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====3.2.3. A Reflective Heuristic====

====3.2.3. A Reflective Heuristic====

In a first attempt to state explicitly the principles by which reflection operates, it helps to notice a few of the tasks that reflection performs. In the process of doing this it is useful to keep this figure of speech, where the anthropomorphic ''reflection'' is interpreted in the figure of its personification, in other words, as a hypostatic reference that personifies the reflective faculty of an agent.

In a first attempt to state explicitly the principles by which reflection

operates, it helps to notice a few of the tasks that reflection performs.

In the process of doing this it is useful to keep this figure of speech,

where the anthropomorphic "reflection" is interpreted in the figure of

its personification, in other words, as a hypostatic reference that

personifies the reflective faculty of an agent.

One of the things that reflection does is to look for common patterns

One of the things that reflection does is to look for common patterns as they appear in diverse materials.  Another thing that reflection does is to look for variations in familiar and recognized patterns. These ideas lead to the statement of two aesthetic guidelines or heuristic suggestions as to how the process of reflection can be duly carried out:

as they appear in diverse materials.  Another thing that reflection

does is to look for variations in familiar and recognized patterns.

These ideas lead to the statement of two aesthetic guidelines or

heuristic suggestions as to how the process of reflection can

be duly carried out:

  Try to reduce the number of primitive notions.

:: Try to reduce the number of primitive notions.

  Try to vary what has been held to be constant.

:: Try to vary what has been held to be constant.

These are a couple of "aesthetic imperatives" or "founding principles"

These are a couple of ''aesthetic imperatives'' or ''founding principles'' that I first noticed as underlying motives in the work of C.S. Peirce, informing the style of thinking that is found throughout his endeavors (Awbrey & Awbrey, 1989).  It ought to be recognized that this pair of imperatives operate in antagonism or work in conflict with each other, each recommending a course that strives against the aims of the other. The circumstances of this opposition appear to suggest a mythological derivation for the faculty of reflection that is being personified in this figure, as if it were possible to inquire into the background of reflection so deeply as to reach that original pair of sibling rivals: Epimetheus, Defender of the Same; Prometheus, Sponsor of the Different.

that I first noticed as underlying motives in the work of C.S. Peirce,

informing the style of thinking that is found throughout his endeavors

(Awbrey & Awbrey, 1989).  It ought to be recognized that this pair of

imperatives operate in antagonism or work in conflict with each other,

each recommending a course that strives against the aims of the other.

The circumstances of this opposition appear to suggest a mythological

derivation for the faculty of reflection that is being personified in

this figure, as if it were possible to inquire into the background of

reflection so deeply as to reach that original pair of sibling rivals:

Epimetheus, Defender of the Same; Prometheus, Sponsor of the Different.

Aesthetic slogans and practical maxims do not have to be consistent in all

Aesthetic slogans and practical maxims do not have to be consistent in all of the exact and universal ways that are required of logical principles, since their applications to each particular matter can be adjusted in a differential and a discriminating manner, taking into account the points of their pertinence, the qualities of their relevance, and the times of their salience.  Nevertheless, the use of these heuristic principles can have a bearing on the practice of logic, especially when it comes to the forms of logical expression and argumentation that are available for use in a particular language, specialized calculus, or other formal system.  Although one's initial formulations of logical reasoning, in the shapes that are seized on by fallible and finite creatures, can be as arbitrary and as idiosyntactic as particular persons and parochial paradigms are likely to make them, a dedicated and persistent application of these two heuristic rudiments, whether in team, in tandem, or in tournament with each other, is capable of leading in time to forms that subtilize and universalize, at the same time, the forms initially taken by thought.

of the exact and universal ways that are required of logical principles,

since their applications to each particular matter can be adjusted in

a differential and a discriminating manner, taking into account the

points of their pertinence, the qualities of their relevance, and

the times of their salience.  Nevertheless, the use of these

heuristic principles can have a bearing on the practice of

logic, especially when it comes to the forms of logical

expression and argumentation that are available for

use in a particular language, specialized calculus,

or other formal system.  Although one's initial

formulations of logical reasoning, in the shapes

that are seized on by fallible and finite creatures,

can be as arbitrary and as idiosyntactic as particular

persons and parochial paradigms are likely to make them,

a dedicated and persistent application of these two heuristic

rudiments, whether in team, in tandem, or in tournament with each

other, is capable of leading in time to forms that subtilize and

universalize, at the same time, the forms initially taken by thought.

====3.2.8. Priorisms of Normative Sciences====

====3.2.8. Priorisms of Normative Sciences====