Changes

In view of these complexities, that interfere with applying even the simplest of organizational paradigms to the material of signs and texts, it is necessary for me to pause a while and carefully contemplate how I can rehabilitate their use, at least, for the ends of this investigation.  First, I examine the distinction between sign and object.  Then, I consider the duality between self and other, or what amounts to the same thing, the relation between a ''first person'' and a ''second person'' POV.  In each case, the task is to discover how a distinction that seems so easy to subvert can ultimately be developed into a useful instrument of analysis and articulation.

In view of these complexities, that interfere with applying even the simplest of organizational paradigms to the material of signs and texts, it is necessary for me to pause a while and carefully contemplate how I can rehabilitate their use, at least, for the ends of this investigation.  First, I examine the distinction between sign and object.  Then, I consider the duality between self and other, or what amounts to the same thing, the relation between a ''first person'' and a ''second person'' POV.  In each case, the task is to discover how a distinction that seems so easy to subvert can ultimately be developed into a useful instrument of analysis and articulation.

There's nought but care on ev'ry han',

| colspan="2" | There's nought but care on ev'ry han',

In every hour that passes, O;

What signifies the life o man,

| width="5%"  |   || In every hour that passes, O;

An 'twere na for the lasses, O.

Robert Burns, Green Grow the Rashes, O

| colspan="2" | What signifies the life o man,

| width="5%"  |   || An 'twere na for the lasses, O.

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''Green Grow the Rashes, O''

Any object, anything grasped as a whole, can be a sign.  Indeed, the entire life of a person or a people can serve as sign unto itself or others and take on a significance all its own.  In converse fashion, every sign token is an object in the world.  In this role, a sign is forced to obey the ruling and relevant natural laws and empowered to take on a dynamics all its own.

Any object, anything grasped as a whole, can be a sign.  Indeed, the entire life of a person or a people can serve as sign unto itself or others and take on a significance all its own.  In converse fashion, every sign token is an object in the world.  In this role, a sign is forced to obey the ruling and relevant natural laws and empowered to take on a dynamics all its own.

In the contention between signs and objects, the answer initially given by the pragmatic theory of signs is that anything can potentially serve in any role of a sign relation.  In particular, the distinction between "sign" and "object" is a "pragmatic" distinction, a mark of use, not an "essential" distinction, a mark of substance.  This is the right answer as far as the beginning of the question goes, where it is the possible character of everything that is at issue.  The pragmatic approach makes it possible to begin an investigation that would otherwise be obstructed by a futile search for non existent essentials, as if it were necessary to divine them from prior considerations before any experience has been ventured and before a bit of empirical evidence has been collected.

In the contention between signs and objects, the answer initially given by the pragmatic theory of signs is that anything can potentially serve in any role of a sign relation.  In particular, the distinction between sign and object is a ''pragmatic'' distinction, a mark of use, not an ''essential'' distinction, a mark of substance.  This is the right answer as far as the beginning of the question goes, where it is the possible character of everything that is at issue.  The pragmatic approach makes it possible to begin an investigation that would otherwise be obstructed by a futile search for non existent essentials, as if it were necessary to divine them from prior considerations before any experience has been ventured and before a bit of empirical evidence has been collected.

Reason alone teaches us to know good and evil.  Therefore conscience, which makes us love the one and hate the other, though it is independent of reason, cannot develop without it.

Reason alone teaches us to know good and evil.  Therefore conscience, which makes us love the one and hate the other, though it is independent of reason, cannot develop without it.

Rousseau, Emile

Rousseau, Emile