Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book XIII

ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XIII

Introduction
Chapter 1 Of the Fall of the First Man, Through Which Mortality Has Been Contracted
Chapter 2 Of that Death Which Can Affect an Immortal Soul, and of that to Which the Body is Subject
Chapter 3 Whether Death, Which by the Sin of Our First Parents Has Passed Upon All Men, is the Punishment of Sin, Even to the Good
Chapter 4 Why Death, the Punishment of Sin, is Not Withheld from Those Who by the Grace of Regeneration are Absolved from Sin
Chapter 5 As the Wicked Make an Ill Use of the Law, Which is Good, So the Good Make a Good Use of Death, Which is an Ill
Chapter 6 Of the Evil of Death in General, Considered as the Separation of Soul and Body
Chapter 7 Of the Death Which the Unbaptized Suffer for the Confession of Christ
Chapter 8 That the Saints, by Suffering the First Death for the Truth's Sake, are Freed from the Second
Chapter 9 Whether We Should Say that The Moment of Death, in Which Sensation Ceases, Occurs in the Experience of the Dying or in that of the Dead
Chapter 10 Of the Life of Mortals, Which is Rather to Be Called Death Than Life
Chapter 11 Whether One Can Both Be Living and Dead at the Same Time
Chapter 12 What Death God Intended, When He Threatened Our First Parents with Death If They Should Disobey His Commandment
Chapter 13 What Was the First Punishment of the Transgression of Our First Parents
Chapter 14 In What State Man Was Made by God, and into What Estate He Fell by the Choice of His Own Will
Chapter 15 That Adam in His Sin Forsook God Ere God Forsook Him, and that His Falling Away From God Was the First Death of the Soul
Chapter 16 Concerning the Philosophers Who Think that the Separation of Soul and Body is Not Penal, Though Plato Represents the Supreme Deity as Promising to the Inferior Gods that They Shall Never Be Dismissed from Their Bodies
Chapter 17 Against Those Who Affirm that Earthly Bodies Cannot Be Made Incorruptible and Eternal
Chapter 18 Of Earthly Bodies, Which the Philosophers Affirm Cannot Be in Heavenly Places, Because Whatever is of Earth is by Its Natural Weight Attracted to Earth
Chapter 19 Against the Opinion of Those Who Do Not Believe that the Primitive Men Would Have Been Immortal If They Had Not Sinned
Chapter 20 That the Flesh Now Resting in Peace Shall Be Raised to a Perfection Not Enjoyed by the Flesh of Our First Parents
Chapter 21 Of Paradise, that It Can Be Understood in a Spiritual Sense Without Sacrificing the Historic Truth of the Narrative Regarding The Real Place
Chapter 22 That the Bodies of the Saints Shall After the Resurrection Be Spiritual, and Yet Flesh Shall Not Be Changed into Spirit
Chapter 23 What We are to Understand by the Animal and Spiritual Body; Or of Those Who Die in Adam, And of Those Who are Made Alive in Christ
Chapter 24 How We Must Understand that Breathing of God by Which "The First Man Was Made a Living Soul," And that Also by Which the Lord Conveyed His Spirit to His Disciples When He Said, "Receive the Holy Ghost

Latin	Latin
BOOK XIII []	The City of God (Book XIII) Argument-In this book it is taught that death is penal, and had its origin in Adam's sin.
BOOK XIII [I] Expeditis de nostri saeculi exortu et de initio generis humani difficillimis quaestionibus nunc iam de lapsu primi hominis, immo primorum hominum, et de origine ac propagine mortis humanae disputationem a nobis institutam rerum ordo deposcit. Non enim eo modo, quo angelos, condiderat Deus homines, ut etiam si peccassent mori omnino non possent; sed ita ut perfunctos oboedientiae munere sine interuentu mortis angelica inmortalitas et beata aeternitas sequeretur; inoboedientes autem mors plecteret damnatione iustissima; quod etiam in libro superiore iam diximus.	Having disposed of the very difficult questions concerning the origin of our world and the beginning of the human race, the natural order requires that we now discuss the fall of the first man (we may say of the first men), and of the origin and propagation of human death. For God had not made man like the angels, in such a condition that, even though they had sinned, they could none the more die. He had so made them, that if they discharged the obligations of obedience, an angelic immortality and a blessed eternity might ensue, without the intervention of death; but if they disobeyed, death should be visited on them with just sentence-which, too, has been spoken to in the preceding book.
BOOK XIII [II] Sed de ipso genere mortis video mihi paulo diligentius disserendum. Quamuis enim anima humana veraciter inmortalis perhibeatur, habet tamen quandam etiam ipsa mortem suam. Nam ideo dicitur inmortalis, quia modo quodam quantulocumque non desinit vivere atque sentire; corpus autem ideo mortale, quoniam deseri omni vita potest nec per se ipsum aliquatenus vivit. Mors igitur animae fit, cum eam deserit Deus, sicut corporis, cum id deserit anima. Ergo utriusque rei, id est totius hominis, mors est, cum anima Deo deserta deserit corpus. Ita enim nec ex Deo vivit ipsa nec corpus ex ipsa. Huius modi autem totius hominis mortem illa sequitur, quam secundam mortem divinorum eloquiorum appellat auctoritas. Hanc Saluator significavit, ubi ait: Eum timete, qui habet potestatem et corpus et animam perdere in gehenna. Quod cum ante non fiat, quam cum anima corpori sic fuerit copulata, ut nulla diremptione separentur: mirum videri potest quo modo corpus ea morte dicatur occidi, qua non anima deseritur, sed animatum sentiensque cruciatur. Nam in illa ultima poena ac sempiterna, de qua suo loco diligentius disserendum est, recte mors animae dicitur, quia non vivit ex Deo; mors autem corporis quonam modo, cum vivat ex anima? Non enim aliter potest ipsa corporalia, quae post resurrectionem futura sunt, sentire tormenta. An quia vita qualiscumque aliquod bonum est, dolor autem malum, ideo nec vivere corpus dicendum est, in quo anima non vivendi causa est, sed dolendi? Vivit itaque anima ex Deo, cum vivit bene; non enim potest bene vivere nisi Deo in se operante quod bonum est; vivit autem corpus ex anima, cum anima vivit in corpore, seu vivat ipsa seu non vivat ex Deo. Impiorum namque in corporibus vita non animarum, sed corporum vita est; quam possunt eis animae etiam mortuae, hoc est Deo desertae, quantulacumque propria vita, ex qua et inmortales sunt, non desistente, conferre. Verum in damnatione novissima quamuis homo sentire non desinat, tamen, quia sensus ipse nec voluptate suavis nec quiete salubris, sed dolore poenalis est, non inmerito mors est potius appellata quam vita. Ideo autem secunda, quia post illam primam est, qua fit cohaerentium diremptio naturarum, sive Dei et animae sive animae et corporis. De prima igitur corporis morte dici potest, quod bonis bona sit, malis mala; secunda vero sine dubio sicut nullorum bonorum est, ita nulli bona.	But I see I must speak a little more carefully of the nature of death. For although the human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal, yet it also has a certain death of its own. For it is therefore called immortal, because, in a sense, it does not cease to live and to feel; while the body is called mortal, because it can be forsaken of all life, and cannot by itself live at all. The death, then, of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it. Therefore the death of both-that is, of the whole man-occurs when the soul, forsaken by God, forsakes the body. For, in this case, neither is God the life of the soul, nor the soul the life of the body. And this death of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of the divine oracles, we call the second death. This the Saviour referred to when He said, "Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Matthew 10:28 And since this does not happen before the soul is so joined to its body that they cannot be separated at all, it may be matter of wonder how the body can be said to be killed by that death in which it is not forsaken by the soul, but, being animated and rendered sensitive by it, is tormented. For in that penal and everlasting punishment, of which in its own place we are to speak more at large, the soul is justly said to die, because it does not live in connection with God; but how can we say that the body is dead, seeing that it lives by the soul? For it could not otherwise feel the bodily torments which are to follow the resurrection. Is it because life of every kind is good, and pain an evil, that we decline to say that that body lives, in which the soul is the cause, not of life, but of pain? The soul, then, lives by God when it lives well, for it cannot live well unless by God working in it what is good; and the body lives by the soul when the soul lives in the body, whether itself be living by God or no. For the wicked man's life in the body is a life not of the soul, but of the body, which even dead souls-that is, souls forsaken of God-can confer upon bodies, how little so-ever of their own proper life, by which they are immortal, they retain. But in the last damnation, though man does not cease to feel, yet because this feeling of his is neither sweet with pleasure nor wholesome with repose, but painfully penal, it is not without reason called death rather than life. And it is called the second death because it follows the first, which sunders the two cohering essences, whether these be God and the soul, or the soul and the body. Of the first and bodily death, then, we may say that to the good it is good, and evil to the evil. But, doubtless, the second, as it happens to none of the good, so it can be good for none.
BOOK XIII [III] Non autem dissimulanda nascitur quaestio, utrum re vera mors, qua separantur anima et corpus, bonis sit bona; quia si ita est, quo modo poterit obtineri, quod etiam ipsa sit poena peccati? Hanc enim primi homines, nisi peccavissent, perpessi utique non fuissent. Quo pacto igitur bona esse possit bonis, quae accidere non posset nisi malis? Sed rursus si non nisi malis posset accidere, non deberet bonis bona esse, sed nulla. Cur enim esset ulla poena in quibus non essent ulla punienda? Quapropter fatendum est primos quidem homines ita fuisse institutos, ut, si non peccassent, nullum mortis experirentur genus; sed eosdem primos peccatores ita fuisse morte multatos, ut etiam quidquid <de> eorum stirpe esset exortum eadem poena teneretur obnoxium. Non enim aliud ex eis, quam quod ipsi fuerant, nasceretur. Pro magnitudine quippe culpae illius naturam damnatio mutavit in peius, ut, quod poenaliter praecessit in peccantibus hominibus primis, etiam naturaliter sequeretur in nascentibus ceteris. Neque enim ita homo ex homine, sicut homo ex puluere. Puluis namque homini faciendo materies fuit; homo autem homini gignendo parens. Proinde quod est terra, non hoc est caro, quamuis ex terra facta sit caro; quod est autem parens homo, hoc est et proles homo. In primo igitur homine per feminam in progeniem transiturum universum genus humanum fuit, quando illa coniugum copula divinam sententiam suae damnationis excepit; et quod homo factus est, non cum crearetur, sed cum peccaret et puniretur, hoc genuit, quantum quidem adtinet ad peccati et mortis originem. Non enim ad infantilem hebetudinem et infirmitatem animi et corporis, quam videmus in paruulis, peccato vel poena ille redactus est (quae Deus voluit esse tamquam primordia catulorum, quorum parentes in bestialem vitam mortemque deiecerat; sicut enim scriptum est: Homo in honore cum esset, non intellexit; comparatus est pecoribus non intellegentibus et similis factus est eis; nisi quod infantes infirmiores etiam cernimus in usu motuque membrorum et sensu adpetendi atque vitandi, quam sunt aliorum tenerrimi fetus animalium; tamquam se tanto adtollat excellentius supra cetera animantia vis humana, quanto magis impetum suum, velut sagitta cum arcus extenditur, retrorsum reducta distulerit); _ non ergo ad ista infantilia rudimenta praesumptione inlicita et damnatione iusta prolapsus vel inpulsus est primus homo; sed hactenus in eo natura humana vitiata atque mutata est, ut repugnantem pateretur in membris inoboedientiam concupiscendi et obstringeretur necessitate moriendi, atque ita id, quod vitio poenaque factus est, id est obnoxios peccato mortique generaret. A quo peccati vinculo si per Mediatoris Christi gratiam soluuntur infantes, hanc solam mortem perpeti possunt, quae animam seiungit a corpore; in secundam vero illam sine fine poenalem liberati a peccati obligatione non transeunt.	But a question not to be shirked arises: Whether in very truth death, which separates soul and body, is good to the good? For if it be, how has it come to pass that such a thing should be the punishment of sin? For the first men would not have suffered death had they not sinned. How, then, can that be good to the good, which could not have happened except to the evil? Then, again, if it could only happen to the evil, to the good it ought not to be good, but non-existent. For why should there be any punishment where there is nothing to punish? Wherefore we must say that the first men were indeed so created, that if they had not sinned, they would not have experienced any kind of death; but that, having become sinners, they were so punished with death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also be punished with the same death. For nothing else could be born of them than that which they themselves had been. Their nature was deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in their children. For man is not produced by man, as he was from the dust. For dust was the material out of which man was made: man is the parent by whom man is begotten. Wherefore earth and flesh are not the same thing, though flesh be made of earth. But as man the parent is, such is man the offspring. In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human nature, which was to be transmitted by the woman to posterity, when that conjugal union received the divine sentence of its own condemnation; and what man was made, not when created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned. For neither by sin nor its punishment was he himself reduced to that infantine and helpless infirmity of body and mind which we see in children. For God ordained that infants should begin the world as the young of beasts begin it, since their parents had fallen to the level of the beasts in the fashion of their life and of their death; as it is written, "Man when he was in honor understood not; he became like the beasts that have no understanding." Nay more, infants, we see, are even feebler in the use and movement of their limbs, and more infirm to choose and refuse, than the most tender offspring of other animals; as if the force that dwells in human nature were destined to surpass all other living things so much the more eminently, as its energy has been longer restrained, and the time of its exercise delayed, just as an arrow flies the higher the further back it has been drawn. To this infantine imbecility the first man did not fall by his lawless presumption and just sentence; but human nature was in his person vitiated and altered to such an extent, that he suffered in his members the warring of disobedient lust, and became subject to the necessity of dying. And what he himself had become by sin and punishment, such he generated those whom he begot; that is to say, subject to sin and death. And if infants are delivered from this bondage of sin by the Redeemer's grace, they can suffer only this death which separates soul and body; but being redeemed from the obligation of sin, they do not pass to that second endless and penal death.
BOOK XIII [IV] Si quem vero movet, cur vel ipsam patiantur, si et ipsa peccati poena est, quorum per gratiam reatus aboletur: iam ista quaestio in alio nostro opere, quod scripsimus de baptismo paruulorum, tractata ac soluta est; ubi dictum est ad hoc relinqui animae experimentum separationis a corpore, quamuis ablato iam criminis nexu, quoniam, si regenerationis sacramentum continuo sequeretur inmortalitas corporis, ipsa fides eneruaretur, quae tunc est fides, quando expectatur in spe, quod in re nondum videtur. Fidei autem robore atque certamine, in maioribus dumtaxat aetatibus, etiam mortis fuerat superandus timor, quod in sanctis martyribus maxime eminuit; cuius profecto certaminis esset nulla victoria, nulla gloria (quia nec ipsum omnino posset esse certamen), si post lauacrum regenerationis iam sancti non possent mortem perpeti corporalem. Cum paruulis autem baptizandis quis non ad Christi gratiam propterea potius curreret, ne a corpore solueretur? Atque ita non inuisibili praemio probaretur fides, sed iam nec fides esset, confestim sui operis quaerendo et sumendo mercedem. Nunc vero maiore et mirabiliore gratia Saluatoris in usus iustitiae peccati poena conversa est. Tunc enim dictum est homini: Morieris, si peccaveris: nunc dicitur martyri: Morere, ne pecces. Tunc dictum est: Si mandatum transgressi fueritis, morte moriemini; nunc dicitur: Si mortem recusaveritis, mandatum transgrediemini. Quod tunc timendum fuerat, ut non peccaretur, nunc suscipiendum est, ne peccetur. Sic per ineffabilem Dei misericordiam et ipsa poena vitiorum transit in arma virtutis, et fit iusti meritum etiam supplicium peccatoris. Tunc enim mors est adquisita peccando, nunc inpletur iustitia moriendo. Verum hoc in sanctis martyribus, quibus alterutrum a persecutore proponitur, ut aut deserant fidem aut sufferant mortem. Iusti enim malunt credendo perpeti, quod sunt primi iniqui non credendo perpessi. Nisi enim peccassent illi, non morerentur; peccabunt autem isti, nisi moriantur. Mortui sunt ergo illi, quia peccaverunt; non peccant isti, quia moriuntur. Factum est per illorum culpam, ut veniretur in poenam; fit per istorum poenam, ne veniatur in culpam; non quia mors bonum aliquod facta est, quae antea malum fuit; sed tantam Deus fidei praestitit gratiam, ut mors, quam vitae constat esse contrariam, instrumentum fieret, per quod transiretur ad vitam.	If, moreover, any one is solicitous about this point, how, if death be the very punishment of sin, they whose guilt is cancelled by grace do yet suffer death, this difficulty has already been handled and solved in our other work which we have written on the baptism of infants. There it was said that the parting of soul and body was left, though its connection with sin was removed, for this reason, that if the immortality of the body followed immediately upon the sacrament of regeneration, faith itself would be thereby enervated. For faith is then only faith when it waits in hope for what is not yet seen in substance. And by the vigor and conflict of faith, at least in times past, was the fear of death overcome. Specially was this conspicuous in the holy martyrs, who could have had no victory, no glory, to whom there could not even have been any conflict, if, after the layer of regeneration, saints could not suffer bodily death. Who would not, then, in company with the infants presented for baptism, run to the grace of Christ, that so he might not be dismissed from the body? And thus faith would not be tested with an unseen reward; and so would not even be faith, seeking and receiving an immediate recompense of its works. But now, by the greater and more admirable grace of the Saviour, the punishment of sin is turned to the service of righteousness. For then it was proclaimed to man, "If you sin, you shall die;" now it is said to the martyr, "Die, that you sin not." Then it was said, "If you trangress the commandments, you shall die;" now it is said, "If you decline death, you transgress the commandment." That which was formerly set as an object of terror, that men might not sin, is now to be undergone if we would not sin. Thus, by the unutterable mercy of God, even the very punishment of wickedness has become the armor of virtue, and the penalty of the sinner becomes the reward of the righteous. For then death was incurred by sinning, now righteousness is fulfilled by dying. In the case of the holy martyrs it is so; for to them the persecutor proposes the alternative, apostasy or death. For the righteous prefer by believing to suffer what the first transgressors suffered by not believing. For unless they had sinned, they would not have died; but the martyrs sin if they do not die. The one died because they sinned, the others do not sin because they die. By the guilt of the first, punishment was incurred; by the punishment of the second, guilt is prevented. Not that death, which was before an evil, has become something good, but only that God has granted to faith this grace, that death, which is the admitted opposite to life, should become the instrument by which life is reached.
BOOK XIII [V] Apostolus cum vellet ostendere, quantum peccatum gratia non subveniente ad nocendum valeret, etiam ipsam legem, qua prohibetur peccatum, non dubitavit dicere virtutem esse peccati. Aculeus, inquit, mortis est peccatum, virtus autem peccati lex. Verissime omnino. Auget enim prohibitio desiderium operis inliciti, quando iustitia non sic diligitur, ut peccandi cupiditas eius delectatione vincatur. Vt autem diligatur et delectet vera iustitia, non nisi divina subvenit gratia. Sed ne propterea lex putaretur malum, quoniam virtus est dicta peccati: ideo ipse alio loco versans huius modi quaestionem: Itaque, inquit, lex quidem sancta et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum. Quod ergo bonum est, inquit, mihi factum est mors? Absit. Sed peccatum, ut appareat peccatum, per bonum mihi operatum est mortem, ut fiat super modum peccator aut peccatum per mandatum. Super modum dixit, quia etiam praeuaricatio additur, cum peccandi aucta libidine etiam lex ipsa contemnitur. Cur hoc commemorandum putavimus? Quia scilicet, sicut lex non est malum, quando auget peccantium concupiscentiam, ita nec mors bonum est, quando auget patientium gloriam, cum vel illa pro iniquitate deseritur et efficit praeuaricatores, vel ista pro veritate suscipitur et efficit martyres. Ac per hoc lex quidem bona est, quia prohibitio est peccati; mors autem mala, quia stipendium est peccati; sed quem ad modum iniustitia male utitur non tantum malis, verum etiam bonis: ita iustitia bene non tantum bonis, sed etiam malis. Hinc fit, ut et mali male lege utantur, quamuis sit lex bonum, et boni bene moriantur, quamuis sit mors malum.	The apostle, wishing to show how hurtful a thing sin is, when grace does not aid us, has not hesitated to say that the strength of sin is that very law by which sin is prohibited. "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law." 1 Corinthians 15:56 Most certainly true; for prohibition increases the desire of illicit action, if righteousness is not so loved that the desire of sin is conquered by that love. But unless divine grace aid us, we cannot love nor delight in true righteousness. But lest the law should be thought to be an evil, since it is called the strength of sin, the apostle, when treating a similar question in another place, says, "The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Was then that which is holy made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." Romans 7:12-13 Exceeding, he says, because the transgression is more heinous when through the increasing lust of sin the law itself also is despised. Why have we thought it worth while to mention this? For this reason, because, as the law is not an evil when it increases the lust of those who sin, so neither is death a good thing when it increases the glory of those who suffer it, since either the former is abandoned wickedly, and makes transgressors, or the latter is embraced, for the truth's sake, and makes martyrs. And thus the law is indeed good, because it is prohibition of sin, and death is evil because it is the wages of sin; but as wicked men make an evil use not only of evil, but also of good things, so the righteous make a good use not only of good, but also of evil things. Whence it comes to pass that the wicked make an ill use of the law, though the law is good; and that the good die well, though death is an evil.
BOOK XIII [VI] Quapropter quod adtinet ad corporis mortem, id est separationem animae a corpore, cum eam patiuntur, qui morientes appellantur, nulli bona est. Habet enim asperum sensum et contra naturam vis ipsa, qua utrumque divellitur, quod fuerat in vivente coniunctum atque consertum, quamdiu moratur, donec omnis adimatur sensus, qui ex ipso inerat animae carnisque complexu. Quam totam molestiam nonnumquam unus ictus corporis vel animae raptus intercipit nec eam sentiri praeveniente celeritate permittit. Quidquid tamen illud est in morientibus, quod cum gravi sensu adimit sensum, pie fideliterque tolerando auget meritum patientiae, non aufert vocabulum poenae. Ita cum ex hominis primi perpetuata propagine procul dubio sit mors poena nascentis, tamen si pro pietate iustitiaque pendatur, fit gloria renascentis; et cum sit mors peccati retributio, aliquando inpetrat, ut nihil retribuatur peccato.	Wherefore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, it is good unto none while it is being endured by those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very violence with which body and soul are wrenched asunder, which in the living had been conjoined and closely intertwined, brings with it a harsh experience, jarring horridly on nature so long as it continues, till there comes a total loss of sensation, which arose from the very interpenetration of spirit and flesh. And all this anguish is sometimes forestalled by one stroke of the body or sudden flitting of the soul, the swiftness of which prevents it from being felt. But whatever that may be in the dying which with violently painful sensation robs of all sensation, yet, when it is piously and faithfully borne, it increases the merit of patience, but does not make the name of punishment inapplicable. Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the punishment of all who are born of him, yet, if it be endured for righteousness' sake, it becomes the glory of those who are born again; and though death be the award of sin, it sometimes secures that nothing be awarded to sin.
BOOK XIII [VII] Nam quicumque etiam non percepto regenerationis lauacro pro Christi confessione moriuntur, tantum eis valet ad dimittenda peccata, quantum si abluerentur sacro fonte baptismatis. Qui enim dixit: Si quis non renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non intrabit in regnum caelorum, alia sententia istos fecit exceptos, ubi non minus generaliter ait: Qui me confessus fuerit coram hominibus, confitebor <et ego> eum coram Patre meo qui in caelis est; et alio loco: Qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, inveniet eam. Hinc est quod scriptum est: Pretiosa in conspectu Domini mors sanctorum eius. Quid enim pretiosius quam mors, per quam fit ut et delicta omnia dimittantur et merita cumulatius augeantur? Neque enim tanti sunt meriti, qui, cum mortem differre non possent, baptizati sunt deletisque omnibus peccatis ex hac vita emigrarunt, quanti sunt hi, qui mortem, cum possent, ideo non distulerunt, quia maluerunt Christum confitendo finire vitam quam eum negando ad eius baptismum pervenire. Quod utique si fecissent, etiam hoc eis in illo lauacro dimitteretur, quod timore mortis negaverant Christum, in quo lauacro et illis facinus tam inmane dimissum est, qui occiderant Christum. Sed quando sine abundantia gratiae Spiritus illius, qui ubi uult spirat, tantum Christum amare possent, ut eum in tanto vitae discrimine sub tanta spe veniae negare non possent? Mors igitur pretiosa sanctorum, quibus cum tanta gratia est praemissa et praerogata mors Christi, ut ad eum adquirendum suam non cunctarentur inpendere, in eos usus redactum esse monstravit, quod ad poenam peccati antea fuerat constitutum, ut inde iustitiae fructus uberior nasceretur. Mors ergo non ideo bonum videri debet, quia in tantam utilitatem non vi sua, sed divina opitulatione conversa est, ut, quae tunc metuenda proposita est, ne peccatum committeretur, nunc suscipienda proponatur, ut peccatum non committatur commissumque deleatur magnaeque victoriae debita iustitiae palma reddatur.	For whatever unbaptized persons die confessing Christ, this confession is of the same efficacy for the remission of sins as if they were washed in the sacred font of baptism. For He who said, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," John 3:5 made also an exception in their favor, in that other sentence where He no less absolutely said, "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven;" Matthew 10:32 and in another place, "Whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it." Matthew 16:25 And this explains the verse, "Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His saints." For what is more precious than a death by which a man's sins are all forgiven, and his merits increased an hundredfold? For those who have been baptized when they could no longer escape death, and have departed this life with all their sins blotted out have not equal merit with those who did not defer death, though it was in their power to do so, but preferred to end their life by confessing Christ, rather than by denying Him to secure an opportunity of baptism. And even had they denied Him under pressure of the fear of death, this too would have been forgiven them in that baptism, in which was remitted even the enormous wickedness of those who had slain Christ. But how abundant in these men must have been the grace of the Spirit, who breathes where He lists, seeing that they so dearly loved Christ as to be unable to deny Him even in so sore an emergency, and with so sure a hope of pardon! Precious, therefore, is the death of the saints, to whom the grace of Christ has been applied with such gracious effects, that they do not hesitate to meet death themselves, if so be they might meet Him. And precious is it, also, because it has proved that what was originally ordained for the punishment of the sinner, has been used for the production of a richer harvest of righteousness. But not on this account should we look upon death as a good thing, for it is diverted to such useful purposes, not by any virtue of its own, but by the divine interference. Death was originally proposed as an object of dread, that sin might not be committed; now it must be undergone that sin may not be committed, or, if committed, be remitted, and the award of righteousness bestowed on him whose victory has earned it.
BOOK XIII [VIII] Si enim diligentius consideremus, etiam cum quisque pro veritate fideliter et laudabiliter moritur, mors cavetur. Ideo quippe aliquid eius suscipitur, ne tota contingat et secunda insuper, quae numquam finiatur, accedat. Suscipitur enim animae a corpore separatio, ne Deo ab anima separato etiam ipsa separetur a corpore, ac sic totius hominis prima morte completa secunda excipiat sempiterna. Quocirca mors quidem, ut dixi, cum eam morientes patiuntur cumque in eis ut moriantur facit, nemini bona est, sed laudabiliter toleratur pro tenendo vel adipiscendo bono; cum vero in ea sunt, qui iam mortui nuncupantur, non absurde dicitur et malis mala et bonis bona. In requie sunt enim animae piorum a corpore separatae, impiorum autem poenas luunt, donec istarum ad aeternam vitam, illarum vero ad aeternam mortem, quae secunda dicitur, corpora revivescant.	For if we look at the matter a little more carefully, we shall see that even when a man dies faithfully and laudably for the truth's sake, it is still death he is avoiding. For he submits to some part of death, for the very purpose of avoiding the whole, and the second and eternal death over and above. He submits to the separation of soul and body, lest the soul be separated both from God and from the body, and so the whole first death be completed, and the second death receive him everlastingly. Wherefore death is indeed, as I said, good to none while it is being actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying to its power; but it is meritoriously endured for the sake of retaining or winning what is good. And regarding what happens after death, it is no absurdity to say that death is good to the good, and evil to the evil. For the disembodied spirits of the just are at rest; but those of the wicked suffer punishment till their bodies rise again,-those of the just to life everlasting, and of the others to death eternal, which is called the second death.
BOOK XIII [IX] Sed id tempus, quo animae a corpore separatae aut in bonis sunt aut in malis, utrum post mortem potius an in morte dicendum est? Si enim post mortem est, iam non ipsa mors, quae transacta atque praeterita est, sed post eam vita praesens animae bona seu mala est. Mors autem tunc eis mala erat, quando erat, hoc est quando eam patiebantur, cum morerentur, quoniam gravis et molestus eius inerat sensus; quo malo bene utuntur boni. Peracta autem mors quonam modo vel bona vel mala est, quae iam non est? Porro si adhuc diligentius adtendamus, nec illa mors esse apparebit, cuius gravem ac molestum in morientibus diximus sensum. Quamdiu enim sentiunt, adhuc utique vivunt, et si adhuc vivunt, ante mortem quam in morte potius esse dicendi sunt; quia illa, cum venerit, aufert omnem corporis sensum, qui ea propinquante molestus est. Ac per hoc quo modo morientes dicamus eos, qui nondum mortui sunt, sed inminente morte iam extrema et mortifera adflictione iactantur, explicare difficile est, etiamsi recte isti appellantur morientes, quia, cum mors quae iam inpendet advenerit, non morientes, sed mortui nuncupantur. Nullus est ergo moriens nisi vivens, quoniam, cum in tanta est extremitate vitae, in quanta sunt quos agere animam dicimus, profecto qui nondum anima caruit adhuc vivit. Idem ipse igitur simul et moriens est et vivens, sed morti accedens, vita cedens; adhuc tamen in vita, quia inest anima corpori; nondum autem in morte, quia nondum abscessit a corpore. Sed si, cum abscesserit, nec tunc in morte, sed post mortem potius erit: quando sit in morte quis dixerit? Nam neque ullus moriens erit, si moriens et vivens simul esse nullus potest. Quamdiu quippe anima in corpore est, non possumus negare viventem. Aut si moriens potius dicendus est, in cuius iam corpore agitur ut moriatur, nec simul quisquam potest esse vivens et moriens: nescio quando sit vivens.	The point of time in which the souls of the good and evil are separated from the body, are we to say it is after death, or in death rather? If it is after death, then it is not death which is good or evil, since death is done with and past, but it is the life which the soul has now entered on. Death was an evil when it was present, that is to say, when it was being suffered by the dying; for to them it brought with it a severe and grievous experience, which the good make a good use of. But when death is past, how can that which no longer is be either good or evil? Still further, if we examine the matter more closely, we shall see that even that sore and grievous pain which the dying experience is not death itself. For so long as they have any sensation, they are certainly still alive; and, if still alive, must rather be said to be in a state previous to death than in death. For when death actually comes, it robs us of all bodily sensation, which, while death is only approaching is painful. And thus it is difficult to explain how we speak of those who are not yet dead, but are agonized in their last and mortal extremity, as being in the article of death. Yet what else can we call them than dying persons? for when death which was imminent shall have actually come, we can no longer call them dying but dead. No one, therefore, is dying unless living; since even he who is in the last extremity of life, and, as we say, giving up the ghost, yet lives. The same person is therefore at once dying and living, but drawing near to death, departing from life; yet in life, because his spirit yet abides in the body; not yet in death, because not yet has his spirit forsaken the body. But if, when it has forsaken it, the man is not even then in death, but after death, who shall say when he is in death? On the one hand, no one can be called dying, if a man cannot be dying and living at the same time; and as long as the soul is in the body, we cannot deny that he is living. On the other hand, if the man who is approaching death be rather called dying, I know not who is living.
BOOK XIII [X] Ex quo enim quisque in isto corpore morituro esse coeperit, numquam in eo non agitur ut mors veniat. Hoc enim agit eius mutabilitas toto tempore vitae huius (si tamen vita dicenda est), ut veniatur in mortem. Nemo quippe est, qui non ei post annum sit, quam ante annum fuit, et cras quam hodie, et hodie quam heri, et paulo post quam nunc, et nunc quam paulo ante propinquior; quoniam, quidquid temporis vivitur, de spatio vivendi demitur, et cotidie fit minus minusque quod restat, ut omnino nihil sit aliud tempus vitae huius, quam cursus ad mortem, in quo nemo vel paululum stare vel aliquanto tardius ire permittitur; sed urgentur omnes pari motu nec diverso inpelluntur accessu. Neque enim, cui vita brevior fuit, celerius diem duxit quam ille, cui longior; sed cum aequaliter et aequalia momenta raperentur ambobus, alter habuit propius, alter remotius, quo non inpari velocitate ambo currebant. Aliud est autem amplius viae peregisse, aliud tardius ambulasse. Qui ergo usque ad mortem productiora spatia temporis agit, non lentius pergit, sed plus itineris conficit. Porro si ex illo quisque incipit mori, hoc est esse in morte, ex quo in illo agi coeperit ipsa mors, id est vitae detractio (quia, cum detrahendo finita fuerit, post mortem iam erit, non in morte): profecto, ex quo esse incipit in hoc corpore, in morte est. Quid enim aliud diebus horis momentisque singulis agitur, donec ea consumpta mors, quae agebatur, impleatur, et incipiat iam tempus esse post mortem, quod, cum vita detraheretur, erat in morte? Numquam igitur in vita homo est, ex quo est in isto corpore moriente potius quam vivente, si et in vita et in morte simul non potest esse. An potius et in vita et in morte simul est; in vita scilicet, in qua vivit, donec tota detrahatur; in morte autem, quia iam moritur, cum vita detrahitur? Si enim non est in vita, quid est quod detrahitur, donec eius fiat perfecta consumptio? Si autem non est in morte, quid est vitae ipsa detractio? Non enim frustra, cum vita fuerit corpori tota detracta, post mortem iam dicitur, nisi quia mors erat, cum detraberetur. Nam si ea detracta non est homo in morte, sed post mortem: quando, nisi cum detrahitur, erit in morte?.	For no sooner do we begin to live in this dying body, than we begin to move ceaselessly towards death. For in the whole course of this life (if life we must call it) its mutability tends towards death. Certainly there is no one who is not nearer it this year than last year, and tomorrow than today, and today than yesterday, and a short while hence than now, and now than a short while ago. For whatever time we live is deducted from our whole term of life, and that which remains is daily becoming less and less; so that our whole life is nothing but a race towards death, in which no one is allowed to stand still for a little space, or to go somewhat more slowly, but all are driven forwards with an impartial movement, and with equal rapidity. For he whose life is short spends a day no more swiftly than he whose life is longer. But while the equal moments are impartially snatched from both, the one has a nearer and the other a more remote goal to reach with this their equal speed. It is one thing to make a longer journey, and another to walk more slowly. He, therefore, who spends longer time on his way to death does not proceed at a more leisurely pace, but goes over more ground. Further, if every man begins to die, that is, is in death, as soon as death has begun to show itself in him (by taking away life, to wit; for when life is all taken away, the man will be then not in death, but after death), then he begins to die so soon as he begins to live. For what else is going on in all his days, hours, and moments, until this slow-working death is fully consummated? And then comes the time after death, instead of that in which life was being withdrawn, and which we called being in death. Man, then, is never in life from the moment he dwells in this dying rather than living body,-if, at least, he cannot be in life and death at once. Or rather, shall we say, he is in both?-in life, namely, which he lives till all is consumed; but in death also, which he dies as his life is consumed? For if he is not in life, what is it which is consumed till all be gone? And if he is not in death, what is this consumption itself? For when the whole of life has been consumed, the expression "after death" would be meaningless, had that consumption not been death. And if, when it has all been consumed, a man is not in death but after death, when is he in death unless when life is being consumed away?
BOOK XIII [XI] Si autem absurdum est, ut hominem, antequam ad mortem perveniat, iam esse dicamus in morte (cui enim propinquat peragendo vitae suae tempora, si iam in illa est?), maxime quia nimis est insolens, ut simul et vivens esse dicatur et moriens, cum vigilans et dormiens simul esse non possit: quaerendum est quando erit moriens. Etenim antequam mors veniat, non est moriens, sed vivens; cum vero mors venerit, mortuus erit, non moriens. Illud ergo est adhuc ante mortem, hoc iam post mortem. Quando ergo in morte? Tunc enim est moriens, ut, quem ad modum tria sunt cum dicimus "ante mortem, in morte, post mortem", ita tria singulis singula "uivens, moriens mortuusque" reddantur. Quando itaque sit moriens, id est in morte, ubi neque sit vivens, quod est ante mortem, neque mortuus, quod est post mortem, sed moriens, id est in morte, difficillime definitur. Quamdiu quippe est anima in corpore, maxime si etiam sensus adsit, procul dubio vivit homo, qui constat ex anima et corpore, ac per hoc adhuc ante mortem, non in morte esse dicendus est; cum vero anima abscesserit omnemque abstulerit corporis sensum, iam post mortem mortuusque perhibetur. Perit igitur inter utrumque, quo moriens vel in morte sit; quoniam si adhuc vivit, ante mortem est; si vivere destitit, iam post mortem est. Numquam ergo moriens, id est in morte, esse conprehenditur. Ita etiam in transcursu temporum quaeritur praesens, nec invenitur, quia sine ullo spatio est, per quod transitur ex futuro in praeteritum. Nonne ergo videndum est, ne ista ratione mors corporis nulla esse dicatur? Si enim est, quando est, quae in ullo et in qua ullus esse non potest? Quando quidem si vivitur, adhuc non est, quia hoc ante mortem, non in morte; si autem vivere iam cessatum est, iam non est, quia et hoc post mortem est, non in morte. Sed rursus si nulla mors est ante quid vel post, quid est quod dicitur ante mortem sive post mortem? Nam et hoc inaniter dicitur, si mors nulla est. Atque utinam in paradiso bene vivendo egissemus, ut re vera nulla mors esset. Nunc autem non solum est, verum etiam tam molesta est, ut nec ulla explicari locutione possit nec ulla ratione vitari. Loquamur ergo secundum consuetudinem (non enim aliter debemus) et dicamus "ante mortem", priusquam mors accidat; sicut scriptum est: Ante mortem ne laudes hominem quemquam. Dicamus etiam cum acciderit: Post mortem illius vel illius factum est illud aut illud. Dicamus et de praesenti tempore ut possumus, velut cum ita loquimur: Moriens ille testatus est, et: Illis atque illis illud atque illud moriens dereliquit; quamuis hoc nisi vivens omnino facere non posset et potius hoc ante mortem fecerit, non in morte. Loquamur etiam sicut loquitur scriptura divina, quae mortuos quoque non post mortem, sed in morte esse non dubitat dicere. Hinc enim est illud: Quoniam non est in morte, qui memor sit tui. Donec enim revivescant, recte esse dicuntur in morte, sicut in somno esse quisque, donec evigilet, dicitur; quamuis in somno positos dicamus dormientes, nec tamen eo modo possumus dicere eos, qui iam sunt mortui, morientes. Non enim adhuc moriuntur, qui, quantum adtinet ad corporis mortem, de qua nunc disserimus, iam sunt a corporibus separati. Sed hoc est, quod dixi explicari aliqua locutione non posse, quonam modo vel morientes dicantur vivere vel iam mortui etiam post mortem adhuc esse dicantur in morte. Quo modo enim post mortem, si adhuc in morte ? praesertim cum eos nec morientes dicamus, sicuti eos, qui in somno sunt, dicimus dormientes, et qui in languore, languentes, et qui in dolore, utique dolentes, et qui in vita, viventes; at vero mortui, priusquam resurgant, esse dicuntur in morte, nec tamen possunt appellari morientes. Vnde non inportune neque incongrue arbitror accidisse, etsi non humana industria, iudicio fortasse divino, ut hoc verbum, quod est moritur, in Latina lingua nec grammatici declinare potuerint ea regula qua cetera talia declinantur. Namque ab eo quod est oritur, fit verbum praeteriti temporis "ortus est"; et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur. Ab eo vero, quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis verbum, responderi adsolet "mortuus est", u littera geminata. Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quo modo fatuus, arduus, conspicuus et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur. Illud autem, quasi ut declinetur, quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen. Convenienter itaque factum est, ut, quem ad modum id quod significat non potest agendo, ita ipsum verbum non posset loquendo declinari. Agi tamen potest in adiutorio gratiae Redemptoris nostri, ut saltem secundam mortem declinare possimus. Illa est enim gravior et omnium malorum pessima, quae non fit separatione animae et corporis, sed in aeternam poenam potius utriusque complexu. Ibi e contrario non erunt homines ante mortem atque post mortem, sed semper in morte; ac per hoc numquam viventes, numquam mortui, sed sine fine morientes. Numquam enim erit homini peius in morte, quam ubi erit mors ipsa sine morte.	But if it is absurd to say that a man is in death before he reaches death (for to what is his course running as he passes through life, if already he is in death?), and if it outrage common usage to speak of a man being at once alive and dead, as much as it does so to speak of him as at once asleep and awake, it remains to be asked when a man is dying? For, before death comes, he is not dying but living; and when death has come, he is not dying but dead. The one is before, the other after death. When, then, is he in death so that we can say he is dying? For as there are three times, before death, in death, after death, so there are three states corresponding, living, dying, dead. And it is very hard to define when a man is in death or dying, when he is neither living, which is before death, nor dead, which is after death, but dying, which is in death. For so long as the soul is in the body, especially if consciousness remain, the man certainly lives; for body and soul constitute the man. And thus, before death, he cannot be said to be in death, but when, on the other hand, the soul has departed, and all bodily sensation is extinct, death is past, and the man is dead. Between these two states the dying condition finds no place; for if a man yet lives, death has not arrived; if he has ceased to live, death is past. Never, then, is he dying, that is, comprehended in the state of death. So also in the passing of time,-you try to lay your finger on the present, and cannot find it, because the present occupies no space, but is only the transition of time from the future to the past. Must we then conclude that there is thus no death of the body at all? For if there is, where is it, since it is in no one, and no one can be in it? Since, indeed, if there is yet life, death is not yet; for this state is before death, not in death: and if life has already ceased, death is not present; for this state is after death, not in death. On the other hand, if there is no death before or after, what do we mean when we say "after death," or "before death?" This is a foolish way of speaking if there is no death. And would that we had lived so well in Paradise that in very truth there were now no death! But not only does it now exist, but so grievous a thing is it, that no skill is sufficient either to explain or to escape it.Let us, then, speak in the customary way,-no man ought to speak otherwise,-and let us call the time before death come, "before death;" as it is written, "Praise no man before his death." Sirach 11:28 And when it has happened, let us say that "after death" this or that took place. And of the present time let us speak as best we can, as when we say, "He, when dying, made his will, and left this or that to such and such persons,"-though, of course, he could not do so unless he were living, and did this rather before death than in death. And let us use the same phraseology as Scripture uses; for it makes no scruple of saying that the dead are not after but in death. So that verse, "For in death there is no remembrance of you." For until the resurrection men are justly said to be in death; as every one is said to be in sleep till he awakes. However, though we can say of persons in sleep that they are sleeping, we cannot speak in this way of the dead, and say they are dying. For, so far as regards the death of the body, of which we are now speaking, one cannot say that those who are already separated from their bodies continue dying. But this, you see, is just what I was saying,-that no words can explain how either the dying are said to live, or how the dead are said, even after death, to be in death. For how can they be after death if they be in death, especially when we do not even call them dying, as we call those in sleep, sleeping; and those in languor, languishing; and those in grief, grieving; and those in life, living? And yet the dead, until they rise again, are said to be in death, but cannot be called dying.And therefore I think it has not unsuitably nor inappropriately come to pass, though not by the intention of man, yet perhaps with divine purpose, that this Latin word moritur cannot be declined by the grammarians according to the rule followed by similar words. For oritur gives the form ortus est for the perfect; and all similar verbs form this tense from their perfect participles. But if we ask the perfect of moritur, we get the regular answer mortuus est, with a double u. For thus mortuus is pronounced, like fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, and similar words, which are not perfect participles but adjectives, and are declined without regard to tense. But mortuus, though in form an adjective, is used as perfect participle, as if that were to be declined which cannot be declined; and thus it has suitably come to pass that, as the thing itself cannot in point of fact be declined, so neither can the word significant of the act be declined. Yet, by the aid of our Redeemer's grace, we may manage at least to decline the second. For that is more grievous still, and, indeed, of all evils the worst, since it consists not in the separation of soul and body, but in the uniting of both in death eternal. And there, in striking contrast to our present conditions, men will not be before or after death, but always in death; and thus never living, never dead, but endlessly dying. And never can a man be more disastrously in death than when death itself shall be deathless.
BOOK XIII [XII] Cum ergo requiritur, quam mortem Deus primis hominibus fuerit comminatus, si ab eo mandatum transgrederentur acceptum nec oboedientiam custodirent, utrum animae an corporis an totius hominis an illam quae appellatur secunda: respondendum est: Omnes. Prima enim constat ex duabus, [secunda] ex omnibus tota. Sicut enim universa terra ex multis terris et universa ecclesia ex multis constat ecclesiis: sic universa mors ex omnibus. Quoniam prima constat ex duabus, una animae, altera corporis; ut sit prima totius hominis mors, cum anima sine Deo et sine corpore ad tempus poenas luit; secunda vero, ubi anima sine Deo cum corpore poenas aeternas luit. Quando ergo dixit Deus primo illi homini, quem in paradiso constituerat, de cibo uetito: Quacumque die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini s non tantum primae mortis partem priorem, ubi anima privatur Deo, nec tantum posteriorem, ubi corpus privatur anima, nec solam ipsam totam primam, ubi anima et a Deo et.a corpore separata punitur; sed quidquid mortis est usque ad novissimam, quae secunda dicitur, qua est nulla posterior, comminatio illa complexa est.	When, therefore, it is asked what death it was with which God threatened our first parents if they should transgress the commandment they had received from Him, and should fail to preserve their obedience,-whether it was the death of soul, or of body, or of the whole man, or that which is called second death,-we must answer, It is all. For the first consists of two; the second is the complete death, which consists of all. For, as the whole earth consists of many lands, and the Church universal of many churches, so death universal consists of all deaths. The first consists of two, one of the body, and another of the soul. So that the first death is a death of the whole man, since the soul without God and without the body suffers punishment for a time; but the second is when the soul, without God but with the body, suffers punishment everlasting. When, therefore, God said to that first man whom he had placed in Paradise, referring to the forbidden fruit, "In the day that you eat thereof you shall surely die," Genesis 2:17 that threatening included not only the first part of the first death, by which the soul is deprived of God; nor only the subsequent part of the first death, by which the body is deprived of the soul; nor only the whole first death itself, by which the soul is punished in separation from God and from the body;-but it includes whatever of death there is, even to that final death which is called second, and to which none is subsequent.
BOOK XIII [XIII] Nam postea quam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim gratia deserente divina de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt. Vnde etiam foliis ficulneis, quae forte a perturbatis prima comperta sunt, pudenda texerunt; quae prius eadem membra erant, sed pudenda non erant. Senserunt ergo nouum motum inoboedientis carnis suae, tamquam reciprocam poenam inoboedientiae suae. Iam quippe anima libertate in peruersum propria delectata et Deo dedignata seruire pristino corporis seruitio destituebatur, et quia superiorem dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat, nec omni modo habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si Deo subdita ipsa mansisset. Tunc ergo coepit caro concupiscere adversus spiritum, cum qua controversia nati sumus, trahentes originem mortis et in membris nostris vitiataque natura contentionem eius sive victoriam de prima praeuaricatione gestantes.	For, as soon as our first parents had transgressed the commandment, divine grace forsook them, and they were confounded at their own wickedness; and therefore they took fig-leaves (which were possibly the first that came to hand in their troubled state of mind), and covered their shame; for though their members remained the same, they had shame now where they had none before. They experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God. For the soul, revelling in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had formerly maintained over the body. And because it had willfully deserted its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant; neither could it hold the flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained itself subject to God. Then began the flesh to lust against the Spirit, Galatians 5:17 in which strife we are born, deriving from the first transgression a seed of death, and bearing in our members, and in our vitiated nature, the contest or even victory of the flesh.
BOOK XIII [XIV] Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor, non utique vitiorum; sed sponte deprauatus iusteque damnatus deprauatos damnatosque generavit. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed iam erat natura seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccatum vitiata et vinculo mortis obstricta iusteque damnata non alterius condicionis homo ex homine nasceretur. Ac per hoc a liberi arbitrii malo usu series calamitatis huius exorta est, quae humanum genus origine deprauata, velut radice corrupta, usque ad secundae mortis exitium, quae non habet finem, solis eis exceptis qui per Dei gratiam liberantur, miseriarum conexione perducit.	For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man upright; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemned children. For we all were in that one man, since we all were that one man, who fell into sin by the woman who was made from him before the sin. For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state. And thus, from the bad use of free will, there originated the whole train of evil, which, with its concatenation of miseries, convoys the human race from its depraved origin, as from a corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God.
BOOK XIII [XV] Quam ob rem etiamsi in eo quod dictum est: Morte moriemini, quoniam non est dictum: Mortibus, eam solam intellegamus, quae fit cum anima deseritur sua vita, quod illi Deus est (non enim deserta est ut desereret, sed ut desereretur deseruit; ad malum quippe eius prior est voluntas eius; ad bonum vero eius prior est voluntas Creatoris eius; sive ut eam faceret, quae nulla erat, sive ut reficiat, quia lapsa perierat), _ etiamsi ergo hanc intellegamus Deum denuntiasse mortem in eo quod ait: Qua die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini; tamquam diceret: Qua die me deserueritis per inoboedientiam, deseram vos per iustitiam: profecto in ea morte etiam ceterae denuntiatae sunt, quae procul dubio fuerant secuturae. Nam in eo, quod inoboediens motus in carne animae inoboedientis exortus est, propter quem pudenda texerunt, sensa est mors una, in qua deseruit animam Deus. Ea significata est verbis eius, quando timore dementi sese abscondenti homini dixit: Adam, ubi es? non utique ignorando quaerens, sed increpando admonens, ut adtenderet ubi esset, in quo Deus non esset. Cum vero corpus anima ipsa deseruit aetate corruptum et senectute confectum, venit in experimentum mors altera, de qua Deus peccatum adhuc puniens homini dixerat: Terra es et in terram ibis; ut ex his duabus mors illa prima, quae totius est hominis, compleretur, quam secunda in ultimo sequitur, nisi homo per gratiam liberetur. Neque enim corpus, quod de terra est, rediret in terram nisi sua morte, quae illi accidit, cum deseritur sua vita, id est anima. Vnde constat inter Christianos veraciter catholicam tenentes fidem etiam ipsam nobis corporis mortem non lege naturae, qua nullam mortem homini Deus fecit, sed merito inflictam esse peccati, quoniam peccatum vindicans Deus dixit homini, in quo tunc omnes eramus: Terra es et in terram ibis.	It may perhaps be supposed that because God said, "You shall die the death," Genesis 2:17 and not "deaths," we should understand only that death which occurs when the soul is deserted by God, who is its life; for it was not deserted by God, and so deserted Him, but deserted Him, and so was deserted by Him. For its own will was the originator of its evil, as God was the originator of its motions towards good, both in making it when it was not, and in remaking it when it had fallen and perished. But though we suppose that God meant only this death, and that the words, "In the day ye eat of it you shall die the death," should be understood as meaning, "In the day ye desert me in disobedience, I will desert you in justice," yet assuredly in this death the other deaths also were threatened, which were its inevitable consequence. For in the first stirring of the disobedient motion which was felt in the flesh of the disobedient soul, and which caused our first parents to cover their shame, one death indeed is experienced, that, namely, which occurs when God forsakes the soul. (This was intimated by the words He uttered, when the man, stupefied by fear, had hid himself, "Adam, where are you?" Genesis 3:9 -words which He used not in ignorance of inquiry, but warning him to consider where he was, since God was not with him.) But when the soul itself forsook the body, corrupted and decayed with age, the other death was experienced of which God had spoken in pronouncing man's sentence, "Earth you are, and unto earth shall you return." Genesis 3:19 And of these two deaths that first death of the whole man is composed. And this first death is finally followed by the second, unless man be freed by grace. For the body would not return to the earth from which it was made, save only by the death proper to itself, which occurs when it is forsaken of the soul, its life. And therefore it is agreed among all Christians who truthfully hold the catholic faith, that we are subject to the death of the body, not by the law of nature, by which God ordained no death for man, but by His righteous infliction on account of sin; for God, taking vengeance on sin, said to the man, in whom we all then were, "Dust you are, and unto dust shall you return."
BOOK XIII [XVI] Sed philosophi, contra quorum calumnias defendimus civitatem Dei, hoc est eius ecclesiam, sapienter sibi videntur inridere, quod dicimus animae a corpore separationem inter poenas eius esse deputandam, quia videlicet eius perfectam beatitudinem tunc illi fieri existimant, cum omni prorsus corpore exuta ad Deum simplex et sola et quodam modo nuda redierit. Vbi si nihil, quo ista refelleretur opinio, in eorum litteris invenirem, operosius mihi disputandum esset, quo demonstrarem non corpus esse animae, sed corruptibile corpus onerosum. Vnde illud est quod de scripturis nostris in superiore libro commemoravimus: Corpus enim corruptibile adgrauat animam. Addendo utique corruptibile non qualicumque corpore, sed quale factum est ex peccato consequente vindicta, animam perhibuit adgrauari. Quod etiamsi non addidisset, nihil aliud intellegere deberemus. Sed cum apertissime Plato deos a summo Deo factos habere inmortalia corpora praedicet eisque ipsum Deum, a quo facti sunt, inducat pro magno beneficio pollicentem, quod in aeternum cum suis corporibus permanebunt nec ab eis ulla morte soluentur: quid est quod isti ad exagitandam Christianam fidem fingunt se nescire quod sciunt, aut etiam sibi repugnantes adversum se ipsos malunt dicere, dum nobis non desinant contradicere? Nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit, quibus inducit summum deum deos quos fecit adloquentem ac dicentem: "Vos, qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite: quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me inuito, quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest; sed haudquaquam bonum est ratione vinctum velle dissoluere. Sed quoniam estis orti, inmortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; ne utiquam tamen dissoluemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem uestram quam illa quibus estis <tum, cum gignebamini,> conligati." Ecce deos Plato dicit et corporis animaeque conligatione mortales, et tamen inmortales dei a quo facti sunt voluntate atque consilio. Si ergo animae poena est in qualicumque corpore conligari, quid est quod eos adloquens deus tamquam sollicitos, ne forte moriantur, id est dissolvantur a corpore, de sua facit inmortalitate securos; non propter eorum naturam, quae sit compacta, non simplex, sed propter suam inuictissimam voluntatem, qua potens est facere, ut nec orta occidant nec conexa solvantur, sed incorruptibiliter perseuerent? Et hoc quidem utrum Plato verum de sideribus dicat, alia quaestio est. Neque enim ei continuo concedendum est globos istos luminum sive orbiculos luce corporea super terras seu die seu nocte fulgentes suis quibusdam propriis animis vivere eisque intellectualibus et beatis, quod etiam de ipso universo mundo, tamquam uno animali maximo, quo cuncta cetera continerentur animalia, instanter adfirmat. Sed haec, ut dixi, alia quaestio est, quam nunc discutiendam non suscepimus. Hoc tantum contra istos commemorandum putavi, qui se Platonicos vocari vel esse gloriantur, cuius superbia nominis erubescunt esse Christiani, ne commune illis cum uulgo vocabulum vilem faciat palliatorum tanto magis inflatam, quanto magis exiguam paucitatem; et quaerentes, quid in doctrina Christiana reprehendant, exagitant aeternitatem corporum, tamquam haec sint inter se contraria, ut et beatitudinem quaeramus animae et eam semper esse velimus in corpore, velut aerumnoso vinculo conligatam; cum eorum auctor et magister Plato donum a deo summo diis ab illo factis dicat esse concessum, ne aliquando moriantur, id est a corporibus, quibus eos conexuit, separentur.	But the philosophers against whom we are defending the city of God, that is, His Church seem to themselves to have good cause to deride us, because we say that the separation of the soul from the body is to be held as part of man's punishment. For they suppose that the blessedness of the soul then only is complete, when it is quite denuded of the body, and returns to God a pure and simple, and, as it were, naked soul. On this point, if I should find nothing in their own literature to refute this opinion, I should be forced laboriously to demonstrate that it is not the body, but the corruptibility of the body, which is a burden to the soul. Hence that sentence of Scripture we quoted in a foregoing book, "For the corruptible body presses down the soul." Wisdom 9:15 The word corruptible is added to show that the soul is burdened, not by any body whatsoever, but by the body such as it has become in consequence of sin. And even though the word had not been added, we could understand nothing else. But when Plato most expressly declares that the gods who are made by the Supreme have immortal bodies, and when he introduces their Maker himself, promising them as a great boon that they should abide in their bodies eternally, and never by any death be loosed from them, why do these adversaries of ours, for the sake of troubling the Christian faith, feign to be ignorant of what they quite well know, and even prefer to contradict themselves rather than lose an opportunity of contradicting us? Here are Plato's words, as Cicero has translated them, in which he introduces the Supreme addressing the gods He had made, and saying, "You who are sprung from a divine stock, consider of what works I am the parent and author. These (your bodies) are indestructible so long as I will it; although all that is composed can be destroyed. But it is wicked to dissolve what reason has compacted. But, seeing that you have been born, you cannot indeed be immortal and indestructible; yet you shall by no means be destroyed, nor shall any fates consign you to death, and prove superior to my will, which is a stronger assurance of your perpetuity than those bodies to which you were joined when you were born." Plato, you see, says that the gods are both mortal by the connection of the body and soul, and yet are rendered immortal by the will and decree of their Maker. If, therefore, it is a punishment to the soul to be connected with any body whatever, why does God address them as if they were afraid of death, that is, of the separation, of soul and body? Why does He seek to reassure them by promising them immortality, not in virtue of their nature, which is composite and not simple, but by virtue of His invincible will, whereby He can effect that neither things born die, nor things compounded be dissolved, but preserved eternally?Whether this opinion of Plato's about the stars is true or not, is another question. For we cannot at once grant to him that these luminous bodies or globes, which by day and night shine on the earth with the light of their bodily substance, have also intellectual and blessed souls which animate each its own body, as he confidently affirms of the universe itself, as if it were one huge animal, in which all other animals were contained. But this, as I said, is another question, which we have not undertaken to discuss at present. This much only I deemed right to bring forward, in opposition to those who so pride themselves on being, or on being called Platonists, that they blush to be Christians, and who cannot brook to be called by a name which the common people also bear, lest they vulgarize the philosophers' coterie, which is proud in proportion to its exclusiveness. These men, seeking a weak point in the Christian doctrine, select for attack the eternity of the body, as if it were a contradiction to contend for the blessedness of the soul, and to wish it to be always resident in the body, bound, as it were, in a lamentable chain; and this although Plato, their own founder and master, affirms that it was granted by the Supreme as a boon to the gods He had made, that they should not die, that is, should not be separated from the bodies with which He had connected them.
BOOK XIII [XVII] Contendunt etiam isti terrestria corpora sempiterna esse non posse cum ipsam universam terram dei sui, non quidem summi, sed tamen magni, id est totius huius mundi, membrum in medio positum et sempiternum esse non dubitent. Cum ergo deus ille summus fecerit eis alterum quem putant deum, id est istum mundum, ceteris diis, qui infra eum sunt, praeferendum, eundemque esse existiment animantem, anima scilicet, sicut asserunt, rationali vel intellectuali in tam magna mole corporis eius inclusa, ipsiusque corporis tamquam membra locis suis posita atque digesta quattuor constituerit elementa, quorum iuncturam, ne umquam deus eorum tam magnus moriatur, insolubilem ac sempiternam velint: quid causae est, ut in corpore maioris animantis tamquam medium membrum aeterna sit terra, et aliorum animantium terrestrium corpora, si Deus sicut illud velit, aeterna esse non possint? Sed terrae, inquiunt, terra reddenda est, unde animalium terrestria sumpta sunt corpora; ex quo fit, inquiunt, ut ea sit necesse dissolvi et emori et eo modo terrae stabili ac sempiternae, unde fuerant sumpta, restitui. Si quis hoc et iam de igne similiter adfirmet et dicat reddenda esse universo igni corpora, quae inde sumpta sunt, ut caelestia fierent animalia: nonne inmortalitas, quam talibus diis, velut deo summo loquente, promisit Plato, tamquam violentia disputationis huius intercidet? An ibi propterea non fit, quia Deus non uult, cuius voluntatem, ut ait Plato, nulla vis vincit? Quid ergo prohibet, ut hoc etiam de terrestribus corporibus Deus possit efficere, quandoquidem, ut nec ea quae orta sunt occidant nec ea quae sunt vincta solvantur nec ea quae sunt ex elementis sumpta reddantur atque ut animae in corporibus constitutae nec umquam ea deserant et cum eis inmortalitate ac sempiterna beatitudine perfruantur, posse Deum facere confitetur Plato? Cur ergo non possit, ut nec terrestria moriantur? An Deus non est potens quo usque Christiani credunt, sed quo usque Platonici volunt? Nimirum quippe consilium Dei et potestatem potuerunt philosophi, nec potuerunt nosse prophetae; cum potius e contrario Dei prophetas ad enuntiandam eius, quantum dignatus est, voluntatem Spiritus eius docuerit, philosophos autem in ea cognoscenda coniectura humana deceperit. Verum non usque adeo decipi debuerunt, non solum ignorantia, verum etiam peruicacia, ut et sibi apertissime refragentur magnis disputationum viribus adserentes animae, ut beata esse possit, non terrenum tantum, sed omne corpus esse fugiendum, et deos rursus dicentes habere beatissimas animas et tamen aeternis corporibus inligatas, caelestes quidem igneis, Iovis autem ipsius animam, quem mundum istum volunt, omnibus omnino corporeis elementis, quibus haec tota moles a terra in caelum surgit, inclusam. Hanc enim animam Plato ab intimo terrae medio, quod geometrae centron vocant, per omnes partes eius usque ad caeli summa et extrema diffundi et extendi per numeros musicos opinatur, ut sit iste mundus animal maximum beatissimum sempiternum, cuius anima et perfectam sapientiae felicitatem teneret et corpus proprium non relinqueret, cuiusque corpus et in aeternum ex illa viveret et eam quamuis non simplex, sed tot corporibus tantisque conpactum hebetare atque tardare non posset. Cum igitur suspicionibus suis ista permittant, cur nolunt credere, divina voluntate atque potentia inmortalia corpora fieri posse terrena, in quibus animae nulla ab eis morte separatae, nullis eorum oneribus adgrauatae sempiterne ac feliciter vivant, quod deos suos posse adserunt in corporibus igneis Iovemque ipsum eorum regem in omnibus corporeis elementis? Nam si animae, ut beata sit, corpus est omne fugiendum, fugiant dii eorum de globis siderum, fugiat Iuppiter de caelo et terra; aut si non possunt, miseri iudicentur. Sed neutrum isti volunt, qui neque a corporibus separationem audent dare diis suis, ne illos mortales colere videantur, nec beatitudinis privationem, ne infelices eos esse fateantur. Non ergo ad beatitudinem consequendam omnia fugienda sunt corpora; sed corruptibilia molesta, gravia moribunda; non qualia fecit primis hominibus bonitas Dei, sed qualia esse compulit poena peccati.	These same philosophers further contend that terrestrial bodies cannot be eternal though they make no doubt that the whole earth, which is itself the central member of their god,-not, indeed, of the greatest, but yet of a great god, that is, of this whole world,-is eternal. Since, then, the Supreme made for them another god, that is, this world, superior to the other gods beneath Him; and since they suppose that this god is an animal, having, as they affirm, a rational or intellectual soul enclosed in the huge mass of its body, and having, as the fitly situated and adjusted members of its body, the four elements, whose union they wish to be indissoluble and eternal, lest perchance this great god of theirs might some day perish; what reason is there that the earth, which is the central member in the body of a greater creature, should be eternal, and the bodies of other terrestrial creatures should not possibly be eternal if God should so will it? But earth, say they, must return to earth, out of which the terrestrial bodies of the animals have been taken. For this, they say, is the reason of the necessity of their death and dissolution, and this the manner of their restoration to the solid and eternal earth whence they came. But if any one says the same thing of fire, holding that the bodies which are derived from it to make celestial beings must be restored to the universal fire, does not the immortality which Plato represents these gods as receiving from the Supreme evanesce in the heat of this dispute? Or does this not happen with those celestials because God, whose will, as Plato says, overpowers all powers, has willed it should not be so? What, then, hinders God from ordaining the same of terrestrial bodies? And since, indeed, Plato acknowledges that God can prevent things that are born from dying, and things that are joined from being sundered, and things that are composed from being dissolved, and can ordain that the souls once allotted to their bodies should never abandon them, but enjoy along with them immortality and everlasting bliss, why may He not also effect that terrestrial bodies die not? Is God powerless to do everything that is special to the Christian's creed, but powerful to effect everything the Platonists desire? The philosophers, forsooth, have been admitted to a knowledge of the divine purposes and power which has been denied to the prophets! The truth is, that the Spirit of God taught His prophets so much of His will as He thought fit to reveal, but the philosophers, in their efforts to discover it, were deceived by human conjecture.But they should not have been so led astray, I will not say by their ignorance, but by their obstinacy, as to contradict themselves so frequently; for they maintain, with all their vaunted might, that in order to the happiness of the soul, it must abandon not only its earthly body, but every kind of body. And yet they hold that the gods, whose souls are most blessed, are bound to everlasting bodies, the celestials to fiery bodies, and the soul of Jove himself (or this world, as they would have us believe) to all the physical elements which compose this entire mass reaching from earth to heaven. For this soul Plato believes to be extended and diffused by musical numbers, from the middle of the inside of the earth, which geometricians call the centre, outwards through all its parts to the utmost heights and extremities of the heavens; so that this world is a very great and blessed immortal animal, whose soul has both the perfect blessedness of wisdom, and never leaves its own body and whose body has life everlasting from the soul, and by no means clogs or hinders it, though itself be not a simple body, but compacted of so many and so huge materials. Since, therefore, they allow so much to their own conjectures, why do they refuse to believe that by the divine will and power immortality can be conferred on earthly bodies, in which the souls would be neither oppressed with the burden of them, nor separated from them by any death, but live eternally and blessedly? Do they not assert that their own gods so live in bodies of fire, and that Jove himself, their king, so lives in the physical elements? If, in order to its blessedness, the soul must quit every kind of body, let their gods flit from the starry spheres, and Jupiter from earth to sky; or, if they cannot do so, let them be pronounced miserable. But neither alternative will these men adopt. For, on the one hand, they dare not ascribe to their own gods a departure from the body, lest they should seem to worship mortals; on the other hand, they dare not deny their happiness, lest they should acknowledge wretches as gods. Therefore, to obtain blessedness, we need not quit every kind of body, but only the corruptible, cumbersome, painful, dying,-not such bodies as the goodness of God contrived for the first man, but such only as man's sin entailed.
BOOK XIII [XVIII] Sed necesse est, inquiunt, ut terrena corpora naturale pondus vel in terra teneat vel cogat ad terram et ideo in caelo esse non possint. Primi quidem illi homines in terra erant nemorosa atque fructuosa, quae paradisi nomen obtinuit; sed quia et ad hoc respondendum est vel propter Christi corpus cum quo ascendit in caelum vel propter sanctorum qualia in resurrectione futura sunt, intueantur paulo adtentius pondera ipsa terrena. Si enim ars humana efficit, ut ex metallis, quae in aquis posita continuo submerguntur, quibusdam modis uasa fabricata etiam natare possint: quanto credibilius et efficacius occultus aliquis modus operationis Dei, cuius omnipotentissima voluntate Plato dicit nec orta interire nec conligata posse dissolvi, cum multo mirabilius incorporea corporeis quam quaecumque corpora quibuscumque corporibus copulentur, potest molibus praestare terrenis, ut nullo in ima pondere deprimantur, ipsisque animis perfectissime beatis, ut quamuis terrena, tamen incorruptibilia iam corpora ubi volunt ponant et quo volunt agant, situ motuque facillimo! An vero si hoc angeli faciant et quaelibet animalia terrestria rapiant unde libet constituantque ubi libet, aut eos non posse aut onera sentire credendum est? Cur ergo sanctorum perfectos et beatos divino munere spiritus sine ulla difficultate posse ferre quo voluerint et sistere ubi voluerint sua corpora non credamus? Nam cum terrenorum corporum, sicut onera in gestando sentire consuevimus, quanto maior est quantitas, tanto sit maior et gravitas, ita ut plura pondo quam pauciora plus premant: membra tamen suae carnis leviora portat anima cum in sanitate robusta sunt quam in languore cum macra sunt. Et cum aliis gestantibus onerosior sit saluus et validus quam exilis et morbidus, ipse tamen ad suum corpus movendum atque portandum agilior est, cum in bona valetudine plus habet molis, quam cum in peste vel fame minimum roboris. Tantum valet in habendis etiam terrenis corporibus, quamuis adhuc corruptibilibus atque mortalibus, non quantitatis pondus, sed temperationis modus. Et quis verbis explicat, quantum distet inter praesentem quam dicimus sanitatem et inmortalitatem futuram? Non itaque nostram fidem redarguunt philosophi de ponderibus corporum. Nolo enim quaerere, cur non credant terrenum esse posse corpus in caelo, cum terra universa libretur in nihilo. Fortassis enim de ipso medio mundi loco, eo quod in eum coeant quaeque graviora, etiam argumentatio veri similior habeatur. Illud dico: Si dii minores, quibus inter animalia terrestria cetera etiam hominem faciendum commisit Plato, potuerunt, sicut dicit, ab igne removere urendi qualitatem, lucendi relinquere quae per oculos emicaret: itane Deo summo concedere dubitabimus, cuius ille voluntati potestatique concessit, ne moriantur quae orta sint, et tam diversa, tam dissimilia, id est corporea et incorporea, sibimet conexa nulla possint dissolutione seiungi, ut de carne hominis, cui donat inmortalitatem, corruptionem auferat, naturam relinquat, congruentiam figurae membrorumque detineat, detrahat ponderis tarditatem? Sed de fide resurrectionis mortuorum, et de corporibus eorum inmortalibus diligentius, si Deus voluerit, in fine huius operis disserendum est.	But it is necessary, they say, that the natural weight of earthly bodies either keeps them on earth or draws them to it; and therefore they cannot be in heaven. Our first parents were indeed on earth, in a well-wooded and fruitful spot, which has been named Paradise. But let our adversaries a little more carefully consider this subject of earthly weight, because it has important bearings, both on the ascension of the body of Christ, and also on the resurrection body of the saints. If human skill can by some contrivance fabricate vessels that float, out of metals which sink as soon as they are placed on the water, how much more credible is it that God, by some occult mode of operation, should even more certainly effect that these earthy masses be emancipated from the downward pressure of their weight? This cannot be impossible to that God by whose almighty will, according to Plato, neither things born perish, nor things composed dissolve, especially since it is much more wonderful that spiritual and bodily essences be conjoined than that bodies be adjusted to other material substances. Can we not also easily believe that souls, being made perfectly blessed, should be endowed with the power of moving their earthy but incorruptible bodies as they please, with almost spontaneous movement, and of placing them where they please with the readiest action? If the angels transport whatever terrestrial creatures they please from any place they please, and convey them whither they please, is it to be believed that they cannot do so without toil and the feeling of burden? Why, then, may we not believe that the spirits of the saints, made perfect and blessed by divine grace, can carry their own bodies where they please, and set them where they will? For, though we have been accustomed to notice, in bearing weights, that the larger the quantity the greater the weight of earthy bodies is, and that the greater the weight the more burdensome it is, yet the soul carries the members of its own flesh with less difficulty when they are massive with health, than in sickness when they are wasted. And though the hale and strong man feels heavier to other men carrying him than the lank and sickly, yet the man himself moves and carries his own body with less feeling of burden when he has the greater bulk of vigorous health, than when his frame is reduced to a minimum by hunger or disease. Of such consequence, in estimating the weight of earthly bodies, even while yet corruptible and mortal, is the consideration not of dead weight, but of the healthy equilibrium of the parts. And what words can tell the difference between what we now call health and future immortality? Let not the philosophers, then, think to upset our faith with arguments from the weight of bodies; for I don't care to inquire why they cannot believe an earthly body can be in heaven, while the whole earth is suspended on nothing. For perhaps the world keeps its central place by the same law that attracts to its centre all heavy bodies. But this I say, if the lesser gods, to whom Plato committed the creation of man and the other terrestrial creatures, were able, as he affirms, to withdraw from the fire its quality of burning, while they left it that of lighting, so that it should shine through the eyes; and if to the supreme God Plato also concedes the power of preserving from death things that have been born, and of preserving from dissolution things that are composed of parts so different as body and spirit;-are we to hesitate to concede to this same God the power to operate on the flesh of him whom He has endowed with immortality, so as to withdraw its corruption but leave its nature, remove its burdensome weight but retain its seemly form and members? But concerning our belief in the resurrection of the dead, and concerning their immortal bodies, we shall speak more at large, God willing, in the end of this work.
BOOK XIII [XIX] Nunc de corporibus primorum hominum quod instituimus explicemus; quoniam nec mors ista, quae bona perbibetur bonis nec tantum paucis intellegentibus sive credentibus, sed omnibus nota est, qua fit animae a corpore separatio, qua certe corpus animantis, quod evidenter vivebat, evidenter emoritur, eis potuisset accidere, nisi peccati meritum sequeretur. Licet enim iustorum ac piorum animae defunctorum quod in requie vivant dubitare fas non sit, usque adeo tamen eis melius esset cum suis corporibus bene valentibus vivere, ut etiam illi, qui omni modo esse sine corpore beatissimum existimant, hanc opinionem suam sententia repugnante conuincant. Neque enim quisquam audebit illorum sapientes homines, sive morituros sive iam mortuos, id est aut carentes corporibus aut corpora relicturos, diis inmortalibus anteponere, quibus Deus summus apud Platonem munus i ngens, indissolubilem scilicet vitam, id est aeternum cum suis corporibus consortium, pollicetur. Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc vitam pie iusteque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati in ipsorum deorum, qui sua corpora numquam deserunt, recipiantur sinum, Scilicet inmemores supera ut convexa revisant Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reuerti; quod Vergilius ex Platonico dogmate dixisse laudatur (ita quippe animas mortalium nec in suis corporibus semper esse posse existimat, sed mortis necessitate dissolvi, nec sine corporibus durare perpetuo, sed alternantibus vicibus indesinenter vivos ex mortuis et ex vivis mortuos fieri putat); ut a ceteris hominibus hoc videantur differre sapientes, quod post mortem feruntur ad sidera, ut aliquanto diutius in astro sibi congruo quisque requiescat atque inde rursus miseriae pristinae oblitus et cupiditate habendi corporis victus redeat ad labores aerumnasque mortalium; illi vero, qui stultam duxerint vitam, ad corpora suis meritis debita sive hominum sive bestiarum de proximo reuoluantur. In hac itaque durissima condicione constituit etiam bonas atque sapientes animas, quibus non talia corpora distributa sunt, cum quibus semper atque inmortaliter viverent, ut neque in corporibus permanere neque sine his possint in aeterna puritate durare. De quo Platonico dogmate iam in libris superioribus diximus Christiano tempori erubuisse Porphyrium et non solum ab, animis humanis removisse corpora bestiarum, verum etiam sapientium animas ita voluisse de corporeis nexibus liberari, ut corpus omne fugientes beatae apud Patrem sine fine teneantur. Itaque ne a Christo vinci videretur vitam sanctis pollicente perpetuam, etiam ipse purgatas animas sine ullo ad miserias pristinas reditu in aeterna felicitate constituit; et ut Christo adversaretur, resurrectionem incorruptibilium corporum negans non solum sine terrenis, sed sine ullis omnino corporibus eas adseruit in sempiternum esse victuras. Nec tamen ista qualicumque opinione praecepit saltem ne diis corporatis religionis obsequio subderentur. Quid ita, nisi quia eas, quamuis nulli corpori sociatas, non credidit illis esse meliores? Quapropter, si non audebunt isti, sicut eos ausuros esse non arbitror, diis beatissimis et tamen in aeternis corporibus constitutis humanas animas anteponere: cur eis videtur absurdum, quod fides Christiana praedicat, et primos homines ita fuisse conditos, ut, si non peccassent, nulla morte a suis corporibus soluerentur, sed pro meritis oboedientiae custoditae inmortalitate donati cum eis viverent in aeternum; et talia sanctos in resurrectione habituros ea ipsa, in quibus hic laboraverunt, corpora, ut nec eorum carni aliquid corruptionis vel difficultatis nec eorum beatitudini aliquid doloris et infelicitatis possit accidere?	At present let us go on, as we have begun, to give some explanation regarding the bodies of our first parents. I say then, that, except as the just consequence of sin, they would not have been subjected even to this death, which is good to the good,-this death, which is not exclusively known and believed in by a few, but is known to all, by which soul and body are separated, and by which the body of an animal which was but now visibly living is now visibly dead. For though there can be no manner of doubt that the souls of the just and holy dead live in peaceful rest, yet so much better would it be for them to be alive in healthy, well-conditioned bodies, that even those who hold the tenet that it is most blessed to be quit of every kind of body, condemn this opinion in spite of themselves. For no one will dare to set wise men, whether yet to die or already dead,-in other words, whether already quit of the body, or shortly to be so,-above the immortal gods, to whom the Supreme, in Plato, promises as a munificent gift life indissoluble, or in eternal union with their bodies. But this same Plato thinks that nothing better can happen to men than that they pass through life piously and justly, and, being separated from their bodies, be received into the bosom of the gods, who never abandon theirs; "that, oblivious of the past, they may revisit the upper air, and conceive the longing to return again to the body." Virgil is applauded for borrowing this from the Platonic system. Assuredly Plato thinks that the souls of mortals cannot always be in their bodies, but must necessarily be dismissed by death; and, on the other hand, he thinks that without bodies they cannot endure for ever, but with ceaseless alternation pass from life to death, and from death to life. This difference, however, he sets between wise men and the rest, that they are carried after death to the stars, that each man may repose for a while in a star suitable for him, and may thence return to the labors and miseries of mortals when he has become oblivious of his former misery, and possessed with the desire of being embodied. Those, again, who have lived foolishly transmigrate into bodies fit for them, whether human or bestial. Thus he has appointed even the good and wise souls to a very hard lot indeed, since they do not receive such bodies as they might always and even immortally inhabit, but such only as they can neither permanently retain nor enjoy eternal purity without. Of this notion of Plato's, we have in a former book already said that Porphyry was ashamed in the light of these Christian times, so that he not only emancipated human souls from a destiny in the bodies of beasts but also contended for the liberation of the souls of the wise from all bodily ties, so that, escaping from all flesh, they might, as bare and blessed souls, dwell with the Father time without end. And that he might not seem to be outbid by Christ's promise of life everlasting to His saints, he also established purified souls in endless felicity, without return to their former woes; but, that he might contradict Christ, he denies the resurrection of incorruptible bodies, and maintains that these souls will live eternally, not only without earthly bodies, but without any bodies at all. And yet, whatever he meant by this teaching, he at least did not teach that these souls should offer no religious observance to the gods who dwelt in bodies. And why did he not, unless because he did not believe that the souls, even though separate from the body, were superior to those gods? Wherefore, if these philosophers will not dare (as I think they will not) to set human souls above the gods who are most blessed, and yet are tied eternally to their bodies, why do they find that absurd which the Christian faith preaches, namely, that our first parents were so created that, if they had not sinned, they would not have been dismissed from their bodies by any death, but would have been endowed with immortality as the reward of their obedience, and would have lived eternally with their bodies; and further, that the saints will in the resurrection inhabit those very bodies in which they have here toiled, but in such sort that neither shall any corruption or unwieldiness be suffered to attach to their flesh, nor any grief or trouble to cloud their felicity?
BOOK XIII [XX] Proinde nunc sanctorum animae defunctorum ideo non habent gravem mortem, qua separatae sunt a corporibus suis quia caro eorum requiescit in spe, quaslibet sine ullo iam sensu contumelias accepisse videatur. Non enim, sicut Platoni visum est, corpora oblivione desiderant, sed potius, quia meminerunt quid sibi ab eo sit promissum, qui neminem fallit, qui eis etiam de capillorum suorum integritate securitatem dedit, resurrectionem corporum, in quibus multa dura perpessi sunt, nihil in eis ulterius tale sensuri desiderabiliter et patienter expectant. Si enim carnem suam non oderant, quando eam suae menti infirmitate resistentem spiritali iure cohercebant, quanto magis eam diligunt etiam ipsam spiritalem futuram! Sicut enim spiritus carni seruiens non incongrue carnalis, ita caro spiritui seruiens recte appellabitur spiritalis, non quia in spiritum convertetur, sicut nonnulli putant ex eo quod scriptum est: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale, sed quia spiritui summa et mirabili obtemperandi facilitate subdetur usque ad implendam inmortalitatis indissolubilis securissimam voluntatem, omni molestiae sensu, omni corruptibilitate et tarditate detracta. Non solum enim non erit tale, quale nunc est in quavis optima valetudine, sed nec tale quidem, quale fuit in primis hominibus ante peccatum, qui licet morituri non essent, nisi peccassent, alimentis tamen ut homines utebantur, nondum spiritalia, sed adhuc animalia corpora terrena gestantes. Quae licet senio non ueterescerent, ut necessitate perducerentur ad mortem (qui status eis de ligno vitae, quod in medio paradiso cum arbore uetita simul erat, mirabili Dei gratia praestabatur), tamen et alios sumebant cibos praeter unam arborem, quae fuerat interdicta, non quia ipsa erat malum, sed propter commendandum purae et simplicis oboedientiae bonum, quae magna virtus est rationalis creaturae sub Creatore Domino constitutae. Nam ubi nullum malum tangebatur, profecto, si prohibitum tangeretur, sola inoboedientia peccabatur. Agebatur ergo aliis quae sumebant, ne animalia corpora molestiae aliquid esuriendo ac sitiendo sentirent; de ligno autem vitae propterea gustabatur, ne mors eis undecumque subreperet vel senectute confecta decursis temporum spatiis interirent; tamquam cetera essent alimento, illud sacramento; ut sic fuisse accipiatur lignum vitae in paradiso corporali, sicut in spiritali, hoc est intellegibili, paradiso sapientia Dei, de qua scriptum est: Lignum vitae est amplectentibus eam.	Thus the souls of departed saints are not affected by the death which dismisses them from their bodies, because their flesh rests in hope, no matter what indignities it receives after sensation is gone. For they do not desire that their bodies be forgotten, as Plato thinks fit, but rather, because they remember what has been promised by Him who deceives no man, and who gave them security for the safe keeping even of the hairs of their head, they with a longing patience wait in hope of the resurrection of their bodies, in which they have suffered many hardships, and are now to suffer never again. For if they did not "hate their own flesh," when it, with its native infirmity, opposed their will, and had to be constrained by the spiritual law, how much more shall they love it, when it shall even itself have become spiritual! For as, when the spirit serves the flesh, it is fitly called carnal, so, when the flesh serves the spirit, it will justly be called spiritual. Not that it is converted into spirit, as some fancy from the words, "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption," 1 Corinthians 15:42 but because it is subject to the spirit with a perfect and marvellous readiness of obedience, and responds in all things to the will that has entered on immortality,- all reluctance, all corruption, and all slowness being removed. For the body will not only be better than it was here in its best estate of health, but it will surpass the bodies of our first parents ere they sinned. For, though they were not to die unless they should sin, yet they used food as men do now, their bodies not being as yet spiritual, but animal only. And though they decayed not with years, nor drew nearer to death,-a condition secured to them in God's marvellous grace by the tree of life, which grew along with the forbidden tree in the midst of Paradise,-yet they took other nourishment, though not of that one tree, which was interdicted not because it was itself bad, but for the sake of commending a pure and simple obedience, which is the great virtue of the rational creature set under the Creator as his Lord. For, though no evil thing was touched, yet if a thing forbidden was touched, the very disobedience was sin. They were, then, nourished by other fruit, which they took that their animal bodies might not suffer the discomfort of hunger or thirst; but they tasted the tree of life, that death might not steal upon them from any quarter, and that they might not, spent with age, decay. Other fruits were, so to speak, their nourishment, but this their sacrament. So that the tree of life would seem to have been in the terrestrial Paradise what the wisdom of God is in the spiritual, of which it is written, "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her." Proverbs 3:18
BOOK XIII [XXI] Vnde nonnulli totum ipsum paradisum, ubi primi homines parentes generis humani sanctae scripturae veritate fuisse narrantur, ad intellegibilia referunt arboresque illas et ligna fructifera in virtutes vitae moresque convertunt; tamquam visibilia et corporalia illa non fuerint, sed intellegibilium significandorum causa eo modo dicta vel scripta sint. Quasi propterea non potuerit esse paradisus corporalis, quia potest etiam spiritalis intellegi; tamquam ideo non fuerint duae mulieres, Agar et Sarra, et ex eis duo filii Abrahae, unus de ancilla, alius de libera, quia duo testamenta in eis figurata dicit apostolus; aut ideo de nulla petra Moyse percutiente aqua defluxerit, quia potest illic figurata significatione etiam Christus intellegi, eodem apostolo dicente: Petra autem erat Christus. Nemo itaque prohibet intellegere paradisum vitam beatorum, quattuor eius flumina quattuor virtutes, prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam atque iustitiam, et ligna eius omnes utiles disciplinas et lignorum fructus mores piorum et lignum vitae ipsam bonorum omnium matrem sapientiam et lignum scientiae boni et mali transgressi mandati experimentum. Poenam enim peccatoribus bene utique, quoniam iuste, constituit Deus, sed non suo bono experitur homo. Possunt haec etiam in ecclesia intellegi, ut ea melius accipiamus tamquam prophetica indicia praecedentia futurorum; paradisum scilicet ipsam eccesiam, sicut de illa legitur in cantico canticorum; quattuor autem paradisi flumina quattuor euangelia, ligna fructifera sanctos, fructus autem eorum opera eorum, lignum vitae sanctum sanctorum utique Christum, lignum scientiae boni et mali proprium voluntatis arbitrium. Nec se ipso quippe homo divina voluntate contempta nisi perniciose uti potest atque ita discit, quid intersit, utrum inhaereat communi omnibus bono an proprio delectetur. Se quippe amans donatur sibi, ut inde timoribus maeroribusque ompletus cantet in psalmo, si tamen mala sua sentit: Ad me ipsum turbata est anima mea; correctusque iam dicat: Fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam. Haec et si qua alia commodius dici possunt de intellegendo spiritaliter paradiso nemine prohibente dicantur, dum tamen et illius historiae veritas fidelissima rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur.	On this account some allegorize all that concerns Paradise itself, where the first men, the parents of the human race, are, according to the truth of holy Scripture, recorded to have been; and they understand all its trees and fruit-bearing plants as virtues and habits of life, as if they had no existence in the external world, but were only so spoken of or related for the sake of spiritual meanings. As if there could not be a real terrestrial Paradise! As if there never existed these two women, Sarah and Hagar, nor the two sons who were born to Abraham, the one of the bond woman, the other of the free, because the apostle says that in them the two covenants were prefigured; or as if water never flowed from the rock when Moses struck it, because therein Christ can be seen in a figure, as the same apostle says, "Now that rock was Christ!" 1 Corinthians 10:4 No one, then, denies that Paradise may signify the life of the blessed; its four rivers, the four virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice; its trees, all useful knowledge; its fruits, the customs of the godly; its tree of life, wisdom herself, the mother of all good; and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the experience of a broken commandment. The punishment which God appointed was in itself, a just, and therefore a good thing; but man's experience of it is not good.These things can also and more profitably be understood of the Church, so that they become prophetic foreshadowings of things to come. Thus Paradise is the Church, as it is called in the Canticles; Song of Songs 4:13 the four rivers of Paradise are the four gospels; the fruit-trees the saints, and the fruit their works; the tree of life is the holy of holies, Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the will's free choice. For if man despise the will of God, he can only destroy himself; and so he learns the difference between consecrating himself to the common good and revelling in his own. For he who loves himself is abandoned to himself, in order that, being overwhelmed with fears and sorrows, he may cry, if there be yet soul in him to feel his ills, in the words of the psalm, "My soul is cast down within me," and when chastened, may say," Because of his strength I will wait upon You." These and similar allegorical interpretations may be suitably put upon Paradise without giving offence to any one, while yet we believe the strict truth of the history, confirmed by its circumstantial narrative of facts.
BOOK XIII [XXII] Corpora ergo iustorum, quae in resurrectione futura sunt, neque ullo ligno indigebunt, quo fiat ut nullo morbo vel senectute inveterata moriantur, neque ullis aliis corporalibus alimentis, quibus esuriendi ac sitiendi qualiscumque molestia devitetur; quoniam certo et omni modo inuiolabili munere inmortalitatis induentur, ut non nisi velint, possibilitate, non necessitate uescantur. Quod angeli quoque visibiliter et tractabiliter adparentes, non quia indigebant, sed quia volebant et poterant, ut hominibus congruerent sui ministerii quadam humanitate, fecerunt (neque enim in phantasmate angelos edisse credendum est, quando eos homines hospitio susceperunt), quamuis utrum angeli essent ignorantibus simili nobis indigentia uesci viderentur. Vnde est quod ait angelus in libro Tobiae: Videbatis me manducare, sed visu uestro videbatis; id est necessitate reficiendi corporis, sicut vos facitis, me cibum sumere putabatis. Sed si forte de angelis aliud credibilius disputari potest, certe fides Christiana de ipso Saluatore non dubitat, quod etiam post resurrectionem, iam quidem in spiritali carne, sed tamen vera, cibum ac potum cum discipulis sumpsit. Non enim potestas, sed egestas edendi ac bibendi talibus corporibus auferetur. Vnde et spiritalia erunt, non quia corpora esse desistent, sed quia spiritu vivificante subsistent.	The bodies of the righteous, then, such as they shall be in the resurrection, shall need neither any fruit to preserve them from dying of disease or the wasting decay of old age, nor any other physical nourishment to allay the cravings of hunger or of thirst; for they shall be invested with so sure and every way inviolable an immortality, that they shall not eat save when they choose, nor be under the necessity of eating, while they enjoy the power of doing so. For so also was it with the angels who presented themselves to the eye and touch of men, not because they could do no otherwise, but because they were able and desirous to suit themselves to men by a kind of manhood ministry. For neither are we to suppose, when men receive them as guests, that the angels eat only in appearance, though to any who did not know them to be angels they might seem to eat from the same necessity as ourselves. So these words spoken in the Book of Tobit, "You saw me eat, but you saw it but in vision;" Tobit 12:19 that is, you thought I took food as you do for the sake of refreshing my body. But if in the case of the angels another opinion seems more capable of defence, certainly our faith leaves no room to doubt regarding our Lord Himself, that even after His resurrection, and when now in spiritual but yet real flesh, He ate and drank with His disciples; for not the power, but the need, of eating and drinking is taken from these bodies. And so they will be spiritual, not because they shall cease to be bodies, but because they shall subsist by the quickening spirit.
BOOK XIII [XXIII] Nam sicut ista, quae habent animam viventem, nondum spiritum vivificantem, animalia dicuntur corpora, nec tamen animae sunt, sed corpora: ita illa spiritalia vocantur corpora; absit tamen ut spiritus ea credamus futura, sed corpora carnis habitura substantiam, sed nullam tarditatem corruptionemque carnalem spiritu vivificante passura. Tunc iam non terrenus, sed caelestis homo erit; non quia corpus, quod de terra factum est, non ipsum erit; sed quia dono caelesti iam tale erit, ut etiam caelo incolendo non amissa natura, sed mutata qualitate conveniat. Primus autem homo de terra terrenus in animam viventem factus est, non in spiritum vivificantem, quod ei post oboedientiae meritum servabatur. Ideo corpus eius, quod cibo ac potu egebat, ne fame adficeretur ac siti, et non inmortalitate illa absoluta atque indissolubili, sed ligno vitae a mortis necessitate prohibebatur atque in ivuentutis flore tenebatur, non spiritale, sed animale fuisse non dubium est, nequaquam tamen moriturum, nisi in Dei praedicentis minantisque sententiam delinquendo conruisset et alimentis quidem etiam extra paradisum non negatis, a ligno tamen vitae prohibitus traditus esset tempori uetustatique finiendus, in ea dumtaxat vita, quam in corpore licet animali, donec spiritale oboedientiae merito fieret, posset in paradiso nisi peccasset habere perpetuam. Quapropter etiamsi mortem istam manifestam, qua fit animae a corpore separatio, intellegamus simul significatam in eo quod Deus dixerat: Qua die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini: non ideo debet absurdum videri, quia non eo prorsus die a corpore sunt soluti, quo cibum interdictum mortiferumque sumpserunt. Eo quippe die mutata in deterius vitiataque natura atque a ligno vitae separatione iustissima mortis in eis etiam corporalis necessitas facta est, cum qua nos necessitate nati sumus. Propter quod apostolus non ait: Corpus quidem moriturum est propter peccatum; sed ait: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam. Deinde subiunxit: Si autem spiritus eius, quo suscitavit Christum a mortuis, habitat in vobis: qui suscitavit Christum a mortuis vivificabit et mortalia corpora uestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis. Tunc ergo erit corpus in spiritum vivificantem, quod nunc est in animam viventem; et tamen mortuum dicit apostolus, quia iam moriendi necessitate constrictum est. Tunc autem <ita> erat in animam viventem, quamuis non in spiritum vivificantem, ut tamen mortuum dici non recte posset, quia nisi perpetratione peccati necessitatem moriendi habere non posset. Cum vero Deus et dicendo: Adam, ubi es? mortem significaverit animae, quae facta est illo deserente, et dicendo: Terra es et in terram ibis mortem significaverit corporis, quae illi fit anima discedente: propterea de morte secunda nihil dixisse credendus est, quia occultam esse voluit propter dispensationem testamenti novi, ubi secunda mors apertissime declaratur; ut prius ista mors prima, quae communis est omnibus, proderetur ex illo venisse peccato, quod in uno commune factum est omnibus; mors vero secunda non utique communis est omnibus propter eos, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, quos ante praescivit et praedestinavit, sicut ait apostolus, conformes imagines filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus, quos a secunda morte per Mediatorem Dei gratia liberavit. In corpore ergo animali primum hominem factum sic apostolus loquitur. Volens enim ab spiritali, quod in resurrectione futurum est, hoc quod nunc est animale discernere: Seminatur, inquit, in corruptione, surget in incorruptione; seminatur in contumelia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale. Deinde ut hoc probaret: Si est, inquit, corpus animale, est et spiritale. Et ut quid esset animale corpus ostenderet: Sic, inquit, <et> scriptum est: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem. Isto igitur modo voluit ostendere quid sit corpus animale, quamuis scriptura non dixerit de homine primo, qui est appellatus Adam, quando illi anima flatu Dei creata est: Et factus est homo in corpore animali; sed: Factus est homo in animam viventem. In eo ergo quod scriptum est: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem, voluit apostolus intellegi corpus hominis animale. Spiritale autem quem ad modum intellegendum esset, ostendit addendo: Novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem, procul dubio Christum significans, qui iam ex mortuis ita resurrexit, ut mori deinceps omnino non possit. Denique sequitur et dicit: Sed non primum quod spiritale est, sed quod animale, postea spiritale. Vbi multo apertius declaravit se animale corpus insinuasse in eo quod scriptum est factum esse primum hominem in animam viventem, spiritale autem in eo quod ait: Novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Prius est enim animale corpus, quale habuit primus Adam, quamuis non moriturum, nisi peccasset; quale nunc habemus et nos, hactenus eius mutata vitiataque natura, quatenus in illo, postea quam peccavit, effectum est, unde haberet iam moriendi necessitatem (tale pro nobis etiam Christus primitus habere dignatus est, non quidem necessitate, sed potestate); postea vero spiritale, quale iam praecessit in Christo tamquam in capite nostro, secuturum est autem in membris eius ultima resurrectione mortuorum. Adiungit deinde apostolus duorum istorum hominum evidentissimam differentiam dicens: Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo. Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni; qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Et quo modo induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius, qui de caelo est. Hoc apostolus ita posuit, ut nunc quidem in nobis secundum sacramentum regenerationis fiat, sicut alibi dicit: Quotquot in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis; re autem ipsa tunc perficietur, cum et in nobis, quod est animale nascendo, spiritale factum fuerit resurgendo. Vt enim eius itidem verbis utar: Spe salui facti sumus. Induimus autem imaginem terreni hominis propagatione praeuaricationis et mortis, quam nobis intulit generatio; sed induemus imaginem caelestis hominis gratia indulgentiae vitaeque perpetuae, quod nobis praestat regeneratio, non nisi per mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum; quem caelestem hominem uult intellegi, quia de caelo venit, ut terrenae mortalitatis corpore uestiretur, quod caelesti inmortalitate uestiret. Caelestes vero ideo appellat et alios, quia fiunt per gratiam membra eius, ut cum illis sit unus Christus, velut caput et corpus. Hoc in eadem epistula evidentius ita ponit: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur.. iam utique in corpore spiritali quod erit in spiritum vivificantem; non quia omnes, qui in Adam moriuntur, membra erunt Christi (ex illis enim multo plures secunda in aeternum morte plectentur); sed ideo dictum est omnes atque omnes, quia, sicut nemo corpore animali nisi in Adam moritur, ita nemo corpore spiritali nisi in Christo vivificatur. Proinde nequaquam putandum est nos in resurrectione tale corpus habituros, quale habuit homo primus ante peccatum; nec illud, quod dictum est: Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, secundum id intellegendum, quod factum est admissione peccati. Non enim existimandum est eum prius, quam peccasset, spiritale corpus habuisse et peccati merito in animale mutatum. Vt enim hoc putetur, parum adtenduntur tanti verba doctoris, qui ait: Si est corpus animale, est et spiritale; sic et scriptum est: Factus est primus homo Adam in animam viventem. Numquid hoc post peccatum factum est, cum sit ista hominis prima conditio, de qua beatissimus Paulus ad corpus animale monstrandum hoc testimonium legis adsumpsit?	For as those bodies of ours, that have a living soul, though not as yet a quickening spirit, are called soul-informed bodies, and yet are not souls but bodies, so also those bodies are called spiritual,-yet God forbid we should therefore suppose them to be spirits and not bodies,-which, being quickened by the Spirit, have the substance, but not the unwieldiness and corruption of flesh. Man will then be not earthly but heavenly,-not because the body will not be that very body which was made of earth, but because by its heavenly endowment it will be a fit inhabitant of heaven, and this not by losing its nature, but by changing its quality. The first man, of the earth earthy, was made a living soul, not a quickening spirit,-which rank was reserved for him as the reward of obedience. And therefore his body, which required meat and drink to satisfy hunger and thirst, and which had no absolute and indestructible immortality, but by means of the tree of life warded off the necessity of dying, and was thus maintained in the flower of youth,-this body, I say, was doubtless not spiritual, but animal; and yet it would not have died but that it provoked God's threatened vengeance by offending. And though sustenance was not denied him even outside Paradise, yet, being forbidden the tree of life, he was delivered over to the wasting of time, at least in respect of that life which, had he not sinned, he might have retained perpetually in Paradise, though only in an animal body, till such time as it became spiritual in acknowledgment of his obedience.Wherefore, although we understand that this manifest death, which consists in the separation of soul and body, was also signified by God when He said, "In the day you eat thereof you shall surely die," Genesis 2:17 it ought not on that account to seem absurd that they were not dismissed from the body on that very day on which they took the forbidden and death-bringing fruit. For certainly on that very day their nature was altered for the worse and vitiated, and by their most just banishment from the tree of life they were involved in the necessity even of bodily death, in which necessity we are born. And therefore the apostle does not say, "The body indeed is doomed to die on account of sin," but he says, "The body indeed is dead because of sin." Then he adds, "But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwells in you." Romans 8:10-11 Then accordingly shall the body become a quickening spirit which is now a living soul; and yet the apostle calls it "dead," because already it lies under the necessity of dying. But in Paradise it was so made a living soul, though not a quickening spirit, that it could not properly be called dead, for, save through the commission of sin, it could not come under the power of death. Now, since God by the words, "Adam, where are you?" pointed to the death of the soul, which results when He abandons it, and since in the words, "Earth you are, and unto earth shall you return," Genesis 3:19 He signified the death of the body, which results when the soul departs from it, we are led, therefore, to believe that He said nothing of the second death, wishing it to be kept hidden, and reserving it for the New Testament dispensation, in which it is most plainly revealed. And this He did in order that, first of all, it might be evident that this first death, which is common to all, was the result of that sin which in one man became common to all. But the second death is not common to all, those being excepted who were "called according to His purpose. For whom He did foreknow, He also did pre destinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren." Romans 8:28-29 Those the grace of God has, by a Mediator, delivered from the second death.Thus the apostle states that the first man was made in an animal body. For, wishing to distinguish the animal body which now is from the spiritual, which is to be in the resurrection, he says, "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." Then, to prove this, he goes on, "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." And to show what the animated body is, he says, "Thus it was written, The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." 1 Corinthians 15:42-45 He wished thus to show what the animated body is, though Scripture did not say of the first man Adam, when his soul was created by the breath of God, "Man was made in an animated body," but "Man was made a living soul." Genesis 2:7 By these words, therefore, "The first man was made a living soul," the apostle wishes man's animated body to be understood. But how he wishes the spiritual body to be understood he shows when he adds, "But the last Adam was made a quickening spirit," plainly referring to Christ, who has so risen from the dead that He cannot die any more. He then goes on to say, "But that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual." And here he much more clearly asserts that he referred to the animal body when he said that the first man was made a living soul, and to the spiritual when he said that the last man was made a quickening spirit. The animal body is the first, being such as the first Adam had, and which would not have died had he not sinned, being such also as we now have, its nature being changed and vitiated by sin to the extent of bringing us under the necessity of death, and being such as even Christ condescended first of all to assume, not indeed of necessity, but of choice; but afterwards comes the spiritual body, which already is worn by anticipation by Christ as our head, and will be worn by His members in the resurrection of the dead.Then the apostle subjoins a notable difference between these two men, saying, "The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." 1 Corinthians 15:47-49 So he elsewhere says, "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ;" Galatians 3:27 but in very deed this shall be accomplished when that which is animal in us by our birth shall have become spiritual in our resurrection. For, to use his words again," We are saved by hope." Romans 8:24 Now we bear the image of the earthly man by the propagation of sin and death, which pass on us by ordinary generation; but we bear the image of the heavenly by the grace of pardon and life eternal, which regeneration confers upon us through the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus. And He is the heavenly Man of Paul's passage, because He came from heaven to be clothed with a body of earthly mortality, that He might clothe it with heavenly immortality. And he calls others heavenly, because by grace they become His members, that, together with them, He may become one Christ, as head and body. In the same epistle he puts this yet more clearly: "Since by man came death, by Man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 -that is to say, in a spiritual body which shall be made a quickening spirit. Not that all who die in Adam shall be members of Christ,-for the great majority shall be punished in eternal death,-but he uses the word "all" in both clauses, because, as no one dies in an animal body except in Adam, so no one is quickened a spiritual body save in Christ. We are not, then, by any means to suppose that we shall in the resurrection have such a body as the first man had before he sinned, nor that the words, "As is the earthy such are they also that are earthy," are to be understood of that which was brought about by sin; for we are not to think that Adam had a spiritual body before he fell, and that, in punishment of his sin, it was changed into an animal body. If this be thought, small heed has been given to the words of so great a teacher, who says, "There is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body; as it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul." Was it after sin he was made so? or was not this the primal condition of man from which the blessed apostle selects his testimony to show what the animal body is?
BOOK XIII [XXIV] Vnde et illud parum considerate quibusdam visum est, in eo quod legitur: Inspiravit Deus in faciem eius spiritum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem, non tunc animam primo homini datam, sed eam, quae iam inerat, Spiritu sancto vivificatam. Movet enim eos, quod Dominus Iesus, postea quam resurrexit a mortuis, insufflavit dicens discipulis suis: Accipite Spiritum sanctum. Vnde tale aliquid factum existimant, quale tunc factum est, quasi et hic secutus euangelista dixerit: Et facti sunt in animam viventem. Quod quidem si dictum esset, hoc intellegeremus, quod animarum quaedam vita sit Spiritus Dei, sine quo animae rationales mortuae deputandae sunt, quamuis earum praesentia vivere corpora videantur. Sed non ita factum, quando est conditus homo, satis ipsa libri verba testantur, quae ita se habent: Et formavit Deus hominem puluerem de terra. Quod quidam planius interpretandum putantes dixerunt: Et finxit Deus hominem de limo terrae, quoniam superius dictum fuerat: Fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae.. ut ex hoc limus intellegendus videretur, umore scilicet terraque concretus. Vbi enim hoc dictum est, continuo sequitur: Et formavit Deus hominem puluerem de terra, sicut Graeci codices habent, unde in Latinam linguam scriptura ipsa conversa est. Sive autem formavit sive finxit quis dicere voluerit, quod Graece dicitur e)/plasen, ad rem nihil interest; magis tamen proprie dicitur finxit. Sed ambiguitas visa est devitanda eis, qui formavit dicere maluerunt, eo quod in Latina lingua illud magis obtinuit consuetudo, ut hi dicantur fingere, qui aliquid mendacio simulante componunt. Hunc igitur formatum hominem de terrae puluere sive limo (erat enim puluis umectus) _ hunc, inquam, ut expressius dicam, sicut scriptura locuta est, puluerem de terra animale corpus factum esse docet apostolus, cum animam accepit: "Et factus est iste homo in animam viventem", id est, formatus iste puluis factus est in animam viventem. Iam, inquiunt, habebat animam, alioquin non appellaretur homo, quoniam homo non est corpus solum vel anima sola, sed qui et anima constat et corpore. Hoc quidem verum est, quod non totus homo, sed pars melior hominis anima est; nec totus homo corpus, sed inferior hominis pars est; sed cum est utrumque coniunctum simul, habet hominis nomen; quod tamen et singula non amittunt, etiam cum de singulis loquimur. Quis enim dicere prohibetur cotidiani quadam lege sermonis: Homo ille defunctus est et nunc in requie est vel in poenis, cum de anima sola possit hoc dici, et: Illo aut illo loco homo ille sepultus est, cum hoc nisi de solo corpore non possit intellegi? An dicturi sunt sic loqui scripturam non solere divinam? Immo vero illa ita nobis in hoc adtestatur, ut etiam cum duo ista coniuncta sunt et vivit homo, tamen etiam singula minis vocabulo appellet, animam scilicet interiorem hominem, corpus autem exteriorem hominem vocans, tamquam duo sint homines, cum simul utrumque sit homo unus. Sed intellegendum est, secundum quid dicatur homo ad imaginem Dei et homo terra atque iturus in terram. Illud enim secundum animam rationalem dicitur, qualem Deus insufflando vel, si commodius dicitur, inspirando indidit homini, id est hominis corpori; hoc autem secundum corpus, qualem hominem Deus finxit ex puluere, cui data est anima, ut fieret corpus animale, id est homo in animam viventem. Quapropter in eo, quod Dominus fecit, quando insufflavit dicens: Accipite Spiritum sanctum, nimirum hoc intellegi voluit, quod Spiritus sanctus non tantum sit Patris, verum etiam ipsius Vnigeniti Spiritus. Idem ipse quippe Spiritus et Patris et Filii, cum quo est trinitas Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, non creatura, sed Creator. Neque enim flatus ille Corporeus de carnis ore procedens substantia erat Spiritus sancti atque natura, sed potius significatio, qua intellegeremus, ut dixi, Spiritum sanctum Patri esse Filioque communem, quia non sunt eis singulis singuli, sed unus amborum est. Semper autem iste Spiritus in scripturis sanctis Graeco vocabulo pneu=ma dicitur, sicut eum et hoc loco Iesus appellavit, quando eum corporalis sui oris flatu significans discipulis dedit; et locis omnibus divinorum eloquiorum non mihi aliter umquam nuncupatus occurrit. Hic vero, ubi legitur: Et finxit Deus hominem puluerem de terra et insuffiavit sive inspiravit in faciem eius spiritum vitae, non ait Graecus pneu=ma, quod solet dici Spiritus sanctus, sed pnoh/n, quod nomen in creatura quam in Creatore frequentius legitur; unde nonnulli etiam Latini propter differentiam hoc vocabulum non spiritum, sed flatum appellare maluerunt. Hoc enim est in Graeco etiam illo loco apud Esaiam, ubi Deus dicit: Omnem flatum ego feci, omnem animam sine dubitatione significans. Quod itaque Graece pnoh\ dicitur, nostri aliquando flatum, aliquando spiritum, aliquando inspirationem vel aspirationem, quando etiam Dei dicitur, interpretati sunt; pneu=ma vero numquam nisi spiritum, sive hominis (de quo ait apostolus: Quis enim scit hominum quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est?) sive pecoris (sicut in Salomonis libro scriptum est: Quis scit si spiritus hominis ascendat sursum in caelum et spiritus pecoris descendat deorsum in terram?) sive istum corporeum, qui etiam ventus dicitur, (nam eius hoc nomen est, ubi in psalmo canitur: Ignis grando, nix glacies, spiritus tempestatis) sive iam non creatum, sed Creatorem, sicut est de quo dicit Dominus in euangelio: Accipite Spiritum sanctum, eum corporei sui oris flatu significans, et ubi ait: Ite, baptizate <omnes> gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, ubi ipsa trinitas excellentissime et evidentissime commendata est, et ubi legitur: Deus spiritus est, et aliis plurimis sacrarum litterarum locis. In his quippe omnibus testimoniis scripturarum, quantum ad Graecos adtinet, non pnoh\n videmus scriptum esse, sed pneu=ma; quantum autem ad Latinos, non flatum, sed spiritum. Quapropter in eo, quod scriptum est: Inspiravit, vel si magis proprie dicendum est: Insufflavit in faciem eius spiritum vitae, si Graecus non pnoh/n, sicut ibi legitur, sed pneu=ma posuisset, nec sic esset consequens, ut Creatorem Spiritum, qui proprie dicitur in trinitate Spiritus sanctus, intellegere cogeremur; quando quidem pneu=ma, ut dictum est, non solum de Creatore, sed etiam de creatura dici solere manifestum est. Sed cum dixisset, inquiunt, spiritum, non adderet vitae, nisi illum sanctum <Spiritum> vellet intellegi; et cum dixisset: Factus est homo in animam, non adderet viventem, nisi animae vitam significaret, quae illi divinitus inpertitur dono Spiritus Dei. Cum enim vivat anima, inquiunt, proprio suae vitae modo, quid opus erat addere viventem, nisi, ut ea vita intellegeretur, quae illi per sanctum Spiritum datur? Hoc quid est aliud nisi diligenter pro humana suspicione contendere et scripturas sanctas neglegenter adtendere? Quid enim magnum erat non ire longius, sed in eodem ipso libro paulo superius legere: Producat terra animam viventem, quando animalia terrestria cuncta creata sunt? Deinde aliquantis interpositis, in eodem tamen ipso libro quid magnum erat advertere quod scriptum est: Et omnia, quae habent spiritum vitae, et omnis, qui erat super aridam, mortuus est, cum insinuaret omnia quae vivebant in terra perisse diluuio? Si ergo et animam viventem et spiritum vitae etiam in pecoribus invenimus, sicut loqui divina scriptura consuevit, et cum hoc quoque loco, ubi legitur: Omnia quae habent spiritum vitae, non Graecus pneu=ma, sed pnoh\n dixerit: cur non dicimus: Quid opus erat ut adderet viventem, cum anima nisi vivat esse non possit? aut quid opus erat ut adderet vitae, cum dixisset spiritum? Sed intellegimus animam viventem et spiritum vitae scripturam suo more dixisse, cum animalia, id est animata corpora, vellet intellegi, quibus inesset per animam perspicuus iste etiam corporis sensus. In hominis autem conditione obliviscimur, quem ad modum loqui scriptura consueuerit, cum suo prorsus more locuta sit, quo insinuaret hominem etiam rationali anima accepta, quam non sicut aliarum carnium aquis et terra producentibus, sed Deo flante creatam voluit intellegi, sic tamen factum, ut in corpore animali, quod fit anima in eo vivente, sicut illa animalia viveret, de quibus dixit: Producat terra animam viventem, et quae itidem dixit habuisse in se spiritum vitae; ubi etiam in Graeco non dixit pneu=ma, sed *pnoh/n; non utique Spiritum sanctum, sed eorum animam tali exprimens nomine. Sed enim Dei flatus, inquiunt, Dei ore exisse intellegitur, quem si animam crediderimus, consequens erit, ut eiusdem fateamur esse substantiae paremque illius sapientiae, quae dicit: Ego ex ore Altissimi prodii. Non quidem dixit sapientia ore Dei efflatam se fuisse, sed ex eius ore prodisse. Sicut autem nos possumus non de nostra natura, qua homines sumus, sed de isto aere circumfuso, quem spirando ac respirando ducimus ac reddimus, flatum facere cum sufflamus: ita omnipotens Deus non de sua natura neque subiacenti creatura, sed etiam de nihilo potuit facere flatum, quem corpori hominis inserendo inspirasse vel insufflasse convenientissime dictus est, incorporeus incorporeum, sed inmutabilis mutabilem, quia non creatus creatum. verum tamen ut sciant isti, qui de scripturis loqui volunt et scripturarum locutiones non advertunt, non hoc solum dici exire ex ore Dei, quod est aequalis eiusdemque naturae, audiant vel legant quod Deo dicente scriptum est: Quoniam tepidus es et neque calidus neque frigidus, incipiam te reicere ex ore meo. Nulla itaque causa est, cur apertissime loquenti resistamus apostolo, ubi ab spiritali corpore corpus animale discernens, id est ab illo in quo futuri sumus hoc in quo nunc sumus, ait: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale; si est corpus animale, est et spiritale; sic et scriptum est: Factus est primus humo Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Sed non primum quod spiritale est, sed quod animale, postea spiritale. Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo. Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Et quomodo induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est. De quibus omnibus apostolicis verbis superius locuti sumus. Corpus igitur animale, in quo primum hominem Adam factum esse dicit apostolus, sic erat factum, non ut mori omnino non posset, sed ut non moreretur, nisi homo peccasset. Nam illud, quod spiritu vivificante spiritale erit et inmortale, mori omnino non poterit, sicut anima creata est inmortalis, quae licet peccato mortua perhibeatur carens quadam vita sua, hoc est dei Spiritu, quo etiam sapienter et beate vivere poterat, tamen propria quadam, licet misera, vita sua non desinit vivere, quia inmortalis est creata; sicut etiam desertores angeli, licet secundum quendam modum mortui sint peccando, quia fontem vitae deseruerunt, qui Deus est, quem potando sapienter et beate poterant vivere, tamen non sic mori potuerunt, ut omni modo desisterent vivere atque sentire, quoniam inmortales creati sunt; atque ita in secundam mortem post ultimum praecipitabuntur iudicium, ut nec illic vita careant, quando quidem etiam sensu, cum in doloribus futuri sunt, non carebunt. Sed homines ad Dei gratiam pertinentes, cives sanctorum angelorum in beata vita manentium, ita spiritalibus corporibus induentur, ut neque peccent amplius neque moriantur; ea tamen inmortalitate uestiti, quae, sicut angelorum, nec peccato possit auferri; natura quidem manente carnis, sed nulla omnino carnali corruptibilitate vel tarditate remanente. Sequitur autem quaestio necessario pertractanda et Domino Deo veritatis adivuante soluenda: Si libido membrorum inoboedientium ex peccato inoboedientiae in illis primis hominibus, cum illos divina gratia deseruisset, exorta est; unde in suam nuditatem oculos aperuerunt, id est eam curiosius adverterunt, et quia inpudens motus voluntatis arbitrio resistebat, pudenda texerunt: quo modo essent filios propagaturi, si, ut creati fuerant; sine praeuaricatione mansissent. Sed quia et liber iste claudendus est nec tanta quaestio in sermonis angustias coartanda, in eum qui sequitur commodiore dispositione differtur.	"Some have hastily supposed from the words, "God breathed into Adam's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul, Genesis 2:7 " that a soul was not then first given to man, but that the soul already given was quickened by the Holy Ghost. They are encouraged in this supposition by the fact that the Lord Jesus after His resurrection breathed on His disciples, and said, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit." John 20:22 From this they suppose that the same thing was effected in either case, as if the evangelist had gone on to say, And they became living souls. But if he had made this addition, we should only understand that the Spirit is in some way the life of souls, and that without Him reasonable souls must be accounted dead, though their bodies seem to live before our eyes. But that this was not what happened when man was created, the very words of the narrative sufficiently show: "And God made man dust of the earth;" which some have thought to render more clearly by the words, "And God formed man of the clay of the earth." For it had before been said that "there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground," Genesis 2:6 in order that the reference to clay, formed of this moisture and dust, might be understood. For on this verse there immediately follows the announcement, "And God created man dust of the earth;" so those Greek manuscripts have it from which this passage has been translated into Latin. But whether one prefers to read "created" or "formed," where the Greek reads ?p?ase?, is of little importance; yet "formed" is the better rendering. But those who preferred "created" thought they thus avoided the ambiguity arising from the fact, that in the Latin language the usage obtains that those are said to form a thing who frame some feigned and fictitious thing. This man, then, who was created of the dust of the earth, or of the moistened dust or clay,-this "dust of the earth" (that I may use the express words of Scripture) was made, as the apostle teaches, an animated body when he received a soul. This man, he says, "was made a living soul;" that is, this fashioned dust was made a living soul.They say, Already he had a soul, else he would not be called a man; for man is not a body alone, nor a soul alone, but a being composed of both. This, indeed, is true, that the soul is not the whole man, but the better part of man; the body not the whole, but the inferior part of man; and that then, when both are joined, they receive the name of man, which, however, they do not severally lose even when we speak of them singly. For who is prohibited from saying, in colloquial usage, "That man is dead, and is now at rest or in torment," though this can be spoken only of the soul; or "He is buried in such and such a place," though this refers only to the body? Will they say that Scripture follows no such usage? On the contrary, it so thoroughly adopts it, that even while a man is alive, and body and soul are united, it calls each of them singly by the name "man," speaking of the soul as the "inward man," and of the body as the "outward man," 2 Corinthians 4:16 as if there were two men, though both together are indeed but one. But we must understand in what sense man is said to be in the image of God, and is yet dust, and to return to the dust. The former is spoken of the rational soul, which God by His breathing, or, to speak more appropriately, by His inspiration, conveyed to man, that is, to his body; but the latter refers to his body, which God formed of the dust, and to which a soul was given, that it might become a living body, that is, that man might become a living soul.Wherefore, when our Lord breathed on His disciples, and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," He certainly wished it to be understood that the Holy Ghost was not only the Spirit of the Father, but of the only begotten Son Himself. For the same Spirit is, indeed, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, making with them the trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit, not a creature, but the Creator. For neither was that material breath which proceeded from the mouth of His flesh the very substance and nature of the Holy Spirit, but rather the intimation, as I said, that the Holy Spirit was common to the Father and to the Son; for they have not each a separate Spirit, but both one and the same. Now this Spirit is always spoken of in sacred Scripture by the Greek word p?e?µa, as the Lord, too, named Him in the place cited when He gave Him to His disciples, and intimated the gift by the breathing of His lips; and there does not occur to me any place in the whole Scriptures where He is otherwise named. But in this passage where it is said, "And the Lord formed man dust of the earth, and breathed, or inspired, into his face the breath of life;" the Greek has not p?e?µa, the usual word for the Holy Spirit, but p???, a word more frequently used of the creature than of the Creator; and for this reason some Latin interpreters have preferred to render it by "breath" rather than "spirit." For this word occurs also in the Greek in Isaiah chapter vii, verse 16 where God says, "I have made all breath," meaning, doubtless, all souls. Accordingly, this word p??? is sometimes rendered "breath," sometimes "spirit," sometimes "inspiration," sometimes "aspiration," sometimes "soul," even when it is used of God. ??e?µa, on the other hand, is uniformly rendered "spirit," whether of man, of whom the apostle says, "For what man knows the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?" 1 Corinthians 2:11 or of beast, as in the book of Solomon, "Who knows the spirit of man that goes upward, and the spirit of the beast that goes downward to the earth?" Ecclesiastes 3:21 or of that physical spirit which is called wind, for so the Psalmist calls it: "Fire and hail; snow and vapors; stormy wind;" or of the uncreated Creator Spirit, of whom the Lord said in the gospel, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," indicating the gift by the breathing of His mouth; and when He says, "Go ye and baptize all nations in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," Matthew 28:19 words which very expressly and excellently commend the Trinity; and where it is said, "God is a Spirit;" John 4:24 and in very many other places of the sacred writings. In all these quotations from Scripture we do not find in the Greek the word p??? used, but p?e?µa, and in the Latin, not flatus, but spiritus. Wherefore, referring again to that place where it is written, "He inspired," or to speak more properly, "breathed into his face the breath of life," even though the Greek had not used p??? (as it has) but p?e?µa, it would not on that account necessarily follow that the Creator Spirit, who in the Trinity is distinctively called the Holy Ghost, was meant, since, as has been said, it is plain that p?e?µa is used not only of the Creator, but also of the creature.But, say they, when the Scripture used the word "spirit," it would not have added "of life" unless it meant us to understand the Holy Spirit; nor, when it said, "Man became a soul," would it also have inserted the word "living" unless that life of the soul were signified which is imparted to it from above by the gift of God. For, seeing that the soul by itself has a proper life of its own, what need, they ask, was there of adding living, save only to show that the life which is given it by the Holy Spirit was meant? What is this but to fight strenuously for their own conjectures, while they carelessly neglect the teaching of Scripture? Without troubling themselves much, they might have found in a preceding page of this very book of Genesis the words, "Let the earth bring forth the living soul," Genesis 1:24 when all the terrestrial animals were created. Then at a slight interval, but still in the same book, was it impossible for them to notice this verse, "All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land, died," by which it was signified that all the animals which lived on the earth had perished in the deluge? If, then, we find that Scripture is accustomed to speak both of the "living soul" and the "spirit of life" even in reference to beasts; and if in this place, where it is said, "All things which have the spirit of life," the word p???, not p?e?µa, is used; why may we not say, What need was there to add "living," since the soul cannot exist without being alive? or, What need to add "of life" after the word spirit? But we understand that Scripture used these expressions in its ordinary style so long as it speaks of animals, that is, animated bodies, in which the soul serves as the residence of sensation; but when man is spoken of, we forget the ordinary and established usage of Scripture, whereby it signifies that man received a rational soul, which was not produced out of the waters and the earth like the other living creatures, but was created by the breath of God. Yet this creation was ordered that the human soul should live in an animal body, like those other animals of which the Scripture said, "Let the earth produce every living soul," and regarding which it again says that in them is the breath of life, where the word p??? and not p?e?µa is used in the Greek, and where certainly not the Holy Spirit, but their spirit, is signified under that name.But, again, they object that breath is understood to have been emitted from the mouth of God; and if we believe that is the soul, we must consequently acknowledge it to be of the same substance, and equal to that wisdom, which says, "I come out of the mouth of the Most High." Sirach 24:3 Wisdom, indeed, does not say it was breathed out of the mouth of God, but proceeded out of it. But as we are able, when we breathe, to make a breath, not of our own human nature, but of the surrounding air, which we inhale and exhale as we draw our breath and breathe again, so almighty God was able to make breath, not of His own nature, nor of the creature beneath Him, but even of nothing; and this breath, when He communicated it to man's body, He is most appropriately said to have breathed or inspired,-the Immaterial breathing it also immaterial, but the Immutable not also the immutable; for it was created, He uncreated. Yet that these persons who are forward to quote Scripture, and yet know not the usages of its language, may know that not only what is equal and consubstantial with God is said to proceed out of His mouth, let them hear or read what God says: "So then because you are lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew you out of my mouth." Revelation 3:16 There is no ground, then, for our objecting, when the apostle so expressly distinguishes the animal body from the spiritual-that is to say, the body in which we now are from that in which we are to be. He says, "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." 1 Corinthians 15:44-49 Of all which words of his we have previously spoken. The animal body, accordingly, in which the apostle says that the first man Adam was made, was not so made that it could not die at all, but so that it should not die unless he should have sinned. That body, indeed, which shall be made spiritual and immortal by the quickening Spirit shall not be able to die at all; as the soul has been created immortal, and therefore, although by sin it may be said to die, and does lose a certain life of its own, namely, the Spirit of God, by whom it was enabled to live wisely and blessedly, yet it does not cease living a kind of life, though a miserable, because it is immortal by creation. So, too, the rebellious angels, though by sinning they did in a sense die, because they forsook God, the Fountain of life, which while they drank they were able to live wisely and well, yet they could not so die as to utterly cease living and feeling, for they are immortals by creation. And so, after the final judgment, they shall be hurled into the second death, and not even there be deprived of life or of sensation, but shall suffer torment. But those men who have been embraced by God's grace, and are become the fellow-citizens of the holy angels who have continued in bliss, shall never more either sin or die, being endued with spiritual bodies; yet, being clothed with immortality, such as the angels enjoy, of which they cannot be divested even by sinning, the nature of their flesh shall continue the same, but all carnal corruption and unwieldiness shall be removed.There remains a question which must be discussed, and, by the help of the Lord God of truth, solved: If the motion of concupiscence in the unruly members of our first parents arose out of their sin, and only when the divine grace deserted them; and if it was on that occasion that their eyes were opened to see, or, more exactly, notice their nakedness, and that they covered their shame because the shameless motion of their members was not subject to their will,-how, then, would they have begotten children had they remained sinless as they were created? But as this book must be concluded, and so large a question cannot be summarily disposed of, we may relegate it to the following book, in which it will be more conveniently treated.

Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book XIII

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