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==Work Area==
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=Work Area=
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===1.4.  Outlook of the Project : All Ways Lead to Inquiry===
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==3.  Outlook of the Project : All Ways Lead to Inquiry==
    
I am using the word ''inquiry'' in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term ''scientific method''.  Use of ''inquiry'' is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:
 
I am using the word ''inquiry'' in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term ''scientific method''.  Use of ''inquiry'' is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:
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The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be implicit in its dogmatic character.  It is done this way in a first approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions, each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in its own good time.  I want to convey the general drift of my current model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it may seem.
 
The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be implicit in its dogmatic character.  It is done this way in a first approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions, each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in its own good time.  I want to convey the general drift of my current model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it may seem.
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====1.4.1.  The Matrix of Inquiry====
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===3.1.  The Matrix of Inquiry===
    
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
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There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, at least partially, in the text of the above description.  Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.
 
There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, at least partially, in the text of the above description.  Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.
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=====1.4.1.1.  Inquiry as Conduct=====
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====3.1.1.  Inquiry as Conduct====
    
First of all, inquiry is conceived to be a form of conduct.  This invokes the technical term ''conduct'', referring to the species of prototypically human action that is both dynamic and deliberate, or conceived to fall under a form of purposeful control, usually conscious but possibly not.  For the sake of clarity, it helps to seek a more formal definition of conduct, one that expresses the concept in terms of abstract features rather than trying to suggest it by means of typical examples.
 
First of all, inquiry is conceived to be a form of conduct.  This invokes the technical term ''conduct'', referring to the species of prototypically human action that is both dynamic and deliberate, or conceived to fall under a form of purposeful control, usually conscious but possibly not.  For the sake of clarity, it helps to seek a more formal definition of conduct, one that expresses the concept in terms of abstract features rather than trying to suggest it by means of typical examples.
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If it is to have the properties that it is commonly thought to have, then reflection must be capable of running in parallel, and not interfering too severely, with the conduct on which it reflects.  If this turns out to be an illusion of reflection that is not really possible in actuality, then reflection must be capable, at the very least, of reviewing the memory record of the conduct in question, in ways that appear concurrent with a replay of its action.  But these are the abilities that reflection is "pre-reflectively" thought to have, that is, before the reflection on reflection can get under way.  If reflection is truly a form of conduct, then it becomes conceivable as a project to reflect on reflection itself, and this reflection can even lead to the conclusion that reflection does not have all of the powers that it is commonly portrayed to have.
 
If it is to have the properties that it is commonly thought to have, then reflection must be capable of running in parallel, and not interfering too severely, with the conduct on which it reflects.  If this turns out to be an illusion of reflection that is not really possible in actuality, then reflection must be capable, at the very least, of reviewing the memory record of the conduct in question, in ways that appear concurrent with a replay of its action.  But these are the abilities that reflection is "pre-reflectively" thought to have, that is, before the reflection on reflection can get under way.  If reflection is truly a form of conduct, then it becomes conceivable as a project to reflect on reflection itself, and this reflection can even lead to the conclusion that reflection does not have all of the powers that it is commonly portrayed to have.
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=====1.4.1.2.  Types of Conduct=====
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====3.1.2.  Types of Conduct====
    
The chief distinction that applies to different forms of conduct is whether the object is the same sort of thing as the states or whether it is something entirely different, a thing apart, of a wholly other order.  Although I am using different words for objects and states, it is always possible that these words are indicative of different roles in a formal relation and not indicative of substantially different types of things.  If objects and states are but formal points and naturally belong to the same domain, then it is conceivable that a temporal sequence of states can include the object in its succession, in other words, that a path through a state space can reach or pass through an object of conduct.  But if a form of conduct has an object that is completely different from any one of its temporal states, then the role of the object in regard to the action cannot be like the end or goal of a temporal development.
 
The chief distinction that applies to different forms of conduct is whether the object is the same sort of thing as the states or whether it is something entirely different, a thing apart, of a wholly other order.  Although I am using different words for objects and states, it is always possible that these words are indicative of different roles in a formal relation and not indicative of substantially different types of things.  If objects and states are but formal points and naturally belong to the same domain, then it is conceivable that a temporal sequence of states can include the object in its succession, in other words, that a path through a state space can reach or pass through an object of conduct.  But if a form of conduct has an object that is completely different from any one of its temporal states, then the role of the object in regard to the action cannot be like the end or goal of a temporal development.
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What names can be given to these two orders of conduct?
 
What names can be given to these two orders of conduct?
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=====1.4.1.3.  Perils of Inquiry=====
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====3.1.3.  Perils of Inquiry====
    
Now suppose that making a hypothesis is a kind of action, no matter how covert, or that testing a hypothesis takes an action that is more overt.  If entertaining a hypothesis in any serious way requires action, and if action is capable of altering the situation in which it acts, then what prevents this action from interfering with the subject of inquiry in a way that undermines, with positive or negative intentions, the very aim of inquiry, namely, to understand the situation as it is in itself?
 
Now suppose that making a hypothesis is a kind of action, no matter how covert, or that testing a hypothesis takes an action that is more overt.  If entertaining a hypothesis in any serious way requires action, and if action is capable of altering the situation in which it acts, then what prevents this action from interfering with the subject of inquiry in a way that undermines, with positive or negative intentions, the very aim of inquiry, namely, to understand the situation as it is in itself?
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Of course, a finite person can only take up so many causes in a single lifetime, and so there is always the excuse of time for not chasing down every conceivable hypothesis that comes to mind.
 
Of course, a finite person can only take up so many causes in a single lifetime, and so there is always the excuse of time for not chasing down every conceivable hypothesis that comes to mind.
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=====1.4.1.4.  Forms of Relations=====
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====3.1.4.  Forms of Relations====
    
The next distinguishing trait that I can draw out of this incipient treatise is its emphasis on the forms of relations.  From a sufficiently formal and relational point of view, many of the complexities that arise from throwing intentions, objectives, and purposes into the mix of discussion are conceivably due to the greater arity of triadic relations over dyadic relations, and do not necessarily implicate any differences of essence inhering in the entities and the states invoked.  As far as this question goes, whether a dynamic object is essentially different from a deliberate object, I intend to remain as neutral as possible, at least, until forced by some good reason to do otherwise.  In the meantime, the factors that are traceable to formal differences among relations are ready to be investigated and useful to examine.  With this in mind, it it useful to make the following definition:
 
The next distinguishing trait that I can draw out of this incipient treatise is its emphasis on the forms of relations.  From a sufficiently formal and relational point of view, many of the complexities that arise from throwing intentions, objectives, and purposes into the mix of discussion are conceivably due to the greater arity of triadic relations over dyadic relations, and do not necessarily implicate any differences of essence inhering in the entities and the states invoked.  As far as this question goes, whether a dynamic object is essentially different from a deliberate object, I intend to remain as neutral as possible, at least, until forced by some good reason to do otherwise.  In the meantime, the factors that are traceable to formal differences among relations are ready to be investigated and useful to examine.  With this in mind, it it useful to make the following definition:
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I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
 
I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
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=====1.4.1.5.  Models of Inquiry=====
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====3.1.5.  Models of Inquiry====
    
The value of a hypothesis, or the worth of a model, is not to be given a prior justification, as by a deductive proof, but has to be examined in practice, as by an empirical probation.  It is not intended to be taken for granted or to go untested, but its meaning in practice has to be articulated before its usefulness can be judged.  This means that the conceivable practical import of the hypothesis or the model has to be developed in terms of its predicted and its promised consequences, after which it is judged by the comparison of these speculative consequences with the actual results.  But this is not the end of the matter, for it can be a useful piece of information to discover that a particular kind of conception fails a particular kind of comparison.  Thus, the final justification for a hypothesis or a model is contained in the order of work that it leads one to do, and the value of this work is often the same whether or not its premiss is true.  Indeed, the fruitfulness of a suggestion can lie in the work that proves it untrue.
 
The value of a hypothesis, or the worth of a model, is not to be given a prior justification, as by a deductive proof, but has to be examined in practice, as by an empirical probation.  It is not intended to be taken for granted or to go untested, but its meaning in practice has to be articulated before its usefulness can be judged.  This means that the conceivable practical import of the hypothesis or the model has to be developed in terms of its predicted and its promised consequences, after which it is judged by the comparison of these speculative consequences with the actual results.  But this is not the end of the matter, for it can be a useful piece of information to discover that a particular kind of conception fails a particular kind of comparison.  Thus, the final justification for a hypothesis or a model is contained in the order of work that it leads one to do, and the value of this work is often the same whether or not its premiss is true.  Indeed, the fruitfulness of a suggestion can lie in the work that proves it untrue.
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Does the inquiry into inquiry begin with a surprise or a problem concerning the process or the conduct of inquiry?  In other words, does the inquiry into inquiry start with one of the following forms of departure:  (1) a surprising difference between what is expected of inquiry and what is observed about it, or (2) a problematic difference between what is observed about inquiry and what is intended for it?
 
Does the inquiry into inquiry begin with a surprise or a problem concerning the process or the conduct of inquiry?  In other words, does the inquiry into inquiry start with one of the following forms of departure:  (1) a surprising difference between what is expected of inquiry and what is observed about it, or (2) a problematic difference between what is observed about inquiry and what is intended for it?
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====1.4.2.  The Moment of Inquiry====
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===3.2.  The Moment of Inquiry===
    
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
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In any case, belief or knowledge is the feature of state that an agent of inquiry lacks at the moment of setting out.  Inquiry begins in a state of impoverishment, need, or privation, a state that is absent the quality of certainty.  It is due to this feature that the agent is motivated, and it is on account of its continuing absence that the agent keeps on striving to achieve it, at least, with respect to the subject in question, and, at any rate, in sufficient measure to make action possible.
 
In any case, belief or knowledge is the feature of state that an agent of inquiry lacks at the moment of setting out.  Inquiry begins in a state of impoverishment, need, or privation, a state that is absent the quality of certainty.  It is due to this feature that the agent is motivated, and it is on account of its continuing absence that the agent keeps on striving to achieve it, at least, with respect to the subject in question, and, at any rate, in sufficient measure to make action possible.
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====1.4.3.  The Modes of Inquiry====
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===3.3.  The Modes of Inquiry===
    
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
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If it were only a matter of doing propositional reasoning as efficiently as possible, I would simply use the cactus language and be done with it, but there are several other reasons for revisiting the syllogistic model.  Treating the discipline that is commonly called "logic" as a cultural subject with a rich and varied history of development, and attending to the thread of tradition in which I currently find myself, I observe what looks like a critical transition that occurs between the classical and the modern ages.  Aside from supplying the barest essentials of a historical approach to the subject, a consideration of this elder standard makes it easier to appreciate the nature and the character of this transformation.  In addition, and surprisingly enough to warrant further attention, there appear to be a number of cryptic relationships that exist between the syllogistic patterns of reasoning and the ostensibly more advanced forms of analysis and synthesis that are involved in the logic of relations.
 
If it were only a matter of doing propositional reasoning as efficiently as possible, I would simply use the cactus language and be done with it, but there are several other reasons for revisiting the syllogistic model.  Treating the discipline that is commonly called "logic" as a cultural subject with a rich and varied history of development, and attending to the thread of tradition in which I currently find myself, I observe what looks like a critical transition that occurs between the classical and the modern ages.  Aside from supplying the barest essentials of a historical approach to the subject, a consideration of this elder standard makes it easier to appreciate the nature and the character of this transformation.  In addition, and surprisingly enough to warrant further attention, there appear to be a number of cryptic relationships that exist between the syllogistic patterns of reasoning and the ostensibly more advanced forms of analysis and synthesis that are involved in the logic of relations.
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=====1.4.3.1.  Deductive Reasoning=====
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====3.3.1.  Deductive Reasoning====
    
In this subsection, I present a trimmed-down version of deductive reasoning in Aristotle, limiting the account to universal syllogisms, in effect, keeping to the level of propositional reasoning.  Within these constraints, there are three basic "figures" of the syllogism.
 
In this subsection, I present a trimmed-down version of deductive reasoning in Aristotle, limiting the account to universal syllogisms, in effect, keeping to the level of propositional reasoning.  Within these constraints, there are three basic "figures" of the syllogism.
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The propositional content of this deduction is summarized on the right.  Expressed in terms of the corresponding classes, it says that if S c P and if R intersects S non-trivially then R must intersect P non-trivially.
 
The propositional content of this deduction is summarized on the right.  Expressed in terms of the corresponding classes, it says that if S c P and if R intersects S non-trivially then R must intersect P non-trivially.
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=====1.4.3.2.  Inductive Reasoning=====
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====3.3.2.  Inductive Reasoning====
    
(Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).
 
(Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).
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=====1.4.3.3.  Abductive Reasoning=====
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====3.3.3.  Abductive Reasoning====
    
A choice of method cannot be justified by deduction or by induction, at least, not wholly, but involves an element of hypothesis.  In ancient times, this mode of inference to an explanatory hypothesis was described by the Greek word "apagoge", articulating an action or a process that "carries", "drives", or "leads" in a direction "away", "from", or "off".  This was later translated into the Latin "abductio", and that is the source of what is today called "abduction" or "abductive reasoning".  Another residue of this sense survives today in the terminology for "abductor muscles", those that "draw away (say, a limb or an eye) from a position near or parallel to the median axis of the body" (Webster's).
 
A choice of method cannot be justified by deduction or by induction, at least, not wholly, but involves an element of hypothesis.  In ancient times, this mode of inference to an explanatory hypothesis was described by the Greek word "apagoge", articulating an action or a process that "carries", "drives", or "leads" in a direction "away", "from", or "off".  This was later translated into the Latin "abductio", and that is the source of what is today called "abduction" or "abductive reasoning".  Another residue of this sense survives today in the terminology for "abductor muscles", those that "draw away (say, a limb or an eye) from a position near or parallel to the median axis of the body" (Webster's).
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But what if an example of a good method is already known to exist, one that has all of the commonly accepted properties that appear to define what a good method ought to be?  In this case, the abductive argument acquires the additional strength of an argument from analogy.
 
But what if an example of a good method is already known to exist, one that has all of the commonly accepted properties that appear to define what a good method ought to be?  In this case, the abductive argument acquires the additional strength of an argument from analogy.
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=====1.4.3.4.  Analogical Reasoning=====
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====3.3.4.  Analogical Reasoning====
    
The classical treatment of analogical reasoning by Aristotle explains it as a combination of induction and deduction.  More recently, C.S. Peirce gave two different ways of viewing the use of analogy, analyzing it into complex patterns of reasoning that involve all three types of inference.  In the appropriate place, it will be useful to consider these alternative accounts of analogy in detail.  At the present point, it is more useful to illustrate the different versions of analogical reasoning as they bear on the topic of choosing a method.
 
The classical treatment of analogical reasoning by Aristotle explains it as a combination of induction and deduction.  More recently, C.S. Peirce gave two different ways of viewing the use of analogy, analyzing it into complex patterns of reasoning that involve all three types of inference.  In the appropriate place, it will be useful to consider these alternative accounts of analogy in detail.  At the present point, it is more useful to illustrate the different versions of analogical reasoning as they bear on the topic of choosing a method.
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It is time to ask the question:  Why do these examples continue to maintain their unrealistic character, their comical and even ridiculous appearance, in spite of all my continuing attempts to reform them in a sensible way?  It is not merely their simplicity.  A simple example can be telling, if it grasps the essence of the problem, that is, so long as it captures even a single essential feature or highlights even a single critical property of the thing that one seeks to understand.  It is more likely due to the circumstance that I am describing agents, methods, and situations all in one piece, that is, without any analysis, articulation, or definition of what exactly constitutes the self, the scientific method, or the world in question.  It is not completely useless to consider cases of this type, since many forms of automatic, customary, and unreflective practice are underlain by arguments that are not much better that this.  Of course, on reflection, their "commedius" character becomes apparent, and all deny or laugh off the suggestion that they ever think this way, but that is just the way of reflection.
 
It is time to ask the question:  Why do these examples continue to maintain their unrealistic character, their comical and even ridiculous appearance, in spite of all my continuing attempts to reform them in a sensible way?  It is not merely their simplicity.  A simple example can be telling, if it grasps the essence of the problem, that is, so long as it captures even a single essential feature or highlights even a single critical property of the thing that one seeks to understand.  It is more likely due to the circumstance that I am describing agents, methods, and situations all in one piece, that is, without any analysis, articulation, or definition of what exactly constitutes the self, the scientific method, or the world in question.  It is not completely useless to consider cases of this type, since many forms of automatic, customary, and unreflective practice are underlain by arguments that are not much better that this.  Of course, on reflection, their "commedius" character becomes apparent, and all deny or laugh off the suggestion that they ever think this way, but that is just the way of reflection.
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In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score ...
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In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score &hellip;
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