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<a name = "intro"><p><b>Introduction</b></a>

<a name = "intro"></a><p><b>Introduction</b>

<p>This is a translation of two questions from the book on the ‘Old Logic’ by the modist writer Radulphus Brito, written probably in the early <s>thirteenth</s> fourteenth[N0] century.  The questions are (i) whether an utterance signifies the same whether the thing it denotes exists or not, a favourite topic of the <i>modistae</i>, and whether ‘there is a man’ follows from ‘there is a dead man’, another favoured topic.  This is one of a series of translations and discussions to do with the question of whether a per se proposition (one whose predicate is included in the subject, such as 'every man is an animal') is true when the subject does not exist.  

<p>This is a translation of two questions from the book on the ‘Old Logic’ by the modist writer Radulphus Brito, written probably in the early <s>thirteenth</s> fourteenth[N0] century.  The questions are (i) whether an utterance signifies the same whether the thing it denotes exists or not, a favourite topic of the <i>modistae</i>, and whether ‘there is a man’ follows from ‘there is a dead man’, another favoured topic.  This is one of a series of translations and discussions to do with the question of whether a per se proposition (one whose predicate is included in the subject, such as 'every man is an animal') is true when the subject does not exist.  

<a href="simonfavnullohomine.htm">Simon of Faversham</a>, and others.  

<a href="simonfavnullohomine.htm">Simon of Faversham</a>, and others.  

<p><a name = "life"><b>Radulphus Brito</b>

<p><a name = "life"></a><b>Radulphus Brito</b>

<p>Radulphus, also known as Ralph the Breton (b. c. 1270, d. c 1320), was probably born in Brittany.  He was Master of arts in the university of Paris in 1296, and joined masters in theology faculty in 1311.  Very few of his works are edited, although he was a prolific and apparently influential writer.

<p>Radulphus, also known as Ralph the Breton (b. c. 1270, d. c 1320), was probably born in Brittany.  He was Master of arts in the university of Paris in 1296, and joined masters in theology faculty in 1311.  Very few of his works are edited, although he was a prolific and apparently influential writer.

<blockquote><a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/3-8-log-1/start.htm?image=00005">http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/3-8-log-1/start.htm?image=00005</a></blockquote>

<blockquote><a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/3-8-log-1/start.htm?image=00005">http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/3-8-log-1/start.htm?image=00005</a></blockquote>

<p><a name = "summary"><b>Summary</b>

<p><a name = "summary"></a><b>Summary</b>

<p>The passages here are two questions on Aristotle's <i>Perihermanias</i> or <i>On Interpretation</i>, summarised as follows.

<p>The passages here are two questions on Aristotle's <i>Perihermanias</i> or <i>On Interpretation</i>, summarised as follows.

(1981-2), <i>Quaestiones super Artem veterem</i> and <i>Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum</i>, ed. S. Ebbesen and J. Pinborg, in 'Gennadios and western scholasticism: Radulphus Brito's Ars Vetus in Greek translation', <i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i> 33, pp. 263-319.

(1981-2), <i>Quaestiones super Artem veterem</i> and <i>Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum</i>, ed. S. Ebbesen and J. Pinborg, in 'Gennadios and western scholasticism: Radulphus Brito's Ars Vetus in Greek translation', <i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i> 33, pp. 263-319.

<p><a name = "references"><b>References</b>  

<p><a name = "references"></a><b>References</b>  

<p>

<p>

<tr> <th>Latin</th><th>English</th>

<tr> <th>Latin</th><th>English</th>

</tr> </thead> <tbody>

</tr> </thead> <tbody>

<tr> <td>    [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00144">144</a>] <a name = "Q1">CONSEQUENTER quaeritur, utrum vox significet idem re existente et non existente.  <a name = "Q1N1">Et arguitur quod non quia voces significant essentiam rei, modo essentia rei non est eadem re existente et non existente, ideo &c.  Maior patet ex praecedenti quaestione, minor de se patet, quia re existente essentia rei non est corrupta, immo habet esse extra animam, sed re non existente illa essentia rei est corrupta.  [<a href = "#Q1adN1">Responsum</a>]

<tr> <td>    [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00144">144</a>] <a name = "Q1"></a>CONSEQUENTER quaeritur, utrum vox significet idem re existente et non existente.  <a name = "Q1N1"></a>Et arguitur quod non quia voces significant essentiam rei, modo essentia rei non est eadem re existente et non existente, ideo &c.  Maior patet ex praecedenti quaestione, minor de se patet, quia re existente essentia rei non est corrupta, immo habet esse extra animam, sed re non existente illa essentia rei est corrupta.  [<a href = "#Q1adN1">Responsum</a>]

</td> <td>    Consequently, it is asked whether an utterance signifies the same with the thing [it denotes] existing or [et] not existing.  1.  And it is argued that [it does] not because utterances signify the essence of a thing, but the essence of a thing is not the same with the thing existing and not existing, therefore &c.  The major is clear from the preceding question, the minor is clear <i>de se</i>, because with a thing existing the essence of the thing is not corrupted.  Or rather, it has being outside the soul, but with the thing not existing, that essence of the thing is corrupted.

</td> <td>    Consequently, it is asked whether an utterance signifies the same with the thing [it denotes] existing or [et] not existing.  1.  And it is argued that [it does] not because utterances signify the essence of a thing, but the essence of a thing is not the same with the thing existing and not existing, therefore &c.  The major is clear from the preceding question, the minor is clear <i>de se</i>, because with a thing existing the essence of the thing is not corrupted.  Or rather, it has being outside the soul, but with the thing not existing, that essence of the thing is corrupted.

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</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1N2">Item tu dicis quod re existente et non existente vox idem significat modo illud quod manet idem re existente non est essentia rei sed magis conceptus rei, ergo significatum vocis est conceptus et non essentia rei, modo hoc est falsum, ut probatum est in alia quaestione, ergo re existente et non existente vox non significat idem, immo re non existente, vox cadit a suo significato. [<a href = "#Q1adN2">Responsum</a>]

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1N2"></a>Item tu dicis quod re existente et non existente vox idem significat modo illud quod manet idem re existente non est essentia rei sed magis conceptus rei, ergo significatum vocis est conceptus et non essentia rei, modo hoc est falsum, ut probatum est in alia quaestione, ergo re existente et non existente vox non significat idem, immo re non existente, vox cadit a suo significato. [<a href = "#Q1adN2">Responsum</a>]

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, you say that with the thing existing and not existing, the utterance signifies the same, but that which remains the same with the thing existing is not the essence of the thing but rather [magis] the concept of the thing.  Therefore the significate of the utterance is a concept and not the essence of the thing.  But this is false, as was proved in the other question, therefore with the thing existing and not existing an utterance may not signify the same, or rather, with the thing not existing, the utterance falls from its significate.

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, you say that with the thing existing and not existing, the utterance signifies the same, but that which remains the same with the thing existing is not the essence of the thing but rather [magis] the concept of the thing.  Therefore the significate of the utterance is a concept and not the essence of the thing.  But this is false, as was proved in the other question, therefore with the thing existing and not existing an utterance may not signify the same, or rather, with the thing not existing, the utterance falls from its significate.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1N3">Item enti et non enti nihil est commune univocum, modo re existente est ens et ipsa non existente est non ens, ergo res existens et non existens, non habet unam rationem intelligendi nec significandi, ergo re existente et non existente voces non significant idem.  [<a href = "#Q1adN3">Responsum</a>]

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1N3"></a>Item enti et non enti nihil est commune univocum, modo re existente est ens et ipsa non existente est non ens, ergo res existens et non existens, non habet unam rationem intelligendi nec significandi, ergo re existente et non existente voces non significant idem.  [<a href = "#Q1adN3">Responsum</a>]

</td> <td>    3.  Likewise, there is nothing univocal common to a being and a non being, but with the thing existing it is a being, and with the thing not existing, it is a non being, therefore a thing existing, and a thing not existing, do not have a single logical nature of understanding, nor of signifying.  Therefore with a thing existing and not existing, utterances do not signify the same.

</td> <td>    3.  Likewise, there is nothing univocal common to a being and a non being, but with the thing existing it is a being, and with the thing not existing, it is a non being, therefore a thing existing, and a thing not existing, do not have a single logical nature of understanding, nor of signifying.  Therefore with a thing existing and not existing, utterances do not signify the same.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1P1">IN OPPOSITUM arguitur, quia si re corrupta, vox non significaret idem, sed caderet a suo significato, tunc oporteret esse novam impositionem vocum corrupta re, modo nos non dicimus istud, immo dicimus quod sortes semper significat sortem, sive sit sive non sit, et tamen dicimus quod sorte non existente, sortes significat sortem, quare &c.   

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1P1"></a>IN OPPOSITUM arguitur, quia si re corrupta, vox non significaret idem, sed caderet a suo significato, tunc oporteret esse novam impositionem vocum corrupta re, modo nos non dicimus istud, immo dicimus quod sortes semper significat sortem, sive sit sive non sit, et tamen dicimus quod sorte non existente, sortes significat sortem, quare &c.   

</td> <td>    IN OPPOSITION, 1. it is argued that if, with the thing destroyed, an utterance were not to signify the same, but were to fall from its significate, then there would have to be a new imposition of utterances, with the thing destroyed [N1].  But we do not say that.  Rather, we say that Socrates always signifies Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, and nevertheless we say that with Socrates not existing, Socrates signifies Socrates, wherefore &c.  

</td> <td>    IN OPPOSITION, 1. it is argued that if, with the thing destroyed, an utterance were not to signify the same, but were to fall from its significate, then there would have to be a new imposition of utterances, with the thing destroyed [N1].  But we do not say that.  Rather, we say that Socrates always signifies Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, and nevertheless we say that with Socrates not existing, Socrates signifies Socrates, wherefore &c.  

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</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1P2">Item illud quod significatur per terminum intelligitur per ipsum, modo intellectus idem intelligit re existente et non existente, [quia]  per sortem, sive sit sive non sit semper idem [144b] intelligit, ergo &c.   

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1P2"></a>Item illud quod significatur per terminum intelligitur per ipsum, modo intellectus idem intelligit re existente et non existente, [quia]  per sortem, sive sit sive non sit semper idem [144b] intelligit, ergo &c.   

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, that which is signified by a term is understood through it, but the understanding understands the same with a thing existing and not existing, because by Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, it understands the same, therefore &c.

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, that which is signified by a term is understood through it, but the understanding understands the same with a thing existing and not existing, because by Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, it understands the same, therefore &c.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1Resp">Ad istam quaestionem dico duo primo quod vox idem significat re existente et non existente, secundo dico quod quantum ad significatum vocis non est idem re existente et non existente.  Primum declaratur sic, quia illud quod per vocem intelligitur per vocem significatur, modo idem intelligitur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit, ergo idem significatur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit.  Maior patet quia significare est intellectum constituere ergo quod intellectus intelligit idem per vocem significat et loquitur de primo intellectu et non de causa intellectus sicut intellectus intelligit unum relativorum per alterum et tamen unum significat alterum.   

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1Resp"></a>Ad istam quaestionem dico duo primo quod vox idem significat re existente et non existente, secundo dico quod quantum ad significatum vocis non est idem re existente et non existente.  Primum declaratur sic, quia illud quod per vocem intelligitur per vocem significatur, modo idem intelligitur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit, ergo idem significatur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit.  Maior patet quia significare est intellectum constituere ergo quod intellectus intelligit idem per vocem significat et loquitur de primo intellectu et non de causa intellectus sicut intellectus intelligit unum relativorum per alterum et tamen unum significat alterum.   

</td> <td>    To this question, I say two things.  First, that an utterance signifies the same with a thing existing or not.  Second, I say that as far as the significate of the utterance, it is not the same with a thing existing or not.  The first [claim] is clarified thus.  For that which is understood by an utterance is signified by the utterance, but the same thing is understood by an utterance whether the thing exists or not.  Therefore the same is signified by an utterance whether the thing exists or not.  The major [premiss] is clear, because signifying establishes understanding.  Therefore what the understanding understands, signifies the same by the utterance, and speaks of the primary understanding and not of the cause of understanding, just as the understanding understands one [of two related things] through the other, and yet one signifies the other.   

</td> <td>    To this question, I say two things.  First, that an utterance signifies the same with a thing existing or not.  Second, I say that as far as the significate of the utterance, it is not the same with a thing existing or not.  The first [claim] is clarified thus.  For that which is understood by an utterance is signified by the utterance, but the same thing is understood by an utterance whether the thing exists or not.  Therefore the same is signified by an utterance whether the thing exists or not.  The major [premiss] is clear, because signifying establishes understanding.  Therefore what the understanding understands, signifies the same by the utterance, and speaks of the primary understanding and not of the cause of understanding, just as the understanding understands one [of two related things] through the other, and yet one signifies the other.   

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</td> <td>    THEN [IN REPLY] TO THE ARGUMENTS.

</td> <td>    THEN [IN REPLY] TO THE ARGUMENTS.

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</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN1">Ad <a href = "#Q1N1">primam</a> cum dicitur vox significat rei essentiam, verum est tamen hoc est sub aliqua ratione intelligendi.  Et cum dicitur rei essentia non manet eadem &c, [145b] verum est secundum id quod est, tamen quantum ad esse intellectum et significatum manet eadem re existente et non existente, et ideo significatum ut significatum manet idem, quia formale in significato manet idem, et ratio significandi, ergo &c.

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN1"></a>Ad <a href = "#Q1N1">primam</a> cum dicitur vox significat rei essentiam, verum est tamen hoc est sub aliqua ratione intelligendi.  Et cum dicitur rei essentia non manet eadem &c, [145b] verum est secundum id quod est, tamen quantum ad esse intellectum et significatum manet eadem re existente et non existente, et ideo significatum ut significatum manet idem, quia formale in significato manet idem, et ratio significandi, ergo &c.

</td> <td>    1.  To the first, when it is said that an utterance signifies the essence of a thing, it is true, nevertheless this falls under the logical nature of understanding.  And when it is said the essence of a thing does not remain the same &c, it is true according to that which exists, yet as far as being that is understood and signified, it remains the same, whether the thing exists or not.  And for that reason what is signified, as signified, remains the same, because what is formal, in what is signified, remains the same, and [so] the reason of signifying, &c.

</td> <td>    1.  To the first, when it is said that an utterance signifies the essence of a thing, it is true, nevertheless this falls under the logical nature of understanding.  And when it is said the essence of a thing does not remain the same &c, it is true according to that which exists, yet as far as being that is understood and signified, it remains the same, whether the thing exists or not.  And for that reason what is signified, as signified, remains the same, because what is formal, in what is signified, remains the same, and [so] the reason of signifying, &c.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN2">Ad <a href = "#Q1N2">aliam</a> cum dicitur conceptus rei &c, verum est, tamen sub illo conceptu est aliquod significatum formale, et ideo quod est formale idem manet, ideo significatum ut significatum est licet illud quod significatum est non maneat idem, et ideo re non existente vox non est significatum per rationem significandi rem immediate.   

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN2"></a>Ad <a href = "#Q1N2">aliam</a> cum dicitur conceptus rei &c, verum est, tamen sub illo conceptu est aliquod significatum formale, et ideo quod est formale idem manet, ideo significatum ut significatum est licet illud quod significatum est non maneat idem, et ideo re non existente vox non est significatum per rationem significandi rem immediate.   

</td> <td>    2.  To the [second], when it is said that the concept of a thing &c, it is true, yet under that concept there is something formal that is signified, and for the reason that is it formal, it remains the same, [and] for that reason the thing signified, as it is signified [remains the same], although that which is signified may not remain the same. And for that reason, when the thing does not exist, an utterance is not a significate by reason of signifying a thing immediately.

</td> <td>    2.  To the [second], when it is said that the concept of a thing &c, it is true, yet under that concept there is something formal that is signified, and for the reason that is it formal, it remains the same, [and] for that reason the thing signified, as it is signified [remains the same], although that which is signified may not remain the same. And for that reason, when the thing does not exist, an utterance is not a significate by reason of signifying a thing immediately.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN3">Ad <a href = "#Q1N3">aliam</a> cum dicitur enti et non enti et cetera, verum est sub propriis rationibus sumptis, cum dicitur, ergo re existente et non existente non est idem significatum non sequitur quia re non existente vox significans non significat talem rem, ut autem existens est, immo significat ipsam ut existens est sicut quia sortes, semper significat sortem sive sit sive non sit.  Unde sorti corrupto sortes non est sortes, immo significat sortem eodem modo est in aliis, ideo &c.

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q1adN3"></a>Ad <a href = "#Q1N3">aliam</a> cum dicitur enti et non enti et cetera, verum est sub propriis rationibus sumptis, cum dicitur, ergo re existente et non existente non est idem significatum non sequitur quia re non existente vox significans non significat talem rem, ut autem existens est, immo significat ipsam ut existens est sicut quia sortes, semper significat sortem sive sit sive non sit.  Unde sorti corrupto sortes non est sortes, immo significat sortem eodem modo est in aliis, ideo &c.

</td> <td>    3.  To the [third], when it is said [there is nothing common] to being and non being &c, it is true under the proper reasons taken.  When it is said, therefore, with a thing existing [or] not existing, what is signified is not the same, it does not follow that with the thing not existing the signifying utterance does not signify such a thing, but as it is existent, or rather, it signifies that thing just as it is existing, just as Socrates always signifies Socrates whether he exists or not.  Wherefore, with Socrates destroyed, Socrates is not Socrates, or rather, it signifies Socrates in the same way it is in the other [cases] &c.

</td> <td>    3.  To the [third], when it is said [there is nothing common] to being and non being &c, it is true under the proper reasons taken.  When it is said, therefore, with a thing existing [or] not existing, what is signified is not the same, it does not follow that with the thing not existing the signifying utterance does not signify such a thing, but as it is existent, or rather, it signifies that thing just as it is existing, just as Socrates always signifies Socrates whether he exists or not.  Wherefore, with Socrates destroyed, Socrates is not Socrates, or rather, it signifies Socrates in the same way it is in the other [cases] &c.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00178">178</a>]<a name = "Q2">Consequenter quaeritur: Utrum sequatur homo mortuus ergo homo.   

<tr> <td>    [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00178">178</a>]<a name = "Q2"></a>Consequenter quaeritur: Utrum sequatur homo mortuus ergo homo.   

</td> <td>    Consequently it is asked: whether 'a dead man, therefore a man' follows [N3].

</td> <td>    Consequently it is asked: whether 'a dead man, therefore a man' follows [N3].

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2P1">Et arguitur quod sic: 1. quia sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes homo mortuus ergo est homo. Antecedens patet, quia idem sequitur ad se, quia mortuum est idem sorti mortuo.  Probatio consequentiae, quia tu non probares consequentiam esse negandam vel non negares nisi quia mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sed hoc non est verum.  Probo quia sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sicut homo de ratione mortui et tamen hoc non obstante bene sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo sortes est homo. [<a href = "#Q2adN1">Responsum</a>]

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2P1"></a>Et arguitur quod sic: 1. quia sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes homo mortuus ergo est homo. Antecedens patet, quia idem sequitur ad se, quia mortuum est idem sorti mortuo.  Probatio consequentiae, quia tu non probares consequentiam esse negandam vel non negares nisi quia mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sed hoc non est verum.  Probo quia sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sicut homo de ratione mortui et tamen hoc non obstante bene sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo sortes est homo. [<a href = "#Q2adN1">Responsum</a>]

</td> <td>    And it is argued that it is so, as follows.  1.  Because it follows [N4]  'Socrates is a dead man, therefore by a similar [argument] it follows, 'Socrates [is] a man therefore there is a man'.  The antecedent is clear, because the same thing follows from itself, because [some] dead [thing] is the same as a dead Socrates.  The proof of the consequent, because you would not prove the consequent to be denied, or you would not deny [it] unless because [being] dead diminishes the logical nature of a man, but this is not true.  I prove  because just as [being] dead diminishes in respect of the logical nature of man, just as man [diminishes] the logical nature of [being] dead, and nevertheless this notwithstanding it validly [bene] follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore he is dead', therefore by a similar [reasoning] it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is a man'.

</td> <td>    And it is argued that it is so, as follows.  1.  Because it follows [N4]  'Socrates is a dead man, therefore by a similar [argument] it follows, 'Socrates [is] a man therefore there is a man'.  The antecedent is clear, because the same thing follows from itself, because [some] dead [thing] is the same as a dead Socrates.  The proof of the consequent, because you would not prove the consequent to be denied, or you would not deny [it] unless because [being] dead diminishes the logical nature of a man, but this is not true.  I prove  because just as [being] dead diminishes in respect of the logical nature of man, just as man [diminishes] the logical nature of [being] dead, and nevertheless this notwithstanding it validly [bene] follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore he is dead', therefore by a similar [reasoning] it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is a man'.

</td> </tr>

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2P2">2.  Item, quandocumque in aliquo antecedente includuntur duo contradictoria ad ipsum sequitur quodlibet ipsorum ut dicitur quarto metaphysicae, scilicet, sortes vel aliquis talis est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, scilicet, unum et non unum, quia in homine intelligitur unum et in mortuo non unum ergo ad antecedens sequitur quodlibet istorum,  

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2P2"></a>2.  Item, quandocumque in aliquo antecedente includuntur duo contradictoria ad ipsum sequitur quodlibet ipsorum ut dicitur quarto metaphysicae, scilicet, sortes vel aliquis talis est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, scilicet, unum et non unum, quia in homine intelligitur unum et in mortuo non unum ergo ad antecedens sequitur quodlibet istorum,  

et sic sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo.  [<a href = "#Q2adN2">Responsum</a>]

et sic sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo.  [<a href = "#Q2adN2">Responsum</a>]

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, whenever in some antecedent two contradictories are involved, there follows anything you like from this, as is said in the fourth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> [N5], namely, Socrates, or some such person, is a dead man involves two contradictories, namely, one and not one, because in 'man' is understood one, and in 'dead', not one, therefore from the antecedent there follows any of those things, and thus it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man'.

</td> <td>    2.  Likewise, whenever in some antecedent two contradictories are involved, there follows anything you like from this, as is said in the fourth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> [N5], namely, Socrates, or some such person, is a dead man involves two contradictories, namely, one and not one, because in 'man' is understood one, and in 'dead', not one, therefore from the antecedent there follows any of those things, and thus it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man'.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2N1">OPPOSITUM vult philosophus [N6] quod quando talia sunt composita quorum unum diminuit de ratione alterius, tunc non licet ex talibus coniunctis inferret divisum, quia ibi est oppositio in obiecto ut homo mortuus ergo homo.

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2N1"></a>OPPOSITUM vult philosophus [N6] quod quando talia sunt composita quorum unum diminuit de ratione alterius, tunc non licet ex talibus coniunctis inferret divisum, quia ibi est oppositio in obiecto ut homo mortuus ergo homo.

</td> <td>    On the opposing side, the Philosopher would have it that when such things are composite of which one diminishes the logical nature of the other, then it is not allowed that from such conjunctions there is implied [<i>inferret</i>] a divided conclusion, because in such a case [ibi] there is opposition <i>in obiecto</i> [N7], as in 'a dead man, therefore a man'.

</td> <td>    On the opposing side, the Philosopher would have it that when such things are composite of which one diminishes the logical nature of the other, then it is not allowed that from such conjunctions there is implied [<i>inferret</i>] a divided conclusion, because in such a case [ibi] there is opposition <i>in obiecto</i> [N7], as in 'a dead man, therefore a man'.

</td> </tr>

</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2Resp">Dico quod non sequitur homo mortuus ergo homo, quia illa consequentia est nulla in qua est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter sed dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo homo, est fallacia secundum quid et simpli[178b]citer, ergo &c.  Maior patet quia omnis consequentia sophystica impedit consequentiam syllogisticam et bonam. Minor declaratur, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, hic tenetur homo pro esse secundum quid ratione de li mortuum, sed quando dicitur ergo sortes est homo, ergo in ista consequentia homo secundum se sumptum tenetur pro esse simpliciter, et quia sumo in antecedente hominem esse secundum quid ut dictum est ideo proceditur ibi a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter non valet consequentia.

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2Resp"></a>Dico quod non sequitur homo mortuus ergo homo, quia illa consequentia est nulla in qua est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter sed dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo homo, est fallacia secundum quid et simpli[178b]citer, ergo &c.  Maior patet quia omnis consequentia sophystica impedit consequentiam syllogisticam et bonam. Minor declaratur, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, hic tenetur homo pro esse secundum quid ratione de li mortuum, sed quando dicitur ergo sortes est homo, ergo in ista consequentia homo secundum se sumptum tenetur pro esse simpliciter, et quia sumo in antecedente hominem esse secundum quid ut dictum est ideo proceditur ibi a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter non valet consequentia.

</td> <td>    I say that 'a dead man, therefore a man' does not follow, because  there is nothing is a [valid] consequence in which there is fallacy of 'with and without qualification'.  But in saying 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore [there is] a man' is a fallacy with and without qualification, therefore &c.  The major is clear because every sophistical consequence prevents a consequence which is syllogistical and valid.  The minor is clarified, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', here 'man' is held for being in a qualified sense, by reason of the word 'dead'.  But when we say 'therefore Socrates is a man', therefore in that consequence 'man', taken according to itself, is taken for being in an unqualified sense.  And because in the antecedent I take 'a man being' in a qualified sense, as was said, for that reason [the argument] advances from what is said in a qualified sense, to what is said without qualification, the consequence is not valid.

</td> <td>    I say that 'a dead man, therefore a man' does not follow, because  there is nothing is a [valid] consequence in which there is fallacy of 'with and without qualification'.  But in saying 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore [there is] a man' is a fallacy with and without qualification, therefore &c.  The major is clear because every sophistical consequence prevents a consequence which is syllogistical and valid.  The minor is clarified, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', here 'man' is held for being in a qualified sense, by reason of the word 'dead'.  But when we say 'therefore Socrates is a man', therefore in that consequence 'man', taken according to itself, is taken for being in an unqualified sense.  And because in the antecedent I take 'a man being' in a qualified sense, as was said, for that reason [the argument] advances from what is said in a qualified sense, to what is said without qualification, the consequence is not valid.

</td> </tr>

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But in the antecedent in relation [<i>habitudine</i>] to the consequent there is opposition and thus the Philosopher understood [it].

But in the antecedent in relation [<i>habitudine</i>] to the consequent there is opposition and thus the Philosopher understood [it].

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</td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2adN1">TUNC AD rationes.  Ad <a href = "#Q2P1">primam</a> cum dicitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo.  Dico quod non est simile, quia homo in antecedente stat secundum exigentiam mortui et ideo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, sed non sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo quia hic sumitur secundum se, sed in antecedente sumitur secundum exigentiam mortui, et sic aliter sumitur in antecedente et aliter in consequente, cum dicitur sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis ita econverso verum est homo secundum se sumptus sed homo sumptus in hoc aggregato non diminuit de ratione mortui.   

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2adN1"></a>TUNC AD rationes.  Ad <a href = "#Q2P1">primam</a> cum dicitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo.  Dico quod non est simile, quia homo in antecedente stat secundum exigentiam mortui et ideo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, sed non sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo quia hic sumitur secundum se, sed in antecedente sumitur secundum exigentiam mortui, et sic aliter sumitur in antecedente et aliter in consequente, cum dicitur sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis ita econverso verum est homo secundum se sumptus sed homo sumptus in hoc aggregato non diminuit de ratione mortui.   

</td> <td>    Now for the arguments.  To the first, when it is said that 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], therefore by similar [reasoning] 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' follows.  I say that it is not similar [reasoning], because 'man' in the antecedent stands as required by 'dead', and for that reason 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], but 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' does not follow, because ['man'] is taken here according to itself, but in the antecedent it is taken required by 'dead'.  And thus it is taken one way in the antecedent and another way in the consequent.  When it is said that just as 'dead' diminishes the logical nature of man, thus, conversely, man taken according to itself, it is true. But man taken in the aggregate [expression], does not diminish the logical nature of 'dead'.

</td> <td>    Now for the arguments.  To the first, when it is said that 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], therefore by similar [reasoning] 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' follows.  I say that it is not similar [reasoning], because 'man' in the antecedent stands as required by 'dead', and for that reason 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], but 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' does not follow, because ['man'] is taken here according to itself, but in the antecedent it is taken required by 'dead'.  And thus it is taken one way in the antecedent and another way in the consequent.  When it is said that just as 'dead' diminishes the logical nature of man, thus, conversely, man taken according to itself, it is true. But man taken in the aggregate [expression], does not diminish the logical nature of 'dead'.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2adN2">Ad <a href = "#Q2P2">aliam</a> cum dicitur quandocumque in aliquo antecedente sumuntur duo contradictoria {et} verum est et cum dicitur in illo antecedente sortes est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, falsum est, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, homo hic non stat pro homine vivo vel vero, sed secundum exigentiam mortui ut visum est.  Unde si acciperetur secundum se, sic esset contradictio.  Unde bene est oppositum in obiecto inter homine et mortuum, ratione de li hominis secundum se sumpti in consequente, et ratione de li mortui [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00179">179</a>]sumpti in consequente ut dictum est sed secundum quod aggregatum simul in antecedente dicendo homo mortuus, quia tunc homo teneretur secundum exigentiam mortui et sic non opponuntur.

<tr> <td>    <a name = "Q2adN2"></a>Ad <a href = "#Q2P2">aliam</a> cum dicitur quandocumque in aliquo antecedente sumuntur duo contradictoria {et} verum est et cum dicitur in illo antecedente sortes est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, falsum est, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, homo hic non stat pro homine vivo vel vero, sed secundum exigentiam mortui ut visum est.  Unde si acciperetur secundum se, sic esset contradictio.  Unde bene est oppositum in obiecto inter homine et mortuum, ratione de li hominis secundum se sumpti in consequente, et ratione de li mortui [<a href = "http://diglib.hab.de/show_image.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-1&lang=en&image=00179">179</a>]sumpti in consequente ut dictum est sed secundum quod aggregatum simul in antecedente dicendo homo mortuus, quia tunc homo teneretur secundum exigentiam mortui et sic non opponuntur.

</td> <td>    To the other, when it is said, whenever in any antecedent there are taken two contradictories, it is true, and when it is said, in that antecedent 'Socrates is a dead man', there are two contradictories involved, it is false, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', 'man' here does not stand for a living or true man, but as it is required by 'dead', as we saw.  Wherefore, if it were taken according to itself, there would be a contradiction.  Wherefore, rightly [<i>bene</i>] there is opposition <i>in obiecto</i> between 'man' and 'dead', by reason of the word 'man', taken according to itself in the consequent, and by reason of the word 'dead' taken in the consequent, as was said, but according as the aggregate together in the antecedent by saying 'dead man', because then 'man' would be held [as] required by 'dead', and thus they are not opposed.

</td> <td>    To the other, when it is said, whenever in any antecedent there are taken two contradictories, it is true, and when it is said, in that antecedent 'Socrates is a dead man', there are two contradictories involved, it is false, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', 'man' here does not stand for a living or true man, but as it is required by 'dead', as we saw.  Wherefore, if it were taken according to itself, there would be a contradiction.  Wherefore, rightly [<i>bene</i>] there is opposition <i>in obiecto</i> between 'man' and 'dead', by reason of the word 'man', taken according to itself in the consequent, and by reason of the word 'dead' taken in the consequent, as was said, but according as the aggregate together in the antecedent by saying 'dead man', because then 'man' would be held [as] required by 'dead', and thus they are not opposed.

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<p><hr>

<p><hr>

<p><a name = "endnotes"><b>Endnotes</b>

<p><a name = "endnotes"></a><b>Endnotes</b>

<br> [N0] Thanks to Jack Zupko for reminding me of the confusing fact that any year beginning in '13..' is actually in the <i>fourteenth</i> century.

<br> [N0] Thanks to Jack Zupko for reminding me of the confusing fact that any year beginning in '13..' is actually in the <i>fourteenth</i> century.