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* [[Directory:Logic Museum/ Nullo homine (Modist)|Late thirteenth and early fourteenth modist school (1270-1310)]]<br>

* [[Directory:Logic Museum/ Nullo homine (Modist)|Late thirteenth and early fourteenth modist school (1270-1310)]]<br>

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<div id="intro"><b>Introduction</b>

==Introduction==

On this page I am collecting together primary references on the medieval discussion on the question whether 'every man is an animal' is true, when no man exists.  The question is closely connected with Terence Parsons' [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square discussion of the O proposition] in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Parsons claims that 'For most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions [i.e. Latin propositions of the form <i>quoddam A est B</i>, standardly represented in English as 'some A is not B'] are vacuously true if their subjects are empty'.  I am suspicious of this claim.  There is pretty firm evidence that no logician before Abelard even considered the special case where the subject term is empty.  There is ample evidence that post-scholastic traditional logicians (i.e. from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century and later) did not hold the view that Parsons mentions.  But there is almost no literature in the high scholastic period on the O proposition, and what references we do have are confusing.

On this page I am collecting together primary references on the medieval discussion on the question whether 'every man is an animal' is true, when no man exists.  The question is closely connected with Terence Parsons' [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square discussion of the O proposition] in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Parsons claims that 'For most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions [i.e. Latin propositions of the form <i>quoddam A est B</i>, standardly represented in English as 'some A is not B'] are vacuously true if their subjects are empty'.  I am suspicious of this claim.  There is pretty firm evidence that no logician before Abelard even considered the special case where the subject term is empty.  There is ample evidence that post-scholastic traditional logicians (i.e. from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century and later) did not hold the view that Parsons mentions.  But there is almost no literature in the high scholastic period on the O proposition, and what references we do have are confusing.

The list of primary references is below.  I have located many of these, and they will start to appear in the Logic Museum in the coming months (August-November 2007).  There is very little secondary literature on the subject, but it is all the more interesting for that.

The list of primary references is below.  I have located many of these, and they will start to appear in the Logic Museum in the coming months (August-November 2007).  There is very little secondary literature on the subject, but it is all the more interesting for that.

<hr><b>Philosophers and dates</b><br>

==Philosophers and dates==

[[Richard the Sophister]] (fl c 1230-40) <br>

[[Richard the Sophister]] (fl c 1230-40) <br>

[[Boethius of Dacia]] (fl c. 1270-80) <br>

[[Boethius of Dacia]] (fl c. 1270-80) <br>

[[Francisco Suarez]] (1548-1617)<br>

[[Francisco Suarez]] (1548-1617)<br>

<hr><b>Primary Sources</b><br>

==Primary Sources==

In approximate date order:

In approximate date order:

<b>c. 1235</b>  Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omne coloratum est</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in <i>Magister Abstractionum</i>, CIMAGL, 18 (1976), 1-4.<br>

<b>c. 1235</b>  Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omne coloratum est</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in <i>Magister Abstractionum</i>, CIMAGL, 18 (1976), 1-4.<br>

<b>1597</b> Francisco Suarez, <i>Utrum Essentia Creata sit Separabilis a sua Substantia</i>, in <i>Disputationes Metaphysicae</i>, D XXXI, Sectio xii, ed. Vives<br>

<b>1597</b> Francisco Suarez, <i>Utrum Essentia Creata sit Separabilis a sua Substantia</i>, in <i>Disputationes Metaphysicae</i>, D XXXI, Sectio xii, ed. Vives<br>

<hr><b>Secondary Sources</b><br>

==Secondary Sources==

Bazan, B., 'La Theorie de la Signification chez Siger de Brabant', in <i>Progress in Linguistic Historiography</i>: Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, August 1978, ed. Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam, Benjamins.<br>

Bazan, B., 'La Theorie de la Signification chez Siger de Brabant', in <i>Progress in Linguistic Historiography</i>: Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, August 1978, ed. Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam, Benjamins.<br>

Ebbesen, S., and Pinborg, J., 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut  

Ebbesen, S., and Pinborg, J., 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut