Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book IX

ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK IX

Introduction
Chapter 1 The Point at Which the Discussion Has Arrived, and What Remains to Be Handled
Chapter 2 Whether Among the Demons, Inferior to the Gods, There are Any Good Spirits Under Whose Guardianship the Human Soul Might Reach True Blessedness
Chapter 3 What Apuleius Attributes to the Demons, to Whom, Though He Does Not Deny Them Reason, He Does Not Ascribe Virtue
Chapter 4 The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions
Chapter 5 That the Passions Which Assail the Souls of Christians Do Not Seduce Them to Vice, But Exercise Their Virtue
Chapter 6 Of the Passions Which, According to Apuleius, Agitate the Demons Who Are Supposed by Him to Mediate Between Gods and Men
Chapter 7 That the Platonists Maintain that the Poets Wrong the Gods by Representing Them as Distracted by Party Feeling, to Which the Demons and Not the Gods, are Subject
Chapter 8 How Apuleius Defines the Gods Who Dwell in Heaven, the Demons Who Occupy the Air, and Men Who Inhabit Earth
Chapter 9 Whether the Intercession of the Demons Can Secure for Men the Friendship of the Celestial Gods
Chapter 10 That, According to Plotinus, Men, Whose Body is Mortal, are Less Wretched Than Demons, Whose Body is Eternal
Chapter 11 Of the Opinion of the Platonists, that the Souls of Men Become Demons When Disembodied
Chapter 12 Of the Three Opposite Qualities by Which the Platonists Distinguish Between the Nature of Men and that of Demons
Chapter 13 How the Demons Can Mediate Between Gods and Men If They Have Nothing in Common with Both, Being Neither Blessed Like the Gods, Nor Miserable Like Men
Chapter 14 Whether Men, Though Mortal, Can Enjoy True Blessedness
Chapter 15 Of the Man Christ Jesus, the Mediator Between God and Men
Chapter 16 Whether It is Reasonable in the Platonists to Determine that the Celestial Gods Decline Contact with Earthly Things and Intercourse with Men, Who Therefore Require the Intercession of the Demons
Chapter 17 That to Obtain the Blessed Life, Which Consists in Partaking of the Supreme Good, Man Needs Such Mediation as is Furnished Not by a Demon, But by Christ Alone
Chapter 18 That the Deceitful Demons, While Promising to Conduct Men to God by Their Intercession, Mean to Turn Them from the Path of Truth
Chapter 19 That Even Among Their Own Worshippers the Name "Demon" Has Never a Good Signification
Chapter 20 Of the Kind of Knowledge Which Puffs Up the Demons
Chapter 21 To What Extent the Lord Was Pleased to Make Himself Known to the Demons
Chapter 22 The Difference Between the Knowledge of the Holy Angels and that of the Demons
Chapter 23 That the Name of Gods is Falsely Given to the Gods of the Gentiles, Though Scripture Applies It Both to the Holy Angels and Just Men

Latin	Latin
BOOK IX []	The City of God (Book IX) Argument-Having in the preceding book shown that the worship of demons must be abjured, since they in a thousand ways proclaim themselves to be wicked spirits, Augustin in this book meets those who allege a distinction among demons, some being evil, while others are good; and, having exploded this distinction, he proves that to no demon, but to Christ alone, belongs the office of providing men with eternal blessedness.
BOOK IX [I] Et bonos et malos deos esse quidam opinati sunt; quidam vero de diis meliora sentientes tantum eis honoris laudisque tribuerunt, ut nullum deorum malum credere auderent. Sed illi, qui deos quosdam bonos, quosdam malos esse dixerunt, daemones quoque appellaverunt nomine deorum, quamquam et deos, sed rarius, nomine daemonum, ita ut ipsum Iovem, quem volunt esse regem ac principem ceterorum, ab Homero fateantur daemonem nuncupatum. Hi autem, qui omnes deos non nisi bonos esse adserunt et longe praestantiores eis hominibus, qui perhibentur boni, merito moventur daemonum factis, quae negare non possunt, eaque nullo modo a diis, quos omnes bonos volunt, committi posse existimantes differentiam inter deos et daemones adhibere coguntur, ut, quidquid eis merito displicet in operibus vel affectibus pravis, quibus vim suam manifestant occulti spiritus, id credant esse daemonum, non deorum. Sed quia eosdem daemones inter homines et deos ita medios constitutos putant, tamquam nullus deus homini misceatur, ut hinc perferant desiderata, inde referant impetrata, atque hoc Platonici, praecipui philosophorum ac nobilissimi, sentiunt, cum quibus velut cum excellentioribus placuit istam examinare quaestionem, utrum cultus plurimorum deorum prosit ad consequendam vitam beatam quae post mortem futura est: libro superiore quaesivimus, quo pacto daemones, qui talibus gaudent, qualia boni et prudentes homines aversantur et damnant, id est sacrilega flagitiosa facinerosa non de quolibet homine, sed de ipsis diis figmenta poetarum et magicarum artium sceleratam puniendamque violentiam, possint quasi propinquiores et amiciores diis bonis conciliare homines bonos, et hoc nulla ratione posse compertum est.	Some have advanced the opinion that there are both good and bad gods; but some, thinking more respectfully of the gods, have attributed to them so much honor and praise as to preclude the supposition of any god being wicked. But those who have maintained that there are wicked gods as well as good ones have included the demons under the name "gods," and sometimes though more rarely, have called the gods demons; so that they admit that Jupiter, whom they make the king and head of all the rest, is called a demon by Homer. Those, on the other hand, who maintain that the gods are all good, and far more excellent than the men who are justly called good, are moved by the actions of the demons, which they can neither deny nor impute to the gods whose goodness they affirm, to distinguish between gods and demons; so that, whenever they find anything offensive in the deeds or sentiments by which unseen spirits manifest their power, they believe this to proceed not from the gods, but from the demons. At the same time they believe that, as no god can hold direct intercourse with men, these demons hold the position of mediators, ascending with prayers, and returning with gifts. This is the opinion of the Platonists, the ablest and most esteemed of their philosophers, with whom we therefore chose to debate this question,-whether the worship of a number of gods is of any service toward obtaining blessedness in the future life. And this is the reason why, in the preceding book, we have inquired how the demons, who take pleasure in such things as good and wise men loathe and execrate, in the sacrilegious and immoral fictions which the poets have written not of men, but of the gods themselves, and in the wicked and criminal violence of magical arts, can be regarded as more nearly related and more friendly to the gods than men are, and can mediate between good men and the good gods; and it has been demonstrated that this is absolutely impossible.
BOOK IX [II] Proinde hic liber, sicut in illius fine promisimus, disputationem continere debebit de differentia (si quam volunt esse) non deorum inter se, quos omnes bonos dicunt, nec de differentia deorum et daemonum, quorum illos ab hominibus longe alteque seiungunt, istos inter deos et homines conlocant; sed de differentia ipsorum daemonum, quod ad praesentem pertinet quaestionem. Apud plerosque enim usitatum est dici, alios bonos alios malos daemones; quae sive sit etiam Platonicorum, sive quorumlibet sententia, nequaquam eius est neglegenda discussio, ne quisquam velut daemones bonos sequendos sibi esse arbitretur, per quos tamquam medios diis, quos omnes bonos credit, dum conciliari adfectat et studet, ut quasi cum eis possit esse post mortem, inretitus malignorum spirituum deceptusque fallacia longe aberret a vero Deo, cum quo solo et in quo solo et de quo solo anima humana, id est rationalis et intellectualis, beata est.	This book, then, ought, according to the promise made in the end of the preceding one, to contain a discussion, not of the difference which exists among the gods, who, according to the Platonists, are all good, nor of the difference between gods and demons, the former of whom they separate by a wide interval from men, while the latter are placed intermediately between the gods and men, but of the difference, since they make one, among the demons themselves. This we shall discuss so far as it bears on our theme. It has been the common and usual belief that some of the demons are bad, others good; and this opinon, whether it be that of the Platonists or any other sect, must by no means be passed over in silence, lest some one suppose he ought to cultivate the good demons in order that by their mediation he may be accepted by the gods, all of whom he believes to be good, and that he may live with them after death; whereas he would thus be ensnared in the toils of wicked spirits, and would wander far from the true God, with whom alone, and in whom alone, the human soul, that is to say, the soul that is rational and intellectual, is blessed.
BOOK IX [III] Quae igitur est differentia daemonum bonorum et malorum? Quando quidem Platonicus Apuleius de his universaliter disserens et tam multa loquens de aeriis eorum corporibus de virtutibus tacuit animorum, quibus essent praediti, si essent boni. Tacuit ergo beatitudinis causam, indicium vero miseriae tacere non potuit, confitens eorum mentem, qua rationales esse perhibuit,non saltem inbutam munitamque virtute passionibus animi inrationabilibus nequaquam cedere, sed ipsam quoque, sicut stultarum mentium mos est, procellosis quodam modo perturbationibus agitari. Verba namque eius de hac re ista sunt: "Ex hoc ferme daemonum numero, inquit, poetae solent haudquaquam procul a veritate osores et amatores quorundam hominum deos fingere; hos prosperare et euehere, illos contra adversari et adfligere; igitur et misereri et indignari, et angi et laetari omnemque humani animi faciem pati, simili motu cordis et salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare. Quae omnes turbelae tempestatesque procul a deorum caelestium tranquillitate exulant." Num est in his verbis ulla dubitatio, quod non animorum aliquas inferiores partes, sed ipsas daemonum mentes, quibus rationalia sunt animalia, velut procellosum salum dixit passionum tempestate turbari? ut ne hominibus quidem sapientibus comparandi sint, qui huius modi perturbationibus animorum, a quibus humana non est inmunis infirmitas, etiam cum eas huius vitae condicione patiuntur, mente inperturbata resistunt, non eis cedentes ad aliquid adprobandum vel perpetrandum, quod exorbitet ab itinere sapientiae et lege iustitiae; sed stultis mortalibus et iniustis non corporibus, sed moribus similes (ut non dicam deteriores, eo quo uetustiores et debita poena insanabiles) ipsius quoque mentis, ut iste appellavit, salo fluctuant, nec in veritate atque virtute, qua turbulentis et pravis affectionibus repugnatur, ex ulla animi parte consistunt.	What, then, is the difference between good and evil demons? For the Platonist Apuleius, in a treatise on this whole subject, while he says a great deal about their aerial bodies, has not a word to say of the spiritual virtues with which, if they were good, they must have been endowed. Not a word has he said, then, of that which could give them happiness; but proof of their misery he has given, acknowledging that their mind, by which they rank as reasonable beings, is not only not imbued and fortified with virtue so as to resist all unreasonable passions, but that it is somehow agitated with tempestuous emotions, and is thus on a level with the mind of foolish men. His own words are: "It is this class of demons the poets refer to, when, without serious error, they feign that the gods hate and love individuals among men, prospering and ennobling some, and opposing and distressing others. Therefore pity, indignation, grief, joy, every human emotion is experienced by the demons, with the same mental disturbance, and the same tide of feeling and thought. These turmoils and tempests banish them far from the tranquility of the celestial gods." Can there be any doubt that in these words it is not some inferior part of their spiritual nature, but the very mind by which the demons hold their rank as rational beings, which he says is tossed with passion like a stormy sea? They cannot, then, be compared even to wise men, who with undisturbed mind resist these perturbations to which they are exposed in this life, and from which human infirmity is never exempt, and who do not yield themselves to approve of or perpetrate anything which might deflect them from the path of wisdom and law of rectitude. They resemble in character, though not in bodily appearance, wicked and foolish men. I might indeed say they are worse, inasmuch as they have grown old in iniquity, and incorrigible by punishment. Their mind, as Apuleius says, is a sea tossed with tempest, having no rallying point of truth or virtue in their soul from which they can resist their turbulent and depraved emotions.
BOOK IX [IV] Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum de his animi motibus, quae Graeci *pa/qh, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam in affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut iste, de Graeco expressius passiones vocant. Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo, quibus ad necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis inponat. Hoc qui sentiunt, Platonici sunt sive Aristotelici, cum Aristoteles discipulus Platonis fuerit, qui sectam Peripateticam condidit. Aliis autem, sicut Stoicis, cadere ullas omnino huiusce modi passiones in sapientem non placet. Hos autem, id est Stoicos, Cicero in libris de finibus bonorum et malorum verbis magis quam rebus adversus Platonicos seu Peripateticos certare conuincit; quando quidem Stoici nolunt bona appellare, sed commoda corporis et externa, eo quod nullum bonum volunt esse hominis praeter virtutem, tamquam artem bene vivendi, quae non nisi in animo est. Haec autem isti simpliciter et ex communi loquendi consuetudine appellant bona; sed in comparatione virtutis, qua recte vivitur, parua et exigua. Ex quo fit, ut ab utrisque quodlibet vocentur, seu bona seu commoda, pari tamen aestimatione pensentur, nec in hac quaestione Stoici delectentur nisi novitate verborum. Videtur ergo mihi etiam in hoc, ubi quaeritur utrum accidant sapienti passiones animi, an ab eis sit prorsus alienus, de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere controversiam. Nam et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam Platonicos et Peripateticos sentire existimo, quantum ad vim rerum adtinet, non ad vocabulorum sonum. Vt enim alia omittam, quibus id ostendam, ne longum faciam, aliquid unum quod sit evidentissimum dicam. In libris, quibus titulus est Noctium Atticarum, scribit A. Gellius, vir elegantissimi eloquii et multae undecumque scientiae, se navigasse aliquando cum quodam philosopho nobili Stoico. Is philosophus, sicut latius et uberius, quod ego breviter adtingam, narrat A. Gellius, cum illud navigium horribili caelo et mari periculosissime iactaretur, vi timoris expalluit. Id animadversum est ab eis, qui aderant, quamuis in mortis vicinia curiosissime adtentis, utrum necne philosophus animo turbaretur. Deinde tempestate transacta mox ut securitas praebuit conloquendi vel etiam garriendi locum, quidam ex his, quos navis illa portabat, dives luxuriosus Asiaticus philosophum compellat inludens, quod extimuisset atque palluisset, cum ipse mansisset intrepidus in eo quod inpendebat exitio. At ille Aristippi Socratici responsum rettulit, qui cum in re simili eadem verba ab homine simili audisset, respondit illum pro anima nequissimi nebulonis merito non fuisse sollicitum, se autem pro Aristippi anima timere debuisse. Hac illo divite responsione depulso postea quaesivit A. Gellius a philosopho non exagitandi animo, sed discendi, quaenam illa ratio esset pauoris sui. Qui ut doceret hominem sciendi studio naviter accensum, protulit statim de sarcinula sua Stoici Epicteti librum, in quo ea scripta essent, quae congruerent decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, quos fuisse Stoicorum principes novimus. In eo libro se legisse dicit A. Gellius hoc Stoicis placuisse, quod animi visa, quas appellant phantasias nec in potestate est utrum et quando incidant animo, cum veniunt ex terribilibus et formidabilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tamquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis officium; nec ideo tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari ista eisque consentiri. Hoc enim esse volunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animum sapientis et stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit atque adcommodat mentis adsensum; sapientis autem, quamuis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his, quae adpetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet, veram et stabilem inconcussa mente sententiam. Haec ut potui non quidem commodius A. Gellio, sed certe brevius et, ut puto, planius exposui, quae ille se in Epicteti libro legisse commemorat eum ex decretis Stoicorum dixisse atque sensisse. Quae si ita sunt, aut nihil aut paene nihil distat inter Stoicorum aliorumque philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et perturbationibus animorum; utrique enim mentem rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt. Et ideo fortasse dicunt eas in sapientem non cadere Stoici, quia nequaquam eius sapientiam, qua utique sapiens est, ullo errore obnubilant aut labe subuertunt. Accidunt autem animo sapientis salua serenitate sapientiae propter illa, quae commoda vel incommoda appellant, quamuis ea nolint dicere bona vel mala. Nam profecto si nihili penderet eas res ille philosophus, quas amissurum se naufragio sentiebat, sicuti est vita ista salusque corporis: non ita illud periculum perhorresceret, ut palloris etiam testimonio proderetur. Verum tamen et illam poterat permotionem pati, et fixam tenere mente sententiam, vitam illam salutemque corporis, quorum amissionem minabatur tempestatis inmanitas, non esse bona, quae illos quibus inessent facerent bonos, sicut facit iustitia. Quod autem aiunt ea nec bona appellanda esse, sed commoda: verborum certamini, non rerum examini deputandum est. Quid enim interest, utrum aptius bona vocentur an commoda, dum tamen ne his privetur non minus Stoicus quam Peripateticus pavescat et palleat, ea non aequaliter appellando, sed aequaliter aestimando? Ambo sane, si bonorum istorum seu commodorum periculis ad flagitium vel facinus urgeantur, ut aliter ea retinere non possint, malle se dicunt haec amittere, quibus natura corporis salua et incolumis habetur, quam illa committere, quibus iustitia violatur. Ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia, nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt inferioribus animi partibus, in se contra rationem praeualere permittit; quin Immo eis ipsa dominatur eisque non consentiendo et potius resistendo regnum virtutis exercet. Talem describit etiam Vergilius Aenean, ubi ait: Mens inmota manet, lacrimae voluuntur inanes.	Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call pa??, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term "goods" to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Atticжthat he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, "You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus." The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasiж, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Жneas by Virgil when he says,"He stands immovable by tears,Nor tenderest words with pity hears."
BOOK IX [V] Non est nunc necesse copiose ac diligenter ostendere, quid de istis passionibus doceat scriptura divina, qua Christiana eruditio continetur. Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et ivuandam mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usum iustitiae convertantur. Denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat. Irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro adflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii. Longe melius et humanius et piorum sensibus accommodatius Cicero in Caesaris laude locutus est, ubi ait: "Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est." Quid est autem misericordia nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique si possumus subvenire compellimur? Seruit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conseruetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti. Hanc Cicero locutor egregius non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti, nobilissimi Stoici, ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui huius sectae primas habuerunt, huiusce modi passiones in animum sapientis admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberum volunt. Vnde fit consequens, ut haec ipsa non putent vitia, quando sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possint, et una sit eademque sententia Peripateticorum vel etiam Platonicorum et ipsorum Stoicorum, sed, ut ait Tullius, verbi controversia iam diu torqueat homines Graeculos contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis. Sed adhuc merito quaeri potest, utrum ad vitae praesentis pertineat infirmitatem etiam in quibusque bonis officiis huiusce modi perpeti affectus, sancti vero angeli et sine ira puniant, quos accipiunt aeterna Dei lege puniendos, et miseris sine miseriae compassione subveniant, et periclitantibus eis, quos diligunt, sine timore opitulentur; et tamen istarum nomina passionum consuetudine locutionis humanae etiam in eos usurpentur propter quandam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem, sicut ipse Deus secundum scripturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur. Hoc enim verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus, non illius turbulentus affectus.	We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consonant with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of Cжsar, when he says, "Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion." And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection.
BOOK IX [VI] Qua interim de sanctis angelis quaestione dilata videamus quem ad modum dicant Platonici medios daemones inter deos et homines constitutos istis passionum aestibus fluctuare. Si enim mente ab his libera eisque dominante motus huiusce modi paterentur, non eos diceret Apuleius simili motu cordis et salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare. Ipsa igitur mens eorum, id est pars animi superior, qua rationales sunt, in qua virtus et sapientia, si ulla eis esset, passionibus turbulentis inferiorum animi partium regendis moderandisque dominaretur, -- ipsa, inquam, mens eorum, sicut iste Platonicus confitetur, salo perturbationum fluctuat. Subiecta est ergo mens daemonum passionibus libidinum formidinum irarum atque huiusmodi ceteris. Quae igitur pars in eis libera est composque sapientiae, qua placeant diis et ad bonorum morum similitudinem hominibus consulant, cum eorum mens passionum vitiis subiugata et oppressa, quidquid rationis naturaliter habet, ad fallendum et decipiendum tanto acrius intendat, quanto eam magis possidet nocendi cupiditas?	Deferring for the present the question about the holy angels, let us examine the opinion of the Platonists, that the demons who mediate between gods and men are agitated by passions. For if their mind, though exposed to their incursion, still remained free and superior to them, Apuleius could not have said that their hearts are tossed with passions as the sea by stormy winds. Their mind, then,-that superior part of their soul whereby they are rational beings, and which, if it actually exists in them, should rule and bridle the turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul,-this mind of theirs, I say, is, according to the Platonist referred to, tossed with a hurricane of passions. The mind of the demons, therefore, is subject to the emotions of fear, anger, lust, and all similar affections. What part of them, then, is free, and endued with wisdom, so that they are pleasing to the gods, and the fit guides of men into purity of life, since their very highest part, being the slave of passion and subject to vice, only makes them more intent on deceiving and seducing, in proportion to the mental force and energy of desire they possess?
BOOK IX [VII] Quod si quisquam dicit, non ex omnium, sed ex malorum daemonum numero esse, quos poetae quorundam hominum osores et amatores deos non procul a veritate confingunt (hos enim dixit Apuleius salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare): quo modo istud intellegere poterimus, quando, cum hoc diceret, non quorundam, id est malorum, sed omnium daemonum medietatem propter aeria corpora inter deos et homines describebat? Hoc enim ait fingere poetas, quod ex istorum daemonum numero deos faciunt et eis deorum nomina inponunt et quibus voluerint hominibus ex his amicos inimicosque distribuunt ficti carminis inpunita licentia, cum deos ab his daemonum moribus et caelesti loco et beatitudinis opulentia remotos esse perhibeat. Haec est ergo fictio poetarum deos dicere, qui dii non sunt, eosque sub deorum nominibus inter se decertare propter homines, quos pro studio partium diligunt vel oderunt. Non procul autem a veritate dicit hanc esse fictionem, quoniam deorum appellati vocabulis, qui dii non sunt, tales tamen describuntur daemones, quales sunt. Denique hinc esse dicit Homericam illam Mineruam, "quae mediis coetibus Graium cohibendo Achilli intervenit." Quod ergo Minerua illa fuerit, poeticum uult esse figmentum, eo quod Mineruam deam putat eamque inter deos, quos omnes bonos beatosque credit, in alta aetheria sede conlocat, procul a conversatione mortalium; quod autem, aliquis daemon fuerit Graecis favens Troianisque contrarius, sicut alius adversus Graecos Troianorum opitulator, quem Veneris seu Martis nomine idem poeta commemorat, quos deos iste talia non agentes in habitationibus caelestibus ponit, et hi daemones pro eis, quos amabant, contra eos, quos oderant, inter se decertaverint: hoc non procul a veritate poetas dixisse confessus est. De his quippe ista dixerunt, quos hominibus simili motu cordis et salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare testatur, ut possint amores et odia non pro iustitia, sed sicut populus similis eorum in venatoribus et aurigis secundum suarum studia partium pro aliis adversus alios exercere. Id enim videtur philosophus curasse Platonicus, ne, cum haec a poetis canerentur, non a daemonibus mediis, sed ab ipsis diis, quorum nomina poetae fingendo ponunt, fieri crederentur.	But if any one says that it is not of all the demons, but only of the wicked, that the poets, not without truth, say that they violently love or hate certain men,-for it was of them Apuleius said that they were driven about by strong currents of emotion,-how can we accept this interpretation, when Apuleius, in the very same connection, represents all the demons, and not only the wicked, as intermediate between gods and men by their aerial bodies? The fiction of the poets, according to him, consists in their making gods of demons, and giving them the names of gods, and assigning them as allies or enemies to individual men, using this poetical license, though they profess that the gods are very different in character from the demons, and far exalted above them by their celestial abode and wealth of beatitude. This, I say, is the poets' fiction, to say that these are gods who are not gods, and that, under the names of gods, they fight among themselves about the men whom they love or hate with keen partisan feeling. Apuleius says that this is not far from the truth, since, though they are wrongfully called by the names of the gods, they are described in their own proper character as demons. To this category, he says, belongs the Minerva of Homer, "who interposed in the ranks of the Greeks to restrain Achilles." For that this was Minerva he supposes to be poetical fiction; for he thinks that Minerva is a goddess, and he places her among the gods whom he believes to be all good and blessed in the sublime ethereal region, remote from intercourse with men. But that there was a demon favorable to the Greeks and adverse to the Trojans, as another, whom the same poet mentions under the name of Venus or Mars (gods exalted above earthly affairs in their heavenly habitations), was the Trojans' ally and the foe of the Greeks, and that these demons fought for those they loved against those they hated,-in all this he owned that the poets stated something very like the truth. For they made these statements about beings to whom he ascribes the same violent and tempestuous passions as disturb men, and who are therefore capable of loves and hatreds not justly formed, but formed in a party spirit, as the spectators in races or hunts take fancies and prejudices. It seems to have been the great fear of this Platonist that the poetical fictions should be believed of the gods, and not of the demons who bore their names.
BOOK IX [VIII] Quid? illa ipsa definitio daemonum parumne intuenda est (ubi certe omnes determinando complexus est), quod ait daemones esse genere animalia, animo passiva, mente rationalia, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna? In quibus quinque commemoratis nihil dixit omnino, quo daemones cum bonis saltem hominibus id viderentur habere commune, quod non esset in malis. Nam ipsos homines cum aliquanto latius describendo complecteretur, suo loco de illis dicens tamquam de infimis atque terrenis, cum prius dixisset de caelestibus diis, ut commendatis duabus partibus ex summo et infimo ultimis tertio loco de mediis daemonibus loqueretur: "Igitur homines, inquit, ratione gaudentes, oratione pollentes, inmortalibus animis, moribundis membris, levibus et anxiis mentibus, brutis et obnoxiis corporibus, dissimilibus moribus, similibus erroribus, peruicaci audacia, pertinaci spe, casso labore, fortuna caduca, singillatim mortales, cuncti tamen universo genere perpetui, vicissim sufficienda prole mutabiles, volucri tempore, tarda sapientia, cita morte, querula vita terras incolunt." Cum hic tam multa diceret, quae ad plurimos homines pertinent, numquid etiam illud tacuit, quod noverat esse paucorum, ubi ait "tarda sapientia"? Quod si praetermisisset, nullo modo recte genus humanum descriptionis huius tam intenta diligentia terminasset. Cum vero deorum excellentiam commendaret, ipsam beatitudinem, quo volunt homines per sapientiam pervenire, in eis adfirmavit excellere. Proinde si aliquos daemones bonos vellet intellegi, aliquid etiam in ipsorum descriptione poneret, unde vel cum diis aliquam beatitudinis partem, vel cum hominibus qualemcumque sapientiam putarentur habere communem. Nunc vero nullum bonum eorum commemoravit, quo boni discernuntur a malis. Quamuis et eorum malitiae liberius exprimendae pepercerit, non tam ne ipsos, quam ne cultores eorum, apud quos loquebatur, offenderet: significavit tamen prudentibus, quid de illis sentire deberent, quando quidem deos, quos omnes bonos beatosque credi voluit, ab eorum passionibus atque, ut ait ipse, turbelis omni modo separavit, sola illos corporum aeternitate coniungens, animo autem non diis, sed hominibus similes daemones apertissime inculcans; et hoc non sapientiae bono, cuius et homines possunt esse participes, sed perturbatione passionum, quae stultis malisque dominatur, a sapientibus vero et bonis ita regitur, ut malint eam non habere quam vincere. Nam si non corporum, sed animorum aeternitatem cum diis habere daemones vellet intellegi, non utique homines ab huius rei consortio separaret, quia et hominibus aeternos esse animos procul dubio sicut Platonicus sentit. Ideo cum hoc genus animantum describeret, inmortalibus animis, moribundis membris dixit esse homines. Ac per hoc si propterea communem cum diis aeternitatem non habent homines, quia corpore sunt mortales: propterea ergo daemones habent, quia corpore sunt inmortales.	The definition which Apuleius gives of demons, and in which he of course includes all demons, is that they are in nature animals, in soul subject to passion, in mind reasonable, in body aerial, in duration eternal. Now in these five qualities he has named absolutely nothing which is proper to good men and not also to bad. For when Apuleius had spoken of the celestials first, and had then extended his description so as to include an account of those who dwell far below on the earth, that, after describing the two extremes of rational being, he might proceed to speak of the intermediate demons, he says, "Men, therefore, who are endowed with the faculty of reason and speech, whose soul is immortal and their members mortal, who have weak and anxious spirits, dull and corruptible bodies, dissimilar characters, similar ignorance, who are obstinate in their audacity, and persistent in their hope, whose labor is vain, and whose fortune is ever on the wane, their race immortal, themselves perishing, each generation replenished with creatures whose life is swift and their wisdom slow, their death sudden and their life a wail,-these are the men who dwell on the earth." In recounting so many qualities which belong to the large proportion of men, did he forget that which is the property of the few when he speaks of their wisdom being slow? If this had been omitted, this his description of the human race, so carefully elaborated, would have been defective. And when he commended the excellence of the gods, he affirmed that they excelled in that very blessedness to which he thinks men must attain by wisdom. And therefore, if he had wished us to believe that some of the demons are good, he should have inserted in his description something by which we might see that they have, in common with the gods, some share of blessedness, or, in common with men, some wisdom. But, as it is, he has mentioned no good quality by which the good may be distinguished from the bad. For although he refrained from giving a full account of their wickedness, through fear of offending, not themselves but their worshippers, for whom he was writing, yet he sufficiently indicated to discerning readers what opinion he had of them; for only in the one article of the eternity of their bodies does he assimilate them to the gods, all of whom, he asserts, are good and blessed, and absolutely free from what he himself calls the stormy passions of the demons; and as to the soul, he quite plainly affirms that they resemble men and not the gods, and that this resemblance lies not in the possession of wisdom, which even men can attain to, but in the perturbation of passions which sway the foolish and wicked, but is so ruled by the good and wise that they prefer not to admit rather than to conquer it. For if he had wished it to be understood that the demons resembled the gods in the eternity not of their bodies but of their souls, he would certainly have admitted men to share in this privilege, because, as a Platonist, he of course must hold that the human soul is eternal. Accordingly, when describing this race of living beings, he said that their souls were immortal, their members mortal. And, consequently, if men have not eternity in common with the gods because they have mortal bodies, demons have eternity in common with the gods because their bodies are immortal.
BOOK IX [IX] Quales igitur mediatores sunt inter homines et deos, per quos ad deorum amicitias homines ambiant, qui hoc cum hominibus habent deterius, quod est in animante melius, id est animum; hoc autem habent cum diis melius, quod est in animante deterius, id est corpus? Cum enim animans, Id est animal, ex anima constet et corpore, quorum duorum anima est utique corpore melior, etsi vitiosa et infirma, melior certe corpore etiam sanissimo atque firmissimo, quoniam natura eius excellentior nec labe vitiorum postponitur corpori, sicut aurum etiam sordidum argento seu plumbo, licet purissimo, carius aestimatur: isti mediatores deorum et hominum, per quos interpositos divinis humana iunguntur, cum diis habent corpus aeternum, vitiosum autem cum hominibus animum; quasi religio, qua volunt diis homines per daemones iungi, in corpore sit, non in animo constituta. Quaenam tandem istos mediatores falsos atque fallaces quasi capite deorsum nequitia vel poena suspendit, ut inferiorem animalis partem, id est corpus, cum superioribus, superiorem vero, id est animum, cum inferioribus habeant, et cum diis caelestibus in parte seruiente coniuncti, cum hominibus autem terrestribus in parte dominante sint miseri? Corpus quippe seruum est, sicut etiam Sallustius ait: "Animi imperio, corporis seruitio magis utimur." Adiunxit autem ille: "Alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum beluis commune est", quoniam de hominibus loquebatur, quibus sicut beluis mortale corpus est. Isti autem, quos inter nos et deos mediatores nobis philosophi providerunt, possunt quidem dicere de animo et corpore: Alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum hominibus commune est; sed, sicut dixi, tamquam in peruersum ligati atque suspensi, seruum corpus cum diis beatis, dominum animum cum hominibus miseris, parte inferiore exaltati, superiore deiecti. Vnde etiamsi quisquam propter hoc eos putaverit aeternitatem habere cum diis, quia nulla morte, sicut animalium terrestrium, animi eorum soluuntur a corpore: nec sic existimandum est eorum corpus tamquam honoratorum aeternum uehiculum, sed aeternum vinculum damnatorum.	How, then, can men hope for a favorable introduction to the friendship of the gods by such mediators as these, who are, like men, defective in that which is the better part of every living creature, viz., the soul, and who resemble the gods only in the body, which is the inferior part? For a living creature or animal consists of soul and body, and of these two parts the soul is undoubtedly the better; even though vicious and weak, it is obviously better than even the soundest and strongest body, for the greater excellence of its nature is not reduced to the level of the body even by the pollution of vice, as gold, even when tarnished, is more precious than the purest silver or lead. And yet these mediators, by whose interposition things human and divine are to be harmonized, have an eternal body in common with the gods, and a vicious soul in common with men,-as if the religion by which these demons are to unite gods and men were a bodily, and not a spiritual matter. What wickedness, then, or punishment has suspended these false and deceitful mediators, as it were head downwards, so that their inferior part, their body, is linked to the gods above, and their superior part, the soul, bound to men beneath; united to the celestial gods by the part that serves, and miserable, together with the inhabitants of earth, by the part that rules? For the body is the servant, as Sallust says: "We use the soul to rule, the body to obey;" adding, "the one we have in common with the gods, the other with the brutes." For he was here speaking of men; and they have, like the brutes, a mortal body. These demons, whom our philosophic friends have provided for us as mediators with the gods, may indeed say of the soul and body, the one we have in common with the gods, the other with men; but, as I said, they are as it were suspended and bound head downwards, having the slave, the body, in common with the gods, the master, the soul, in common with miserable men,-their inferior part exalted, their superior part depressed. And therefore, if any one supposes that, because they are not subject, like terrestrial animals, to the separation of soul and body by death, they therefore resemble the gods in their eternity, their body must not be considered a chariot of an eternal triumph, but rather the chain of an eternal punishment.
BOOK IX [X] Plotinus certe nostrae memoriae vicinis temporibus Platonem ceteris excellentius intellexisse laudatur. Is cum de humanis animis ageret: "Pater, inquit, misericors mortalia illis vincla faciebat." Ita hoc ipsum, quod mortales sunt homines corpore, ad misericordiam Dei patris pertinere arbitratus est, ne semper huius vitae miseria tenerentur. Hac misericordia indigna iudicata est iniquitas daemonum, quae in animi passivi miseria non mortale sicut homines, sed aeternum corpus accepit. Essent quippe feliciores hominibus, si mortale cum eis haberent corpus et cum diis animum beatum. Essent autem pares hominibus, si cum animo misero corpus saltem mortale cum eis habere meruissent; si tamen adquirerent aliquid pietatis, ut ab aerumnis vel in morte requiescerent. Nunc vero non solum feliciores hominibus non sunt animo misero, sed etiam miseriores sunt perpetuo corporis vinculo. Non enim aliqua pietatis et sapientiae disciplina proficientes intellegi voluit ex daemonibus fieri deos, cum apertissime dixerit daemones aeternos.	Plotinus, whose memory is quite recent, enjoys the reputation of having understood Plato better than any other of his disciples. In speaking of human souls, he says, "The Father in compassion made their bonds mortal;" that is to say, he considered it due to the Father's mercy that men, having a mortal body, should not be forever confined in the misery of this life. But of this mercy the demons have been judged unworthy, and they have received, in conjunction with a soul subject to passions, a body not mortal like man's, but eternal. For they should have been happier than men if they had, like men, had a mortal body, and, like the gods, a blessed soul. And they should have been equal to men, if in conjunction with a miserable soul they had at least received, like men, a mortal body, so that death might have freed them from trouble, if, at least, they should have attained some degree of piety. But, as it is, they are not only no happier than men, having, like them, a miserable soul, they are also more wretched, being eternally bound to the body; for he does not leave us to infer that by some progress in wisdom and piety they can become gods, but expressly says that they are demons forever.
BOOK IX [XI] Dicit quidem et animas hominum daemones esse et ex hominibus fieri lares, si boni meriti sunt; lemures, si mali, seu laruas; manes autem deos dici, si incertum est bonorum eos seu malorum esse meritorum. In qua opinione quantam voraginem aperiant sectandis perditis moribus, quis non videat, si vel paululum adtendat? Quando quidem quamlibet nequam homines fuerint, vel laruas se fieri dum opinantur, vel dum manes deos, tanto peiores fiunt, quanto sunt nocendi cupidiores, ut etiam quibusdam sacrificiis tamquam divinis honoribus post mortem se inuitari opinentur, ut noceant. Laruas quippe dicit esse noxios daemones ex hominibus factos. Sed hinc alia quaestio est. Inde autem perhibet appellari Graece beatos. *eu)dai/monas, quod boni sint animi, hoc est boni daemones, animos quoque hominum daemones esse confirmans.	He says, indeed, that the souls of men are demons, and that men become Lares if they are good, Lemures or Larvж if they are bad, and Manes if it is uncertain whether they de serve well or ill. Who does not see at a glance that this is a mere whirlpool sucking men to moral destruction? For, however wicked men have been, if they suppose they shall become Larvж or divine Manes, they will become the worse the more love they have for inflicting injury; for, as the Larvж are hurtful demons made out of wicked men, these men must suppose that after death they will be invoked with sacrifices and divine honors that they may inflict injuries. But this question we must not pursue. He also states that the blessed are called in Greek e?da?µ??e?, because they are good souls, that is to say, good demons, confirming his opinion that the souls of men are demons.
BOOK IX [XII] Sed nunc de his agimus, quos in natura propria descripsit inter deos et homines genere animalia, mente rationalia, animo passiva, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna. Nempe cum prius deos in sublimi caelo, homines autem in terra infima disiunctos locis et naturae dignitate secerneret, ita conclusit: "Habetis, inquit, interim bina animalia: deos ab hominibus plurimum differentes loci sublimitate, vitae perpetuitate, naturae perfectione, nullo inter se propinquo communicatu, cum et habitacula summa ab infimis tanta intercapedo fastigii dispescat, et vivacitas illic aeterna et indefecta sit, hic caduca et subsiciva, et ingenia illa ad beatitudinem sublimata, haec ad miserias infimata." Hic terna video commemorata contraria de duabus naturae partibus ultimis, id est summis atque infimis. Nam tria quae proposuit de diis laudabilia, eadem repetivit, aliis quidem verbis, ut eis adversa alia tria ex hominibus redderet. Tria deorum haec sunt: loci sublimitas, vitae perpetuitas, perfectio naturae. Haec aliis verbis ita repetivit, ut eis tria contraria humanae condicionis opponeret. "Cum et habitacula, inquit, summa ab infimis tanta intercapedo fastigii dispescat", quia dixerat loci sublimitatem; "et vivacitas, inquit, illic aeterna et indefecta sit, hic caduca et subsiciva", quia dixerat vitae perpetuitatem; "et ingenia illa, inquit, ad beatitudinem sublimata, haec ad miserias infimata", quia dixerat naturae perfectionem. Tria igitur ab eo posita sunt deorum, id est locus sublimis, aeternitas, beatitudo; et his contraria tria hominum, id est locus infimus, mortalitas, miseria.	But at present we are speaking of those beings whom he described as being properly intermediate between gods and men, in nature animals, in mind rational, in soul subject to passion, in body aerial, in duration eternal. When he had distinguished the gods, whom he placed in the highest heaven, from men, whom he placed on earth, not only by position but also by the unequal dignity of their natures, he concluded in these words: "You have here two kinds of animals: the gods, widely distinguished from men by sublimity of abode, perpetuity of life, perfection of nature; for their habitations are separated by so wide an interval that there can be no intimate communication between them, and while the vitality of the one is eternal and indefeasible, that of the others is fading and precarious, and while the spirits of the gods are exalted in bliss, those of men are sunk in miseries." Here I find three opposite qualities ascribed to the extremes of being, the highest and lowest. For, after mentioning the three qualities for which we are to admire the gods, he repeated, though in other words, the same three as a foil to the defects of man. The three qualities are, "sublimity of abode, perpetuity of life, perfection of nature." These he again mentioned so as to bring out their contrasts in man's condition. As he had mentioned "sublimity of abode," he says, "Their habitations are separated by so wide an interval;" as he had mentioned "perpetuity of life," he says, that "while divine life is eternal and indefeasible, human life is fading and precarious;" and as he had mentioned "perfection of nature," he says, that "while the spirits of the gods are exalted in bliss, those of men are sunk in miseries." These three things, then, he predicates of the gods, exaltation, eternity, blessedness; and of man he predicates the opposite, lowliness of habitation, mortality, misery.
BOOK IX [XIII] Inter haec terna deorum et hominum quoniam daemones medios posuit, de loco nulla est controversia; inter sublimem quippe et infimum medius locus aptissime habetur et dicitur. Cetera bina restant, quibus cura adtentior adhibenda est, quem ad modum vel aliena esse a daemonibus ostendantur, vel sic eis distribuantur, ut medietas videtur exposcere. Sed ab eis aliena esse non possunt. Non enim sicut dicimus locum medium nec summum esse nec infimum, ita daemones, cum sint animalia rationalia, nec beatos esse nec miseros, sicuti sunt arbusta vel pecora, quae sunt sensus vel rationis expertia, recte possumus dicere. Quorum ergo ratio mentibus inest, aut miseros esse aut beatos necesse est. Item non possumus recte dicere nec mortales esse daemones nec aeternos. Omnia namque viventia aut in aeternum vivunt, aut finiunt morte quod vivunt. Iam vero iste tempore aeternos daemone s dixit. Quid igitur restat, nisi ut hi medii de duobus summis unum habeant et de duobus infimis alterum? Nam si utraque de imis habebunt aut utraque de summis, medii non erunt, sed in alterutram partem vel resiliunt vel recumbunt. Quia ergo his binis, sicut demonstratum est, carere utrisque non possunt, acceptis ex utraque parte singulis mediabuntur. Ac per hoc quia de infimis habere non possunt aeternitatem, quae ibi non est, unum hoc de summis habent; et ideo non est alterum ad complendam medietatem suam, quod de infimis habeant, nisi miseriam. Est itaque secundum Platonicos sublimium deorum vel beata aeternitas vel aeterna beatitudo; hominum vero infimorum vel miseria mortalis vel mortalitas misera; daemonum autem mediorum vel misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Nam et quinque illis, quae in definitione daemonum posuit, non eos medios, sicut promittebat, ostendit; quoniam tria dixit eos habere nobis cum, quod genere animalia, quod mente rationalia, quod animo passiva sunt; cum diis autem unum, quod tempore aeterna; et unum proprium, quod corpore aeria. Quo modo ergo medii, quando unum habent cum summis, tria cum infimis? Quis non videat relicta medietate quantum inclinentur et deprimantur ad infima? Sed plane etiam ibi medii possunt ita inveniri, ut unum habeant proprium, quod est corpus aerium, sicut et illi de summis atque infimis singula propria, dii corpus aetherium hominesque terrenum; duo vero communia sint omnibus, quod genere sunt animalia et mente rationalia. Nam et ipse cum de diis et hominibus loqueretur: "Habetis, inquit, bina animalia", et non solent isti deos nisi rationales mente perhibere. Duo sunt residua, quod sunt animo passiva et tempore aeterna; quorum habent unum cum infimis, cum summis alterum, ut proportionali ratione librata medietas neque sustollatur in summa, neque in infima deprimatur. Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Qui enim ait "animo passiva", etiam "misera" dixisset, nisi eorum cultoribus erubuisset. Porro quia providentia summi Dei, sicut etiam ipsi fatentur, non fortuita temeritate regitur mundus, numquam esset istorum aeterna miseria, nisi esset magna malitia. Si igitur beati recte dicuntur eudaemones, non sunt eudaemones daemones, quos inter homines et deos isti in medio locaverunt. Quis ergo est locus bonorum daemonum, qui supra homines, infra deos istis praebeant adiutorium, illis ministerium? Si enim boni aeternique sunt, profecto et beati sunt. Aeterna autem beatitudo medios eos esse non sinit, quia multum cum diis comparat multumque ab hominibus separat. Vnde frustra isti conabuntur ostendere, quo modo daemones boni, si et inmortales sunt et beati, recte medii constituantur inter deos inmortales ac beatos et homines mortales ac miseros. Cum enim utrumque habeant cum diis, et beatitudinem scilicet et inmortalitatem, nihil autem horum cum hominibus et miseris et mortalibus: quo modo non potius remoti sunt ab hominibus diisque coniuncti, quam inter utrosque medii constituti? Tunc enim medii essent, si haberent et ipsi duo quaedam sua, non cum binis alterutrorum, sed cum singulis utrorumque communia; sicut homo medium quiddam est, sed inter pecora et angelos, ut, quia pecus est animal inrationale atque mortale, angelus autem rationale et inmortale, medius homo est, sed inferior angelis, superior pecoribus, habens cum pecoribus mortalitatem, rationem cum angelis, animal rationale mortale. Ita ergo cum quaerimus medium inter beatos inmortales miserosque mortales, hoc invenire debemus, quod aut mortale sit beatum, aut inmortale sit miserum.	If, now, we endeavor to find between these opposites the mean occupied by the demons, there can be no question as to their local position; for, between the highest and lowest place, there is a place which is rightly considered and called the middle place. The other two qualities remain, and to them we must give greater care, that we may see whether they are altogether foreign to the demons, or how they are so bestowed upon them without infringing upon their mediate position. We may dismiss the idea that they are foreign to them. For we cannot say that the demons, being rational animals, are neither blessed nor wretched, as we say of the beasts and plants, which are void of feeling and reason, or as we say of the middle place, that it is neither the highest nor the lowest. The demons, being rational, must be either miserable or blessed. And, in like manner, we cannot say that they are neither mortal nor immortal; for all living things either live eternally or end life in death. Our author, besides, stated that the demons are eternal. What remains for us to suppose, then, but that these mediate beings are assimilated to the gods in one of the two remaining qualities, and to men in the other? For if they received both from above, or both from beneath, they should no longer be mediate, but either rise to the gods above, or sink to men beneath. Therefore, as it has been demonstrated that they must possess these two qualities, they will hold their middle place if they receive one from each party. Consequently, as they cannot receive their eternity from beneath, because it is not there to receive, they must get it from above; and accordingly they have no choice but to complete their mediate position by accepting misery from men.According to the Platonists, then, the gods, who occupy the highest place, enjoy eternal blessedness, or blessed eternity; men, who occupy the lowest, a mortal misery, or a miserable mortality; and the demons, who occupy the mean, a miserable eternity, or an eternal misery. As to those five things which Apu leius included in his definition of demons, he did not show, as he promised, that the demons are mediate. For three of them, that their nature is animal, their mind rational, their soul subject to passions, he said that they have in common with men; one thing, their eternity, in common with the gods; and one proper to themselves, their aerial body. How, then, are they intermediate, when they have three things in common with the lowest, and only one in common with the highest? Who does not see that the intermediate position is abandoned in proportion as they tend to, and are depressed towards, the lowest extreme? But perhaps we are to accept them as intermediate because of their one property of an aerial body, as the two extremes have each their proper body, the gods an ethereal, men a terrestrial body, and because two of the qualities they possess in common with man they possess also in common with the gods, namely, their animal nature and rational mind. For Apuleius himself, in speaking of gods and men, said, "You have two animal natures." And Platonists are wont to ascribe a rational mind to the gods. Two qualities remain, their liability to passion, and their eternity,-the first of which they have in common with men, the second with the gods; so that they are neither wafted to the highest nor depressed to the lowest extreme, but perfectly poised in their intermediate position. But then, this is the very circumstance which constitutes the eternal misery, or miserable eternity, of the demons. For he who says that their soul is subject to passions would also have said that they are miserable, had he not blushed for their worshippers. Moreover, as the world is governed, not by fortuitous haphazard, but, as the Platonists themselves avow, by the providence of the supreme God, the misery of the demons would not be eternal unless their wickedness were great.If, then, the blessed are rightly styled eudemons, the demons intermediate between gods and men are not eudemons. What, then, is the local position of those good demons, who, above men but beneath the gods, afford assistance to the former, minister to the latter? For if they are good and eternal, they are doubtless blessed. But eternal blessedness destroys their intermediate character, giving them a close resemblance to the gods, and widely separating them from men. And therefore the Platonists will in vain strive to show how the good demons, if they are both immortal and blessed, can justly be said to hold a middle place between the gods, who are immortal and blessed, and men, who are mortal and miserable. For if they have both immortality and blessedness in common with the gods, and neither of these in common with men, who are both miserable and mortal, are they not rather remote from men and united with the gods, than intermediate between them. They would be intermediate if they held one of their qualities in common with the one party, and the other with the other, as man is a kind of mean between angels and beasts,-the beast being an irrational and mortal animal, the angel a rational and immortal one, while man, inferior to the angel and superior to the beast, and having in common with the one mortality, and with the other reason, is a rational and mortal animal. So, when we seek for an intermediate between the blessed immortals and miserable mortals, we should find a being which is either mortal and blessed, or immortal and miserable.
BOOK IX [XIV] Vtrum et beatus et mortalis homo esse possit, magna est inter homines quaestio. Quidam enim condicionem suam humilius inspexerunt negaveruntque hominem capacem esse posse beatitudinis, quamdiu mortaliter vivit. Quidam vero extulerunt se et ausi sunt dicere sapientiae compotes beatos esse posse mortales. Quod si ita est, cur non ipsi potius medii: constituuntur inter mortales miseros et inmortales beatos, beatitudinem habentes cum inmortalibus beatis, mortalitatem cum mortalibus miseris? Profecto enim, si beati sunt, inuident nemini (nam quid miserius inuidentia?) et ideo mortalibus miseris, quantum possunt, ad consequendam beatitudinem consulunt, ut etiam inmortales valeant esse post mortem et angelis inmortalibus beatisque coniungi.	It is a great question among men, whether man can be mortal and blessed. Some, taking the humbler view of his condition, have denied that he is capable of blessedness so long as he continues in this mortal life; others, again, have spurned this idea, and have been bold enough to maintain that, even though mortal, men may be blessed by attaining wisdom. But if this be the case, why are not these wise men constituted mediators between miserable mortals and the blessed immortals, since they have blessedness in common with the latter, and mortality in common with the former? Certainly, if they are blessed, they envy no one (for what more miserable than envy?), but seek with all their might to help miserable mortals on to blessedness, so that after death they may become immortal, and be associated with the blessed and immortal angels.
BOOK IX [XV] Si autem, quod multo credibilius et probabilius disputatur, omnes homines, quamdiu mortales sunt, etiam miseri sint necesse est, quaerendus est medius, qui non solum homo, verum etiam deus sit, ut homines ex mortali miseria ad beatam inmortalitatem huius medii beata mortalitas interveniendo perducat; quem neque non fieri mortalem oportebat, neque permanere mortalem. Mortalis quippe factus est non infirmata Verbi divinitate, sed carnis infirmitate suscepta; non autem permansit in ipsa carne mortalis, quam resuscitavit a mortuis; quoniam Ipse est fructus mediationis eius, ut nec ipsi, propter quos liberandos mediator effectus est, in perpetua vel carnis morte remanerent. Proinde mediatorem inter nos et Deum et mortalitatem habere oportuit transeuntem et beatitudinem permanentem, ut per id, quod transit, congrueret morituris, et ad id, quod permanet, transferret ex mortuis. Boni igitur angeli inter miseros mortales et beatos inmortales medii esse non possunt, quia ipsi quoque et beati et inmortales sunt; possunt autem medii esse angeli mali, quia inmortales sunt cum illis, miseri cum istis. His contrarius est mediator bonus, qui adversus eorum inmortalitatem et miseriam et mortalis esse ad tempus voluit, et beatus in aeternitate persistere potuit; ac sic eos et inmortales superbos et miseros noxios, ne inmortalitatis iactantia seducerent ad miseriam, et suae mortis humilitate et suae beatitudinis benignitate destruxit in eis, quorum corda per suam fidem mundans ab illorum inmundissima dominatione liberavit. Homo itaque mortalis et miser longe seiunctus ab inmortalibus et beatis quid eligat medium, per quod inmortalitati et beatitudini copuletur? Quod possit delectare in daemonum inmortalitate, miserum est; quod posset offendere in Christi mortalitate, iam non est. Ibi ergo cavenda est miseria sempiterna; hic mors timenda non est, quae non esse potuit sempiterna, et beatitudo amanda est sempiterna. Ad hoc se quippe interponit medius inmortalis et miser, ut ad inmortalitatem beatam transire non sinat, quoniam persistit quod inpedit, id est ipsa miseria; ad hoc se autem interposuit mortalis et beatus, ut mortalitate transacta et ex mortuis faceret inmortales, quod in se resurgendo monstravit, et ex miseris beatos, unde numquam ipse discessit. Alius est ergo medius malus, qui separat amicos; alius bonus, qui reconciliat inimicos. Et ideo multi sunt medii separatores, quia multitudo, quae beata est, unius Dei participatione fit beata; cuius participationis privatione misera multitudo malorum angelorum, quae se opponit potius ad inpedimentum, quam interponit ad beatitudinis adiutorium, etiam ipsa multitudine obstrepit quodam modo, ne possit ad illud unum beatificum <bonum> perveniri, ad quod ut perduceremur, non multis, sed uno mediatore opus erat, et hoc eo ipso, cuius participatione simus beati, hoc est Verbo Dei non facto, per quod facta sunt omnia. Nec tamen ob hoc mediator est, quia Verbum; maxime quippe inmortale et maxime beatum Verbum longe est a mortalibus miseris; sed mediator, per quod homo, eo ipso utique ostendens ad illud non solum beatum, verum etiam beatificum bonum non oportere quaeri alios mediatores, per quos arbitremur nobis peruentionis gradus esse moliendos, quia beatus et beatificus Deus factus particeps humanitatis nostrae compendium praebuit participandae divinitatis suae. Neque enim nos a mortalitate et miseria liberans ad angelos inmortales beatosque ita perducit, ut eorum participatione etiam nos inmortales et beati simus; sed ad illam Trinitatem, cuius et angeli participatione beati sunt. Ideo quando in forma serui, ut mediator esset, infra angelos esse voluit, in forma Dei supra angelos mansit; idem in inferioribus via vitae, qui in superioribus vita.	But if, as is much more probable and credible, it must needs be that all men, so long as they are mortal, are also miserable, we must seek an intermediate who is not only man, but also God, that, by the interposition of His blessed mortality, He may bring men out of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality. In this intermediate two things are requisite, that He become mortal, and that He do not continue mortal. He did become mortal, not rendering the divinity of the Word infirm, but assuming the infirmity of flesh. Neither did He continue mortal in the flesh, but raised it from the dead; for it is the very fruit of His mediation that those, for the sake of whose redemption He became the Mediator, should not abide eternally in bodily death. Wherefore it became the Mediator between us and God to have both a transient mortality and a permanent blessedness, that by that which is transient He might be assimilated to mortals, and might translate them from mortality to that which is permanent. Good angels, therefore, cannot mediate between miserable mortals and blessed immortals, for they themselves also are both blessed and immortal; but evil angels can mediate, because they are immortal like the one party, miserable like the other. To these is opposed the good Mediator, who, in opposition to their immortality and misery, has chosen to be mortal for a time, and has been able to continue blessed in eternity. It is thus He has destroyed, by the humility of His death and the benignity of His blessedness, those proud immortals and hurtful wretches, and has prevented them from seducing to misery by their boast of immortality those men whose hearts He has cleansed by faith, and whom He has thus freed from their impure dominion.Man, then, mortal and miserable, and far removed from the immortal and the blessed, what medium shall he choose by which he may be united to immortality and blessedness? The immortality of the demons, which might have some charm for man, is miserable; the mortality of Christ, which might offend man, exists no longer. In the one there is the fear of an eternal misery; in the other, death, which could not be eternal, can no longer be feared, and blessedness, which is eternal, must be loved. For the immortal and miserable mediator interposes himself to prevent us from passing to a blessed immortality, because that which hinders such a passage, namely, misery, continues in him; but the mortal and blessed Mediator interposed Himself, in order that, having passed through mortality, He might of mortals make immortals (showing His power to do this in His own resurrection), and from being miserable to raise them to the blessed company from the number of whom He had Himself never departed. There is, then, a wicked mediator, who separates friends, and a good Mediator, who reconciles enemies. And those who separate are numerous, because the multitude of the blessed are blessed only by their participation in the one God; of which participation the evil angels being deprived, they are wretched, and interpose to hinder rather than to help to this blessedness, and by their very number prevent us from reaching that one beatific good, to obtain which we need not many but one Mediator, the uncreated Word of God, by whom all things were made, and in partaking of whom we are blessed. I do not say that He is Mediator because He is the Word, for as the Word He is supremely blessed and supremely immortal, and therefore far from miserable mortals; but He is Mediator as He is man, for by His humanity He shows us that, in order to obtain that blessed and beatific good, we need not seek other mediators to lead us through the successive steps of this attainment, but that the blessed and beatific God, having Himself become a partaker of our humanity, has afforded us ready access to the participation of His divinity. For in delivering us from our mortality and misery, He does not lead us to the immortal and blessed angels, so that we should become immortal and blessed by participating in their nature, but He leads us straight to that Trinity, by participating in which the angels themselves are blessed. Therefore, when He chose to be in the form of a servant, and lower than the angels, that He might be our Mediator, He remained higher than the angels, in the form of God,-Himself at once the way of life on earth and life itself in heaven.
BOOK IX [XVI] Non enim verum est, quod idem Platonicus ait Platonem dixisse: "Nullus Deus miscetur homini"; et hoc praecipuum eorum sublimitatis ait esse specimen, quod nulla adtrectatione hominum contaminantur. Ergo daemones contaminari fatetur, et ideo eos, a quibus contaminantur, mundare non possunt omnesque inmundi pariter fiunt, et daemones contrectatione hominum et homines cultu daemonum. Aut si et contrectari miscerique hominibus, nec tamen contaminari daemones possunt, diis profecto meliores sunt, quia illi, si miscerentur, contaminarentur. Nam hoc deorum dicitur esse praecipuum, ut eos sublimiter separatos humana contrectatio contaminare non possit. Deum quidem summum omnium creatorem, quem nos verum Deum dicimus, sic a Platone praedicari asseuerat, quod ipse sit solus qui non possit penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice conprehendi; vix autem sapientibus viris, cum se vigore animi quantum licuit a corpore removerunt, intellectum huius Dei, id quoque interdum velut in altissimis tenebris rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicare. Si ergo supra omnia vere summus Deus intellegibili et ineffabili quadam praesentia, etsi interdum, etsi tamquam rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicans, adest tamen sapientium mentibus, cum se quantum licuit a corpore removerunt, nec ab eis contaminari potest: quid est quod isti dii propterea constituuntur longe in sublimi loco, ne contrectatione contaminentur humana? Quasi vero aliud corpora illa aetheria quam videre sufficiat, quorum luce terra, quantum sufficit, inlustratur. Porro si non contaminantur sidera, cum videntur, quos deos omnes visibiles dicit: nec daemones hominum contaminantur aspectu, quamuis de proximo videantur. An forte vocibus humanis contaminarentur, qui acie non contaminantur oculorum, et ideo daemones medios habent, per quos eis voces hominum nuntientur, a quibus longe absunt, ut incontaminatissimi perseuerent? Quid iam de ceteris sensibus dicam? Non enim olfaciendo contaminari vel dii possent, si adessent, vel cum adsunt daemones possunt vivorum corporum uaporibus humanorum, si tantis sacrificiorum cadaverinis non contaminantur nidoribus. In gustandi autem sensu nulla necessitate reficiendae mortalitatis urgentur, ut fame adacti cibos ab hominibus quaerant. Tactus vero in potestate est. Nam licet ab eo potissimum sensu contrectatio dicta videatur, hactenus tamen, si vellent, miscerentur hominibus, ut viderent et viderentur, audirent et audirentur. Tangendi autem quae necessitas? Nam neque homines id concupiscere auderent, cum deorum vel daemonum bonorum conspectu vel conloquio fruerentur; et si in tantum curiositas progrederetur, ut vellent: quonam pacto quispiam posset inuitum tangere deum vel daemonem, qui nisi captum non potest passerem? Videndo igitur visibusque se praebendo et loquendo et audiendo dii corporaliter misceri hominibus possent. Hoc autem modo daemones si miscentur, ut dixi, et non contaminantur, dii autem contaminarentur, si miscerentur: incontaminabiles dicunt daemones et contaminabiles deos. Si autem contaminantur et daemones, quid conferunt hominibus ad vitam post mortem beatam, quos contaminati mundare non possunt, ut eos mundos diis incontaminatis possint adiungere, inter quos et illos medii constituti sunt? Aut si hoc eis beneficii non conferunt, quid prodest hominibus daemonum amica mediatio? An ut post mortem non ad deos homines per daemones transeant, sed simul vivant utrique contaminati ac per hoc neutri beati? Nisi forte quis dicat more spongiarum vel huiusce modi rerum mundare daemones amicos suos, ut tanto ipsi sordidiores fiant, quanto fiunt homines eis velut tergentibus mundiores. Quod si ita est, contaminatioribus dii miscentur daemonibus, qui, ne contaminarentur, hominum propinquitatem contrectationemque vitarunt. An forte dii possunt ab hominibus contaminatos mundare daemones, nec ab eis contaminari, et eo modo non possent et homines? Quis talia sentiat, nisi quem fallacissimi daemones deceperunt? Quid quod, si videri et videre contaminat, videntur ab hominibus dii, quos visibiles dicit, "clarissima mundi lumina" et cetera sidera, tutioresque sunt daemones ab ista hominum contaminatione, qui non possunt videri, nisi velint? Aut si non videri, sed videre contaminat, negent ab istis clarissimis mundi luminibus, quos deos opinantur, videri homines, cum radios suos terras usque pertendant. Qui tamen eorum radii per quaeque inmunda diffusi non contaminantur, et dii contaminarentur, si hominibus miscerentur, etiamsi esset necessarius in subveniendo contactus? Nam radiis solis et lunae terra contingitur, nec istam contaminat lucem.	That opinion, which the same Platonist avers that Plato uttered, is not true, "that no god holds intercourse with men." And this, he says, is the chief evidence of their exaltation, that they are never contaminated by contact with men. He admits, therefore, that the demons are contaminated; and it follows that they cannot cleanse those by whom they are themselves contaminated, and thus all alike become impure, the demons by associating with men, and men by worshipping the demons. Or, if they say that the demons are not contaminated by associating and dealing with men, then they are better than the gods, for the gods, were they to do so, would be contaminated. For this, we are told, is the glory of the gods, that they are so highly exalted that no human intercourse can sully them. He affirms, indeed, that the supreme God, the Creator of all things, whom we call the true God, is spoken of by Plato as the only God whom the poverty of human speech fails even passably to describe; and that even the wise, when their mental energy is as far as possible delivered from the trammels of connection with the body, have only such gleams of insight into His nature as may be compared to a flash of lightning illumining the darkness. If, then, this supreme God, who is truly exalted above all things, does nevertheless visit the minds of the wise, when emancipated from the body, with an intelligible and ineffable presence, though this be only occasional, and as it were a swift flash of light athwart the darkness, why are the other gods so sublimely removed from all contact with men, as if they would be polluted by it? as if it were not a sufficient refutation of this to lift up our eyes to those heavenly bodies which give the earth its needful light. If the stars, though they, by his account, are visible gods, are not contaminated when we look at them, neither are the demons contaminated when men see them quite closely. But perhaps it is the human voice, and not the eye, which pollutes the gods; and therefore the demons are appointed to mediate and carry men's utterances to the gods, who keep themselves remote through fear of pollution? What am I to say of the other senses? For by smell neither the demons, who are present, nor the gods, though they were present and inhaling the exhalations of living men, would be polluted if they are not contaminated with the effluvia of the carcasses offered in sacrifice. As for taste, they are pressed by no necessity of repairing bodily decay, so as to be reduced to ask food from men. And touch is in their own power. For while it may seem that contact is so called, because the sense of touch is specially concerned in it, yet the gods, if so minded, might mingle with men, so as to see and be seen, hear and be heard; and where is the need of touching? For men would not dare to desire this, if they were favored with the sight or conversation of gods or good demons; and if through excessive curiosity they should desire it, how could they accomplish their wish without the consent of the god or demon, when they cannot touch so much as a sparrow unless it be caged?There is, then, nothing to hinder the gods from mingling in a bodily form with men, from seeing and being seen, from speaking and hearing. And if the demons do thus mix with men, as I said, and are not polluted, while the gods, were they to do so, should be polluted, then the demons are less liable to pollution than the gods. And if even the demons are contaminated, how can they help men to attain blessedness after death, if, so far from being able to cleanse them, and present them clean to the unpolluted gods, these mediators are themselves polluted? And if they cannot confer this benefit on men, what good can their friendly mediation do? Or shall its result be, not that men find entrance to the gods, but that men and demons abide together in a state of pollution, and consequently of exclusion from blessedness? Unless, perhaps, some one may say that, like sponges or things of that sort, the demons themselves, in the process of cleansing their friends, become themselves the filthier in proportion as the others become clean. But if this is the solution, then the gods, who shun contact or intercourse with men for fear of pollution, mix with demons who are far more polluted. Or perhaps the gods, who cannot cleanse men without polluting themselves, can without pollution cleanse the demons who have been contaminated by human contact? Who can believe such follies, unless the demons have practised their deceit upon him? If seeing and being seen is contamination, and if the gods, whom Apuleius himself calls visible, "the brilliant lights of the world," and the other stars, are seen by men, are we to believe that the demons, who cannot be seen unless they please, are safer from contamination? Or if it is only the seeing and not the being seen which contaminates, then they must deny that these gods of theirs, these brilliant lights of the world, see men when their rays beam upon the earth. Their rays are not contaminated by lighting on all manner of pollution, and are we to suppose that the gods would be contaminated if they mixed with men, and even if contact were needed in order to assist them? For there is contact between the earth and the sun's or moon's rays, and yet this does not pollute the light.
BOOK IX [XVII] Miror autem plurimum tam doctos homines, qui cuncta corporalia et sensibilia prae incorporalibus et intellegibilibus postponenda iudicaverunt, cum agitur de beata vita, corporalium contrectationum facere mentionem. Vbi est illud Plotini, ubi ait: "Fugiendum est igitur ad carissimam patriam, et ibi pater, et ibi omnia. Quae igitur, inquit, classis aut fuga? Similem Deo fieri." Si ergo deo quanto similior, tanto fit quisque propinquior: nulla est ab illo alia longinquitas quam eius dissimilitudo. Incorporali vero illi aeterno et incommutabili tanto est anima hominis dissimilior, quanto rerum temporalium mutabiliumque cupidior. Hoc ut sanetur, quoniam inmortali puritati, quae in summo est, ea quae in imo sunt mortalia et inmunda convenire non possunt, opus est.quidem mediatore; non tamen tali, qui corpus quidem habeat inmortale propinquum summis, animum autem morbidum similem infimis (quo morbo nobis inuideat potius ne sanemur, quam adivuet ut sanemur); sed tali, qui nobis infimis ex corporis mortalitate coaptatus inmortali spiritus iustitia, per quam non locorum distantia, sed similitudinis excellentia mansit in summis, mundandis liberandisque nobis vere divinum praebeat adiutorium. Qui profecto incontaminabilis Deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus est, aut ex hominibus inter quos in homine conversatus est. Non enim parua sunt haec interim duo, quae salubriter sua incarnatione monstravit, nec carne posse contaminari veram divinitatem, nec ideo putandos daemones nobis esse meliores, quia non habent carnem. Hic est, sicut eum sancta scriptura praedicat, mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus, de cuius et divinitate, qua patri est semper aequalis, et humanitate, qua nobis factus est similis, non hic locus est ut competenter pro nostra facultate dicamus.	I am considerably surprised that such learned men, men who pronounce all material and sensible things to be altogether inferior to those that are spiritual and intelligible, should mention bodily contact in connection with the blessed life. Is that sentiment of Plotinus forgotten?-"We must fly to our beloved fatherland. There is the Father, there our all. What fleet or flight shall convey us thither? Our way is, to become like God." If, then, one is nearer to God the liker he is to Him, there is no other distance from God than unlikeness to Him. And the soul of man is unlike that incorporeal and unchangeable and eternal essence, in proportion as it craves things temporal and mutable. And as the things beneath, which are mortal and impure, cannot hold intercourse with the immortal purity which is above, a mediator is indeed needed to remove this difficulty; but not a mediator who resembles the highest order of being by possessing an immortal body, and the lowest by having a diseased soul, which makes him rather grudge that we be healed than help our cure. We need a Mediator who, being united to us here below by the mortality of His body, should at the same time be able to afford us truly divine help in cleansing and liberating us by means of the immortal righteousness of His spirit, whereby He remained heavenly even while here upon earth. Far be it from the incontaminable God to fear pollution from the man He assumed, or from the men among whom He lived in the form of a man. For, though His incarnation showed us nothing else, these two wholesome facts were enough, that true divinity cannot be polluted by flesh, and that demons are not to be considered better than ourselves because they have not flesh. This, then, as Scripture says, is the "Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus," 1 Timothy 2:5 of whose divinity, whereby He is equal to the Father, and humanity, whereby He has become like us, this is not the place to speak as fully as I could.
BOOK IX [XVIII] Falsi autem illi fallacesque mediatores daemones, qui, cum per spiritus inmunditiam miseri ac maligni multis effectibus clareant, per corporalium tamen locorum interualla et per aeriorum corporum levitatem a provectu animorum nos auocare atque avertere moliuntur, non viam praebent ad Deum, sed, ne via teneatur, inpediunt. Quando quidem et in ipsa via corporali (quae falsissima est et plenissima erroris, qua non iter agit iustitia; quoniam non per corporalem altitudinem, sed per spiritalem, hoc est incorporalem, similitudinem ad Deum debemus ascendere) -- in ipsa tamen via corporali, quam daemonum amici per elementorum gradus ordinant inter aetherios deos et terrenos homines aeriis daemonibus mediis constitutis, hoc deos opinantur habere praecipuum, ut propter hoc interuallum locorum contrectatione non contaminentur humana. Ita daemones contaminari potius ab hominibus, quam homines mundari a daemonibus credunt, et deos ipsos contaminari potuisse, nisi loci altitudine munirentur. Quis tam infelix est, ut ista via mundari se existimet, ubi homines contaminantes, daemones contaminati, dii contaminabiles praedicantur; et non potius eligat viam, ubi contaminantes magis daemones evitentur et ab incontaminabili Deo ad ineundam societatem incontaminatorum angelorum homines a contaminatione mundentur?	As to the demons, these false and deceitful mediators, who, though their uncleanness of spirit frequently reveals their misery and malignity, yet, by virtue of the levity of their aerial bodies and the nature of the places they inhabit, do contrive to turn us aside and hinder our spiritual progress; they do not help us towards God, but rather prevent us from reaching Him. Since even in the bodily way, which is erroneous and misleading, and in which righteousness does not walk,-for we must rise to God not by bodily ascent, but by incorporeal or spiritual conformity to Him,-in this bodily way, I say, which the friends of the demons arrange according to the weight of the various elements, the aerial demons being set between the ethereal gods and earthy men, they imagine the gods to have this privilege, that by this local interval they are preserved from the pollution of human contact. Thus they believe that the demons are contaminated by men rather than men cleansed by the demons, and that the gods themselves should be polluted unless their local superiority preserved them. Who is so wretched a creature as to expect purification by a way in which men are contaminating, demons contaminated, and gods contaminable? Who would not rather choose that way whereby we escape the contamination of the demons, and are cleansed from pollution by the incontaminable God, so as to be associated with the uncontaminated angels?
BOOK IX [XIX] Sed ne de verbis etiam nos certare videamur, quoniam nonnulli istorum, ut ita dixerim, daemonicolarum, in quibus et Labeo est, eosdem perhibent ab aliis angelos dici, quos Ipsi daemones nuncupant, iam mihi de bonis angelis aliquid video disserendum, quos isti esse non negant, sed eos bonos daemones vocare quam angelos malunt. Nos autem, sicut scriptura loquitur, secundum quam Christiani sumus, angelos quidem partim bonos, partim malos, numquam vero bonos daemones legimus; sed ubicumque illarum litterarum hoc nomen positum reperitur, sive daemones, sive daemonia dicantur, non nisi maligni significantur spiritus. Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum populi usquequaque secuti sunt, ut eorum etiam, qui pagani appellantur et deos multos ac daemones colendos esse contendunt, nullus fere sit tam litteratus et doctus, qui audeat in laude vel seruo suo dicere: "Daemonem habes"; sed cuilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi, quam maledicere voluisse, dubitare non possit. Quae igitur nos causa compellit, ut post offensionem aurium tam multarum, ut iam paene sint omnium, quae hoc verbum non nisi in malam partem audire consuerunt, quod diximus cogamur exponere, cum possimus angelorum nomine adhibito eandem offensionem, quae nomine daemonum fieri poterat, evitare?	But as some of these demonolators, as I may call them, and among them Labeo, allege that those whom they call demons are by others called angels, I must, if I would not seem to dispute merely about words, say something about the good angels. The Platonists do not deny their existence, but prefer to call them good demons. But we, following Scripture, according to which we are Christians, have learned that some of the angels are good, some bad, but never have we read in Scripture of good demons; but wherever this or any cognate term occurs, it is applied only to wicked spirits. And this usage has become so universal, that, even among those who are called pagans, and who maintain that demons as well as gods should be worshipped, there is scarcely a man, no matter how well read and learned, who would dare to say by way of praise to his slave, You have a demon, or who could doubt that the man to whom he said this would consider it a curse? Why, then, are we to subject ourselves to the necessity of explaining away what we have said when we have given offence by using the word demon, with which every one, or almost every one, connects a bad meaning, while we can so easily evade this necessity by using the word angel?
BOOK IX [XX] Quamquam etiam ipsa origo huius nominis, si divinos intueamur libros, aliquid adfert cognitione dignissimum. Daemones enim dicuntur (quoniam vocabulum Graecum est) ab scientia nominati. Apostolus autem spiritu sancto locutus ait: Scientia inflat, caritas vero aedificat; quod recte aliter non intellegitur, nisi scientiam tunc prodesse, cum caritas inest; sine hac autem inflare, id est in superbiam inanissimae quasi ventositatis extollere. Est ergo in daemonibus scientia sine caritate, et ideo tam inflati, hoc est tam superbi sunt, ut honores divinos et religionis seruitutem, quam vero Deo deberi sciunt, sibi satis egerint exhiberi, et quantum possunt et apud quos possunt adhuc agant. Contra superbiam porro daemonum, qua pro meritis possidebatur genus humanum, Dei humilitas, quae in Christo apparuit, quantam virtutem habeat, animae hominum nesciunt inmunditia elationis inflatae, daemonibus similes superbia, non scientia.	However, the very origin of the name suggests something worthy of consideration, if we compare it with the divine books. They are called demons from a Greek word meaning knowledge. Now the apostle, speaking with the Holy Spirit, says, "Knowledge puffs up, but charity builds up." 1 Corinthians 8:1 And this can only be understood as meaning that without charity knowledge does no good, but inflates a man or magnifies him with an empty windiness. The demons, then, have knowledge without charity, and are thereby so inflated or proud, that they crave those divine honors and religious services which they know to be due to the true God, and still, as far as they can, exact these from all over whom they have influence. Against this pride of the demons, under which the human race was held subject as its merited punishment, there was exerted the mighty influence of the humility of God, who appeared in the form of a servant; but men, resembling the demons in pride, but not in knowledge, and being puffed up with uncleanness, failed to recognize Him.
BOOK IX [XXI] Ipsi autem daemones etiam hoc ita sciunt, ut eidem Domino infirmitate carnis induto dixerint: Quid nobis et tibi, Iesu Nazarene? Venisti perdere nos? Clarum est in his verbis, quod in eis et tanta scientia erat, et caritas non erat. Poenam suam quippe formidabant ab illo, non in illo iustitiam diligebant. Tantum vero eis innotuit, quantum voluit; tantum autem voluit, quantum oportuit. Sed innotuit non sicut angelis sanctis, qui eius, secundum id quod Dei Verbum est, participata aeternitate perfruuntur, sed sicut eis terrendis innotescendum fuit, ex quorum tyrannica quodam modo potestate fuerat liberaturus praedestinatos in suum regnum et gloriam semper veracem et veraciter sempiternam. Innotuit ergo daemonibus non per id, quod est vita aeterna et lumen incommutabile, quod inluminat pios, cui videndo per fidem, quae in illo est, corda mundantur, sed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta et occultissimae signa praesentiae, quae angelicis sensibus etiam malignorum spirituum potius quam infirmitati hominum possent esse conspicua. Denique quando ea paululum supprimenda iudicavit et aliquanto altius latuit, dubitavit de illo daemonum princeps eumque temptavit, an Christus esset explorans, quantum se temptari ipse permisit, ut hominem, quem gerebat, ad nostrae imitationis temperaret exemplum. Post illam vero temptationem, cum angeli, sicut scriptum est, ministrarent ei, boni utique et sancti ac per hoc spiritibus inmundis metuendi et tremendi, magis magisque innotescebat daemonibus quantus esset, ut ei iubenti, quamuis in illo contemptibilis videretur carnis infirmitas, resistere nullus auderet.	The devils themselves knew this manifestation of God so well, that they said to the Lord though clothed with the infirmity of flesh, "What have we to do with You, Jesus of Nazareth? Have You come to destroy us before the time?" Mark 1:24 From these words, it is clear that they had great knowledge, and no charity. They feared His power to punish, and did not love His righteousness. He made known to them so much as He pleased, and He was pleased to make known so much as was needful. But He made Himself known not as to the holy angels, who know Him as the Word of God, and rejoice in His eternity, which they partake, but as was requisite to strike with terror the beings from whose tyranny He was going to free those who were predestined to His kingdom and the glory of it, eternally true and truly eternal. He made Himself known, therefore, to the demons, not by that which is life eternal, and the unchangeable light which illumines the pious, whose souls are cleansed by the faith that is in Him, but by some temporal effects of His power, and evidences of His mysterious presence, which were more easily discerned by the angelic senses even of wicked spirits than by human infirmity. But when He judged it advisable gradually to suppress these signs, and to retire into deeper obscurity, the prince of the demons doubted whether He were the Christ, and endeavored to ascertain this by tempting Him, in so far as He permitted Himself to be tempted, that He might adapt the manhood He wore to be an example for our imitation. But after that temptation, when, as Scripture says, He was ministered to Matthew 4:3-11 by the angels who are good and holy, and therefore objects of terror to the impure spirits, He revealed more and more distinctly to the demons how great He was, so that, even though the infirmity of His flesh might seem contemptible, none dared to resist His authority.
BOOK IX [XXII] His igitur angelis bonis omnis corporalium temporaliumque rerum scientia, qua inflantur daemones, vilis est; non quod earum ignari sint, sed quod illis Dei, qua sanctificantur, caritas cara est, prae cuius non tantum incorporali, verum etiam incommutabili et ineffabili pulchritudine, cuius sancto amore inardescunt, omnia, quae infra sunt et, quod illud est, non sunt seque ipsos inter illa contemnunt, ut ex toto, quod boni sunt, eo bono, ex quo boni sunt, perfruantur. Et ideo certius etiam temporalia et mutabilia ista noverunt, quia eorum principales causas in Verbo Dei conspiciunt, per quod factus est mundus; quibus causis quaedam probantur, quaedam reprobantur, cuncta ordinantur. Daemones autem non aeternas temporum causas et quodam modo cardinales in Dei sapientia contemplantur, sed quorundam signorum nobis occultorum maiore experientia multo plura quam homines futura prospiciunt; dispositiones quoque suas aliquando praenuntiant. Denique saepe isti, numquam illi omnino falluntur. Aliud est enim temporalibus temporalia et mutabilibus mutabilia coniectare eisque temporalem et mutabilem modum suae voluntatis et facultatis inserere, quod daemonibus certa ratione permissum est; aliud autem in aeternis atque incommutabilibus Dei legibus, quae in eius sapientia vivunt, mutationes temporum praevidere Deique voluntatem, quae tam certissima quam potentissima est omnium, spiritus eius participatione cognoscere; quod sanctis angelis recta discretione donatum est. Itaque non solum aeterni, verum etiam beati sunt. Bonum autem, quo beati sunt, Deus illis est, a quo creati sunt. Illius quippe indeclinabiliter participatione et contemplatione perfruuntur.	The good angels, therefore, hold cheap all that knowledge of material and transitory things which the demons are so proud of possessing,-not that they are ignorant of these things, but because the love of God, whereby they are sanctified, is very dear to them, and because, in comparison of that not merely immaterial but also unchangeable and ineffable beauty, with the holy love of which they are inflamed, they despise all things which are beneath it, and all that is not it, that they may with every good thing that is in them enjoy that good which is the source of their goodness. And therefore they have a more certain knowledge even of those temporal and mutable things, because they contemplate their principles and causes in the word of God, by which the world was made,-those causes by which one thing is, approved, another rejected, and all arranged. But the demons do not behold in the wisdom of God these eternal, and, as it were, cardinal causes of things temporal, but only foresee a larger part of the future than men do, by reason of their greater acquaintance with the signs which are hidden from us. Sometimes, too, it is their own intentions they predict. And, finally, the demons are frequently, the angels never, deceived. For it is one thing, by the aid of things temporal and changeable, to conjecture the changes that may occur in time, and to modify such things by one's own will and faculty,-and this is to a certain extent permitted to the demons,-it is another thing to foresee the changes of times in the eternal and immutable laws of God, which live in His wisdom, and to know the will of God, the most infallible and powerful of all causes, by participating in His spirit; and this is granted to the holy angels by a just discretion. And thus they are not only eternal, but blessed. And the good wherein they are blessed is God, by whom they were created. For without end they enjoy the contemplation and participation of Him.
BOOK IX [XXIII] Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere eisque adnumerare, quos a summo Deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato: dicant quod volunt; non enim cum eis de verborum controversia laborandum est. Si enim sic inmortales, ut tamen a summo Deo factos, et si non per se ipsos, sed ei, a quo facti sunt, adhaerendo beatos esse dicunt: hoc dicunt quod dicimus, quolibet eos nomine appellent. Hanc autem Platonicorum esse sententiam, sive omnium sive meliorum, in eorum litteris inveniri potest. Nam et de ipso nomine, quod huius modi inmortalem beatamque creaturam deos appellant, ideo inter nos et ipsos paene nulla dissensio est, quia et in nostris sacris litteris legitur: Deus deorum dominus locutus est, et alibi: Confitemini deo deorum, et alibi: Rex magnus super omnes deos. Illud autem ubi scriptum est: Terribilis est super omnes deos, cur dictum sit, deinceps ostenditur. Sequitur enim: Quoniam omnes dii gentium daemonia, Dominus autem caelos fecit. Super omnes ergo deos dixit, sed gentium, id est quos gentes pro diis habent, quae sunt daemonia; ideo terribilis, sub quo terrore Domino dicebant: Venisti perdere nos? Illud vero, ubi dicitur: Deus deorum, non potest intellegi deus daemoniorum; et rex magnus super omnes deos absit ut dicatur rex magnus super omnia daemonia. Sed homines quoque in populo Dei eadem scriptura deos appellat. Ego, inquit, dixi, dii estis et filii Excelsi omnes. Potest itaque intellegi horum deorum deus, qui dictus est deus deorum, et super hos deos rex magnus, qui dictus est rex magnus super omnes deos. Verum tamen cum a nobis quaeritur: Si homines dicti sunt dii, quod in populo Dei sunt, quem per angelos vel per homines alloquitur Deus, quanto magis inmortales eo nomine digni sunt, qui ea fruuntur beatitudine, ad quam Deum colendo cupiunt homines pervenire: quid respondebimus nisi non frustra in scripturis sanctis expressius homines nuncupatos deos, quam illos inmortales et beatos, quibus nos aequales futuros in resurrectione promittitur, ne scilicet propter illorum excellentiam aliquem eorum nobis constituere deum infidelis auderet infirmitas? Quod in homine facile est evitare. Et evidentius dici debuerunt homines dii in populo Dei, ut certi ac fidentes fierent eum esse Deum suum, qui dictus est deus deorum f quia etsi appellentur dii inmortales illi et beati, qui in caelis sunt, non tamen dicti sunt dii deorum, id est dii hominum in populo Dei constitutorum, quibus dictum est: Ego dixi, dii estis et filii Excelsi omnes. Hinc est quod ait apostolus: Etsi sunt qui dicuntur dii, sive in caelo sive in terra, sicuti sunt dii multi et domini multis nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia et nos in ipso, et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum. Non multum ergo de nomine disceptandum est, cum res ipsa ita clareat, ut ab scrupulo dubitationis aliena sit. Illud vero, quod nos ex eorum inmortalium beatorum numero missos esse angelos dicimus, qui Dei voluntatem hominibus adnuntiarent, illis autem non placet, quia hoc ministerium non per illos, quos deos appellant, id est inmortales et beatos, sed per daemones fieri credunt, quos inmortales tantum, non etiam beatos audent dicere, aut certe ita inmortales et beatos, ut tamen daemones bonos, non deos sublimiter conlocatos et ab humana contrectatione semotos, quamuis nominis controversia videatur, tamen ita detestabile est nomen daemonum, ut hoc modis omnibus a sanctis angelis nos removere debeamus. Nunc ergo ita liber iste claudatur, ut sciamus inmortales et beatos, quodlibet vocentur, qui tamen facti et creati sunt, medios non esse ad inmortalem beatitudinem perducendis mortalibus miseris, a quibus utraque differentia separantur. Qui autem medii sunt communem habendo inmortalitatem cum superioribus, miseriam cum inferioribus, quoniam merito malitiae miseri sunt, beatitudinem, quam non habent, inuidere nobis <possunt> potius quam praebere. Vnde nihil habent amici daemonum quod nobis dignum adferant, cur eos tamquam adiutores colere debeamus, quos potius ut deceptores vitare debemus. Quos autem bonos et ideo non solum inmortales, verum etiam beatos deorum nomine sacris et sacrificiis propter vitam beatam post mortem adipiscendam colendos putant, qualescumque illi sint et quolibet vocabulo digni sint, non eos velle per tale religionis obsequium nisi unum Deum coli, a quo creati et cuius participatione beati sunt, adivuante ipso in sequenti libro diligentius disseremus.	If the Platonists prefer to call these angels gods rather than demons, and to reckon them with those whom Plato, their founder and master, maintains were created by the supreme God, they are welcome to do so, for I will not spend strength in fighting about words. For if they say that these beings are immortal, and yet created by the supreme God, blessed but by cleaving to their Creator and not by their own power, they say what we say, whatever name they call these beings by. And that this is the opinion either of all or the best of the Platonists can be ascertained by their writings. And regarding the name itself, if they see fit to call such blessed and immortal creatures gods, this need not give rise to any serious discussion between us, since in our own Scriptures we read, "The God of gods, the Lord has spoken;" and again, "Confess to the God of gods;" and again, "He is a great King above all gods." And where it is said, "He is to be feared above all gods," the reason is forthwith added, for it follows, "for all the gods of the nations are idols, but the Lord made the heavens." He said, "above all gods," but added, "of the nations;" that is to say, above all those whom the nations count gods, in other words, demons. By them He is to be feared with that terror in which they cried to the Lord, "Have You come to destroy us?" But where it is said, "the God of gods," it cannot be understood as the god of the demons; and far be it from us to say that "great King above all gods" means "great King above all demons." But the same Scripture also calls men who belong to God's people "gods:" "I have said, You are gods, and all of you children of the Most High." Accordingly, when God is styled God of gods, this may be understood of these gods; and so, too, when He is styled a great King above all gods. Nevertheless, some one may say, if men are called gods because they belong to God's people, whom He addresses by means of men and angels, are not the immortals, who already enjoy that felicity which men seek to attain by worshipping God, much more worthy of the title? And what shall we reply to this, if not that it is not without reason that in holy Scripture men are more expressly styled gods than those immortal and blessed spirits to whom we hope to be equal in the resurrection, because there was a fear that the weakness of unbelief, being overcome with the excellence of these beings, might presume to constitute some of them a god? In the case of men this was a result that need not be guarded against. Besides, it was right that the men belonging to God's people should be more expressly called gods, to assure and certify them that He who is called God of gods is their God; because, although those immortal and blessed spirits who dwell in the heavens are called gods, yet they are not called gods of gods, that is to say, gods of the men who constitute God's people, and to whom it is said, "I have said, You are gods, and all of you the children of the Most High." Hence the saying of the apostle, "Though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, as there be gods many and lords many, but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him." 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 We need not, therefore, laboriously contend about the name, since the reality is so obvious as to admit of no shadow of doubt. That which we say, that the angels who are sent to announce the will of God to men belong to the order of blessed immortals, does not satisfy the Platonists, because they believe that this ministry is discharged, not by those whom they call gods, in other words, not by blessed immortals, but by demons, whom they dare not affirm to be blessed, but only immortal, or if they do rank them among the blessed immortals, yet only as good demons, and not as gods who dwell in the heaven of heavens remote from all human contact. But, though it may seem mere wrangling about a name, yet the name of demon is so detestable that we cannot bear in any sense to apply it to the holy angels. Now, therefore, let us close this book in the assurance that, whatever we call these immortal and blessed spirits, who yet are only creatures, they do not act as mediators to introduce to everlasting felicity miserable mortals, from whom they are severed by a twofold distinction. And those others who are mediators, in so far as they have immortality in common with their superiors, and misery in common with their inferiors (for they are justly miserable in punishment of their wickedness), cannot bestow upon us, but rather grudge that we should possess, the blessedness from which they themselves are excluded. And so the friends of the demons have nothing considerable to allege why we should rather worship them as our helpers than avoid them as traitors to our interests. As for those spirits who are good, and who are therefore not only immortal but also blessed, and to whom they suppose we should give the title of gods, and offer worship and sacrifices for the sake of inheriting a future life, we shall, by God's help, endeavor in the following book to show that these spirits, call them by what name, and ascribe to them what nature you will, desire that religious worship be paid to God alone, by whom they were created, and by whose communications of Himself to them they are blessed.

Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God Book IX

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