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| ====3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos==== | | ====3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos==== |
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− | <pre>
| + | This Section outlines the general idea of a ''priorism of normative sciences'' (PONS) and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the ''pragmatic cosmos''. This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best accords with the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing the order of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this work. From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further qualification, it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean to invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying out of its live interpretation. |
− | This Section outlines the general idea of a "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS) | |
− | and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the "pragmatic cosmos". | |
− | This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best accords with | |
− | the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing the order | |
− | of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this work. | |
− | From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further qualification, | |
− | it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean to | |
− | invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its | |
− | underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying | |
− | out of its live interpretation. | |
| | | |
− | Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are | + | Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences, the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called ''aesthetics'', the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods |
− | exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences, | + | is called ''ethics'', and the study of signs that indicate these actions is called ''logic''. Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration and the analysis of signs with regard to their ''truth'', a property that only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the objects that are desired. In other words, logic evaluates signs with regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit in a mediate relationship to their objects. As an appreciative study, logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most likely to lead agents toward their objects. |
− | the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called "aesthetics", | |
− | the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods | |
− | is called "ethics", and the study of signs that indicate these actions | |
− | is called "logic". Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration | |
− | and the analysis of signs with regard to their "truth", a property that | |
− | only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the | |
− | objects that are desired. In other words, logic evaluates signs with | |
− | regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and | |
− | this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit | |
− | in a mediate relationship to their objects. As an appreciative study, | |
− | logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the | |
− | scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that | |
− | permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most | |
− | likely to lead agents toward their objects. | |
| | | |
− | From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics, | + | From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics, one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct. Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the ''good'' of |
− | one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special | + | anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications that lead to it. An action that leads to the good is a good action, and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics, as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions. A sign that indicates a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics. Moreover, thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs, and this makes thinking a special kind of action. In sum, the questions that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations. |
− | case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct. | |
− | Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the "good" of | |
− | anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications | |
− | that lead to it. An action that leads to the good is a good action, | |
− | and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics, | |
− | as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions. A sign that indicates | |
− | a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts | |
− | the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics. Moreover, | |
− | thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs, | |
− | and this makes thinking a special kind of action. In sum, the questions | |
− | that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are | |
− | properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations. | |
| | | |
− | The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of ethics, | + | The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of ethics, which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each realm from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch over all of the domains that it is set within. In sum, the image is that of three cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to a succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be, whether imaginary or real, rational or transcendental. |
− | which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each realm | |
− | from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch over | |
− | all of the domains that it is set within. In sum, the image is that of three | |
− | cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to a | |
− | succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the | |
− | lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes | |
− | their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone | |
− | that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be, whether | |
− | imaginary or real, rational or transcendental. | |
| | | |
− | Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics, | + | Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics, while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics. By way of definition, a ''monitory function'' is a duty, a role, or a task that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline, checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations, evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions, and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity of its acts in accord with its aims. A definite attitude and particular perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role with any hope or measure of success. The necessary station arises from the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once, and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature within a finite creation. Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims. |
− | while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics. | |
− | By way of definition, a "monitory function" is a duty, a role, or a task | |
− | that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline, | |
− | checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations, | |
− | evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions, | |
− | and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity | |
− | of its acts in accord with its aims. A definite attitude and particular | |
− | perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role | |
− | with any hope or measure of success. The necessary station arises from | |
− | the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once, | |
− | and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature | |
− | within a finite creation. Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty | |
− | needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor | |
− | it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher | |
− | considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and | |
− | finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims. | |
| | | |
| + | <pre> |
| To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS): | | To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS): |
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