expressions are assured to denote or even connote much of anything at all.  This danger is amplified in computational frameworks where it resonates with a related theme, that not all programs are guaranteed to terminate normally with a definite result.  In order to deal with these eventualities, a more cautious approach to sign relations is demanded to cover the risk of generating nonsense, in other words, to guard against degenerate forms of sign relations that fail to serve any significant purpose in communication or inquiry.

The second option I call the ''sign convention'', observing it to be the treatment of choice in programming and formal language studies.  In the formal language context it is necessary to consider the possibility that not all signs and expressions are assured to denote or even connote much of anything at all.  This danger is amplified in computational frameworks where it resonates with a related theme, that not all programs are guaranteed to terminate normally with a definite result.  In order to deal with these eventualities, a more cautious approach to sign relations is demanded to cover the risk of generating nonsense, in other words, to guard against degenerate forms of sign relations that fail to serve any significant purpose in communication or inquiry.

Whenever a greater degree of care is required, it becomes necessary to replace the object convention with the sign convention, which presumes to take for granted only what can be obvious to all observers, namely, the phenomenal appearances and temporal occurrences of objectified states of systems.  To be sure, these modulations of media are still presented as signs, but only potentially as signs of other things.  It goes with the territory of the formal language context to constantly check the inveterate impulses of the literate mind, to reflect on its automatic reflex toward meaning, to inhibit its uncontrolled operation, and to pause long enough in the rush to judgment to question whether its constant presumption of a motive is itself innocent.

Whenever a greater degree of care is required, it becomes necessary to replace the object convention with the sign convention, which presumes to take for granted only what can be obvious to all observers, namely, the phenomenal appearances and temporal occurrences of objectified states of systems.  To be sure, these modulations of media are still presented as signs, but only potentially as signs of other things.  It goes with the territory of the formal language context to constantly check the inveterate impulses of the literate mind, to reflect on its automatic reflex toward meaning, to inhibit its uncontrolled operation, and to pause long enough in the rush to judgment to question whether its constant presumption of a motive is itself innocent.

In order to deal with these issues of discourse analysis in an explicit way, it is necessary to have in place a technical notation for marking the very kinds of interpretive assumptions that normally go unmarked.  Thus, I will describe a set of devices for annotating certain kinds of interpretive contingencies, called the "discourse analysis frames" (DAFs) or the "global interpretive frames" (GIFs), that can be operative at any given moment in a particular context of discussion.

In order to deal with these issues of discourse analysis in an explicit way, it is necessary to have in place a technical notation for marking the very kinds of interpretive assumptions that normally go unmarked.  Thus, I will describe a set of devices for annotating certain kinds of interpretive contingencies, namely, the ''discourse analysis frames'' or the ''global interpretive frames'' that may be operative at any given moment in a particular context of discussion.

To mark a context of discussion where a particular set J of interpretive conventions is being maintained, I use labeled brackets of the following two forms:  "unitary", as "{J| ... |J}, or "divided", as {J| ... | ... |J}.  The unitary form encloses a context of discussion by delimiting a range of text whose reading is subject to the interpretive constraints J.  The divided form specifies the objects, signs, and interpretive information in accord with which a species of discussion is generated.  Labeled brackets enclosing contexts can be nested in their scopes, with interpretive data on each outer envelope applying to every inclusion.  Labeled brackets arranging the "conversation pieces" or the "generators and relations" of a topic can lead to discussions that spill outside their frames, and thus are permitted to constitute overlapping contexts.

To mark a context of discussion where a particular set J of interpretive conventions is being maintained, I use labeled brackets of the following two forms:  "unitary", as "{J| ... |J}, or "divided", as {J| ... | ... |J}.  The unitary form encloses a context of discussion by delimiting a range of text whose reading is subject to the interpretive constraints J.  The divided form specifies the objects, signs, and interpretive information in accord with which a species of discussion is generated.  Labeled brackets enclosing contexts can be nested in their scopes, with interpretive data on each outer envelope applying to every inclusion.  Labeled brackets arranging the "conversation pieces" or the "generators and relations" of a topic can lead to discussions that spill outside their frames, and thus are permitted to constitute overlapping contexts.