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→Excerpt 2. Peirce (CP 2.315)
<p>But take an “analytical”, ''i.e.'', an explicative proposition; and to begin with, take the formula “A is A”. If this be intended to state anything about real things, it is quite unintelligible. It must be understood to mean something about symbols; no doubt, that the substantive verb “is“ expresses one of those relations that everything bears to itself, like “loves whatever may be loved by”. So understood, it conveys information about a symbol. A symbol is not an individual, it is true. But any information about a symbol is information about every replica of it; and a replica is strictly an individual. What information, then, does the proposition “A is A” furnish concerning this replica?</p>
<p>But take an “analytical”, ''i.e.'', an explicative proposition; and to begin with, take the formula “A is A”. If this be intended to state anything about real things, it is quite unintelligible. It must be understood to mean something about symbols; no doubt, that the substantive verb “is“ expresses one of those relations that everything bears to itself, like “loves whatever may be loved by”. So understood, it conveys information about a symbol. A symbol is not an individual, it is true. But any information about a symbol is information about every replica of it; and a replica is strictly an individual. What information, then, does the proposition “A is A” furnish concerning this replica?</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (''c.'' 1902).<br>
<p>The information is that if the replica be modified so as to bring the same name before it and after it, then the result will be a replica of a proposition which will never be in conflict with any fact. To say that something ''never'' will be is not to state any real fact, and until some experience occurs — whether outward experience, or experience of fancies — which might be an occasion for a conflict with the proposition in question, it does not, to our knowledge, represent any actual Secondness. But as soon as such an occasion does arise, the proposition relates to the single replica that then occurs and to the single expeerience, and describes the relation between them. Similar remarks apply to every explicative proposition.</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (c. 1902).<br>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331).</p>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331).</p>
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