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| | <p>Charles Sanders Peirce (1905), “What Pragmatism Is”, ''The Monist'' 15, 161–181. Reprinted, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.411—437.</p> | | <p>Charles Sanders Peirce (1905), “What Pragmatism Is”, ''The Monist'' 15, 161–181. Reprinted, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.411—437.</p> |
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| − | ===Discussion Note 1===
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| − | * JA = Jon Awbrey
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| − | * JH = Jay Halcomb
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| − | Let me make a try at explaining some of this in plainer terms.
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| − | The topic of second intentional logic was raised most recently by Bernard Morand, replying to a note that I cross-posted to the "Semiotics and Communication List":
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| − | * http://yaka.univ-perp.fr/wws/arc/gdsemiocom
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| − | I thought that his comment was extremely helpful with respect to the entangled questions of abstract objects, the processes of abstraction, the relationships of abstractions to abstractees, and so on, that we were engaged in at the time.
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| − | But I have since come to realize that in making the conventional translation from ''higher intentional logic of relatives'' (HILOR) to ''higher order logic'' (HOL) that some very serious distortions are almost inevitably introduced into the discussion. I am still trying to work out what might account for these losses in translation, but the main fact seems to be that the traditions that have severally used these terminologies have very different purposes attached to their use, whatever form of ''logically in principle'' (LIP) conversion might be enunciated betweeen them.
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| − | I am adducing to the HAPA account a few canonical remarks from Peirce that I hope will help to explain some of the things that the older traditions regarded as belonging under the heading of second and higher intentions:
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| − | So far:
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| − | * http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11271.html
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| − | * http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11277.html
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| − | If I had to give a midflight capsule summary, I would probably say that the HOL concern is primarily levelled at issues of global coverage while the HIL concern starts out primarily from local operations, especially the formal logical processes that support ''critical reflection on method'' (CROM).
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| − | In a way that is yet to be made as clear as I would like, HILOR demands slightly more “elbow room” than FOL can ever seem to afford — but here it may not be the cramp of FOL per se so much as the habits of 2-adic reductive thinking that have been its accidents in history so far — at any rate, HILOR doesn't really care all that much right at first “how high is the sky” the way that it sounds if you transduce higher intentional talk into higher order talk. That's the best I can explain it right now.
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| − | Previously:
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| − | {| align="center" width="90%"
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| − | <p>I must lie down where all the ladders start<br>
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| − | In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart.</p>
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| − | <p>[http://www.web-books.com/Classics/Poetry/Anthology/Yeats/Circus.htm William Butler Yeats, “The Circus Animals' Desertion”]</p>
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| − | |}
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| − | <pre>
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| − | JA: I am glad that a few people are beginning to be dissatisfied with the
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| − | weenie logics that have historically flown down from Principian coops,
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| − | and that they are finally beginning to chafe at the albatross that
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| − | Russell hung around their necks. Those who have consequently been
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| − | encouraged to begin doing their homework on the subject would do
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| − | well to look into the state of the art that logic had attained
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| − | by mid 1980's in the hands of those who actually use it to any
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| − | purpose, for instance, as exemplified by the excerpts that
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| − | I archived from Lambek and Scott. It goes without saying
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| − | that the state of the art in 1980's was in many ways just
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| − | catching up with what Peirce had been doing in the 1870's,
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| − | but I will let that continue to go without saying, for now.
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| − | JA: [HOCL. Higher Order Categorical Logic -- Links 01-30]
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| − | JH: Jon, I know not what this antick term, 'weenie logic' signifieth.
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| − | JA: Sorry, that shudda been "over-weenie logic".
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| − | JH: By the Rood! I am indeed mightily glad to hear of such doctrines as
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| − | you've conveyed, scholiastickly, as they may yet be the saving of me.
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| − | JH: For all along I've been in a great swivet and stew about whether
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| − | 'tis better to marry or to burn, as a Saint has vouchsafed that
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| − | one state was better than t'other. But it now has fallen out
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| − | that learned men say that if we be but pleased in good sense
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| − | to take the having and the not-having of a wife, we shall
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| − | indeed find no repugnancy nor contradiction in the
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| − | terms at all, betimes.
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| − | JH: For example:
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| − | http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/r/r11g/part135.html
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| − | JH: Shall we not conclude that in like wise all nuptials may fare as
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| − | well, both in good Holy order and with much attendant merriment?
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| − | JH: Or, in simpler words, what formalized logic do you endorse,
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| − | if any, and of which do you disapprove, Jon? And why?
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| − | I freely confess it's awfully hard to tell.
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| − | JA: Jay, thanks for the chance to play the deadpun, as I really need the practice.
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| − | But here, I think that I do e-spy a question to which I can e-spouse a re:ply.
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| − | JA: I got into this booming buzziness out of a desire to solve some problems.
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| − | To make a long story short, that has led me by a winding stairway not to
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| − | heaven, not just yet, but to that "foul rag and bone shop of the heart"
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| − | that one finds at the _|_ of the recursed heap, and by this _|_ line to
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| − | say that I am mostly concerned with what the grubby pragmatician might
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| − | call "applicable computable logic" (ACL), and what all this monicker
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| − | would likely suggest to the common sense problem solver. And here,
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| − | from the _|_ of my heart, at the _|_ of this persistently recursed
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| − | heap of problems that go about orphaned and unaddressed by high
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| − | and mighty logicists of every persuasion, I don't really care
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| − | a Fig 1 or Fig 2 what flag they fly over the rubble, so long
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| − | as they get down from their high-rise vacant LOT's and help
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| − | clean up the mess.
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| − | JH: It might be, e.g., weak (finitary) 2nd order logic, monadic 2nd order logic,
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| − | 2nd order logic itself, 3rd order logic, the theory of types, or something else.
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| − | JH: Which do you think Peirce might have preferred?
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| − | JH: Can you cite me some Holy Writ thereupon from the Canon to clear up the matter?
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| − | JA: See above, or read the writing on the wall (of the city of philosophy).
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| − | JH: Nor discern I where be the 'coops of Principia',
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| − | nor what strange fowl roost therein. Might this
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| − | bespeak the fabled land of 'type theory', of which
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| − | I have sometime heard strange ramifications?
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| − | JA: Close, but no cigar. True, there's a mockingbird in this coop,
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| − | but what I really had in my mental aviary was a bird like this:
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| − | JA: I give Russell full credit, well, partial credit, for asking some really
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| − | good questions, like what does it mean to believe a statement, to desire
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| − | a state of being, a state of affairs, or to undertstand a proposition,
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| − | as he puts it in one place:
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| − | BR: | "How shall we describe the logical form of a belief?"
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| − | | POLA 25. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05000.html
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| − | | POLA 26. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05001.html
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| − | | POLA 27. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05002.html
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| − | | POLA 28. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05006.html
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| − | | POLA 29. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05007.html
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| − | JA: Of course, he quite characteristically has to
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| − | go and spoil it all by saying something like:
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| − | <blockquote>
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| − | I hope you will forgive the fact that so much of what I say today is tentative and consists of pointing out difficulties. The subject is not very easy and it has not been much dealt with or discussed. Practically nobody has until quite lately begun to consider the problem of the nature of belief with anything like a proper logical apparatus and therefore one has very little to help one in any discussion and so one has to be content on many points at present with pointing out difficulties rather than laying down quite clear solutions. (Russell, POLA, pp. 91-92).
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| − | Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 35-155
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| − | in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', edited with an introduction
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| − | by David Pears, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985. First published 1918.
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| − | POLA 27. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05002.html
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| − | JA: The mark of a midterm paper by somebody who didn't read the homework assignment.
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| − | JA: But every time that Russell found that a "pre-theoretcially really
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| − | apt question" (PRAQ) didn't just fall over and play dead before the
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| − | display of his "proper logical apparatus", he promptly consigned it,
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| − | with all due encouragement from Wittgenstein to do so, to the realm
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| − | of illegitimate questions. He never seemed able to draw the rather
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| − | obvious conclusion that maybe it was his "proper logical apparatus"
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| − | that was lacking something somewhere.
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| − | JA: [POLA. Philosophy Of Logical Atomism -- Links 01-29]
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| − | JA: [RTOK. Russell's Theory Of Knowledge -- Links 01-03]
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| − | JA: [RTOP. Russell's Treatise On Propositions -- Links 01-02]
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| − | JH: Praised be the good God in all things, but especially for bringing the world into that height of refinedness beyond what it was when I first came to be acquainted therewith, that now the learnedst and most prudent philosophers are not ashamed to be seen entering in at the porches and frontispieces of the schools of the Pyrrhonian, Aporrhetic, Sceptic, and Ephectic sects. Blessed be the holy name of God! Veritably, it is like henceforth to be found an enterprise of much more easy undertaking to catch lions by the neck, horses by the main, oxen by the horns, bulls by the muzzle, wolves by the tail, goats by the beard, and flying birds by the feet, than to entrap such philosophers in their words.
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| − | JH: http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/r/r11g/part136.html
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| − | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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| − | </pre>
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| | ==DIEP. De In Esse Predication== | | ==DIEP. De In Esse Predication== |