Changes

A related source of conceptual turbulence stems from the circumstance that, even though a certain aesthetic dynamics attracts the mind toward sign relational systems that are capable of reflecting on, commenting on, and thus ''counter-rolling'' their own behavior, it is still important to distinguish in every active instance the part of the system that is doing the discussing from the part of the system that is being discussed.  To do this, interpreters need two things:  (1) the senses to discern the essential tensions that typically prevail between the formal pole and the informal arena, and (2) the language to articulate, aside from their potential roles, the moment by moment placement of dynamic elements and systematic components with respect to this field of polarities.

A related source of conceptual turbulence stems from the circumstance that, even though a certain aesthetic dynamics attracts the mind toward sign relational systems that are capable of reflecting on, commenting on, and thus ''counter-rolling'' their own behavior, it is still important to distinguish in every active instance the part of the system that is doing the discussing from the part of the system that is being discussed.  To do this, interpreters need two things:  (1) the senses to discern the essential tensions that typically prevail between the formal pole and the informal arena, and (2) the language to articulate, aside from their potential roles, the moment by moment placement of dynamic elements and systematic components with respect to this field of polarities.

=====1.3.4.11.  Review & Prospect=====

=====1.3.4.11.  Review and Prospect=====

What has been learned from the foregoing study of icons and indices?  The import of this examination can be sized up in two stages, at first, by reflecting on the action of both the formal and the casual signs that were found to be operating in and around the discussion of A and B, and then, by taking up the lessons of this circumscribed arena as a paradigm for future investigation.

What has been learned from the foregoing study of icons and indices?  The import of this examination can be sized up in two stages, at first, by reflecting on the action of both the formal and the casual signs that were found to be operating in and around the discussion of ''A'' and ''B'', and then, by taking up the lessons of this circumscribed arena as a paradigm for future investigation.

In order to explain the operation of sign relations corresponding to iconic and indexical signs in the A and B example, it becomes necessary to refer to potential objects of thought that are located, if they exist at all, outside the realm of the initial object set, that is, lying beyond the objects of thought present at the outset of discussion that one initially recognizes as objects of formally identified signs.  In particular, it is incumbent on a satisfying explanation to invoke the abstract properties of objects and the actual instances of objects, where these properties and instances are normally assumed to be new objects of thought that are distinct from the objects to which they refer.

 

In order to explain the operation of sign relations corresponding to iconic and indexical signs in the ''A'' and ''B'' example, it becomes necessary to refer to potential objects of thought that are located, if they exist at all, outside the realm of the initial object set, that is, lying beyond the objects of thought present at the outset of discussion that one initially recognizes as objects of formally identified signs.  In particular, it is incumbent on a satisfying explanation to invoke the abstract properties of objects and the actual instances of objects, where these properties and instances are normally assumed to be new objects of thought that are distinct from the objects to which they refer.

In the pragmatic account of things, thoughts are just signs in the mind of their thinker, so every object of a thought is the object of a sign, though perhaps in a sign relation that has not been fully formalized.  Considered on these grounds, the search for a satisfactory context in which to explain the actions and effects of signs turns into a recursive process that potentially calls on ever higher levels of properties and ever deeper levels of instances that are found to stem from whatever objects instigated the search.

In the pragmatic account of things, thoughts are just signs in the mind of their thinker, so every object of a thought is the object of a sign, though perhaps in a sign relation that has not been fully formalized.  Considered on these grounds, the search for a satisfactory context in which to explain the actions and effects of signs turns into a recursive process that potentially calls on ever higher levels of properties and ever deeper levels of instances that are found to stem from whatever objects instigated the search.