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A '''correspondence theory of truth''' is a philosophical position holding that any element of conception or discourse is rendered [[truth|true]] by virtue of a corresponding ''[[fact]]'', that is, a real state of affairs, typically having corresponding elements and a similar structure. In particular, such a position maintains that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined by how it relates to an objective world, by whether and how accurately it describes that world.

The '''correspondence theory of truth''' states that something (for example, a proposition or statement or sentence) is rendered [[truth|true]] by the existence of a [[fact]] with corresponding elements and a similar structure. The theory maintains that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world. The theory presupposes an objective world and is therefore antagonistic to theories that problematise objectivity such as [[skepticism]] or [[relativism]].

Problems with the theory arise from consideration of precisely what is supposed to correspond with what. If a statement is just a sentence then it is merely a physical thing (for example, ink on a page, or sound waves in the air) with no intrinsic meaning. Therefore it is usually claimed that it is the [[proposition]] (or ''meaning'') expressed by a statement that is supposed to correspond with the facts. Yet both these "[[entities]]", propositions and facts, may be unappealing to [[minimalism|minimalists]] who refuse to admit such [[Wiktionary:abstract|abstract]] entities to their [[ontology]]. Also, precisely defining what constitutes [[correspondence]] is also a problem.

Problems with the theory arise from consideration of precisely what is supposed to correspond with what. If a statement is just a sentence then it is merely a physical thing (for example, ink on a page, or sound waves in the air) with no intrinsic meaning. Therefore it is usually claimed that it is the [[proposition]] (or ''meaning'') expressed by a statement that is supposed to correspond with the facts. Yet both these "[[entities]]", propositions and facts, may be unappealing to [[minimalism|minimalists]] who refuse to admit such [[Wiktionary:abstract|abstract]] entities to their [[ontology]]. Also, precisely defining what constitutes [[correspondence]] is also a problem.

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Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.  According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object.  Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, ''by taking knowledge of it''.  My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth.  For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object.  Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients ''[[Diallelos]]''.  And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man.  (Kant, 45)

Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.  According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object.  Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, ''by taking knowledge of it''.  My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth.  For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object.  Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients ''[[Diallelos]]''.  And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man.  (Kant, 45).

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To get around this problem, we can easily see that in order for a proposition to be true according to the correspondence theory, there must ''exist'' some fact to which it corresponds: the proposition P has to correspond with the fact that P, if the proposition P is true. So, we can say that it is true that P if, and only if, there exists a fact that P. In this case, it is true that some dogs bark if, and only if, there exists a fact that some dogs bark.

To get around this problem, we can easily see that in order for a proposition to be true according to the correspondence theory, there must ''exist'' some fact to which it corresponds: the proposition P has to correspond with the fact that P, if the proposition P is true. So, we can say that it is true that P if, and only if, there exists a fact that P. In this case, it is true that some dogs bark if, and only if, there exists a fact that some dogs bark.

*The proposition that P is ''true'' [[iff]] it is a fact that P.

:* The proposition that P is ''true'' [[iff]] it is a fact that P.

So the correspondence theory could be revised as:  

So the correspondence theory could be revised as:  

*P is true when it is a fact that P.

:* P is true when it is a fact that P.

For example:

For example:

*The proposition that dogs bark is true if it is a fact that some dogs bark.

:* The proposition that dogs bark is true if it is a fact that some dogs bark.

*The proposition that God exists is true if it is a fact that God exists.   

:* The proposition that God exists is true if it is a fact that God exists.   

*The proposition that snow is white is true if it is a fact that snow is white.

:* The proposition that snow is white is true if it is a fact that snow is white.

This solves the problem of defining ''correspondence'' by stating that if there is a fact that P, then that fact corresponds with the proposition that P. Basically, "true proposition" means "factual proposition."

This solves the problem of defining ''correspondence'' by stating that if there is a fact that P, then that fact corresponds with the proposition that P. Basically, "true proposition" means "factual proposition".

However, this reformulation of the theory faces now a different problem: what are facts, and what does it mean to say that facts exist, or that there is some alleged fact? The theory now has to give some definition of what facts are.  

However, this reformulation of the theory faces now a different problem: what are facts, and what does it mean to say that facts exist, or that there is some alleged fact? The theory now has to give some definition of what facts are.