12,080
edits
Changes
→1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations: markup
Of course, a finite person can only take up so many causes in a single lifetime, and so there is always the excuse of time for not chasing down every conceivable hypothesis that comes to mind.
Of course, a finite person can only take up so many causes in a single lifetime, and so there is always the excuse of time for not chasing down every conceivable hypothesis that comes to mind.
=====1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations=====
=====1.4.1.4. Forms of Relations=====
The next distinguishing trait that I can draw out of this incipient treatise is its emphasis on the forms of relations. From a sufficiently formal and relational point of view, many of the complexities that arise from throwing intentions, objectives, and purposes into the mix of discussion are conceivably due to the greater arity of triadic relations over dyadic relations, and do not necessarily implicate any differences of essence inhering in the entities and the states invoked. As far as this question goes, whether a dynamic object is essentially different from a deliberate object, I intend to remain as neutral as possible, at least, until forced by some good reason to do otherwise. In the meantime, the factors that are traceable to formal differences among relations are ready to be investigated and useful to examine. With this in mind, it it useful to make the following definition:
The next distinguishing trait that I can draw out of this incipient treatise is its emphasis on the forms of relations. From a sufficiently "formal and relational" (FAR) point of view, many of the complexities that arise from throwing intentions, objectives, and purposes into the mix of discussion are conceivably due to the greater arity of triadic relations over dyadic relations, and do not necessarily implicate any differences of essence inhering in the entities and the states invoked. As far as this question goes, whether a dynamic object is essentially different from a deliberate object, I intend to remain as neutral as possible, at least, until forced by some good reason to do otherwise. In the meantime, the factors that are traceable to formal differences among relations are ready to be investigated and useful to examine. With this in mind, it it useful to make the following definition:
A "conduct relation" is a triadic relation involving a domain of objects and two domains of states. When a shorter term is desired, I refer to a conduct relation as a "conduit". A conduit is given in terms of its extension as a subset C c XxYxZ, where X is the "object domain" and where Y and Z are the "state domains". Typically, Y = Z.
A ''conduct relation'' is a triadic relation involving a domain of objects and two domains of states. When a shorter term is desired, I refer to a conduct relation as a ''conduit''. A conduit is given in terms of its extension as a subset C c XxYxZ, where X is the ''object domain'' and where Y and Z are the ''state domains''. Typically, Y = Z.
In general, a conduct relation serves as a "model of conduct" (MOC), not always the kind of model that is meant to be emulated, but the type of model that captures an aspect of structure in a form of conduct.
In general, a conduct relation serves as a ''model of conduct'' (MOC), not always the kind of model that is meant to be emulated, but the type of model that captures an aspect of structure in a form of conduct.
The question arises: What is the relationship between signs and states? On the assumption that signs and states are comparable in their levels of generality, consider the following possibilities:
The question arises: What is the relationship between signs and states? On the assumption that signs and states are comparable in their levels of generality, consider the following possibilities:
# Signs are special cases of states.
# Signs and states are the same sorts of things.
# States are special cases of signs.
Depending on how one answers this question, one is also choosing among the following options:
Depending on how one answers this question, one is also choosing among the following options:
# Sign relations are special cases of conduct relations.
# Sign relations and conduct relations are the same sorts of things.
# Conduct relations are special cases of sign relations.
I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
=====1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry=====
=====1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry=====