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→Excerpt 1. Peirce (CP 2.315)
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<p>If a definition is to be understood as introducing the definitum, so that it means “Let so and so — the definitum — mean so and so — the definition”, then it is a proposition in the imperative mood, and consequently, not a proposition; for a proposition is equivalent to a sentence in the indicative mood.</p>
<p>If a definition is to be understood as introducing the definitum, so that it means “Let so and so — the definitum — mean so and so — the definition”, then it is a proposition in the imperative mood, and consequently, not a proposition; for a proposition is equivalent to a sentence in the indicative mood.</p>
<p>The definition is thus only a proposition if the definitum be already known to the interpreter. But in that case it clearly conveys information as to the character of this definitum, which is a matter of fact.</p>
<p>The definition is thus only a proposition if the definitum be already known to the interpreter. But in that case it clearly conveys information as to the character of this definitum, which is a matter of fact.</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (''c.'' 1902).<br>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (c. 1902)<br>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331).</p>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331)</p>
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