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Expectations and Ethics
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At what cost was this destruction achieved? Throughout the course of the air war against Germany, 9,949 American bomber planes were lost. This figure accounts for a significant fraction of the total number of bombers in action. It should be
 
At what cost was this destruction achieved? Throughout the course of the air war against Germany, 9,949 American bomber planes were lost. This figure accounts for a significant fraction of the total number of bombers in action. It should be
 
considered that with each lost bomber went not one engine, but usually four, not one man, but perhaps ten. In fact, 79,265 American aviators were lost in action<ref>Saundby, "The Uses", p. 225.</ref> (more than 52,000 of them killed)<ref>Michael S. Sherry, '''The Rise of American Air Power''', p. 204</ref> during bombing sorties. These fliers represented one of the most highly-trained and valuable segments of the military. Was their loss necessary?
 
considered that with each lost bomber went not one engine, but usually four, not one man, but perhaps ten. In fact, 79,265 American aviators were lost in action<ref>Saundby, "The Uses", p. 225.</ref> (more than 52,000 of them killed)<ref>Michael S. Sherry, '''The Rise of American Air Power''', p. 204</ref> during bombing sorties. These fliers represented one of the most highly-trained and valuable segments of the military. Was their loss necessary?
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==Expectations and Ethics==
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A largely unanimous belief is found today that the American strategic bombing campaign in Europe neither lived up to military expectations nor maintained an ethical posture. Some dissention over these matters persists, but the facts argue in favor of the above. The pre-war expectation in the American ranks held that precision bombing would knock out certain key industries, thus crippling the Nazi war machine. The bomber was seen as a revolutionary means to replace old methods of war (land and sea), thereby shortening and ending war altogether. Founding these new beliefs was the Italian general Giulio Douhet who wrote many treatises on air power during the 1920's. In his '''The Command of the Air''',<ref>Giulio Douhet, '''The Command of the Air''', trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1942).</ref> he outlined his basic tenet: wars of the future could be won by flying massive bombing strikes against enemy centers of production. These gigantic raids involving thousands of bomber aircraft would supposedly force the population to submit immediately to terms of peace.
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Douhet, like so many other military theorists, understandably wished to avoid another war like the Great War. The senseless, bloody battles over a few hundred yards of "no man's land" nearly erased an entire generation from Europe's demography. Another trench-war stalemate was to be avoided at all costs. The solution seemed to be air power. There was a deep public fascination with the airplane, and it seemed a valiant, even humane, way to fight a war. Douhet's strategy, though, was primarily disregarded by military leaders and decision makers as too expensive and too risky. Wars had been fought with cannons and ships for so long that generals a;nd admirals were unwilling to scrap these tried and true methods for an unproved one. General Billy Mitchell was the chief Douhetan advocate in America, and his voice ran into very stiff opposition and doubt. The idea that immense air strikes against enemy production centers could quickly win a war would have to wait until wartime to be implemented. The problem was that, in practice, the air raids were increased only gradually, not unleashed en masse at the dawn of war. Douhet's primary argument (sudden onslaught) was ignored in the hopes of building up bomber forces during the conflict.
    
==References==
 
==References==
 
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