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If the essence of inquiry, or any aspect of what an inquiry can be, is captured by the concept of a TOSR, then a lot can be learned about the nature of inquiry by studying the manifest varieties and the internal structures of TOSRs.

If the essence of inquiry, or any aspect of what an inquiry can be, is captured by the concept of a TOSR, then a lot can be learned about the nature of inquiry by studying the manifest varieties and the internal structures of TOSRs.

Expressing this in terms of a prospective calculus, the present inquiry, <math>y_0,\!</math> constituted as an inquiry into inquiry, <math>y \cdot y,\!</math> ...

Expressing this in terms of a prospective calculus, the present inquiry, y0, constituted as an inquiry into inquiry, y.y, ...

As the clarification of a concept is pursued to the limit, it approaches the status of a definition.  And so one finds oneself contemplating a definition of inquiry that defines it at least partially in terms of itself.  But an attempt to define a concept in terms of itself is ordinarily considered to be a bad thing, leading to the sort of circular definition that vitiates the utility of the whole effort toward clarity.

As the clarification of a concept is pursued to the limit, it approaches the status of a definition.  And so one finds oneself contemplating a definition of inquiry that defines it at least partially in terms of itself.  But an attempt to define a concept in terms of itself is ordinarily considered to be a bad thing, leading to the sort of circular definition that vitiates the utility of the whole effort toward clarity.

In summary, because the subject of "inquiry" is something that one can reasonably be in question about, and because the topic of "inquiry" is something that one can sensibly inquire into, the chances that one can make sense of an inquiry into inquiry is not merely an interesting and diverting possibility but a necessary part of the meaning of inquiry.

In summary, because the subject of inquiry is something that one can reasonably be in question about, and because the topic of inquiry is something that one can sensibly inquire into, the chances that one can make sense of an inquiry into inquiry is not merely an interesting and diverting possibility but a necessary part of the meaning of inquiry.

Definitions are limiting cases of clarifications, since a process of clarification pursued far enough approaches a formulation of a concept that is tantamount to its definition.   

Definitions are limiting cases of clarifications, since a process of clarification pursued far enough approaches a formulation of a concept that is tantamount to its definition.   

Before an inquiry can proceed very far, it needs to develop a map or a plan of the territory that the agent of inquiry intends to investigate.  This task involves the drawing of distinctions, the finding of natural differences and the making of useful separations, among the objects of inquiry.

Before an inquiry can proceed very far, it needs to develop a map or a plan of the territory that the agent of inquiry intends to investigate.  This task involves the drawing of distinctions, the finding of natural differences and the making of useful separations, among the objects of inquiry.

Let me call attention to a compound form of existence, the kind that is composed of a sign and the interpreter that authors it, and describe it more briefly as a "sign and issuer" (SAI) or a "text and writer" (TAW).  As long as one moves through a casual context it is convenient to carry along these portmanteau words, precisely because their two components are confounded so consistently in informal speech, where it is hardly polite to keep on objecting to their ambiguities and anthropomorphisms.  When I say that a SAI does this or that, it is up to the good sense of a charitable interpreter to decide whether this or that is something that a sign or rather its issuer is supposed to be able to do.  In these terms, a SAI that speaks of and to itself and addresses its own composition or a TAW that talks about itself in either sense are not likely to have the same interest for others as they do in themselves.

Let me call attention to a compound form of existence, the kind that is composed of a sign and the interpreter that authors it, and describe it more briefly as a ''sign and issuer'' (SAI) or a ''text and writer'' (TAW).  As long as one moves through a casual context it is convenient to carry along these portmanteau words, precisely because their two components are confounded so consistently in informal speech, where it is hardly polite to keep on objecting to their ambiguities and anthropomorphisms.  When I say that a SAI does this or that, it is up to the good sense of a charitable interpreter to decide whether this or that is something that a sign or rather its issuer is supposed to be able to do.  In these terms, a SAI that speaks of and to itself and addresses its own composition or a TAW that talks about itself in either sense are not likely to have the same interest for others as they do in themselves.

It is ordinarily thought to be a good thing for a SAI or a TAW to be able to reflect on itself, but one whose subject is solely oneself is not ordinarily thought to be of interest to others.   

It is ordinarily thought to be a good thing for a SAI or a TAW to be able to reflect on itself, but one whose subject is solely oneself is not ordinarily thought to be of interest to others.   

In this work, I am interested in SAI's and TAW's that survive the onset of recursion while avoiding the snares of sheer self reference, that pose patterns of self reference but only in the service of a greater subject, and that slip the snarly bonds of narcissism frequently enough to say something significant about something else.

In this work, I am interested in SAIs and TAWs that survive the onset of recursion while avoiding the snares of sheer self reference, that pose patterns of self reference but only in the service of a greater subject, and that slip the snarly bonds of narcissism frequently enough to say something significant about something else.

It is a form of narcissism to think that others are necessarily as interested in every detail of one's existence as one is oneself.  But narcissism is an unnatural condition that has to be distinguished from one's more commonly understandable interest in oneself.  In its extreme forms, a full blown narcissism is not the natural flourishing of a healthy self interest but the outgrowth of deep and typically early disturbances in the systematic structure of the self.

It is a form of narcissism to think that others are necessarily as interested in every detail of one's existence as one is oneself.  But narcissism is an unnatural condition that has to be distinguished from one's more commonly understandable interest in oneself.  In its extreme forms, a full blown narcissism is not the natural flourishing of a healthy self interest but the outgrowth of deep and typically early disturbances in the systematic structure of the self.

In order to understand how a sign functions as a sign it is necessary to understand the interpreter for whom it actually functions as a sign.  The ways that a sign denotes its objects and connotes its interpretants say a lot about the interpreter for whom it denotes its objects and for whom it connotes its interpretants, where the antecedents of all these "its" can be either the sign or its interpreter.  To the extent that all knowledge is expressed in signs, to know anything at all is to know an aspect of oneself, however unwittingly.  In this way, one can arrive at the epigrammatic formulas that "all knowledge is self knowledge" and that "every inquiry is an inquiry into inquiry".

In order to understand how a sign functions as a sign it is necessary to understand the interpreter for whom it actually functions as a sign.  The ways that a sign denotes its objects and connotes its interpretants say a lot about the interpreter for whom it denotes its objects and for whom it connotes its interpretants, where the antecedents of all these occurrences of &ldquo;its&rdquo; can be either the sign or its interpreter.  To the extent that all knowledge is expressed in signs, to know anything at all is to know an aspect of oneself, however unwittingly.  In this way, one can arrive at the epigrammatic formulas that &ldquo;all knowledge is self knowledge&rdquo; and that &ldquo;every inquiry is an inquiry into inquiry&rdquo;.

A "symbol" is a type of sign whose relation to its object is constituted solely by the fact that an interpreter employs it to denote that object, in other words, that an interpretant connects it with that object in an "elementary sign relation", or an ordered triple of the form <o, s, i>. This means that the nature and the character of an interpreter can be studied especially well as reflected in the symbols that it employs.

A ''symbol'' is a type of sign whose relation to its object is constituted solely by the fact that an interpreter employs it to denote that object, in other words, that an interpretant connects it with that object in an ''elementary sign relation'', or an ordered triple of the form <math>o, s, i.\!</math>  This means that the nature and the character of an interpreter can be studied especially well as reflected in the symbols that it employs.

Unlike icons and indices, which have rationales for their denotations in the properties and instances, respectively, which are common to objects and their signs, ...  

Unlike icons and indices, which have rationales for their denotations in the properties and instances, respectively, which are common to objects and their signs, ...  

term/premiss/argument:  symbols with internal or instructive hints?

: term/premiss/argument:  symbols with internal or instructive hints?

An "argument" is a type of symbol that incorporates among its syntactic provisions an independent indication of the method that is intended for its interpretation, that is, it embodies a series of hints about the ways and the means that its issuer intends its prospective interpreter to use in order to achieve its interpretant, in short, to reach its conclusion.

An ''argument'' is a type of symbol that incorporates among its syntactic provisions an independent indication of the method that is intended for its interpretation, that is, it embodies a series of hints about the ways and the means that its issuer intends its prospective interpreter to use in order to achieve its interpretant, in short, to reach its conclusion.

=====5.1.2.1. The Signal Moment=====

=====5.1.2.1. The Signal Moment=====