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# A ''formal system'' (FS) contains the signs, expressions, and forms of argumentation that embody a particular way of talking and thinking about the objects in a designated OS.  For the agent that uses a given FS, its design determines the way that these objects are perceived, described, and reasoned about, and the details of its constitution have consequences for all the processes of observation, contemplation, logical expression, articulate communication, and controlled action that it helps to mediate.  Thus, the FS serves two main types of purposes:  (a) As a formal language, it permits the articulation of an agent's observations with respect to the actual and proposed properties of an object system.  (b) In addition, it embodies a ''system of practices'', including techniques of argumentation, that are useful in representing reasoning about the properties and activities of the object system and that give the FS meaning and bearing with respect to the objective world.

# A ''formal system'' (FS) contains the signs, expressions, and forms of argumentation that embody a particular way of talking and thinking about the objects in a designated OS.  For the agent that uses a given FS, its design determines the way that these objects are perceived, described, and reasoned about, and the details of its constitution have consequences for all the processes of observation, contemplation, logical expression, articulate communication, and controlled action that it helps to mediate.  Thus, the FS serves two main types of purposes:  (a) As a formal language, it permits the articulation of an agent's observations with respect to the actual and proposed properties of an object system.  (b) In addition, it embodies a ''system of practices'', including techniques of argumentation, that are useful in representing reasoning about the properties and activities of the object system and that give the FS meaning and bearing with respect to the objective world.

There is a standard form of disclaimer that needs to be attached to this scheme of categories, qualifying any claim that it might be interpreted as making about the ontological status of the proposed distinctions.  As often as not, the three categories of systems identified above do not correspond to materially different types of underlying entities so much as different stages in their development, or only in the development of discussions about them.  As always, these distinctions do not reveal the essential categories and the substantial divergences of real systems so much as they reflect different ways of viewing them.

There is a standard form of disclaimer that needs to be attached to this scheme of categories, qualifying any claim that it might be interpreted as making about the ontological status of the proposed distinctions.  As often as not, the three categories of systems identified above do not correspond to materially different types of underlying entities so much as different stages in their development, or only in the development of discussions about them.  As always, these distinctions do not reveal the essential categories and the substantial divergences of real systems so much as they reflect different ways of viewing them.

The need for a note of caution at this point is due to a persistent but unfortunate tendency of the symbol using mentality, one that forms a potentially deleterious side effect to the necessary analytic capacity.  Namely, having once discovered the many splendored facets of each real object worth looking into, the mind never ceases from trying to force its imagined "categories of descriptive expressions" (CODEs) down into the original "categories of real entities" (COREs).  In spite of every contrary impression, the deeper lying substrate of existence is solely responsible for funding the phenomenal appearances of the world.

The need for a note of caution at this point is due to a persistent but unfortunate tendency of the symbol-using mentality, one that forms a potentially deleterious side effect to the necessary analytic capacity.  Namely, having once discovered the many splendored facets of each real object worth looking into, the mind never ceases from trying to force its imagined ''categories of descriptive expressions'' (CODEs) down into the original ''categories of real entities'' (COREs).  In spite of every contrary impression, the deeper-lying substrate of existence is solely responsible for funding the phenomenal appearances of the world.

Out of this tendency of the symbol using mentality arises a constant difficulty with every theory of every reality.  Namely, every use of a "theoretical framework" (TF) to view an "underlying reality" (UR) leads the user to forget, temporarily, that the reality is "anything but" (AB) its appearance, image, or representation in that framework.  Logically speaking, there is an inalienable spectre of negation involved in every form of apparition, imagination, or representation.  This AB negation would be complete if it were not for the possibility held out that some URs may nevertheless be capable of representing themselves over time.

Out of this tendency of the symbol-using mentality arises a constant difficulty with every theory of every reality.  Namely, every use of a ''theoretical framework'' to view an ''underlying reality'' leads the user to forget, temporarily, that the reality is ''anything but'' its appearance, image, or representation in that framework.  Logically speaking, there is an inalienable spectre of negation involved in every form of apparition, imagination, or representation.  This abnegation would be complete if it were not for the possibility held out that some underlying realities may nevertheless be capable of representing themselves over time.

The relationship of objects in an UR to their images in a TF is a topic that this discussion will return to repeatedly as the work progresses.  In sum, for now, all of the following statements are approximations to the truth.  At any given moment, the image is usually not the object.  At times, it can almost be anything but the object.  It is even entirely possible, oddly enough, that the image is nothing but the negation of the object, but as often as not it enjoys a more complex relationship than that of sheer opposition.  Over time, in some instances, the image can become nearly indistinguishable from its object, but whether this is a good thing or not, in the long run, I cannot tell.  The sense of the resulting identification, the bearing of the image on its object, depends on "exactly how" and "how exactly" this final coincidence comes about.

The relationship of objects in an underlying reality to their images in a theoretical framework is a topic that this discussion will return to repeatedly as the work progresses.  In sum, for now, all of the following statements are approximations to the truth.  At any given moment, the image is usually not the object.  At times, it can almost be anything but the object.  It is even entirely possible, oddly enough, that the image is nothing but the negation of the object, but as often as not it enjoys a more complex relationship than that of sheer opposition.  Over time, in some instances, the image can become nearly indistinguishable from its object, but whether this is a good thing or not, in the long run, I cannot tell.  The sense of the resulting identification, the bearing of the image on its object, depends on ''exactly how'' and ''how exactly'' this final coincidence comes about.

One of the goals of this work, indeed, of the whole pragmatic theory of sign relations, is an adequate understanding of the relationship between UR objects and TF images.  The purpose and also the criterion of an "adequate understanding" is this:  It would prevent an interpretive agent, even while immersed in the context of a pertinent sign relation and deliberately taking part in a share of its conduct, from ever being confused again about the different roles of objects and images.

One of the goals of this work, indeed, of the whole pragmatic theory of sign relations, is an adequate understanding of the relationship between underlying reality objects and theoretical framework images.  The purpose and also the criterion of an ''adequate understanding'' is this:  It would prevent an interpretive agent, even while immersed in the context of a pertinent sign relation and deliberately taking part in a share of its conduct, from ever being confused again about the different roles of objects and images.

If one assumes that there is a unique and all inclusive universe, and thus only one kind of system in essence that generates the phenomenon known as the "whole objective world" (WOW), then this integral form of universe is bound to enjoy all three aspects of systems phenomena in full measure.  Then the task for a fully system theoretic and reflective inquiry is to see how all of these aspects of systems can be integrated into a single mode of realization.

If one assumes that there is a unique and all inclusive universe, and thus only one kind of system in essence that generates the phenomenon known as the "whole objective world" (WOW), then this integral form of universe is bound to enjoy all three aspects of systems phenomena in full measure.  Then the task for a fully system theoretic and reflective inquiry is to see how all of these aspects of systems can be integrated into a single mode of realization.