Changes

# In effect, a ''founded or grounded'' (FOG) system requires absolute certainty with respect to some of its points, the points on which it is said to rest.  It is as if these fixed points put it in contact with an infinite source of knowledge or connect it to an infinite sink for uncertainties.  Of course, a FOG system that casts itself as a beacon of enlightenment and sells itself under the label of “science” can never admit to seeing itself in this image, since the very act of making the claim explicit already puts its grant in jeopardy.  But that is what it amounts to, nevertheless.

# In effect, a ''founded or grounded'' (FOG) system requires absolute certainty with respect to some of its points, the points on which it is said to rest.  It is as if these fixed points put it in contact with an infinite source of knowledge or connect it to an infinite sink for uncertainties.  Of course, a FOG system that casts itself as a beacon of enlightenment and sells itself under the label of “science” can never admit to seeing itself in this image, since the very act of making the claim explicit already puts its grant in jeopardy.  But that is what it amounts to, nevertheless.

Another way to see the over-constrained nature of these FOG conditions, for the certainty of foundations, is by expressing them in terms of the ''boundary conditions'' that a given system of belief is assumed to have.  In this regard, it helps to make the following definition.  An ''open'' system of belief is one that has each of its points ''mediated'' by the system itself, in other words, surrounded by, apprehended within, and evidentially or argumentatively justified by a neighborhood of similar points that falls entirely within the system in question.

Another way to see the over constrained nature of these FOG conditions, for the certainty of foundations, is by expressing them in terms of the "boundary conditions" that a given system of belief is assumed to have.  In this regard, it helps to make the following definition.  An "open" system of belief is one that has each of its points "mediated" by the system itself, in other words, surrounded by, apprehended within, and evidentially or argumentatively justified by a neighborhood of similar points that falls entirely within the system in question.

When it is considered in the light of this definition of "openness", a FOG system is clearly seen to constitute a "non open" system of belief.  In short, not all of its axioms, points, or tenets are "mediated" within the system itself, but have their motives, reasons, and supports lying in points ulterior to it.  In hopes of serving both the understanding and the memory, let me try to express this situation in a couple of striking, if slightly ludicrous, metaphors, a pair of judicial, if not entirely judicious, figures of speech:

When it is considered in the light of this definition of ''openness'', a FOG system is clearly seen to constitute a ''non-open'' system of belief.  In short, not all of its axioms, points, or tenets are mediated within the system itself, but have their motives, reasons, and supports lying in points ulterior to it.  In hopes of serving both the understanding and the memory, let me try to express this situation in a couple of striking, if slightly ludicrous, metaphors, a pair of judicial, if not entirely judicious, figures of speech:

1. The "corpus delicti", the body of material evidence and substantial fact that is necessary to justify the institution of the system and the initiation of its every process, is always found to lie in such a disposition that it rests partially beyond the system in question.

# The ''corpus delicti'', the body of material evidence and substantial fact that is necessary to justify the institution of the system and the initiation of its every process, is always found to lie in such a disposition that it rests partially beyond the system in question.

 

# The ''habeas corpus'', the body of probable causes and sufficient reasons that is tendered to justify the holding of certain points, is always deposed in such a demeanor that its true warrant either stays unwrit or is writ largely outside the system in question.

2. The "habeas corpus", the body of probable causes and sufficient reasons that is tendered to justify the holding of certain points, is always deposed in such a demeanor that its true warrant either stays unwrit or is writ largely outside the system in question.

Whether it is verifiably jurisprudent or merely a fantastic simile, whether it is really a conspiracy of their natural bents or purely a coincidence of their accustomed distortions, the parody of a judicial process that one constantly sees being carried on in the name of this or that FOG system, and always apparently up to the limits of their several FOG boundaries, makes a mockery of the spirit of inquiry, and of all its pretensions to a critical reflection, since it places not only the first apprehension but the final justice of such a system beyond all question of executive examination, judicial review, and constitutional amendment.  The whole matter is even more deceptive that it appears at first sight, precisely because a FOG system, as lit within, or according to its own lights, often takes on all the appearance of being open.  But this is only because the boundaries of its viability and the outlines of the external obstacles that represent a threat to the illusions of its omni pervasiveness are actively being obscured by the limitations inherent in its unreflective nature.

Whether it is verifiably jurisprudent or merely a fantastic simile, whether it is really a conspiracy of their natural bents or purely a coincidence of their accustomed distortions, the parody of a judicial process that one constantly sees being carried on in the name of this or that FOG system, and always apparently up to the limits of their several FOG boundaries, makes a mockery of the spirit of inquiry, and of all its pretensions to a critical reflection, since it places not only the first apprehension but the final justice of such a system beyond all question of executive examination, judicial review, and constitutional amendment.  The whole matter is even more deceptive that it appears at first sight, precisely because a FOG system, as lit within, or according to its own lights, often takes on all the appearance of being open.  But this is only because the boundaries of its viability and the outlines of the external obstacles that represent a threat to the illusions of its omni pervasiveness are actively being obscured by the limitations inherent in its unreflective nature.

This is just the kind of situation that one would expect in the purely deductive or demonstrative sections of science, for instance, in logics and mathematics of the "purer" and less "applied" sorts.  In these more abstract traces and more refined extracts of a fully scientific method, the authority of the conclusions, or the level of certainty achieved on output, is no greater than the authority of the premisses, or the level of certainty possessed on input.  Thus, the work of reasoning in such a case is purely "expliative", that is, wholly expository or explicational.

This is just the kind of situation that one would expect in the purely deductive or demonstrative sections of science, for instance, in logics and mathematics of the “purer” and less “applied” sorts.  In these more abstract traces and more refined extracts of a fully scientific method, the authority of the conclusions, or the level of certainty achieved on output, is no greater than the authority of the premisses, or the level of certainty possessed on input.  Thus, the work of reasoning in such a case is purely ''expliative'', that is, wholly expository or explicational.

But a truly synthetic or "ampliative" analysis should be able to reduce a complex induction to simple inductions, meanwhile gaining a measure of certainty in the process, and all without losing the power to reconstruct the complex from the simple.  The perceived gain of practical certainty that develops in this analysis can be explained in the following manner.  A complex induction, prior to analysis, is likely to be a very uncertain induction, but is likely to have its certainty shored up if the analysis to simple inductions is successful.

But a truly synthetic or ''ampliative'' analysis should be able to reduce a complex induction to simple inductions, meanwhile gaining a measure of certainty in the process, and all without losing the power to reconstruct the complex from the simple.  The perceived gain of practical certainty that develops in this analysis can be explained in the following manner.  A complex induction, prior to analysis, is likely to be a very uncertain induction, but is likely to have its certainty shored up if the analysis to simple inductions is successful.

This is a pretty sorry picture, especially in view of all the bright promises of enlightenment through inquiry that inquiry makes, to be a veritable system of belief for constituting systems of veritable belief.  But the promise of inquiry to be better than all that, to be an advance over other systems of belief, not just another dogma in the management of uncertainty but a unique way of life, holds out hopes that are still tempting and that deserve to be pursued further.  So it is time to ask:  If not by means of these foundations, then what form of constitution can provide the sought for JOI?

This is a pretty sorry picture, especially in view of all the bright promises of enlightenment through inquiry that inquiry makes, to be a veritable system of belief for constituting systems of veritable belief.  But the promise of inquiry to be better than all that, to be an advance over other systems of belief, not just another dogma in the management of uncertainty but a unique way of life, holds out hopes that are still tempting and that deserve to be pursued further.  So it is time to ask:  If not by means of these foundations, then what form of constitution can provide the sought for JOI?

Fortunately, there is another JOI, arising from the pragmatic critique of even the most enlightened fundamentalism.  If the fundamental approach is viewed as a project to conjoin three positive features — "founding", "beginning", and "certain" — in single point of conceptual architecture, then the pragmatic critique of this plan can be understood as objecting that this point is overloaded.  There are ways to preserve this triarchic association, but not without protracting other angles of approach to the juncture and not without compassing other senses of the terms than the meanings originally intended.  It is perhaps easier just to abrogate one of the terms, either rescinding its constraint or trading it in for its logical negation.

Fortunately, there is another JOI, arising from the pragmatic critique of even the most enlightened fundamentalism.  If the fundamental approach is viewed as a project to conjoin three positive features — ''founding'', ''beginning'', and ''certain'' — in a single point of conceptual architecture, then the pragmatic critique of this plan can be understood as objecting that this point is overloaded.  There are ways to preserve this triarchic association, but not without protracting other angles of approach to the juncture and not without compassing other senses of the terms than the meanings originally intended.  It is perhaps easier just to abrogate one of the terms, either rescinding its constraint or trading it in for its logical negation.

The pragmatic approach to the foundations of inquiry, more precisely, its approach to the hoped for JOI, whether or not this leaves room in the end for a notion of secure foundations, suggests that reason does begin with unreason, but only in the sense that inquiry starts from a state of uncertainty.  If one objects that this doubt is not radical, because many things in the meantime are never in fact doubted at all, then this is correct, but only in the sense that these things are not doubted because they are never even consciously questioned.  If that sort of lack of doubt is the type one plans to found their reason on, then I think it is a very fond notion indeed.

The pragmatic approach to the foundations of inquiry, more precisely, its approach to the hoped for JOI, whether or not this leaves room in the end for a notion of secure foundations, suggests that reason does begin with unreason, but only in the sense that inquiry starts from a state of uncertainty.  If one objects that this doubt is not radical, because many things in the meantime are never in fact doubted at all, then this is correct, but only in the sense that these things are not doubted because they are never even consciously questioned.  If that sort of lack of doubt is the type one plans to found their reason on, then I think it is a very fond notion indeed.

There's a double meaning in that.

There's a double meaning in that.

Much Ado About Nothing:  Benedick—2.3.246

Much Ado About Nothing:  Benedick—2.3.246