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| ====Pragmatic Maxim as Closure Principle==== | | ====Pragmatic Maxim as Closure Principle==== |
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− | <pre> | + | <blockquote> |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | Consider what effects that might ''conceivably'' have practical bearings you ''conceive'' the objects of your ''conception'' to have. Then, your ''conception'' of those effects is the whole of your ''conception'' of the object. (C.S. Peirce, CP 5.438). |
− | | + | </blockquote> |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems : Note 23
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− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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− | | |
− | | Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you
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− | | conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception
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− | | of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.
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| | | |
| Consider the following attempts at interpretation: | | Consider the following attempts at interpretation: |
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− | 1. Your concept of x is your concept of the practical effects of x.
| + | : Your concept of <math>x\!</math> is your concept of the practical effects of <math>x.\!</math> |
| | | |
| Not exactly. It seems a bit more like: | | Not exactly. It seems a bit more like: |
| | | |
− | 2. Your concept of x is your concept of your-conceived-practical-effects of x.
| + | : Your concept of <math>x\!</math> is your concept of your-conceived-practical-effects of <math>x.\!</math> |
| | | |
| Converting to a third person point of view: | | Converting to a third person point of view: |
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− | 3. j's concept of x is j's concept of j's-conceived-practical-effects of x.
| + | : <math>j\!</math>'s concept of <math>x\!</math> is <math>j\!</math>'s concept of <math>j\!</math>'s-conceived-practical-effects of <math>x.\!</math> |
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| An ordinary closure principle looks like this: | | An ordinary closure principle looks like this: |
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− | C(x) = C(C(x)) | + | : <math>C(x) = C(C(x))\!</math> |
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− | It is tempting to try and read the pragmatic maxim | + | It is tempting to try and read the pragmatic maxim as if it had the following form, where <math>C\!</math> and <math>E\!</math> are supposed to be a 1-adic functions for "concept of" and "effects of", respectively. |
− | as if it had the following form, where C and E are | |
− | supposed to be a 1-adic functions for "concept of" | |
− | and "effects of", respectively. | |
| | | |
− | 1-adic functional case: | + | : 1-adic functional case: |
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− | C(x) = C(E(x)) | + | : <math>C(x) = C(E(x))\!</math> |
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| But it is really more like: | | But it is really more like: |
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− | 2-adic functional case: | + | : 2-adic functional case: |
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− | C(y, x) = C(y, E(y, x)) | + | : <math>C(y, x) = C(y, E(y, x))\!</math> |
| | | |
| where: | | where: |
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− | 1. y = you.
| + | : <math>y\!</math> = you. |
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− | 2. C(y, x) = the concept that you have of x.
| + | : <math>C(y, x)\!</math> = the concept that you have of <math>x.\!</math> |
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− | 3. E(y, x) = the effects that you know of x.
| + | : <math>E(y, x)\!</math> = the effects that you know of <math>x.\!</math> |
| | | |
| + | <pre> |
| x C(y, x) | | x C(y, x) |
| o------------>o | | o------------>o |
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| o------------>o | | o------------>o |
| E(y, x) C(y, E(y, x)) | | E(y, x) C(y, E(y, x)) |
| + | </pre> |
| + | |
| + | The concept that you have of <math>x\!</math> is the concept that you have of the effects that you know of <math>x.\!</math> |
| + | |
| + | It is also very likely that the functional interpretations will not do the trick, and that 3-adic relations will need to be used instead. |
| + | |
| + | '''Source.''' [http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/suo/ontology/msg04316.html Jon Awbrey (08 Aug 2002), "Inquiry Driven Systems : Note 23", Ontology List, Peirce List]. |
| + | |
| + | ==Determination== |
| + | |
| + | # [http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd63.html#02377 Jon Awbrey (May–Aug 2001), "Determination", Ontology List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-May/thread.html#489 Jon Awbrey (May 2001), "Determination", Arisbe List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#942 Jon Awbrey (Aug 2001), "Determination", Arisbe List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2197 Jon Awbrey (Dec 2004), "Determination", Inquiry List]. |
| + | |
| + | ==Logic As Semiotic== |
| + | |
| + | # [http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd48.html#03070 Jon Awbrey (Aug 2001), "Logic As Semiotic", Ontology List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#844 Jon Awbrey (Aug 2001), "Logic As Semiotic", Arisbe List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2219 Jon Awbrey (Dec 2004), "Logic As Semiotic", Inquiry List]. |
| + | |
| + | ==Inquiry Into Information== |
| + | |
| + | # [http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd47.html#03172 Jon Awbrey (Aug 2001), "Inquiry Into Information", Ontology List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#935 Jon Awbrey (Aug 2001), "Inquiry Into Information", Arisbe List]. |
| + | # [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2229 Jon Awbrey (Dec 2004), "Inquiry Into Information", Inquiry List]. |
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− | The concept that you have of x
| + | ==Resources== |
− | is the concept that you have of
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− | the effects that you know of x.
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| | | |
− | It is also very likely that the functional interpretations will not
| + | * [http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm Peirce, C.S. (13 Nov 1867), "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension"]. |
− | do the trick, and that 3-adic relations will need to be used instead.
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| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | [[Category:Charles Sanders Peirce]] |
− | </pre>
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− | '''Source.''' [http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/suo/ontology/msg04316.html Jon Awbrey (08 Aug 2002), Ontology List, Peirce List].
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