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| − | SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XIV - XVIII
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| − | [[Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa Theologiae|Index]]
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| − | *[[#q14a1|Question 14.1 Of God's Knowledge]]
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| − | *[[#q14a2|Question 14.2]]
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| − | *[[#q14a3|Question 14.3]]
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| − | *[[#q14a4|Question 14.4]]
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| − | *[[#q14a5|Question 14.5]]
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| − | *[[#q14a6|Question 14.6]]
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| − | *[[#q14a7|Question 14.7]]
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| − | *[[#q14a8|Question 14.8]]
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| − | *[[#q14a9|Question 14.9]]
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| − | *[[#q14a10|Question 14.10]]
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| − | *[[#q14a11|Question 14.11]]
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| − | *[[#q14a12|Question 14.12]]
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| − | *[[#q14a13|Question 14.13]]
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| − | *[[#q14a14|Question 14.14]]
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| − | *[[#q14a15|Question 14.15]]
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| − | *[[#q14a16|Question 14.16]]
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| − | *[[#q15a1|Question 15.1 Of Ideas]]
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| − | *[[#q15a2|Question 15.2]]
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| − | *[[#q15a3|Question 15.3]]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a1 Question 16.1 Of Truth (Main Logic Museum)]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a2 Question 16.2]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a3 Question 16.3]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a4 Question 16.4]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a5 Question 16.5]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a6 Question 16.6]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a7 Question 16.7]
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| − | *[http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/truth/aquinasq16.htm#a8 Question 16.8]
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| − | *[[#q17a1|Question 17.1 Concerning Falsity]]
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| − | *[[#q17a2|Question 17.2]]
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| − | *[[#q17a3|Question 17.3]]
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| − | *[[#q17a4|Question 17.4]]
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| − | *[[#q18a1|Question 18.1 The Life of God]]
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| − | *[[#q18a2|Question 18.2]]
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| − | *[[#q18a3|Question 18.3]]
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| − | *[[#q18a4|Question 18.4]]
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 pr. </b>Post considerationem eorum quae ad divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in effectum exteriorem procedentis. Quia vero intelligere quoddam vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam considerandum de veritate et falsitate. Rursum, quia omne cognitum in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Circa scientiam vero quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. Secundo, utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. Tertio, utrum comprehendat se. Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. Quinto, utrum intelligat alia a se. Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam cognitionem. Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. Octavo, utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit eorum quae non sunt. Decimo, utrum sit malorum. Undecimo, utrum sit singularium. Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. Decimotertio, utrum sit contingentium futurorum. Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium. Decimoquinto, utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Decimosexto, utrum Deus de rebus habeat speculativam scientiam vel practicam. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q14a1"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit scientia. Scientia enim habitus est, qui Deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam et actum. Ergo scientia non est in Deo. ||Objection 1. It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omnis scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo non est scientia. ||Objection 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (3, 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit Rom. XI, o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. ||On the contrary, The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Romans 11:33).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem. Propter quod dicit philosophus, III de anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia. Coarctatio autem formae est per materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. Unde in II de anima dicitur quod plantae non cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis. ||I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (7, 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (7, 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia et actus purus. ||Reply to Objection 1. Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (4, 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis, in Deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est. Homo autem, secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam, secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed haec omnia Deus una et simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit. Unde simplex Dei cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest, ita tamen quod ab unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit, secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid perfectionis est. Et secundum hoc dicitur Iob XII, apud ipsum est sapientia et fortitudo; ipse habet consilium et intelligentiam. ||Reply to Objection 2. Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (13, 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis, scitum enim est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo, cum modus divinae essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturae sunt, scientia divina non habet modum creatae scientiae, ut scilicet sit universalis vel particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia, vel secundum aliquem talem modum disposita. ||Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a2"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non intelligat se. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, quod omnis sciens qui scit suam essentiam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Sed Deus non exit extra essentiam suam, nec aliquo modo movetur, et sic non competit sibi redire ad essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est sciens essentiam suam. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, intelligere est quoddam pati et moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima, scientia etiam est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum etiam est perfectio scientis. Sed nihil movetur, vel patitur, vel perficitur a seipso; neque similitudo sibi est, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo Deus non est sciens seipsum. ||Objection 2. Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, praecipue Deo sumus similes secundum intellectum, quia secundum mentem sumus ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed intellectus noster non intelligit se, nisi sicut intelligit alia, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo nec Deus intelligit se, nisi forte intelligendo alia. ||Objection 3. Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. II, quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. ||On the contrary, It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Corinthians 2:11).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, licet in operationibus quae transeunt in exteriorem effectum, obiectum operationis, quod significatur ut terminus, sit aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus quae sunt in operante, obiectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in actu. Unde dicitur in libro de anima, quod sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis, ita scilicet, ut neque careat specie intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia; neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus divinus. Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit. ||I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur, inquantum vero in seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivae quae non sunt subsistentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non cognoscunt seipsas; sicut patet in singulis sensibus. Sed virtutes cognoscitivae per se subsistentes, cognoscunt seipsas. Et propter hoc dicitur in libro de causis, quod sciens essentiam suam, redit ad essentiam suam. Per se autem subsistere maxime convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime rediens ad essentiam suam, et cognoscens seipsum. ||Reply to Objection 1. Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce secundum quod intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur in III de anima. Non enim intelligere est motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est ab alio in aliud, sed actus perfecti, existens in ipso agente. Similiter etiam quod intellectus perficiatur ab intelligibili vel assimiletur ei, hoc convenit intellectui qui quandoque est in potentia, quia per hoc quod est in potentia, differt ab intelligibili, et assimilatur ei per speciem intelligibilem, quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et perficitur per ipsam, sicut potentia per actum. Sed intellectus divinus, qui nullo modo est in potentia, non perficitur per intelligibile, neque assimilatur ei, sed est sua perfectio et suum intelligibile. ||Reply to Objection 2. Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod esse naturale non est materiae primae, quae est in potentia, nisi secundum quod est reducta in actum per formam. Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium, eo quod est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad naturalia. Unde intellectus noster possibilis non potest habere intelligibilem operationem, nisi inquantum perficitur per speciem intelligibilem alicuius. Et sic intelligit seipsum per speciem intelligibilem, sicut et alia, manifestum est enim quod ex eo quod cognoscit intelligibile, intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam. Deus autem est sicut actus purus tam in ordine existentium, quam in ordine intelligibilium, et ideo per seipsum, seipsum intelligit. ||Reply to Objection 3. Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a3"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod id quod comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Si dicatur quod Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est contra prius determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum. ||Objection 2. If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (7, 1). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit ibidem, omne quod intelligit se, comprehendit se. Sed Deus intelligit se. Ergo comprehendit se. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut cognoscibilis est. Sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur, quando scitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est. Est enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus, non enim cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Tanta est autem virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia per hoc quod actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit. ||I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (1, 2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat aliquid habens et includens alterum. Et sic oportet quod omne comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat. Sed huiusmodi locutiones per negationem sunt exponendae. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur; ita dicitur comprehendi a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum, quod totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem. ||Reply to Objection 1. The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in non excedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquod finitum in non excedendo intellectum finitum. Non autem sic dicitur Deus sibi finitus, quod ipse intelligat se esse aliquid finitum. ||Reply to Objection 2. When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a4"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipsum intelligere Dei non sit eius substantia. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Operatio autem aliquid significat procedens ab operante. Ergo ipsum intelligere Dei non est ipsa Dei substantia. ||Objection 1. It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, cum aliquis intelligit se intelligere, hoc non est intelligere aliquid magnum vel principale intellectum, sed intelligere quoddam secundarium et accessorium. Si igitur Deus sit ipsum intelligere, intelligere Deum erit sicut cum intelligimus intelligere. Et sic non erit aliquid magnum intelligere Deum. ||Objection 2. Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne intelligere est aliquid intelligere. Cum ergo Deus intelligit se, si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum. Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia. ||Objection 3. Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., Deo hoc est esse, quod sapientem esse. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius substantia. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (3, 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia. Nam si intelligere Dei sit aliud quam eius substantia, oporteret, ut dicit philosophus in XII Metaphys., quod aliquid aliud esset actus et perfectio substantiae divinae, ad quod se haberet substantia divina sicut potentia ad actum (quod est omnino impossibile), nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis. Hoc autem qualiter sit, considerandum est. Sicut enim supra dictum est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio eius, prout esse est perfectio existentis, sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem. In Deo autem non est forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde, cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum est, ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse. Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis quod in Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem. Unde patet quod per hoc quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla multiplicitas ponitur in eius substantia. ||I answer that, It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above (2), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above (3). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere non est operatio exiens ab ipso operante, sed manens in ipso. ||Reply to Objection 1. To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum intelligitur illud intelligere quod non est subsistens, non intelligitur aliquid magnum; sicut cum intelligimus intelligere nostrum. Et ideo non est simile de ipso intelligere divino, quod est subsistens. ||Reply to Objection 2. When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium. Nam intelligere divinum, quod est in seipso subsistens, est sui ipsius; et non alicuius alterius, ut sic oporteat procedere in infinitum. ||Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a5"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qu., quod neque quidquam Deus extra seipsum intuetur. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod est impossibile. ||Objection 2. Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ipsum intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a se. ||Objection 3. Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr. IV, omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius. ||On the contrary, It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (Hebrews 4:13).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est. Ad sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso. ||I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (2, 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause--viz. God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in seipso, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species eius, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia Dei. ||Reply to Objection 2. The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam. ||Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a6"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo, sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (5), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic, cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere. ||Objection 2. Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (12/2). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge of it.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res solum in communi. ||Objection 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra, habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod pertingit usque ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius. ||On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Hebrews 4:12-13).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris, cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida; ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se, esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis, sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam, cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem; tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum, sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma, per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem, homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi, sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem, cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium, cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit, secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur. ||I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings. But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (4, 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors. Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (4, 2) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est, potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu, inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso. ||Reply to Objection 1. So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge. We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e converso. ||Reply to Objection 2. The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque, secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a diversis creaturis. ||Reply to Objection 3. The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a7"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1 </b>Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud discurrat. ||Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo cognitio sua est discursiva. ||Objection 2. Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in Deo. ||Objection 3. Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod Deus non particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno, quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum, procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus. Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius cognitio non est discursiva. ||I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam, effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio est sine discursu, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 2. God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 7 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva. ||Reply to Objection 3. God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a8"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1 </b>Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat. ||Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rm. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae sint ab aeterno. ||Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum. ||Objection 3. Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., universas creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo sunt, quia novit. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis. ||I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of approbation."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae, cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus sciat. ||Reply to Objection 1. Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above. But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen quod creaturae sint ab aeterno. ||Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 8 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam facta capit. ||Reply to Objection 3. Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a9"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1 </b>Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium. ||Objection 1. It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet scientiam de non entibus. ||Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt. ||On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (Romans 4:17).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum extra videntem. ||I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic sciuntur a Deo. ||Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a Deo. ||Reply to Objection 2. Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 9 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse possint. ||Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a10"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1 </b>Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (2), it seems that God does not know evil things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. ||Objection 2. Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo Deus non cognoscit mala. ||Objection 3. Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, quod cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum. ||Objection 4. Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb. XV, Infernus et perditio coram Deo. ||On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 15:11), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus per semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras quam a lumine. ||I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum. ||Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. ||Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita cognoscit. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 10 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per bonum. ||Reply to Objection 4. To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a11"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1 </b>Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima, ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus non cognoscit singularia. ||Objection 2. Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo, quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia. ||Objection 3. Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, omnes viae hominum patent oculis eius. ||On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 16:2), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate. Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est. Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei, inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum. ||I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (4, 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect. Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity. On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (44, 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia, non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia. ||Reply to Objection 1. Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et materialia, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 11 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a12"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1 </b>Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita. Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit, XII de Civ. Dei, quod quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi. ||Objection 1. It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2 </b>Si dicatur quod ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra, ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic. Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est infinita. ||Objection 2. Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a Deo. ||Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius scientiae non est numerus. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita. Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen, si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur, creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest. Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt ab invicem distincta. ||I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infiniti ratio congruit quantitati, secundum philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita. ||Reply to Objection 1. The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus, et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum, potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen tanquam pertransibile. ||Reply to Objection 2. Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 12 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei. ||Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a13"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1 </b>Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium. ||Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster. probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo, est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium. ||Objection 2. Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum contingens futurum est scitum a Deo. ||Objection 3. Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, qui finxit singillatim corda eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum, scilicet hominum. Sed opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia. ||On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata. ||I answer that, Since as was shown above (9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (10, 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria. ||Reply to Objection 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est. Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, sicut et antecedens, quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est esse, ut dicitur in I Periherm. ||Reply to Objection 2. Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow." Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 13 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est intelligibile. ||Reply to Objection 3. Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a14"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1 </b>Ad decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia. ||Objection 1. It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia. ||Objection 2. Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, dominus scit cogitationes hominum. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia. ||On the contrary, It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (Psalm 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri; Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis accidere possunt. ||I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (9), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium. ||Reply to Objection 1. This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 14 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur. ||Reply to Objection 2. Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a15"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1 </b>Ad decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum. ||Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem. ||Objection 2. Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Deus scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis. ||Objection 3. Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. I, quod apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque vicissitudinis obumbratio. ||On the contrary, It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse. ||I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (9, 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo, quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de Deo. ||Reply to Objection 1. "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit. Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret, esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea sciat. ||Reply to Objection 2. God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 15 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera, quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit, scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est, quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re, eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo. ||Reply to Objection 3. The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
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| − | ||<div id="q14a16"><b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1 </b>Ad decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa. ||Objection 1. It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above (8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea. Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa. ||Objection 2. Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 s. c. </b>Sed contra, omne quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam. ||On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, nam intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo, sicut dicitur in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam, secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas. ||I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt. ||Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est humana. ||Reply to Objection 2. The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 14 a. 16 ad 3 </b>Ad id vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam omnium aliorum. ||Reply to Objection 3. In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 pr. </b>Post considerationem de scientia Dei, restat considerare de ideis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, an sint ideae. Secundo, utrum sint plures, vel una tantum. Tertio, utrum sint omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q15a1"><b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo ideae non sunt. ||Objection 1. It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Deus in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia. ||Objection 2. Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (14, 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, idea ponitur ut principium cognoscendi et operandi. Sed essentia divina est sufficiens principium cognoscendi et operandi omnia. Non ergo necesse est ponere ideas. ||Objection 3. Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., tanta vis in ideis constituitur, ut, nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse nemo possit. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. Quod sic patet. In omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse finem generationis cuiuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter formam, nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam enim agentibus praeexistit forma rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per naturam; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae agunt per intellectum; sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideae. ||I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (46, 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se existentem. Et sic etiam Aristoteles improbat opinionem Platonis de ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes, non in intellectu. ||Reply to Objection 1. God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet Deus per essentiam suam se et alia cognoscat, tamen essentia sua est principium operativum aliorum, non autem sui ipsius, et ideo habet rationem ideae secundum quod ad alia comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia. ||Reply to Objection 3. God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
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| − | ||<div id="q15a2"><b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. Idea enim in Deo est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea est una. ||Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, sicut idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia. Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientiae. Ergo nec plures ideae. ||Objection 2. Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Si dicatur quod ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas, contra, pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa aeterni. ||Objection 3. Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturae non sint ab aeterno, pluralitas idearum non erit ab aeterno, si multiplicentur solum secundum huiusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo, sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas personarum, quod est contra Damascenum, dicentem quod in divinis omnia unum sunt, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem. Sic igitur non sunt plures ideae. ||Objection 4. Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., ideae sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII Metaphys. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium, prout quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est tanta rerum multitudo, secundum quam opinionem, Deus non haberet nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt. Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius similitudinem domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus, quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum; quae sunt plures ideae. ||I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae ex una essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideae. ||Reply to Objection 1. The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus intelligit, sed idea ut quod Deus intelligit. Deus autem uno intelligit multa; et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in materia, dicitur intelligere domum, dum autem intelligit formam domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam, intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere plures rationes rerum; vel, plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut intellectas. ||Reply to Objection 2. By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideae, non causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam suam ad res. ||Reply to Objection 3. Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus creatis, sed in Deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a Deo. ||Reply to Objection 4. Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
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| − | ||<div id="q15a3"><b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae. ||Objection 1. It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Deus cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et effectivae rerum. Ergo non omnium quae a Deo cognoscuntur, sunt ideae in ipso. ||Objection 2. Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Deus cognoscit materiam primam, quae non potest habere ideam, cum nullam habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius. ||Objection 3. Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera et singularia et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideae, secundum positionem Platonis, qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit Augustinus. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideae in ipso. ||Objection 4. Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra, ideae sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet. Sed omnium quae cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo omnium quae cognoscit, habet ideam. ||On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. Secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis. ||I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni. Et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio. ||Reply to Objection 1. Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum quod significat rationem. ||Reply to Objection 2. God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam, et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est. ||Reply to Objection 3. Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 15 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum subiecto. Accidentia autem quae superveniunt subiecto, specialem ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia quae a principio concomitantur domum, sed ea quae superveniunt domui iam factae, ut picturae vel aliquid aliud, facit per aliquam aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam ideam quam ideam speciei, tum quia singularia individuantur per materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et concausam ideae; tum quia intentio naturae consistit in speciebus, nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad singularia, ut infra dicetur. ||Reply to Objection 4. Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (22, 3).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 pr. </b>Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus. Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu. Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q17a1"><b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., si verum est id quod est, falsum non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante. ||Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera Relig., quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam speciem. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur. ||Objection 2. Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, verum dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est falsa. ||Objection 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above (16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod omne corpus est verum corpus et falsa unitas; quia imitatur unitatem, et non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid. Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere, quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit, secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium? Sicut per oppositum operatio virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa, quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod tragoedus est falsus Hector. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum, secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel, et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod eas res falsas nominamus, quae verisimilia apprehendimus. Et philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt. Et per hunc modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. ||I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art. In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Psalm 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21). But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est, dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. Unde verus tragoedus est falsus Hector, ut dicitur in II Soliloq. Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis. ||Reply to Objection 1. A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum non habent existentiam. ||Reply to Objection 2. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas secundum quid. ||Reply to Objection 3. Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum, quod in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo, dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus. ||Reply to Objection 4. To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
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| − | ||<div id="q17a2"><b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., si omnes corporis sensus ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus, ignoro. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic falsitas in sensu non est. ||Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod falsitas non est propria sensui, sed phantasiae. ||Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, in incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est falsitas. ||Objection 3. Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., apparet nos in omnibus sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu, ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem, sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum refertur ad alia. ||I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (16, 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are. The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire. ||Reply to Objection 1. The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione planius dicitur, quod sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non est. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem. ||Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum. ||Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
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| − | ||<div id="q17a3"><b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., omnis qui fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit. Sed falsum dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur. Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas. ||Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas. ||Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod ubi compositio intellectuum est, ibi verum et falsum est. Sed compositio intellectuum est in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu. ||On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21, 22 that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde, sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera. Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem, quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil intelligit. ||I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said (2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (16, 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (2). But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur, non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur. ||Reply to Objection 1. Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti. ||Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
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| − | ||<div id="q17a4"><b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, nam verum est id quod est, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. ||Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., tragoedus non esset falsus Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. ||Objection 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, in Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur, Ierem. VIII, apprehenderunt mendacium; Glossa, idest idola. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. ||Objection 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jeremiah 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam opinionem verae contrariam. ||On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris. Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus, IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria. ||I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas. Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum, contraria est, bonum non est bonum. ||Reply to Objection 1. What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero. ||Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 17 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua. Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate Dei. ||Reply to Objection 3. Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 pr. </b>Quoniam autem intelligere viventium est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino, considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q18a1"><b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam. ||Objection 1. It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora naturalia vivant. ||Objection 2. Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, inter corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora naturalia vitam habent. ||Objection 3. Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod plantae secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere, ex quo potest accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere. ||On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod vita in animalibus manifesta est. Unde secundum illud oportet distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere, quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam similitudinem. ||I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal, ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium corporum. ||Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri, nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali, non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco, vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora viventia. ||Reply to Objection 2. To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum, aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere, habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium. ||Reply to Objection 3. Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
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| − | ||<div id="q18a2"><b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti, sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est operatio quaedam. ||Objection 1. It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, vita activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo vita est quaedam operatio. ||Objection 2. Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet per illud Ioan. XVII, haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum. Ergo vita est operatio. ||Objection 3. Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, vivere viventibus est esse. ||On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu, cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere. ||I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (17, 3), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (13, 1), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" denotes "to run" in the abstract. Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae. Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod esse est sentire vel intelligere, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium. Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea; quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum, sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi; quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines. ||Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand--in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem, quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam, dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam, quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum dicitur vita aeterna. ||Reply to Objection 2. By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Unde patet solutio ad tertium. ||Reply to Objection 3. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
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| − | ||<div id="q18a3"><b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere. ||Objection 1. It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated (2). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, in omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde dicitur in II de anima, quod anima est viventis corporis causa et principium. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi non competit vivere. ||Objection 2. Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus incorporalibus non competit vivere. ||Objection 3. Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. ||On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo, finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam. Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus, videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu. ||I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship. But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio, una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle. Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti. ||Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet vivendi principium. ||Reply to Objection 2. As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc, in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus. ||Reply to Objection 3. Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.
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| − | ||<div id="q18a4"><b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim Act. XVII, in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus. Sed non omnia in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita. ||Objection 1. It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnia sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita. ||Objection 2. Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia. ||Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, sicut sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens. ||Objection 4. Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita. ||On the contrary, (John 1:3-4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina. ||I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated (3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita. ||Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse divinum. ||Reply to Objection 2. The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia. ||Reply to Objection 3. If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 18 a. 4 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo, cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis. ||Reply to Objection 4. Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.
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