Pragmatic theory of truth - Revision history

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 * [http://mywikibiz.com/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ MyWikiBiz]
 * [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ InterSciWiki]
 {{col-break}}
 * [http://ref.subwiki.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ Subject Wikis]
 * [http://beta.wikiversity.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ Wikiversity Beta]

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 * [http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://semanticweb.org/ Semantic Web]
 * [http://getwiki.net/-Pragmatist_Truth_Theory Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://getwiki.net/ GetWiki]
-* [http://wikinfo.org/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://wikinfo.org/ Wikinfo]
+* [http://web.archive.org/web/20111128025828/http://www.wikinfo.org/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://wikinfo.org/ Wikinfo]
 * [http://textop.org/wiki/index.php?title=Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://textop.org/wiki/ Textop Wiki]
 * [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pragmatic_theory_of_truth&oldid=108062621 Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://en.wikipedia.org/ Wikipedia]

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	==References==		==References==
		+
		+	<references/>

	* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 40–52. [http://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive]. [http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry Online].		* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 40–52. [http://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive]. [http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry Online].

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 * [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pragmatic_theory_of_truth&oldid=108062621 Pragmatic Theory of Truth], [http://en.wikipedia.org/ Wikipedia]
 {{col-end}}
 [[Category:Inquiry]]

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 * [[Dagobert D. Runes|Runes, Dagobert D.]] (ed., 1962), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.  Cited as DOP.
-==See also==
+==Syllabus==
 {{col-begin}}
 {{col-break}}
-* [[Truth]]
+* [[Inquiry Live]]
-* [[Truth theory]]
+{{col-break}}
 {{col-break}}
-* [[Coherentism]]
+* [http://p2pfoundation.net/Pragmatic_Theory_of_Truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ P2P Foundation]
-* [[Confirmation holism]]
+* [http://ref.subwiki.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth Pragmatic Theory of Truth @ Subject Wikis]
 {{col-end}}
-===Theories of truth===
+===Logical operators===
 {{col-begin}}
 {{col-break}}
-* [[Coherence theory of truth]]
+* [[Exclusive disjunction]]
-* [[Consensus theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical conjunction]]
-* [[Correspondence theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical disjunction]]
-* [[Deflationary theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical equality]]
 {{col-break}}
-* [[Epistemic theories of truth]]
+* [[Logical implication]]
-* [[Indefinability theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical NAND]]
-* [[Redundancy theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical NNOR]]
-* [[Semantic theory of truth]]
+* [[Logical negation|Negation]]
 {{col-end}}
 ===Related topics===
 {{col-begin}}
 {{col-break}}
 * [[Inquiry]]
-* [[Kaina Stoicheia]]
+* [[Dynamics of inquiry]]
 {{col-break}}
 * [[Semeiotic]]
-* [[Semiotics]]
+* [[Logic of information]]
 {{col-break}}
-* [[Semiotic information theory]]
+* [[Descriptive science]]
-* [[Scientific method]]
+* [[Normative science]]
-* [[Sign relation]]
+{{col-break}}
-* [[Testability]]
+* [[Pragmatic maxim]]
-* [[Triadic relation]]
+* [[Truth theory]]
 {{col-end}}
 ==Document history==

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 ==References==
-* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), &ldquo;Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry&rdquo;, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 407&ndash;52.  [http://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive].  [http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry Online].
+* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), &ldquo;Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry&rdquo;, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 40&ndash;52.  [http://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive].  [http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry Online].
-* [[James Mark Baldwin|Baldwin, J.M.]] (1901–1905), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', 3 volumes in 4, New&nbsp;York, NY.
+* [[James Mark Baldwin|Baldwin, J.M.]] (1901&ndash;1905), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', 3 volumes in 4, New&nbsp;York, NY.
-* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1929), ''The Quest for Certainty:  A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action'', Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY.  Reprinted, pp. 1–254 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4: 1929'', [[Jo Ann Boydston]] (ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), [[Stephen Toulmin]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984.
+* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1929), ''The Quest for Certainty : A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action'', Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY.  Reprinted, pp. 1&ndash;254 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925&ndash;1953, Volume 4 : 1929'', [[Jo Ann Boydston]] (ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), [[Stephen Toulmin]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984.
-* Dewey, John (1938), ''Logic: The Theory of Inquiry'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938.  Reprinted, pp. 1–527 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12: 1938'', [[Jo Ann Boydston]] (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), [[Ernest Nagel]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.
+* Dewey, John (1938), ''Logic : The Theory of Inquiry'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938.  Reprinted, pp. 1&ndash;527 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925&ndash;1953, Volume 12 : 1938'', [[Jo Ann Boydston]] (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), [[Ernest Nagel]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.
-* [[Vergilius Ferm|Ferm, Vergilius]] (1962), "Consensus Gentium", p. 64 in Runes (1962).
+* [[Vergilius Ferm|Ferm, Vergilius]] (1962), &ldquo;Consensus Gentium&rdquo;, p. 64 in Runes (1962).
-* [[Susan Haack|Haack, Susan]] (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry:  Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
+* [[Susan Haack|Haack, Susan]] (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry : Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
-* [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas, Jürgen]] (1976), "What Is  Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", ''Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie'', [[Karl-Otto Apel]] (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.  Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1979.
+* [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas, Jürgen]] (1976), &ldquo;What Is  Universal Pragmatics?&rdquo;, 1st published, &ldquo;Was heißt Universalpragmatik?&rdquo;, ''Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie'', [[Karl-Otto Apel]] (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.  Reprinted, pp. 1&ndash;68 in Jürgen Habermas, ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1979.
 * Habermas, Jürgen (1979), ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
@@ Line 139: / Line 139: @@
 * [[William James|James, William]] (1907), ''Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
-* James, William (1909), ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'&nbsp;'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
+* James, William (1909), ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to &lsquo;Pragmatism&rsquo;'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
 * [[Immanuel Kant|Kant, Immanuel]] (1800), ''Introduction to Logic''.  Reprinted, [[Thomas Kingsmill Abbott]] (trans.), [[Dennis Sweet]] (intro.), Barnes and Noble, New York, NY, 2005.
@@ Line 145: / Line 145: @@
 * [[Charles Peirce (Bibliography)|Peirce, C.S., Bibliography]].
-* Peirce, C.S., ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition'', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianoplis, IN, 1981–.  ''Volume 1 (1857–1866)'', 1981.  ''Volume 2 (1867–1871)'', 1984.  ''Volume 3 (1872–1878)'', 1986.  Cited as CE&nbsp;volume,&nbsp;page.
+* Peirce, C.S., ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition'', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianoplis, IN, 1981&ndash;.  ''Volume 1 (1857&ndash;1866)'', 1981.  ''Volume 2 (1867&ndash;1871)'', 1984.  ''Volume 3 (1872&ndash;1878)'', 1986.  Cited as CE&nbsp;volume,&nbsp;page.
-* Peirce, C.S., ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.  Cited as CP&nbsp;vol.para.
+* Peirce, C.S., ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1&ndash;6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7&ndash;8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931&ndash;1935, 1958.  Cited as CP&nbsp;vol.para.
-* Peirce, C.S., ''The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867–1893)'', Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1992.  Cited as EP&nbsp;1, page.
+* Peirce, C.S., ''The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867&ndash;1893)'', Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1992.  Cited as EP&nbsp;1, page.
-* Peirce, C.S., ''The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913)'', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998.  Cited as EP&nbsp;2, page.
+* Peirce, C.S., ''The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893&ndash;1913)'', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998.  Cited as EP&nbsp;2, page.
-* Peirce, C.S. (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' 2 (1868), 140–157.  Reprinted (CP 5.264–317), (CE 2, 211–242), (EP 1, 28–55).  [http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm Eprint].  NB. Misprints in CP and Eprint copy.
+* Peirce, C.S. (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' 2 (1868), 140&ndash;157.  Reprinted (CP 5.264&ndash;317), (CE 2, 211&ndash;242), (EP 1, 28&ndash;55).  [http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm Online].  NB. Misprints in CP and Online copy.
-* Peirce, C.S. (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1877), 1–15.  Reprinted (CP 5.358–387), (CE 3, 242–257), (EP 1, 109–123).  [http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html Eprint].
+* Peirce, C.S. (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1877), 1&ndash;15.  Reprinted (CP 5.358&ndash;387), (CE 3, 242&ndash;257), (EP 1, 109&ndash;123).  [http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html Online].
-* Peirce, C.S. (1878), "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1878), 286–302.  Reprinted (CP 5.388–410), (CE 3, 257–276)), (EP 1, 124–141).  [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/How_to_Make_Our_Ideas_Clear Eprint].
+* Peirce, C.S. (1878), "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1878), 286&ndash;302.  Reprinted (CP 5.388&ndash;410), (CE 3, 257&ndash;276)), (EP 1, 124&ndash;141).  [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/How_to_Make_Our_Ideas_Clear Online].
-* Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', vol. 2.  Reprinted (CP 5.565–573).
+* Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718&ndash;720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', vol. 2.  Reprinted (CP 5.565&ndash;573).
-* Peirce, C.S. (1905), "What Pragmatism Is", ''The Monist'' 15, 161–181.  Reprinted (CP 5.411–437), (EP 2, 331–345).
+* Peirce, C.S. (1905), "What Pragmatism Is", ''The Monist'' 15, 161&ndash;181.  Reprinted (CP 5.411&ndash;437), (EP 2, 331&ndash;345).
-* Peirce, C.S. (1906), "Basis of Pragmaticism", first published in ''Collected Papers'', CP 1.573–574 and 5.549–554.
+* Peirce, C.S. (1906), "Basis of Pragmaticism", first published in ''Collected Papers'', CP 1.573&ndash;574 and 5.549&ndash;554.
-* [[Nicholas Rescher|Rescher, Nicholas]] (1995), ''Pluralism:  Against the Demand for Consensus'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
+* [[Nicholas Rescher|Rescher, Nicholas]] (1995), ''Pluralism : Against the Demand for Consensus'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
 * [[Richard Rorty|Rorty, R.]] (1979), ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

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 <font size="3">&#9758;</font> This page belongs to resource collections on [[Logic Live|Logic]] and [[Inquiry Live|Inquiry]].
-'''''Pragmatic theory of truth''''' refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept ''[[truth]]'' that distinguish the philosophies of [[pragmatism]] and [[pragmaticism]].  The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]], but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the ''[[pragmatic maxim]]'' as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, ''truth'' in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the ''[[poiesis|product]]'' variously branded as ''[[belief]]'', ''[[certainty]]'', ''[[knowledge]]'', or ''[[truth]]'' is the result of a ''[[process]]'', namely, ''[[inquiry]]''.
+'''''Pragmatic theory of truth''''' refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept ''[[truth]]'' that distinguish the philosophies of [[pragmatism]] and [[pragmaticism]].  The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]], but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the ''[[pragmatic maxim]]'' as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, ''truth'' in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the ''product'' variously branded as ''belief'', ''certainty'', ''knowledge'', or ''truth'' is the result of a ''process'', namely, ''[[inquiry]]''.
 ==Background==
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 ==Peirce==
 {{main|Charles Sanders Peirce}}
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 <blockquote>
-Now thought is of the nature of a sign.  In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out — the right method of transforming signs — then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us.  In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign — something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself.  (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).
+Now thought is of the nature of a sign.  In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out &mdash; the right method of transforming signs &mdash; then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us.  In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign &mdash; something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself.  (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).
 </blockquote>
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 Dewey says more of what he understands by ''truth'' in terms of his preferred concept of ''[[warranted assertibility]]'' as the end-in-view and conclusion of inquiry (Dewey, 14–15).
 ==Criticism==
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 First, due originally to [[Bertrand Russell]] (1907) in a discussion of James's theory, is that pragmatism mixes up the notion of truth with ''epistemology''. Pragmatism describes an ''indicator'' or a ''sign'' of truth.  It really cannot be regarded as a theory of the ''meaning'' of the word "true". There's a difference between ''stating an indicator'' and ''giving the meaning''. For example, when the streetlights turn at the end of a day, that's an [[indicator]], a sign, that evening is coming on.  It would be an obvious mistake to say that the word "evening" just means "the time that the streetlights turn on".  In the same way, while it might be an ''indicator'' of truth, that a proposition is part of that perfect science at the ideal limit of inquiry, that just isn't what "truth" ''means''.
-Russell's objection isn't so much an [[Logical argument|argument]] against [[pragmatism]], so much as it is a [[request]] — that we make sure that we aren't confusing an ''indicator'' of truth with the ''meaning'' of the concept truth. There is a difference between the two and pragmatism confuses them.
+Russell's objection isn't so much an argument against pragmatism, so much as it is a request &mdash; that we make sure that we aren't confusing an ''indicator'' of truth with the ''meaning'' of the concept truth.  There is a difference between the two and pragmatism confuses them.
-Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a [[belief]] "works", or that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led to much debate.
+Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a belief "works", or that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led to much debate.
-Another objection — which can be applied to all of the epistemic theories — is that pragmatism appears to be incompatible with the T-scheme mentioned above (and Tarski's inductive definition, in relation to the connectives ~, & and so on). According to the T-scheme, if ~A is true, then A is not true. But presumably both a proposition A and its negation ~A might be useful to believe, which contradicts the T-scheme. For any determinate proposition A, either A is true or ~A is true. But it might be that neither is useful to believe. And so on.
+Another objection &mdash; which can be applied to all of the epistemic theories &mdash; is that pragmatism appears to be incompatible with the T-scheme mentioned above (and Tarski's inductive definition, in relation to the connectives ~, & and so on). According to the T-scheme, if ~A is true, then A is not true. But presumably both a proposition A and its negation ~A might be useful to believe, which contradicts the T-scheme. For any determinate proposition A, either A is true or ~A is true. But it might be that neither is useful to believe. And so on.
 A final objection is that pragmatism of James's variety (and [[Richard Rorty|Rorty]]'s) entails relativism. What is useful for ''you'' to believe might not be useful for ''me'' to believe. It follows that "truth" for you is different from "truth" for me (and that the relevant facts don't matter). This is relativism.

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 ==Document history==
-* Some content adapted from the [http://www.wikinfo.org/index.php/Main_Page Wikinfo] article [http://www.wikinfo.org/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth "Pragmatic theory of truth"] under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]].
+Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]], under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.
 <br><sharethis />
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 [[Category:Education]]
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 [[Category:Information Systems]]
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