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→Excerpt 20. Peirce (CE 1, 245–246)
====Excerpt 20. Peirce (CE 1, 245–246)====
====Excerpt 20. Peirce (CE 1, 245–246)====
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<p>The terms ''à priori'' and ''à posteriori'' in their ancient sense denote respectively reasoning from an antecedent to a consequent and from a consequent to an antecedent. Thus suppose we know that every incompetent general will meet with defeat. Then if we reason that because a given general is incompetent that he must meet with a defeat, we reason ''à priori''; but if we reason that because a general is defeated he was a bad one, we reason ''à posteriori''.</p>
<p>The terms ''à priori'' and ''à posteriori'' in their ancient sense denote respectively reasoning from an antecedent to a consequent and from a consequent to an antecedent. Thus suppose we know that every incompetent general will meet with defeat. Then if we reason that because a given general is incompetent that he must meet with a defeat, we reason ''à priori''; but if we reason that because a general is defeated he was a bad one, we reason ''à posteriori''.</p>
<p>Kant however uses these terms in another and derived sense. He did not entirely originate their modern use, for his contemporaries were already beginning to apply them in the same way, but he fixed their ''meaning'' in the new application and made them household words in subsequent philosophy.</p>
<p>Kant however uses these terms in another and derived sense. He did not entirely originate their modern use, for his contemporaries were already beginning to apply them in the same way, but he fixed their ''meaning'' in the new application and made them household words in subsequent philosophy.</p>
<p>If one judges that a house falls down on the testimony of his eyesight then it is clear that he reasons ''à posteriori'' because he infers the fact from an effect of it on his eyes. If he judges that a house falls because he knows that the props have been removed he reasons ''à priori''; yet not purely ''à priori'' for his premisses were obtained from experience. But if he infers it from axioms innate in the constitution of the mind, he may be said to reason purely 'à priori'. All this had been said previously to Kant. I will now state how he modified the meaning of the terms while preserving this application of them. What is known from experience must be known ''à posteriori'', because the thought is determined from without. To determine means to make a circumstance different from what it might have been otherwise. For example, a drop of rain falling on a stone determines it to be wet, provided the stone may have been dry before. But if the fact of a whole shower half an hour previous is given, then one drop does not determine the stone to be wet; for it would be wet, at any rate. Now, it is said that the results of experience are inferred ''à posteriori'', for this reason that they are determined from without the mind by something not previously present to it; being so determined their determinants or // causes / reasons // are not present to the mind and of course could not be reasoned from. Hence, a thought determined from without by something not in consciousness even implicitly is inferred ''à posteriori''.</p>
<p>If one judges that a house falls down on the testimony of his eyesight then it is clear that he reasons ''à posteriori'' because he infers the fact from an effect of it on his eyes. If he judges that a house falls because he knows that the props have been removed he reasons ''à priori''; yet not purely ''à priori'' for his premisses were obtained from experience. But if he infers it from axioms innate in the constitution of the mind, he may be said to reason purely 'à priori'.</p>
<p>All this had been said previously to Kant. I will now state how he modified the meaning of the terms while preserving this application of them. What is known from experience must be known ''à posteriori'', because the thought is determined from without.</p>
<p>To determine means to make a circumstance different from what it might have been otherwise. For example, a drop of rain falling on a stone determines it to be wet, provided the stone may have been dry before. But if the fact of a whole shower half an hour previous is given, then one drop does not determine the stone to be wet; for it would be wet, at any rate.</p>
<p>Now, it is said that the results of experience are inferred ''à posteriori'', for this reason that they are determined from without the mind by something not previously present to it; being so determined their determinants or // causes / reasons // are not present to the mind and of course could not be reasoned from. Hence, a thought determined from without by something not in consciousness even implicitly is inferred ''à posteriori''.</p>
<p>Kant, accordingly, uses the term ''à posteriori'' as meaning what is determined from without. The term ''à priori'' he uses to mean determined from within or involved implicitly in the whole of what is present to consciousness (or in a conception which is the logical condition of what is in consciousness). The twist given to the words is so slight that their application remains almost exactly the same. If there is any change it is this. A primary belief is ''à priori'' according to Kant; for it is determined from within. But it is not ''inferred'' at all and therefore neither of the terms is applicable in their ancient sense. And yet as an explicit judgment it is inferred and inferred ''à priori''.</p>
<p>Kant, accordingly, uses the term ''à posteriori'' as meaning what is determined from without. The term ''à priori'' he uses to mean determined from within or involved implicitly in the whole of what is present to consciousness (or in a conception which is the logical condition of what is in consciousness). The twist given to the words is so slight that their application remains almost exactly the same. If there is any change it is this. A primary belief is ''à priori'' according to Kant; for it is determined from within. But it is not ''inferred'' at all and therefore neither of the terms is applicable in their ancient sense. And yet as an explicit judgment it is inferred and inferred ''à priori''.</p>
<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 245–246</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 245–246</p>
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<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, “Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''” (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>
<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, “Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''” (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>
====Excerpt 21. Peirce (CE 1, 246–247)====
====Excerpt 21. Peirce (CE 1, 246–247)====