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Let me see if can summarize as quickly as possible the problem that I see before me.  Each time that I try to express my experience, to lend it a form that others can recognize, to put it in a shape that I myself can later recall, or to store it in a state that allows me the chance of its re-experience, I generate an image of the way things are, or at least a description of how things seem to me.  I call this process ''reflection'', since it fabricates an image in a medium of signs that reflects an aspect of experience.  Often this experience can be said to be ''of'' — what? — something that exists or persists at least partially outside the immediate experience, some action, event, or object that is imagined to inform the present experience, or perhaps some conduct of one's own that obtrudes for a moment into the world of others and meets with a reaction there.  In all of these cases, where the experience is everted to refer to an object and becomes the attribute of something with an external aspect, something that is thus supposed to be a prior cause of the experience, the reflection on experience doubles as a reflection on that conduct, performance, or transaction that the experience is an experience ''of''.  In short, if the experience has an eversion that makes it ''of'' an object, then its reflection is again a reflection that is also ''of'' this object.

Let me see if I can summarize as quickly as possible the problem that I see before me.  On each occasion that I try to express my experience, to lend it a form that others can recognize, to put it in a shape that I myself can later recall, or to store it in a state that allows me the chance of its re-experience, I generate an image of the way things are, or at least a description of how things seem to me.  I call this process ''reflection'', since it fabricates an image in a medium of signs that reflects an aspect of experience.  Very often this experience is said to be ''of'' — what? — something that exists or persists at least partly outside the immediate experience, some action, event, or object that is imagined to inform the present experience, or perhaps some conduct of one's own doing that obtrudes for a moment into the world of others and meets with a reaction there.  In all of these cases, where the experience is everted to refer to an object and thus becomes the attribute of something with an external aspect, something that is thus supposed to be a prior cause of the experience, the reflection on experience doubles as a reflection on that conduct, performance, or transaction that the experience is an experience ''of''.  In short, if the experience has an eversion that makes it an experience ''of'' an object, then its reflection is again a reflection that is also ''of'' this object.

Just at the point where one threatens to become lost in the morass of words for describing experience and the nuances of their interpretation, one can adopt a formal perspective, and realize that the relation among objects, experiences, and reflective images is formally analogous to the relation among objects, signs, and interpretant signs that is covered by the pragmatic theory of signs.  One still has the problem:  How are the expressions of experience everted to form the exterior faces of extended objects and exploited to embed them in their external circumstances, and no matter whether this object with an outer face is oneself or another?  Here, one needs to understand that expressions of experience include the original experiences themselves, at least, to the extent that they permit themselves to be recognized and reflected in ongoing experience.  But now, from the formal point of view, "how" means only:  To describe the formal conditions of a formal possibility.

Just on the point of becoming lost in the morass of words for describing experience and the nuances of their interpretation, one can adopt a formal perspective, and realize that the relation among objects, experiences, and reflective images is formally analogous to the relation among objects, signs, and interpretant signs that is covered by the pragmatic theory of signs.  The problem remains:  ''How'' are the expressions of experience everted to form the exterior faces of extended objects and exploited to embed them in their external circumstances, and no matter whether this object with an outer face is oneself or another?  Here, one needs to understand that expressions of experience include the original experiences themselves, at least, to the extent that they permit themselves to be recognized and reflected in ongoing experience.  But now, from the formal point of view, ''How'' means only:  To describe the formal conditions of a formal possibility.

=====1.3.5.2. The Forms of Reasoning=====

=====1.3.5.2. The Forms of Reasoning=====