Changes

For ease of reference, I introduce the following terminology.  With respect to the empirical dimension, a ''good'' POSR is described as an ''exculpable self-reference'' (ESR) while a ''bad'' POSR is described as an ''indictable self-reference'' (ISR).  With respect to the intuitive dimension, a ''good'' POSR is depicted as an ''explicative self-reference'' (ESR) while a ''bad'' POSR is depicted as an ''implicative self-reference'' (ISR).  Here, underscored acronyms are used to mark the provisionally settled, hypothetically tentative, or status quo condition of these casually intuitive categories.

For ease of reference, I introduce the following terminology.  With respect to the empirical dimension, a ''good'' POSR is described as an ''exculpable self-reference'' (ESR) while a ''bad'' POSR is described as an ''indictable self-reference'' (ISR).  With respect to the intuitive dimension, a ''good'' POSR is depicted as an ''explicative self-reference'' (ESR) while a ''bad'' POSR is depicted as an ''implicative self-reference'' (ISR).  Here, underscored acronyms are used to mark the provisionally settled, hypothetically tentative, or status quo condition of these casually intuitive categories.

These categories of POSRs can be discussed in greater detail as follows:

These categories of POSRs can be discussed in greater detail as follows:

1. There is an "empirical distinction" that appears to impose itself on the varieties of self-reference, separating the forms that lead to trouble in thought and communication from the forms that do not.  And there is a pragmatic reason for being interested in this distinction, the motive being to avoid the corresponding types of trouble in reflective thinking.  Whether this apparent distinction can hold up under close examination is a good question to consider at a later point.  But the real trouble to be faced at the moment is that an empirical distinction is a post hoc mark, a difference that makes itself obvious only after the possibly unpleasant facts to be addressed are already present in experience.  Consequently, its certain recognition comes too late to avert the adverse portions of those circumstances that its very recognition is desired to avoid.

<ol style="list-style-type:decimal">

According to the form of this empirical distinction, a POSR can be classified either as an "exculpable self-reference" (ESR) or as an "indictable self-reference" (ISR).  The distinction and the categories to either side of it are intended to sort out the POSRs that are safe and effective to use in thought and communication from the POSRs that can be hazardous to the health of inquiry.

<p>There is an ''empirical distinction'' that appears to impose itself on the varieties of self-reference, separating the forms that lead to trouble in thought and communication from the forms that do not.  And there is a pragmatic reason for being interested in this distinction, the motive being to avoid the corresponding types of trouble in reflective thinking.  Whether this apparent distinction can hold up under close examination is a good question to consider at a later point.  But the real trouble to be faced at the moment is that an empirical distinction is a ''post&nbsp;hoc'' mark, a difference that makes itself obvious only after the possibly unpleasant facts to be addressed are already present in experience.  Consequently, its certain recognition comes too late to avert the adverse portions of those circumstances that its very recognition is desired to avoid.</p>

More explicitly, the distinction between ESRs and ISRs is intended to capture the differences that exist between the following cases:

<p>According to the form of this empirical distinction, a POSR can be classified either as an ''exculpable self-reference'' (ESR) or as an ''indictable self-reference'' (ISR).  The distinction and the categories to either side of it are intended to sort out the POSRs that are safe and effective to use in thought and communication from the POSRs that can be hazardous to the health of inquiry.</p>

a. ESRs are POSRs that cause no apparent problems in thought or communication, often appearing as practiaclly useful in many contexts and even as logically necessary in some contexts.

<p>More explicitly, the distinction between ESRs and ISRs is intended to capture the differences that exist between the following cases:</p></li>

I refer to this as an "empirical distinction", in spite of the fact that the domain of experience in question is decidedly a formal one, because it rests on the kinds of concrete experiences and grows through the kinds of unforseen developments that are ever the hallmark of experimental knowledge.

<p>ESRs are POSRs that cause no apparent problems in thought or communication, often appearing as practiaclly useful in many contexts and even as logically necessary in some contexts.</p></li>

There is a pragmatic motive involved in this effort to classify the forms of self-reference, namely, to avoid certain types of trouble that seem to arise in reasoning by means of self referent forms.  Accordingly, there is an obvious difference in the uses of self referent forms that is of focal interest here, but it presents itself as an empirical distinction, that is, an after the fact feature or post hoc mark.  Namely, there are forms of self-reference that prove themselves useful in practice, being conducive to both thought and communciation, and then there are forms that always seem to lead to trouble.  The difference is evident enough after the impact of their effects has begun to set in, but it is not always easy to recognize these facts in advance of risking the very circumstances of confusion that one desires a classification to avoid.

<p>ISRs are POSRs that lead to various sorts of trouble in the attempt to reason with them or to reason about them, that is, to use them consistently or even to decide for or against their use.</p></li></ol>

In summary, one has the following problem.  There is found an empirical distinction between different kinds of self-reference, one that becomes evident and is easy to judge after the onset of their effects has begun to set in, between the kinds of self-reference that lead to trouble and the kinds that do not.  But what kinds of intuitive features, properties that one could recognize before the fact, would serve to distinguish the immanent and imminent empirical categories before one has gone through the trouble of suffering their effects?

<p>I refer to this as an ''empirical distinction'' in spite of the fact that the domain of experience in question is decidedly a formal one, because it rests on the kinds of concrete experiences and grows through the kinds of unforeseen developments that are ever the hallmark of experimental knowledge.</p>

Thus, one has the problem of translating between a given collection of empirical categories and a suitable collection of intuitive categories, the latter being of a kind that can be judged before the facts of experience have become inevitable, hoping thereby to correlate the two dimensions in such a way that the categories of intuition about POSRs can foretell the categories of experience with POSRs.

<p>There is a pragmatic motive involved in this effort to classify the forms of self-reference, namely, to avoid certain types of trouble that seem to arise in reasoning by means of self referent forms.  Accordingly, there is an obvious difference in the uses of self referent forms that is of focal interest here, but it presents itself as an empirical distinction, that is, an after the fact feature or ''post&nbsp;hoc'' mark.  Namely, there are forms of self-reference that prove themselves useful in practice, being conducive to both thought and communication, and then there are forms that always seem to lead to trouble.  The difference is evident enough after the impact of their effects has begun to set in, but it is not always easy to recognize these facts in advance of risking the very circumstances of confusion that one desires a classification to avoid.</p>

2. In a tentative approach to the subject of self-reference, I notice a principled distinction between two varieties of self-reference, that I call "constitutional", "implicative", or "intrinsic self-reference" (ISR) and "extra constitutional", "explicative", or "extrinsic self-reference" (ESR), respectively.

<p>In summary, one has the following problem.  There is found an empirical distinction between different kinds of self-reference, one that becomes evident and is easy to judge after the onset of their effects has begun to set in, between the kinds of self-reference that lead to trouble and the kinds that do not.  But what kinds of intuitive features, properties that one could recognize before the fact, would serve to distinguish the immanent and imminent empirical categories before one has gone through the trouble of suffering their effects?</p>

a. ISR

<p>Thus, one has the problem of translating between a given collection of empirical categories and a suitable collection of intuitive categories, the latter being of a kind that can be judged before the facts of experience have become inevitable, hoping thereby to correlate the two dimensions in such a way that the categories of intuition about POSRs can foretell the categories of experience with POSRs.</p></li>

b. ESR

<p>In a tentative approach to the subject of self-reference, I notice a principled distinction between two varieties of self-reference, that I call ''constitutional'', ''implicative'', or ''intrinsic self-reference'' (ISR) and ''extra-constitutional'', ''explicative'', or ''extrinsic self-reference'' (ESR), respectively.</p></li>

In the rest of this section I put aside the question of defining a thing, symbol, or concept in terms of itself, which promises to be an exercise in futility, and consider only the possibility of explaining, explicating, or elaborating a thing, symbol, or concept in terms of itself.  In this connection I attach special importance to a particular style of exposition, one that reformulates one's initial idea of an object in terms of the active implications or the effective consequences that its presence in a situation or its recognition and use in an application constitutes for the practical agent concerned.  This style of "pragmatic reconstruction" can serve a useful purpose in clarifying the information one possesses about the object, sign, or idea of concern.  Properly understood, it is marks the effective reformulation of ideas in ways that are akin to the more reductive sorts of "operational definition", but overall is both more comprehensive and more pointedly related to the pragmatic agent, or the actual interpreter of the symbols and concepts in question.

In the rest of this section I put aside the question of defining a thing, symbol, or concept in terms of itself, which promises to be an exercise in futility, and consider only the possibility of explaining, explicating, or elaborating a thing, symbol, or concept in terms of itself.  In this connection I attach special importance to a particular style of exposition, one that reformulates one's initial idea of an object in terms of the active implications or the effective consequences that its presence in a situation or its recognition and use in an application constitutes for the practical agent concerned.  This style of "pragmatic reconstruction" can serve a useful purpose in clarifying the information one possesses about the object, sign, or idea of concern.  Properly understood, it is marks the effective reformulation of ideas in ways that are akin to the more reductive sorts of "operational definition", but overall is both more comprehensive and more pointedly related to the pragmatic agent, or the actual interpreter of the symbols and concepts in question.