User:Jon Awbrey/IDS - Revision history

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.3.8. Rondeau —Tempo di Menuetto */

2010-09-13T02:46:47Z

1.3.8. Rondeau —Tempo di Menuetto

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.3.1. Initial Analysis of Inquiry — Allegro Aperto */

2010-09-13T02:45:32Z

1.3.1. Initial Analysis of Inquiry — Allegro Aperto

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.3.12. Syntactic Transformations */ minor mods

2010-09-03T00:10:53Z

1.3.12. Syntactic Transformations: minor mods

Jon Awbrey: /* IDS. Obligatory Note 1 */ markup

2010-09-02T19:16:27Z

IDS. Obligatory Note 1: markup

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.3.12. Syntactic Transformations */ fix paragraph break

2010-09-02T18:02:10Z

1.3.12. Syntactic Transformations: fix paragraph break

Jon Awbrey: /* Notes */ markup

2010-09-02T15:28:10Z

Notes: markup

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Jon Awbrey: /* 1.4.3 The Modes of Inquiry */ markup

2010-09-02T03:20:13Z

1.4.3 The Modes of Inquiry: markup

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Jon Awbrey: /* 1.4.2 The Moment of Inquiry */ markup

2010-09-02T03:10:53Z

1.4.2 The Moment of Inquiry: markup

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry */ markup

2010-09-02T03:08:05Z

1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry: markup

Jon Awbrey: /* 1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations */ markup

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1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations: markup

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 </pre>
-====1.3.8.  Rondeau — Tempo di Menuetto====
+====1.3.8.  Rondeau &mdash; Tempo di Menuetto====
 <pre>

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 </pre>
-====1.3.1.  Initial Analysis of Inquiry -- Allegro Aperto====
+====1.3.1.  Initial Analysis of Inquiry &mdash; Allegro Aperto====
 <pre>

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 ====1.3.12.  Syntactic Transformations====
-We have been examining several distinct but closely related notions of indication.  To discuss the import of these ideas in greater depth, it serves to establish a number of logical relations and set-theoretic identities that can be found to hold among their roughly parallel arrays of conceptions and constructions.  Facilitating this task, in turn, requires a number of auxiliary concepts and notations.
+We have been examining several distinct but closely related notions of ''indication''.  To discuss the import of these ideas in greater depth, it serves to establish a number of logical relations and set-theoretic identities that can be found to hold among their roughly parallel arrays of conceptions and constructions.  Facilitating this task requires in turn a number of auxiliary concepts and notations.
 The diverse notions of indication presently under discussion are expressed in a variety of different notations, enumerated as follows:
@@ Line 10,158: / Line 10,158: @@
 =====1.3.12.1.  Syntactic Transformation Rules=====
-A good way to summarize the necessary translations between different styles of indication, and along the way to organize their use in practice, is by means of the "rules of syntactic transformation" (ROSTs) that partially formalize the translations in question.
+A good way to summarize the necessary translations between different styles of indication, and along the way to organize their use in practice, is by means of the ''rules of syntactic transformation'' (ROSTs) that partially formalize the translations in question.
 Rudimentary examples of ROSTs are readily mined from the raw materials that are already available in this area of discussion.  To begin as near the beginning as possible, let the definition of an indicator function be recorded in the following form:

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 ===IDS.  Obligatory Note 1===
-<pre>
+While I remain compelled to remain silent on the status of the absolute fiat, the irrelative notion of the unmotivated motion and the disinterested stance, let me then turn to the other axes of description, descriptive vs. normative.  Axes of description, indeed, you can almost hear one branch of the recursion already beginning to wind up its whine to the verge of a howl, but toss it a sop and try to persevere in the quest.
-In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma --
+In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma &mdash; aim, business, concern, desire, end, function, goal, intention, interest, objective, purpose, its names are legion &mdash; and the good sense of the norm is simply to suggest what one ought to do, contingent, of course, on one's motive to achieve that pragma.
-If we keep in mind the kinds of "applied research task" (ART) that your
+If we keep in mind the kinds of ''applied research task'' (ART) that your everyday artist, designer, engineer, mathematician, scientist, or other type of technical worker has to carry out on an everyday basis, we note how these axes of description can be used to frame their activities and to depict their forms of conduct, without mistaking either the frame or the picture for the object of the picture so framed.  Nor does any body imagine that the observer must flatten out into a single plane or align with a single axis, in order to make a vantage of the frame so pictured.
-Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the
+Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the achievement of a desirable result will naturally depend on acquiring good descriptions of the lay of the land in which we hope to advance.
 ===IDS.  Projective Note 1===

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 # The geometric language of sets
-Correspondingly, one way to explain the relationships that exist among the various notions of indication is to describe the translations that they
+Correspondingly, one way to explain the relationships that exist among the various notions of indication is to describe the translations that they induce among the associated families of notation.
 =====1.3.12.1.  Syntactic Transformation Rules=====

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 Does the inquiry into inquiry begin with a surprise or a problem concerning the process or the conduct of inquiry?  In other words, does the inquiry into inquiry start with one of the following forms of departure:  (1) a surprising difference between what is expected of inquiry and what is observed about it, or (2) a problematic difference between what is observed about inquiry and what is intended for it?
-====1.4.2  The Moment of Inquiry====
+====1.4.2.  The Moment of Inquiry====
 <blockquote>
-<p>Every young man - not to speak of old men - on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still;  just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others, will question them too about the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path.</p>
+<p>Every young man &mdash; not to speak of old men &mdash; on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still;  just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others, will question them too about the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path.</p>
-<p>(Plato, Laws, VII, 799C).</p>
+<p>(Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 799C).</p>
 </blockquote>

@@ Line 11,698: / Line 11,698: @@
 I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
-=====1.4.1.5  Models of Inquiry=====
+=====1.4.1.5.  Models of Inquiry=====
 The value of a hypothesis, or the worth of a model, is not to be given a prior justification, as by a deductive proof, but has to be examined in practice, as by an empirical probation.  It is not intended to be taken for granted or to go untested, but its meaning in practice has to be articulated before its usefulness can be judged.  This means that the conceivable practical import of the hypothesis or the model has to be developed in terms of its predicted and its promised consequences, after which it is judged by the comparison of these speculative consequences with the actual results.  But this is not the end of the matter, for it can be a useful piece of information to discover that a particular kind of conception fails a particular kind of comparison.  Thus, the final justification for a hypothesis or a model is contained in the order of work that it leads one to do, and the value of this work is often the same whether or not its premiss is true.  Indeed, the fruitfulness of a suggestion can lie in the work that proves it untrue.
-My plan then has to be, rather than trying to derive a model of inquiry in a deductive fashion from a number of conditions like y0 = y.y, only to propose a plausible model, and then to test it under such conditions.  Each of these tests is a "two-edged sword", and the result of applying a particular test to a proposed model can have either one of two effects.  If one believes that a particular test is a hard and fast rule of inquiry, or a condition that any inquiry is required to satisfy, then the failure of a model to live up to its standard tends only to rule out that model.  If one has reason to believe that a particular model of inquiry covers a significant number of genuine examples, then the failure of these models to follow the prescribed rule can reflect badly on the test itself.
+My plan then has to be, rather than trying to derive a model of inquiry in a deductive fashion from a number of conditions like <math>y_0 = y \cdot y,</math> only to propose a plausible model, and then to test it under such conditions.  Each of these tests is a two-edged sword, and the result of applying a particular test to a proposed model can have either one of two effects.  If one believes that a particular test is a hard and fast rule of inquiry, or a condition that any inquiry is required to satisfy, then the failure of a model to live up to its standard tends only to rule out that model.  If one has reason to believe that a particular model of inquiry covers a significant number of genuine examples, then the failure of these models to follow the prescribed rule can reflect badly on the test itself.
 In order to prime the pump, therefore, let me offer the following account of inquiry in general, the whole of which can be taken as a plausible hypothesis about the nature of inquiry in general.
@@ Line 11,708: / Line 11,708: @@
 My observations of inquiry in general, together with a few suggestions that seem apt to me, have led me to believe that inquiry begins with a "surprise" or a "problem".  The way I understand these words, they refer to departures, differences, or discrepancies among various modalities of experience, in particular, among "observations", "expectations", and "intentions".
-.  A "surprise" is a departure of an observation from an expectation, and thus it invokes a comparison between present experience and past experience, since expectations are based on the remembered disposition of past experience.
+# A ''surprise'' is a departure of an observation from an expectation, and thus it invokes a comparison between present experience and past experience, since expectations are based on the remembered disposition of past experience.
+# A ''problem'' is a departure of an observation from an intention, and thus it invokes a comparison between present experience and future experience, since intentions choose from the envisioned disposition of future experience.
 With respect to these

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 Of course, a finite person can only take up so many causes in a single lifetime, and so there is always the excuse of time for not chasing down every conceivable hypothesis that comes to mind.
-=====1.4.1.4  Forms of Relations=====
+=====1.4.1.4.  Forms of Relations=====
-<pre>
+The next distinguishing trait that I can draw out of this incipient treatise is its emphasis on the forms of relations.  From a sufficiently formal and relational point of view, many of the complexities that arise from throwing intentions, objectives, and purposes into the mix of discussion are conceivably due to the greater arity of triadic relations over dyadic relations, and do not necessarily implicate any differences of essence inhering in the entities and the states invoked.  As far as this question goes, whether a dynamic object is essentially different from a deliberate object, I intend to remain as neutral as possible, at least, until forced by some good reason to do otherwise.  In the meantime, the factors that are traceable to formal differences among relations are ready to be investigated and useful to examine.  With this in mind, it it useful to make the following definition:
-A "conduct relation" is a triadic relation involving a domain of objects and two domains of states.  When a shorter term is desired, I refer to a conduct relation as a "conduit".  A conduit is given in terms of its extension as a subset C c XxYxZ, where X is the "object domain" and where Y and Z are the "state domains".  Typically, Y = Z.
+A ''conduct relation'' is a triadic relation involving a domain of objects and two domains of states.  When a shorter term is desired, I refer to a conduct relation as a ''conduit''.  A conduit is given in terms of its extension as a subset C c XxYxZ, where X is the ''object domain'' and where Y and Z are the ''state domains''.  Typically, Y = Z.
-In general, a conduct relation serves as a "model of conduct" (MOC), not always the kind of model that is meant to be emulated, but the type of model that captures an aspect of structure in a form of conduct.
+In general, a conduct relation serves as a ''model of conduct'' (MOC), not always the kind of model that is meant to be emulated, but the type of model that captures an aspect of structure in a form of conduct.
 The question arises:  What is the relationship between signs and states?  On the assumption that signs and states are comparable in their levels of generality, consider the following possibilities:
-.	Signs are special cases of states.
+# Signs are special cases of states.
+# Signs and states are the same sorts of things.
-.	Signs and states are the same sorts of things.
+# States are special cases of signs.
 Depending on how one answers this question, one is also choosing among the following options:
-.	Sign relations are special cases of conduct relations.
+# Sign relations are special cases of conduct relations.
+# Sign relations and conduct relations are the same sorts of things.
-.	Sign relations and conduct relations are the same sorts of things.
+# Conduct relations are special cases of sign relations.
 I doubt if there is any hard and fast answer to this question, but think that it depends on particular interpreters and particular observers, to what extent each one interprets a state as a sign, and to what degree each one recognizes a sign as a component of a state.
 =====1.4.1.5  Models of Inquiry=====