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How does this ancient issue, concerning the relation of reason, to action, to the good that is overall desired or intended, transform itself through the medium of intellectual history onto the modern scene?  In particular, what bearing does it have on the subjects of artificial intelligence and systems theory, and on the object of the present inquiry?  As it turns out, in classical cybernetics and in systems theory, and especially in the parts of AI and cognitive science that have to do with heuristic reasoning, the transformations of the problem have tarried so long in the vicinity of a singular triviality that the original form of the question is nearly unmistakable in every modern version.  The transposition of the theme <math>(\text{Reason}, \text{Action}, \text{Good})</math> into the mode of <math>(\text{Intelligence}, \text{Operation}, \text{Goal})</math> can make for an interesting variation, but it does not alter the given state of accord or discord among its elements and does nothing to turn the lock into its key.

How does this ancient issue, concerning the relation of reason, to action,

to the good that is overall desired or intended, transform itself through

the medium of intellectual history onto the modern scene?  In particular,

what bearing does it have on the subjects of artificial intelligence and

systems theory, and on the object of the present inquiry?  As it turns out,

in classical cybernetics and in systems theory, and especially in the parts

of AI and cognitive science that have to do with heuristic reasoning, the

transformations of the problem have tarried so long in the vicinity of

a singular triviality that the original form of the question is nearly

unmistakable in every modern version.  The transposition of the theme

<Reason, Action, Good> into the mode of <Intelligence, Operation, Goal>

can make for an interesting variation, but it does not alter the given

state of accord or discord among its elements and does nothing to turn

the lock into its key.

How do these questions bear on the present inquiry?  Suppose that

How do these questions bear on the present inquiry?  Suppose that one is trying to understand something like an agency of life, a capacity for inquiry, a faculty of intelligence, or a power of learning and reasoning.  For starters, ''something like'' is a little vague, so let me suggest calling the target class of agencies, capacities, faculties, or powers that most hold my interest here by the name of ''virtues'', thereby invoking as an offstage direction the classical concepts of ''anima'' and ''arete'' that seem to prompt them all.  What all of these virtues have in common is their appearance, whether it strikes one on first impression or only develops in one's appreciation through a continuing acquaintance over time, of transcending or rising infinitely far beyond all of one's attempts to construct them from or reduce them to the sorts of instrumentalities that are much more basic, familiar, mundane, ordinary, simpler, in short, the kinds of abilities that one already understands well enough and is granted to have well under one's command or control. For convenience, I dub this class of abilities, that a particular agent has a thorough understanding of and a complete competency in, as the ''resources'' of that agent.

one is trying to understand something like an agency of life, a

capacity for inquiry, a faculty of intelligence, or a power of

learning and reasoning.  For starters, "something like" is a

little vague, so let me suggest calling the target class of

agencies, capacities, faculties, or powers that most hold

my interest here by the name of "virtues", thereby invoking

as an offstage direction the classical concepts of "anima"

and "arete" that seem to prompt them all.  What all of these

virtues have in common is their appearance, whether it strikes

one on first impression or only develops in one's appreciation

through a continuing acquaintance over time, of transcending or

rising infinitely far beyond all of one's attempts to construct

them from or reduce them to the sorts of instrumentalities that

are much more basic, familiar, mundane, ordinary, simpler, in

short, the kinds of abilities that one already understands well

enough and is granted to have well under one's command or control.

For convenience, I dub this class of abilities, that a particular

agent has a thorough understanding of and a complete competency in,

as the "resources" of that agent.

The language of "virtues" and "resources" gives me a way to express the

The language of ''virtues'' and ''resources'' gives me a way to express the main problem of this inquiry, indeed, the overriding challenge that is engaged in every round of effective analysis and functional modeling. I emphasized the ''apparent transcendence'' of virtues because the hope is often precisely that this appearance will turn out to be false, not that the virtue is false in any of the properties that it seems to have, but that the awesome aspect of its unapproachability can be diminished, and that a way opens up to acquire this virtue by means of the kinds of gradual steps that are available to a fallible and a finite agent.

main problem of this inquiry, indeed, the overriding challenge that is

engaged in every round of effective analysis and functional modeling.

I emphasized the "apparent transcendence" of virtues because the hope

is often precisely that this appearance will turn out to be false, not

that the virtue is false in any of the properties that it seems to have,

but that the awesome aspect of its unapproachability can be diminished,

and that a way opens up to acquire this virtue by means of the kinds of

gradual steps that are available to a fallible and a finite agent.

If I had my own choice in the matter I would proceed by using the words

If I had my own choice in the matter I would proceed by using the words ''knowledge'' and ''understanding'' as synonyms, deploying them in ways that make them refer to one and the same resource, roughly corresponding the Greek ''episteme'', and thus guaranteeing that the faculty they denote is teachable.  But others use these terms in ways that make one or the other of them suggest a transcendental aptitude more akin to ''wisdom'', and thus amounting to a virtue extending in the intellectual direction whose very teachability is open to question.  Keeping this variety of senses and understandings in mind, it is advisable to be flexible in one's usage.

"knowledge" and "understanding" as synonyms, deploying them in ways that

make them refer to one and the same resource, roughly corresponding the

Greek "episteme", and thus guaranteeing that the faculty they denote is

teachable.  But others use these terms in ways that make one or the other

of them suggest a transcendental aptitude more akin to "wisdom", and thus

amounting to a virtue extending in the intellectual direction whose very

teachability is open to question.  Keeping this variety of senses and

understandings in mind, it is advisable to be flexible in one's usage.

Virtue involves, not just knowing what is the case and knowing what can be done

Virtue involves, not just knowing what is the case and knowing what can be done in each case, but knowing how to do each thing that can be done, knowing which is the best to do in a given case, and finally, having the willingness to do it.

in each case, but knowing how to do each thing that can be done, knowing which

is the best to do in a given case, and finally, having the willingness to do it.

What are the features that are really at stake in the examination of these

What are the features that are really at stake in the examination of these admittedly paradigmatic and even parabolic examples?  There are two ways that virtues appear to transcend the limitations of effectively finite and empirically rational resources and thus appear to distinguish themselves from teachings and understandings, that is, from the orders of disciplined conduct and doctrinal knowledge that bind themselves too severely to the merely mechanical ritual and the purely rote recitation.

admittedly paradigmatic and even parabolic examples?  There are two ways

that virtues appear to transcend the limitations of effectively finite

and empirically rational resources and thus appear to distinguish

themselves from teachings and understandings, that is, from the

orders of disciplined conduct and doctrinal knowledge that bind

themselves too severely to the merely mechanical ritual and the

purely rote recitation.

1.  In their qualitative aspect, virtues appear to combine characters of act and

# In their qualitative aspect, virtues appear to combine characters of act and will that appear to be lacking in the simple imputations of knowledge alone. In particular, virtues appear to display qualities of persistent action, efficient volition, the will to actually do the right thing, and the willingness to keep on doing the right thing on each occasion that arises.  Thus, virtues appear to possess a live performance value that is not guaranteed by simply knowing the right thing to do and to say, indeed, they appear to have a unique and irreproducible mix of qualities that goes beyond the facts circumscribed by any name and thus that goes missing from the ordinary interpretation of its meaning.

    will that appear to be lacking in the simple imputations of knowledge alone.

# In their quantitative aspect, virtues appear to be infinitely far beyond the grasp of discrete, finite, and even rational resources.

    In particular, virtues appear to display qualities of persistent action,

    efficient volition, the will to actually do the right thing, and the

    willingness to keep on doing the right thing on each occasion that

    arises.  Thus, virtues appear to possess a live performance value

    that is not guaranteed by simply knowing the right thing to do and

    to say, indeed, they appear to have a unique and irreproducible mix

    of qualities that goes beyond the facts circumscribed by any name and

    thus that goes missing from the ordinary interpretation of its meaning.

 

2.  In their quantitative aspect, virtues appear to be infinitely far

    beyond the grasp of discrete, finite, and even rational resources.

====3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos====

====3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos====