|
|
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
| − | -----------------------------
| + | Moved to [http://www.logicmuseum.com/authors/augustine/civitate-5.htm here]. |
| − | ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK V
| |
| − | -----------------------------
| |
| − | [[Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God|Index]]
| |
| − | | |
| − | Translated by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcus_Dods_%28theologian%29 Marcus Dods]
| |
| − | | |
| − | | |
| − | *[[#c0|Introduction]]
| |
| − | *[[#c1|Chapter 1]] That the Cause of the Roman Empire, and of All Kingdoms, is Neither Fortuitous Nor Consists in the Position of the Stars
| |
| − | *[[#c2|Chapter 2]] On the Difference in the Health of Twins
| |
| − | *[[#c3|Chapter 3]] Concerning the Arguments Which Nigidius the Mathematician Drew from the Potter's Wheel, in the Question About the Birth of Twins
| |
| − | *[[#c4|Chapter 4]] Concerning the Twins Esau and Jacob, Who Were Very Unlike Each Other Both in Their Character and Actions
| |
| − | *[[#c5|Chapter 5]] In What Manner the Mathematicians are Convicted of Professing a Vain Science
| |
| − | *[[#c6|Chapter 6]] Concerning Twins of Different Sexes
| |
| − | *[[#c7|Chapter 7]] Concerning the Choosing of a Day for Marriage, or for Planting, or Sowing
| |
| − | *[[#c8|Chapter 8]] Concerning Those Who Call by the Name of Fate, Not the Position of the Stars, But the Connection of Causes Which Depends on the Will of God
| |
| − | *[[#c9|Chapter 9]] Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition to the Definition of Cicero
| |
| − | *[[#c10|Chapter 10]] Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity
| |
| − | *[[#c11|Chapter 11]] Concerning the Universal Providence of God in the Laws of Which All Things are Comprehended
| |
| − | *[[#c12|Chapter 12]] By What Virtues the Ancient Romans Merited that the True God, Although They Did Not Worship Him, Should Enlarge Their Empire
| |
| − | *[[#c13|Chapter 13]] Concerning the Love of Praise, Which, Though It is a Vice, is Reckoned a Virtue, Because by It Greater Vice is Restrained
| |
| − | *[[#c14|Chapter 14]] Concerning the Eradication of the Love of Human Praise, Because All the Glory of the Righteous is in God
| |
| − | *[[#c15|Chapter 15]] Concerning the Temporal Reward Which God Granted to the Virtues of the Romans
| |
| − | *[[#c16|Chapter 16]] Concerning the Reward of the Holy Citizens of the Celestial City, to Whom the Example of the Virtues of the Romans are Useful
| |
| − | *[[#c17|Chapter 17]] To What Profit the Romans Carried on Wars, and How Much They Contributed to the Well-Being of Those Whom They Conquered
| |
| − | *[[#c18|Chapter 18]] How Far Christians Ought to Be from Boasting, If They Have Done Anything for the Love of the Eternal Country, When the Romans Did Such Great Things]] for Human Glory and a Terrestrial City
| |
| − | *[[#c19|Chapter 19]] Concerning the Difference Between True Glory and the Desire of Domination
| |
| − | *[[#c20|Chapter 20]] That It is as Shameful for the Virtues to Serve Human Glory as Bodily Pleasure
| |
| − | *[[#c21|Chapter 21]] That the Roman Dominion Was Granted by Him from Whom is All Power, and by Whose Providence All Things are Ruled
| |
| − | *[[#c22|Chapter 22]] The Durations and Issues of War Depend on the Will of God
| |
| − | *[[#c23|Chapter 23]] Concerning the War in Which Radagaisus, King of the Goths, a Worshipper of Demons, Was Conquered in One Day, with All His Mighty Forces
| |
| − | *[[#c24|Chapter 24]] What Was the Happiness of the Christian Emperors, and How Far It Was True Happiness
| |
| − | *[[#c25|Chapter 25]] Concerning the Prosperity Which God Granted to the Christian Emperor Constantine
| |
| − | *[[#c26|Chapter 26]] On the Faith and Piety of Theodosius Augustus
| |
| − | | |
| − | | |
| − |
| |
| − | | |
| − | | |
| − | {| border=1 cellpadding=10
| |
| − | !valign = top width=45%|Latin
| |
| − | !valign = top width=55%|Latin
| |
| − | | |
| − |
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c0"><b>BOOK V</b> [Pr] Quoniam constat omnium rerum optandarum plenitudinem esse felicitatem, quae non est dea, sed donum Dei, et ideo nullum deum colendum esse ab hominibus, nisi qui potest eos facere felices (unde sit illa dea esset, sola colenda merito diceretur): iam consequenter videamus, qua causa Deus, qui potest et illa bona dare, quae habere possunt etiam non boni ac per hoc etiam non felices, Romanum imperium tam magnum tamque diuturnum esse voluerit. Quia enim hoc deorum falsorum illa quam colebant multitudo non fecit, et multa iam diximus, et ubi visum fuerit oportunum esse dicemus. ||The City of God (Book V) Argument-Augustin first discusses the doctrine of fate, for the sake of confuting those who are disposed to refer to fate the power and increase of the Roman empire, which could not be attributed to false gods, as has been shown in the preceding book. After that, he proves that there is no contradiction between God's prescience and our free will. He then speaks of the manners of the ancient Romans, and shows in what sense it was due to the virtue of the Romans themselves, and in how far to the counsel of God, that he increased their dominion, though they did not worship him. Finally, he explains what is to be accounted the true happiness of the Christian emperors.Preface.Since, then, it is established that the complete attainment of all we desire is that which constitutes felicity, which is no goddess, but a gift of God, and that therefore men can worship no god save Him who is able to make them happy,-and were Felicity herself a goddess, she would with reason be the only object of worship,-since, I say, this is established, let us now go on to consider why God, who is able to give with all other things those good gifts which can be possessed by men who are not good, and consequently not happy, has seen fit to grant such extended and long-continued dominion to the Roman empire; for that this was not effected by that multitude of false gods which they worshipped, we have both already adduced, and shall, as occasion offers, yet adduce considerable proof.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c1"><b>BOOK V</b> [I] Causa ergo magnitudinis imperii Romani nec fortuita est nec fatalis secundum eorum sententiam sive opinionem, qui ea dicunt esse fortuita, quae vel nullas causas habent vel non ex aliquo rationabili ordine venientes, et ea fatalia, quae praeter Dei et hominum voluntatem cuiusdam ordinis necessitate contingunt. Prorsus divina providentia regna constituuntur humana. Quae si propterea quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Cur enim non hoc primum dicit, quod postea dicturus est, cum ab illo quisquam quaesierit quid dixerit fatum? Nam, id homines quando audiunt, usitata loquendi consuetudine non intellegunt nisi vim positionis siderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur; quod aliqui alienant a Dei voluntate, aliqui ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. Sed illi, qui sine Dei voluntate decernere opinantur sidera quid agamus vel quid bonorum habeamus malorumue patiamur, ab auribus omnium repellendi sunt, non solum eorum qui veram religionem tenent sed <et> qui deorum qualiumcumque, licet falsorum, volunt esse cultores. Haec enim opinio quid agit aliud, nisi ut nullus omnino colatur aut rogetur Deus? Contra quos modo nobis disputatio non est instituta, sed contra hos qui pro defensione eorum, quos deos putant, Christianae religioni adversantur. Illi vero, qui positionem stellarum quodam modo decernentium qualis quisque sit et quid ei proveniat boni quidue mali accidat ex Dei voluntate suspendunt, si easdem stellas putant habere hanc potestatem traditam sibi a summa illius potestate, ut volentes ista decernant: magnam caelo faciunt iniuriam, in cuius velut clarissimo senatu ac splendidissima curia opinantur scelera facienda decerni, qualia si aliqua terrena civitas decrevisset, genere humano decernente fuerat euertenda. Quale deinde iudicium de hominum factis Deo relinquitur, quibus caelestis necessitas adhibetur, cum dominus ille sit et siderum et hominum? Aut si non dicunt stellas, accepta quidem potestate a summo Deo, arbitrio suo ista decernere, sed in talibus necessitatibus ingerendis illius omnino iussa complere: itane de ipso Deo sentiendum est, quod indignissimum visum est de stellarum voluntate sentire? Quod si dicuntur stellae significare potius ista quam facere, ut quasi locutio quaedam sit illa positio praedicens futura, non agens (non enim mediocriter doctorum hominum fuit ista sententia): non quidem ita solent loqui mathematici, ut verbi gratia dicant: "Mars ita positus homicidam significat", sed: "homicidam facit"; veruntamen ut concedamus non eos ut debent loqui et a philosophis accipere oportere sermonis regulam ad ea praenuntianda, quae in siderum positione reperire se putant: quid fit, quod nihil umquam dicere potuerunt, cur in vita geminorum, in actionibus, in euentis, in professionibus, artibus, honoribus ceterisque rebus ad humanam vitam pertinentibus atque in ipsa morte sit plerumque tanta diversitas, ut similiores eis sint, quantum ad haec adtinet, multi extranei quam ipsi inter se gemini perexiguo temporis interuallo in nascendo separati, in conceptu autem per unum concubitum uno etiam momento seminati? ||The cause, then, of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judgment or opinion of those who call those things fortuitous which either have no causes, or such causes as do not proceed from some intelligible order, and those things fatal which happen independently of the will of God and man, by the necessity of a certain order. In a word, human kingdoms are established by divine providence. And if any one attributes their existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God itself by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his language. For why does he not say at first what he will say afterwards, when some one shall put the question to him, What he means by fate? For when men hear that word, according to the ordinary use of the language, they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular position of the stars which may exist at the time when any one is born or conceived, which some separate altogether from the will of God, while others affirm that this also is dependent on that will. But those who are of opinion that, apart from the will of God, the stars determine what we shall do, or what good things we shall possess, or what evils we shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not only by those who hold the true religion, but by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does this opinion really amount to but this, that no god whatever is to be worshipped or prayed to? Against these, however, our present disputation is not intended to be directed, but against those who, in defence of those whom they think to be gods, oppose the Christian religion. They, however, who make the position of the stars depend on the divine will, and in a manner decree what character each man shall have, and what good or evil shall happen to him, if they think that these same stars have that power conferred upon them by the supreme power of God, in order that they may determine these things according to their will, do a great injury to the celestial sphere, in whose most brilliant senate, and most splendid senate-house, as it were, they suppose that wicked deeds are decreed to be done,-such deeds as that, if any terrestrial state should decree them, it would be condemned to overthrow by the decree of the whole human race. What judgment, then, is left to God concerning the deeds of men, who is Lord both of the stars and of men, when to these deeds a celestial necessity is attributed? Or, if they do not say that the stars, though they have indeed received a certain power from God, who is supreme, determine those things according to their own discretion, but simply that His commands are fulfilled by them instrumentally in the application and enforcing of such necessities, are we thus to think concerning God even what it seemed unworthy that we should think concerning the will of the stars? But, if the stars are said rather to signify these things than to effect them, so that that position of the stars is, as it were, a kind of speech predicting, not causing future things,-for this has been the opinion of men of no ordinary learning,-certainly the mathematicians are not wont so to speak saying, for example, Mars in such or such a position signifies a homicide, but makes a homicide. But, nevertheless, though we grant that they do not speak as they ought, and that we ought to accept as the proper form of speech that employed by the philosophers in predicting those things which they think they discover in the position of the stars, how comes it that they have never been able to assign any cause why, in the life of twins, in their actions, in the events which befall them, in their professions, arts, honors, and other things pertaining to human life, also in their very death, there is often so great a difference, that, as far as these things are concerned, many entire strangers are more like them than they are like each other, though separated at birth by the smallest interval of time, but at conception generated by the same act of copulation, and at the same moment?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c2"><b>BOOK V</b> [II] Cicero dicit Hippocratem, nobilissimum medicum, scriptum reliquisse, quosdam fratres, cum simul aegrotare coepissent et eorum morbus eodem tempore ingravesceret, eodem leuaretur, geminos suspicatum; quos Posidonius Stoicus, multum astrologiae deditus, eadem constitutione astrorum natos eademque conceptos solebat asserere. Ita quod medicus pertinere credebat ad simillimam temperiem valetudinis, hoc philosophus astrologus ad vim constitutionemque siderum, quae fuerat quo tempore concepti natique sunt. In hac causa multo est acceptabilior et de proximo credibilior coniectura medicinalis, quoniam parentes ut erant corpore adfecti, dum concumberent, ita primordia conceptorum adfici potuerunt, ut consecutis ex materno corpore prioribus incrementis paris valetudinis nascerentur; deinde in una domo eisdem alimentis nutriti, ubi aerem et loci positionem et vim aquarum plurimum valere ad corpus vel bene vel male accipiendum medicina testatur, eisdem etiam exercitationibus adsuefacti tam similia corpora gererent, ut etiam ad aegrotandum uno tempore eisdemque causis similiter moverentur. Constitutionem vero caeli ac siderum, quae fuit quando concepti sive nati sunt, velle trahere ad istam aegrotandi parilitatem, cum tam multa diversissimi generis diversissimorum effectuum et euentorum eodem tempore in unius regionis terra eidem caelo subdita potuerint concipi et nasci, nescio cuius sit insolentiae. Nos autem novimus geminos non solum actus et peregrinationes habere diversas, verum etiam dispares aegritudines perpeti. De qua re facillimam, quantum mihi videtur, rationem redderet Hippocrates, diversis alimentis et exercitationibus, quae non de corporis temperatione, sed de animi voluntate veniunt, dissimiles eis accidere potuisse valetudines. Porro autem Posidonius vel quilibet fatalium siderum assertor mirum si potest hic invenire quid dicat, si nolit imperitorum mentibus in eis quas nesciunt rebus inludere. Quod enim conantur efficere de interuallo exiguo temporis, quod inter se gemini dum nascerentur habuerunt, propter caeli particulam, ubi ponitur horae notatio, quem horoscopum vocant: aut non tantum valet, quanta invenitur in geminorum voluntatibus actibus moribus casibusque diversitas, aut plus etiam valet, quam est geminorum vel humilitas generis eadem vel nobilitas, cuius maximam diversitatem non nisi in hora, qua quisque nascitur, ponunt. Ac per hoc si tam celeriter alter post alterum nascitur, ut eadem pars horoscopi maneat, paria cuncta quaero, quae in nullis possunt geminis inveniri; si autem sequentis tarditas horoscopum mutat, parentes diversos quaero, quos gemini habere non possunt. ||Cicero says that the famous physician Hippocrates has left in writing that he had suspected that a certain pair of brothers were twins, from the fact that they both took ill at once, and their disease advanced to its crisis and subsided in the same time in each of them. Posidonius the Stoic, who was much given to astrology, used to explain the fact by supposing that they had been born and conceived under the same constellation. In this question the conjecture of the physician is by far more worthy to be accepted, and approaches much nearer to credibility, since, according as the parents were affected in body at the time of copulation, so might the first elements of the f_S tuses have been affected, so that all that was necessary for their growth and development up till birth having been supplied from the body of the same mother, they might be born with like constitutions. Thereafter, nourished in the same house, on the same kinds of food, where they would have also the same kinds of air, the same locality, the same quality of water,-which, according to the testimony of medical science, have a very great influence, good or bad, on the condition of bodily health,-and where they would also be accustomed to the same kinds of exercise, they would have bodily constitutions so similar that they would be similarly affected with sickness at the same time and by the same causes. But, to wish to adduce that particular position of the stars which existed at the time when they were born or conceived as the cause of their being simultaneously affected with sickness, manifests the greatest arrogance, when so many beings of most diverse kinds, in the most diverse conditions, and subject to the most diverse events, may have been conceived and born at the same time, and in the same district, lying under the same sky. But we know that twins do not only act differently, and travel to very different places, but that they also suffer from different kinds of sickness; for which Hippocrates would give what is in my opinion the simplest reason, namely, that, through diversity of food and exercise, which arises not from the constitution of the body, but from the inclination of the mind, they may have come to be different from each other in respect of health. Moreover, Posidonius, or any other asserter of the fatal influence of the stars, will have enough to do to find anything to say to this, if he be unwilling to im pose upon the minds of the uninstructed in things of which they are ignorant. But, as to what they attempt to make out from that very small interval of time elapsing between the births of twins, on account of that point in the heavens where the mark of the natal hour is placed, and which they call the "horoscope," it is either disproportionately small to the diversity which is found in the dispositions, actions, habits, and fortunes of twins, or it is disproportionately great when compared with the estate of twins, whether low or high, which is the same for both of them, the cause for whose greatest difference they place, in every case, in the hour on which one is born; and, for this reason, if the one is born so immediately after the other that there is no change in the horoscope, I demand an entire similarity in all that respects them both, which can never be found in the case of any twins. But if the slowness of the birth of the second give time for a change in the horoscope, I demand different parents, which twins can never have.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c3"><b>BOOK V</b> [III] Frustra itaque adfertur nobile illud commentum de figuli rota, quod respondisse ferunt Nigidium hac quaestione turbatum, unde et Figulus appellatus est. Dum enim rotam figuli vi quanta potuit intorsisset, currente illa bis numero de atramento tamquam uno eius loco summa celeritate percussit; deinde inventa sunt signa, quae fixerat, desistente motu, non paruo interuallo in rotae illius extremitate distantia. "Sic, inquit, in tanta rapacitate caeli, etiamsi alter post alterum tanta celeritate nascatur, quanta rotam bis ipse percussi, in caeli spatio plurimum est: hinc sunt, inquit, quaecumque dissimillima perhibentur in moribus casibusque geminorum." Hoc figmentum fragilius est quam uasa, quae illa rotatione finguntur. Nam si tam multum in caelo interest, quod constellationibus conprehendi non potest, ut alteri geminorum hereditas obveniat, alteri non obveniat: cur audent ceteris, qui gemini non sunt, cum inspexerint eorum constellationes, talia pronuntiare, quae ad illud secretum pertinent, quod nemo potest conprehendere et momentis adnotare nascentium? Si autem propterea talia dicunt in aliorum genituris, quia haec ad productiora spatia temporum pertinent; momenta vero illa partium minutarum, quae inter se gemini possunt habere nascentes, rebus minimis tribuuntur, de qualibus mathematici non solent consuli (quis enim consulat quando sedeat, quando deambulet, quando vel quid prandeat?): numquid ista dicimus, quando in moribus operibus casibusque geminorum plurima plurimumque diversa monstramus? ||It is to no purpose, therefore, that that famous fiction about the potter's wheel is brought forward, which tells of the answer which Nigidius is said to have given when he was perplexed with this question, and on account of which he was called Figulus. For, having whirled round the potter's wheel with all his strength he marked it with ink, striking it twice with the utmost rapidity, so that the strokes seemed to fall on the very same part of it. Then, when the rotation had ceased, the marks which he had made were found upon the rim of the wheel at no small distance apart. Thus, said he, considering the great rapidity with which the celestial sphere revolves, even though twins were born with as short an interval between their births as there was between the strokes which I gave this wheel, that brief interval of time is equivalent to a very great distance in the celestial sphere. Hence, said he, come whatever dissimilitudes may be remarked in the habits and fortunes of twins. This argument is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned by the rotation of that wheel. For if there is so much significance in the heavens which cannot be comprehended by observation of the constellations, that, in the case of twins, an inheritance may fall to the one and not to the other, why, in the case of others who are not twins, do they dare, having examined their constellations, to declare such things as pertain to that secret which no one can comprehend, and to attribute them to the precise moment of the birth of each individual? Now, if such predictions in connection with the natal hours of others who are not twins are to be vindicated on the ground that they are founded on the observation of more extended spaces in the heavens, while those very small moments of time which separated the births of twins, and correspond to minute portions of celestial space, are to be connected with trifling things about which the mathematicians are not wont to be consulted,-for who would consult them as to when he is to sit, when to walk abroad, when and on what he is to dine? -how can we be justified in so speaking, when we can point out such manifold diversity both in the habits, doings, and destinies of twins?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c4"><b>BOOK V</b> [IV] Nati sunt duo gemini antiqua patrum memoria (ut de insignibus loquar) sic alter post alterum, ut posterior plantam prioris teneret. Tanta in eorum vita fuerunt moribusque diversa, tanta in actibus disparilitas, tanta in parentum amore dissimilitudo, ut etiam inimicos eos inter se faceret ipsa distantia. Numquid hoc dicitur, quia uno ambulante alius sedebat, et alio dormiente alius vigilabat, et alio loquente tacebat alius; quae pertinent ad illas minutias, quae non possunt ab eis conprehendi, qui constitutionem siderum, qua quisque nascitur, scribunt, unde mathematici consulantur? Vnus duxit mercennariam seruitutem, alius non seruivit; unus a matre diligebatur, alius non diligebatur; unus honorem, qui magnus apud eos habebatur, amisit, alter indeptus est. Quid de uxoribus, quid de filiis, quid de rebus, quanta diversitas! Si ergo haec ad illas pertinent minutias temporum, quae inter se habent gemini, et constellationibus non adscribuntur: quare aliorum constellationibus inspectis ista dicuntur? Si autem ideo dicuntur, quia non ad minuta inconprehensibilia, sed ad temporum spatia pertinent, quae observari notarique possunt: quid hic agit rota illa figuli, nisi ut homines luteum cor habentes in gyrum mittantur, ne mathematicorum uaniloquia conuincantur? ||In the time of the ancient fathers, to speak concerning illustrious persons, there were born two twin brothers, the one so immediately after the other, that the first took hold of the heel of the second. So great a difference existed in their lives and manners, so great a dissimilarity in their actions, so great a difference in their parents' love for them respectively, that the very contrast between them produced even a mutual hostile antipathy. Do we mean, when we say that they were so unlike each other, that when the one was walking the other was sitting, when the one was sleeping the other was waking,-which differences are such as are attributed to those minute portions of space which cannot be appreciated by those who note down the position of the stars which exists at the moment of one's birth, in order that the mathematicians may be consulted concerning it? One of these twins was for a long time a hired servant; the other never served. One of them was beloved by his mother; the other was not so. One of them lost that honor which was so much valued among their people; the other obtained it. And what shall we say of their wives, their children, and their possessions? How different they were in respect to all these! If, therefore, such things as these are connected with those minute intervals of time which elapse between the births of twins, and are not to be attributed to the constellations, wherefore are they predicted in the case of others from the examination of their constellations? And if, on the other hand, these things are said to be predicted, because they are connected, not with minute and inappreciable moments, but with intervals of time which can be observed and noted down, what purpose is that potter's wheel to serve in this matter, except it be to whirl round men who have hearts of clay, in order that they may be prevented from detecting the emptiness of the talk of the mathematicians?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c5"><b>BOOK V</b> [V] Quid idem ipsi, quorum morbum, quod eodem tempore gravior leviorque apparebat amborum, medicinaliter inspiciens Hippocrates geminos suspicatus est, nonne satis istos redarguunt, qui volunt sideribus dare, quod de corporum simili temperatione veniebat? Cur enim similiter eodemque tempore, non alter prior, alter posterior aegrotabant, sicut nati fuerant, quia utique simul nasci ambo non poterant? Aut si nihil momenti adtulit, ut diversis temporibus aegrotarent, quod diversis temporibus nati sunt: quare tempus in nascendo diversum ad aliarum rerum diversitates valere contendunt? cur potuerunt diversis temporibus peregrinari, diversis temporibus ducere uxores, diversis temporibus filios procreare et multa alia, propterea quia diversis temporibus nati sunt, et non potuerunt eadem causa diversis etiam temporibus aegrotare? Si enim dispar nascendi mora mutavit horoscopum et disparilitatem intulit ceteris rebus: cur illud in aegritudinibus mansit, quod habebat in temporis aequalitate conceptus? Aut si fata valetudinis in conceptu sunt, aliarum vero rerum in ortu esse dicuntur, non deberent inspectis natalium constellationibus de valetudine aliquid dicere, quando eis inspicienda conceptionalis hora non datur. Si autem ideo praenuntiant aegritudines non inspecto conceptionis horoscopo, quia indicant eas momenta nascentium: quo modo dicerent cuilibet eorum geminorum ex nativitatis hora, quando aegrotaturus esset, cum et alter, qui non habebat eandem horam nativitatis, necesse haberet pariter aegrotare? Deinde quaero: si tanta distantia est temporis in nativitate germinorum, ut per hanc oporteat eis constellatines fieri diversas propter diversum horoscopum et ob hoc diversos omnes cardines, ubi tanta vis ponitur, ut hinc etiam diversa sint fata: unde hoc accidere potuit, cum eorum conceptus diversum tempus habere non possit? Aut si duorum uno momento temporis conceptorum potuerunt esse ad nascendum fata disparia, cur non et duorum uno momento temporis natorum possint esse ad vivendum atque moriendum fata disparia? Nam si unum momentum, quo ambo concepti sunt, non impedivit, ut alter prior, alter posterior nasceretur: cur uno momento si duo nascantur, impedit aliquid, ut alter prior, alter posterior moriatur? Si conceptio momenti unius diversos casus in utero geminos habere permittit, cur nativitas momenti unius non etiam quoslibet duos in terra diversos casus habere permittat, ac sic omnis huius artis vel potius uanitatis commenta tollantur? Quid est hoc, cur uno tempore, momento uno, sub una eademque caeli positione concepti diversa habent fata, quae illos perducant ad diversarum horarum nativitatem, et uno momento temporis sub una eademque caeli positione de duabus matribus duo pariter nati diversa fata habere non possint, quae illos perducant ad diversam vivendi vel moriendi necessitatem? An concepti nondum habent fata, quae nisi nascantur habere non poterunt? Quid est ergo quod dicunt, si hora conceptionalis inveniatur, multa ab istis dici posse divinius? Vnde etiam illud a nonnullis praedicatur, quod quidam sapiens horam elegit, qua cum uxore concumberet, unde filium mirabilem gigneret. Vnde postremo et hoc est, quod de illis pariter aegrotantibus geminis Posidonius magnus astrologus idemque philosophus respondebat, ideo fieri, quod eodem tempore fuissent nati eodemque concepti. Nam utique propter hoc addebat conceptionem, ne diceretur ei non ad liquidum eodem tempore potuisse nasci, quos constabat omnino eodem tempore fuisse conceptos; ut hoc, quod similiter simulque aegrotabant, non daret de proximo pari corporis temperamento, sed eandem quoque valetudinis parilitatem sidereis nexibus alligaret. Si igitur in conceptu tanta vis est ad aequalitatem fatorum, non debuerunt nascendo eadem fata mutari. Aut si propterea mutantur fata geminorum quia temporibus diversis nascuntur, cur non potius intellegamus iam fuisse mutata, ut diversis temporibus nascerentur? Itane non mutat fata nativitatis voluntas viventium, cum mutet fata conceptionis ordo nascentium? ||Do not those very persons whom the medical sagacity of Hippocrates led him to suspect to be twins, because their disease was observed by him to develop to its crisis and to subside again in the same time in each of them,-do not these, I say, serve as a sufficient refutation of those who wish to attribute to the influence of the stars that which was owing to a similarity of bodily constitution? For wherefore were they both sick of the same disease, and at the same time, and not the one after the other in the order of their birth? (for certainly they could not both be born at the same time.) Or, if the fact of their having been born at different times by no means necessarily implies that they must be sick at different times, why do they contend that the difference in the time of their births was the cause of their difference in other things? Why could they travel in foreign parts at different times, marry at different times, beget children at different times, and do many other things at different times, by reason of their having been born at different times, and yet could not, for the same reason, also be sick at different times? For if a difference in the moment of birth changed the horoscope, and occasioned dissimilarity in all other things, why has that simultaneousness which belonged to their conception remained in their attacks of sickness? Or, if the destinies of health are involved in the time of conception, but those of other things be said to be attached to the time of birth, they ought not to predict anything concerning health from examination of the constellations of birth, when the hour of conception is not also given, that its constellations may be inspected. But if they say that they predict attacks of sickness without examining the horoscope of conception, because these are indicated by the moments of birth, how could they inform either of these twins when he would be sick, from the horoscope of his birth, when the other also, who had not the same horoscope of birth, must of necessity fall sick at the same time? Again, I ask, if the distance of time between the births of twins is so great as to occasion a difference of their constellations on account of the difference of their horoscopes, and therefore of all the cardinal points to which so much influence is attributed, that even from such change there comes a difference of destiny, how is it possible that this should be so, since they cannot have been conceived at different times? Or, if two conceived at the same moment of time could have different destinies with respect to their births, why may not also two born at the same moment of time have different destinies for life and for death? For if the one moment in which both were conceived did not hinder that the one should be born before the other, why, if two are born at the same moment, should anything hinder them from dying at the same moment? If a simultaneous conception allows of twins being differently affected in the womb, why should not simultaneousness of birth allow of any two individuals having different fortunes in the world? and thus would all the fictions of this art, or rather delusion, be swept away. What strange circumstance is this, that two children conceived at the same time, nay, at the same moment, under the same position of the stars, have different fates which bring them to different hours of birth, while two children, born of two different mothers, at the same moment of time, under one and the same position of the stars, cannot have different fates which shall conduct them by necessity to diverse manners of life and of death? Are they at conception as yet without destinies, because they can only have them if they be born? What, therefore, do they mean when they say that, if the hour of the conception be found, many things can be predicted by these astrologers? from which also arose that story which is reiterated by some, that a certain sage chose an hour in which to lie with his wife, in order to secure his begetting an illustrious son. From this opinion also came that answer of Posidonius, the great astrologer and also philosopher, concerning those twins who were attacked with sickness at the same time, namely, "That this had happened to them because they were conceived at the same time, and born at the same time." For certainly he added "conception," lest it should be said to him that they could not both be born at the same time, knowing that at any rate they must both have been conceived at the same time; wishing thus to show that he did not attribute the fact of their being similarly and simultaneously affected with sickness to the similarity of their bodily constitutions as its proximate cause, but that he held that even in respect of the similarity of their health, they were bound together by a sidereal connection. If, therefore, the time of conception has so much to do with the similarity of destinies, these same destinies ought not to be changed by the circumstances of birth; or, if the destinies of twins be said to be changed because they are born at different times, why should we not rather understand that they had been already changed in order that they might be born at different times? Does not, then, the will of men living in the world change the destinies of birth, when the order of birth can change the destinies they had at conception?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c6"><b>BOOK V</b> [VI] Quamquam et in ipsis geminorum conceptibus, ubi certe amborum eadem momenta sunt temporum, unde fit ut sub eadem constellatione fatali alter concipiatur masculus, altera femina? Novimus geminos diversi sexus, ambo adhuc vivunt, ambo aetate adhuc vigent; quorum cum sint inter se similes corporum species, quantum in diverso sexu potest, instituto tamen et proposito vitae ita sunt dispares, ut praeter actus, quos necesse est a virilibus distare femineos (quod ille in officio comitis militat et a sua domo paene semper peregrinatur, illa de solo patrio et de rure proprio non recedit), insuper (quod est incredibilius, si astralia fata credantur; non autem mirum, si voluntates hominum et Dei munera cogitentur) ille coniugatus, illa virgo sacra est; ille numerosam prolem genuit, illa nec nupsit. At enim plurimum vis horoscopi valet. Hoc quam nihil sit, iam satis disserui. Sed qualecumque sit, in ortu valere dicunt; numquid et in conceptu? ubi et unum concubitum esse manifestum est, et tanta naturae vis est, ut, cum conceperit femina, deinde alterum concipere omnino non possit; unde necesse est eadem esse in geminis momenta conceptus. An forte quia diverso horoscopo nati sunt, aut ille in masculum, dum nascerentur, aut illa in feminam commutata est? Cum igitur non usquequaque absurde dici posset ad solas corporum differentias adflatus quosdam valere sidereos, sicut in solaribus accessibus et decessibus videmus etiam ipsius anni tempora variari et lunaribus incrementis atque detrimentis augeri et minui quaedam genera rerum, sicut echinos et conchas et mirabiles aestus oceani; non autem et animi voluntates positionibus siderum subdi: nunc isti, cum etiam nostros actus inde religare conantur, admonent ut quaeramus, unde ne in ipsis quidem corporibus eis possit ratio ista constare. Quid enim tam ad corpus pertinens quam corporis sexus? et tamen sub eadem positione siderum diversi sexus gemini concipi potuerunt. Vnde quid insipientius dici aut credi potest, quam siderum positionem, quae ad horam conceptionis eadem ambobus fuit, facere non potuisse, ut, cum quo habebat eandem constellationem, sexum diversum a fratre non haberet; et positionem siderum, quae fuit ad horam nascentium, facere potuisse, ut ab eo tam multum virginali sanctitate distaret? ||But even in the very conception of twins, which certainly occurs at the same moment in the case of both, it often happens that the one is conceived a male, and the other a female. I know two of different sexes who are twins. Both of them are alive, and in the flower of their age; and though they resemble each other in body, as far as difference of sex will permit, still they are very different in the whole scope and purpose of their lives (consideration being had of those differences which necessarily exist between the lives of males and females),-the one holding the office of a count, and being almost constantly away from home with the army in foreign service, the other never leaving her country's soil, or her native district. Still more,-and this is more incredible, if the destinies of the stars are to be believed in, though it is not wonderful if we consider the wills of men, and the free gifts of God,-he is married; she is a sacred virgin: he has begotten a numerous offspring; she has never even married. But is not the virtue of the horoscope very great? I think I have said enough to show the absurdity of that. But, say those astrologers, whatever be the virtue of the horoscope in other respects, it is certainly of significance with respect to birth. But why not also with respect to conception, which takes place undoubtedly with one act of copulation? And, indeed, so great is the force of nature, that after a woman has once conceived, she ceases to be liable to conception. Or were they, perhaps, changed at birth, either he into a male, or she into a female, because of the difference in their horoscopes? But, while it is not altogether absurd to say that certain sidereal influences have some power to cause differences in bodies alone,-as, for instance, we see that the seasons of the year come round by the approaching and receding of the sun, and that certain kinds of things are increased in size or diminished by the waxings and wanings of the moon, such as sea-urchins, oysters, and the wonderful tides of the ocean,-it does not follow that the wills of men are to be made subject to the position of the stars. The astrologers, however, when they wish to bind our actions also to the constellations, only set us on investigating whether, even in these bodies, the changes may not be attributable to some other than a sidereal cause. For what is there which more intimately concerns a body than its sex? And yet, under the same position of the stars, twins of different sexes may be conceived. Wherefore, what greater absurdity can be affirmed or believed than that the position of the stars, which was the same for both of them at the time of conception, could not cause that the one child should not have been of a different sex from her brother, with whom she had a common constellation, while the position of the stars which existed at the hour of their birth could cause that she should be separated from him by the great distance between marriage and holy virginity?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c7"><b>BOOK V</b> [VII] Iam illud quis ferat, quod in eligendis diebus noua quaedam suis actibus fata moliuntur? Non erat videlicet ille ita natus, ut haberet admirabilem filium, sed ita potius, ut contemptibilem gigneret, et ideo vir doctus elegit horam qua misceretur uxori. Fecit ergo fatum, quod non habebat, et ex ipsius facto coepit esse fatale, quod in eius nativitate non fuerat. O stultitiam singularem! Eligitur dies ut ducatur uxor; credo propterea, quia potest in diem non bonum, nisi eligatur, incurri et infeliciter duci. Vbi est ergo quod nascenti iam sidera decreuerunt? An potest homo, quod ei iam constitutum est, diei electione mutare, et quod ipse in eligendo die constituerit, non poterit ab alia potestate mutari? Deinde si soli homines, non autem omnia quae sub caelo sunt, constellationibus subiacent, cur aliter eligunt dies accommodatos ponendis vitibus vel arboribus vel segetibus, alios dies pecoribus vel domandis vel admittendis maribus, quibus equarum vel boum fetentur armenta, et cetera huius modi? Si autem propterea valent ad has res dies electi, quia terrenis omnibus corporibus sive animantibus secundum diversitates temporalium momentorum siderum positio dominatur: considerent quam innumerabilia sub uno temporis puncto vel nascantur vel oriantur vel inchoentur, et tam diversos exitus habeat, ut istas observationes cuivis puero ridendas esse persuadeant. Quis enim est tam excors, ut audeat dicere omnes arbores, omnes herbas, omnes bestias serpentes aves pisces vermiculos momenta nascendi singillatim habere diversa? Solent tamen homines ad temptandam peritiam mathematicorum adferre ad eos constellationes mutorum animalium, quorum ortus propter hanc explorationem domi suae diligenter observant, eosque mathematicos praeferunt ceteris, qui constellationibus inspectis dicunt non esse hominem natum, sed pecus. Audent etiam dicere quale pecus, utrum aptum lanitio, an uectationi, an aratro, an custodiae domus. Nam et ad canina fata temptantur et cum magnis admirantium clamoribus ista respondent. Sic desipiunt homines, ut existiment, cum homo nascitur, ceteros rerum ortus ita inhiberi, ut cum illo sub eadem caeli plaga nec musca nascatur. Nam si hanc admiserint, procedit ratiocinatio, quae gradatim accessibus modicis eos a muscis ad camelos elephantosque perducat. Nec illud volunt advertere, quod electo ad seminandum agrum die tam multa grana in terram simul veniunt, simul germinant, exorta segete simul herbescunt pubescunt flavescunt, et tamen inde spicas ceteris coaeuas atque, ut ita dixerim, congerminales alias robigo interimit, alias aves depopulantur, alias homines avellunt. Quo modo istis alias constellationes fuisse dicturi sunt, quas tam diversos exitus habere conspiciunt? An eos paenitebit his rebus dies eligere easque ad caeleste negabunt pertinere decretum, et solos sideribus subdent homines, quibus solis in terra Deus dedit liberas voluntates? His omnibus consideratis non inmerito creditur, cum astrologi mirabiliter multa vera respondent, occulto instinctu fieri spirituum non bonorum, quorum cura est has falsas et noxias opiniones de astralibus fatis inserere humanis mentibus atque firmare, non horoscopi notati et inspecti aliqua arte, quae nulla est. ||Now, will any one bring forward this, that in choosing certain particular days for particular actions, men bring about certain new destinies for their actions? That man, for instance, according to this doctrine, was not born to have an illustrious son, but rather a contemptible one, and therefore, being a man of learning, he choose an hour in which to lie with his wife. He made, therefore, a destiny which he did not have before, and from that destiny of his own making something began to be fatal which was not contained in the destiny of his natal hour. Oh, singular stupidity! A day is chosen on which to marry; and for this reason, I believe, that unless a day be chosen, the marriage may fall on an unlucky day, and turn out an unhappy one. What then becomes of what the stars have already decreed at the hour of birth? Can a man be said to change by an act of choice that which has already been determined for him, while that which he himself has determined in the choosing of a day cannot be changed by another power? Thus, if men alone, and not all things under heaven, are subject to the influence of the stars, why do they choose some days as suitable for planting vines or trees, or for sowing grain, other days as suitable for taming beasts on, or for putting the males to the females, that the cows and mares may be impregnated, and for such-like things? If it be said that certain chosen days have an influence on these things, because the constellations rule over all terrestrial bodies, animate and inanimate, according to differences in moments of time, let it be considered what innumerable multitudes of beings are born or arise, or take their origin at the very same instant of time, which come to ends so different, that they may persuade any little boy that these observations about days are ridiculous. For who is so mad as to dare affirm that all trees, all herbs, all beasts, serpents, birds, fishes, worms, have each separately their own moments of birth or commencement? Nevertheless, men are wont, in order to try the skill of the mathematicians, to bring before them the constellations of dumb animals, the constellations of whose birth they diligently observe at home with a view to this discovery; and they prefer those mathematicians to all others, who say from the inspection of the constellations that they indicate the birth of a beast and not of a man. They also dare tell what kind of beast it is, whether it is a wool-bearing beast, or a beast suited for carrying burthens, or one fit for the plough, or for watching a house; for the astrologers are also tried with respect to the fates of dogs, and their answers concerning these are followed by shouts of admiration on the part of those who consult them. They so deceive men as to make them think that during the birth of a man the births of all other beings are suspended, so that not even a fly comes to life at the same time that he is being born, under the same region of the heavens. And if this be admitted with respect to the fly, the reasoning cannot stop there, but must ascend from flies till it lead them up to camels and elephants. Nor are they willing to attend to this, that when a day has been chosen whereon to sow a field, so many grains fall into the ground simultaneously, germinate simultaneously, spring up, come to perfection, and ripen simultaneously; and yet, of all the ears which are coeval, and, so to speak, congerminal, some are destroyed by mildew, some are devoured by the birds, and some are pulled by men. How can they say that all these had their different constellations, which they see coming to so different ends? Will they confess that it is folly to choose days for such things, and to affirm that they do not come within the sphere of the celestial decree, while they subject men alone to the stars, on whom alone in the world God has bestowed free wills? All these things being considered, we have good reason to believe that, when the astrologers give very many wonderful answers, it is to be attributed to the occult inspiration of spirits not of the best kind, whose care it is to insinuate into the minds of men, and to confirm in them, those false and noxious opinions concerning the fatal influence of the stars, and not to their marking and inspecting of horoscopes, according to some kind of art which in reality has no existence.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c8"><b>BOOK V</b> [VIII] Qui vero non astrorum constitutionem, sicuti est cum quidque concipitur vel nascitur vel inchoatur, sed omnium conexionem seriemque causarum, qua fit omne quod fit, fati nomine appellant: non multum cum eis de verbi controversia laborandum atque certandum est, quando quidem ipsum causarum ordinem et quandam conexionem Dei summi tribuunt voluntati et potestati, qui optime et veracissime creditur et cuncta scire antequam fiant et nihil inordinatum relinquere; a quo sunt omnes potestates, quamuis ab illo non sint omnium voluntates. Ipsam itaque praecipue Dei summi voluntatem, cuius potestas insuperabiliter per cuncta porrigitur, eos appellare fatum sic probatur. Annaei Senecae sunt, nisi fallor, hi versus: Duc, summe pater altique dominator poli,Quocumque placuit, nulla parendi mora est.Adsum impiger: fac nolle, comitabor gemens Malusque patiar, facere quod licuit bono. Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Nempe evidentissime hoc ultimo versu ea fata appellavit, quam supra dixerat summi patris voluntatem; cui paratum se oboedire dicit, ut volens ducatur, ne nolens trahatur; quoniam scilicet Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Illi quoque versus Homerici huic sententiae suffragantur, quos Cicero in Latinum vertit: Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Iuppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras. Nec in hac quaestione auctoritatem haberet poetica senttia; sed quoniam Stoicos dicit vim fati asserentes istos ex Homero versus solere usurpare, non de illius poetae, sed de istorum philosophorum opinione tractatur, cum per istos versus, quos disputationi adhibent quam de fato habent, quid sentiant esse fatum apertissime declaratur, quoniam Iovem appellant, quem summum deum putant, a quo conexionem dicunt pendere fatorum. ||But, as to those who call by the name of fate, not the disposition of the stars as it may exist when any creature is conceived, or born, or commences its existence, but the whole connection and train of causes which makes everything become what it does become, there is no need that I should labor and strive with them in a merely verbal controversy, since they attribute the so-called order and connection of causes to the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly and most truly believed to know all things before they come to pass, and to leave nothing unordained; from whom are all powers, although the wills of all are not from Him. Now, that it is chiefly the will of God most high, whose power extends itself irresistibly through all things which they call fate, is proved by the following verses, of which, if I mistake not, Annжus Seneca is the author:-"Father supreme, You ruler of the lofty heavens,Lead me where'er it is Your pleasure; I will giveA prompt obedience, making no delay,Lo! here I am. Promptly I come to do Your sovereign will;If your command shall thwart my inclination, I will stillFollow You groaning, and the work assigned,With all the suffering of a mind repugnant,Will perform, being evil; which, had I been good,I should have undertaken and performed, though hard,With virtuous cheerfulness.The Fates do lead the man that follows willing;But the man that is unwilling, him they drag."Most evidently, in this last verse, he calls that "fate" which he had before called "the will of the Father supreme," whom, he says, he is ready to obey that he may be led, being willing, not dragged, being unwilling, since "the Fates do lead the man that follows willing, but the man that is unwilling, him they drag."The following Homeric lines, which Cicero translates into Latin, also favor this opinion :-"Such are the minds of men, as is the lightWhich Father Jove himself does pourIllustrious o'er the fruitful earth."Not that Cicero wishes that a poetical sentiment should have any weight in a question like this; for when he says that the Stoics, when asserting the power of fate, were in the habit of using these verses from Homer, he is not treating concerning the opinion of that poet, but concerning that of those philosophers, since by these verses, which they quote in connection with the controversy which they hold about fate, is most distinctly manifested what it is which they reckon fate, since they call by the name of Jupiter him whom they reckon the supreme god, from whom, they say, hangs the whole chain of fates.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c9"><b>BOOK V</b> [IX] Hos Cicero ita redarguere nititur, ut non existimet aliquid se adversus eos valere, nisi auferat divinationem. Quam sic conatur auferre, ut neget esse scientiam futurorum, eamque omnibus viribus nullam esse omnino contendat, vel in homine vel in deo, nullamque rerum praedictionem. Ita et Dei praescientiam negat et omnem prophetiam luce clariorem conatur euertere uanis argumentationibus et opponendo sibi quaedam oracula, quae facile possunt refelli; quae tamen nec ipsa conuincit. In his autem mathematicorum coniecturis refutandis eius regnat oratio, quia vere tales sunt, ut se ipsae destruant et refellant. Multo sunt autem tolerabiliores, qui vel siderea fata constituunt, quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum. Nam et confiteri esse Deum et negare praescium futurorum apertissima insania est. Quod et ipse cum videret, etiam illud temptavit quod scriptum est: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus; sed non ex sua persona. Vidit enim quam esset inuidiosum et molestum, ideoque Cottam fecit disputantem de hac re adversus Stoicos in libris de deorum natura et pro Lucilio Balbo, cui Stoicorum partes defendendas dedit, maluit ferre sententiam quam pro Cotta, qui nullam divinam naturam esse contendit. In libris vero de divinatione ex se ipso apertissime oppugnat praescientiam futurorum. Hoc autem totum facere videtur, ne fatum esse consentiat et perdat liberam voluntatem. Putat enim concessa scientia futurorum ita esse consequens fatum, ut negari omnino non possit. Sed quoquo modo se habeant tortuosissimae concertationes et disputationes philosophorum, nos ut confitemur summum et verum Deum, ita voluntatem summamque potestatem ac praescientiam eius confitemur; nec timemus ne ideo non voluntate faciamus, quod voluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli non potest; quod Cicero timuit, ut oppugnaret praescientiam, et Stoici, ut non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent, quamuis omnia fato fieri contenderent. Quid est ergo, quod Cicero timuit in praescientia futurorum, ut eam labefactare disputatione detestabili niteretur? Videlicet quia, si praescita sunt omnia futura, hoc ordine venient, quo ventura esse praescita sunt; et si hoc ordine venient, certus est ordo rerum praescienti Deo; et si certus est ordo rerum, certus est ordo causarum; non enim fieri aliquid potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit; si autem certus est ordo causarum, quo fit omne quod fit, fato, inquit, fiunt omnia quae fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis; quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana vita subuertitur, frustra leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes laudes, vituperationes exhortationes adhibentur, neque ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta sunt. Haec ergo ne consequantur indigna et absurda et perniciosa rebus humanis, non uult esse praescientiam futurorum; atque in has angustias coartat animum religiosum, ut unum eligat e duobus, aut esse aliquid in nostra voluntate, aut esse praescientiam futurorum, quoniam utrumque arbitratur esse non posse, sed si alterum confirmabitur, alterum tolli; si elegerimus praescientiam futurorum, tolli voluntatis arbitrium; si elegerimus voluntatis arbitrium, tolli praescientiam futurorum. Ipse itaque ut vir magnus et doctus et vitae humanae plurimum ac peritissime consulens ex his duobus elegit liberum voluntatis arbitrium; quod ut confirmaretur, negavit praescientiam futurorum atque ita, dum uult facere liberos, fecit sacrilegos. Religiosus autem animus utrumque eligit, utrumque confitetur et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat. Quo modo? inquit; nam si est praescientia futurorum, sequentur illa omnia, quae conexa sunt, donec eo perveniatur, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate. Porro si est aliquid in nostra voluntate, eisdem recursis gradibus eo pervenitur, ut non sit praescientia futurorum. Nam per illa omnia sic recurritur: si est voluntatis arbitrium, non omnia fato fiunt; si non omnia fato fiunt, non est omnium certus ordo causarum; si certus causarum ordo non est, nec rerum certus est ordo praescienti Deo, quae fieri non possunt, nisi praecedentibus et efficientibus causis; si rerum ordo praescienti Deo certus non est, non omnia sic veniunt, ut ea ventura praescivit; porro si non omnia sic veniunt, ut ab illo ventura praescita sunt, non est, inquit, in Deo praescientia omnium futurorum. Nos adversus istos sacrilegos ausus atque impios et Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant, et voluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis non nisi volentibus fieri sentimus et novimus. Omnia vero fato fieri non dicimus, immo nulla fieri fato dicimus; quoniam fati nomen ubi solet a loquentibus poni, id est in constitutione siderum cum quisque conceptus aut natus est, quoniam res ipsa inaniter asseritur, nihil valere monstramus. Ordinem autem causarum, ubi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, neque negamus, neque fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi forte ut fatum a fando dictum intellegamus, id est a loquendo; non enim abnuere possumus esse scriptum in litteris sanctis: Semel locutus est Deus, duo haec audivi, quoniam potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia, qui reddis unicuique secundum opera eius. Quod enim dictum est: Semel locutus est, intellegitur "inmobiliter", haoc est incommutabiliter, "est locus", sicut novit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt et quae ipse facturus est. Hac itaque ratione possemus a fando fatum appellare, nisi hoc nomen iam in alia re soleret intellegi, quo corda hominum nolumus inclinari. Non est autem consequens, ut, si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostrae voluntatis arbitrio. Et ipsae quippe nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo eiusque praescientia continetur, quoniam et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae sunt; atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas praescivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse praescivit. Nam et illud, quod idem Cicero concedit, nihil fieri si causa efficiens non praecedat, satis est ad eum in hac quaestione redarguendum. Quid enim eum adivuat, quod dicit nihil quidem fieri sine causa, sed non omnem causam esse fatalem, quia est causa fortuita, est naturalis, est voluntaria? Sufficit, quia omne, quod fit, non nisi causa praecedente fieri confitetur. Nos enim eas causas, quae dicuntur fortuitae, unde etiam fortuna nomen accepit, non esse dicimus nullas, sed latentes, easque tribuimus vel Dei veri vel quorumlibet spirituum voluntati, ipsasque naturales nequaquam ab illius voluntate seiungimus, qui est auctor omnis conditorque naturae. Iam vero causae voluntariae aut Dei sunt aut angelorum aut hominum aut quorumque animalium, si tamen voluntates appellandae sunt animarum rationis expertium motus illi, quibus aliqua faciunt secundum naturam suam, cum quid vel adpetunt vel evitant. Angelorum autem voluntates dico seu bonorum, quos angelos Dei dicimus, seu malorum, quos angelos diaboli vel etiam daemones appellamus: sic et hominum, et bonorum scilicet et malorum. Ac per hoc colligitur non esse causas efficientes omnium quae fiunt nisi voluntarias, ilius naturae scilicet, quae spiritus vitae est. Nam et aer iste seu ventus dicitur spiritus; sed quoniam corpus est, non est spiritus vitae. Spiritus ergo vitae, qui vivificat omnia creatorque est omnis corporis et omnis creati spiritus, ipse est Deus, spiritus utique non creatus. In eius voluntate summa potestas est, quae creatorum spirituum bonas voluntates adivuat, malas iudicat, omnes ordinat et quibusdam tribuit potestate, quibus dam non tribuit. Sicut enim omnium naturarum creator est, ita omnium potestatum dator, non voluntatum. Malae quippe voluntates ab illo non sunt, quoniam contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est. Corpora igitur magis subiacent voluntatibus, quaedam nostris, id est omnium animantium mortalium et magis hominum quam bestiarum; quaedam vero angelorum; sed omnia maxime Dei voluntati subdita sunt, cui etiam voluntates omnes subiciuntur, quia non habent potestatem nisi quam ille concedit. Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est; aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes adnumerandae, quoniam hoc possunt ,quod ex ipsis faciunt sprituum voluntates. Quo modo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est Deo, id efficit, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine magnum habeant locum nostrae volutnates? Contendat ergo Cicero cum eis, qui hunc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem vel potius ipsum fati nomine appellant, quod nos abhorremus praecipue propter vocabulum, quod non in re vera consueruit intellegi. Quod vero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum et Dei praescientiae notissimum, plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. Aut enim esse Deum negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in libris de deorum natura facere molitus est; aut si esse confitetur Deum, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic nihil dicit aliud, quam quod ille dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus. Qui enim non est raescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus. Quapropter et voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit atque praescivit; et ideo quidquid valent, certissime valent, et quod facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt, quia valituras atque facturas ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli non potest. Quapropter si mihi fati nomen alicui rei adhibendum placeret, magis dicerem fatum esse infirmioris potentioris voluntatem, qui eum habet in potestate, quam illo causarum ordine, quem non usitato, sed suo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auferri. ||The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events. For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, "The fool has said in his heart, There is no God." That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods, he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it was this,-that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge,-both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order:-If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God,-for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,-but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, "God has spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongs unto God. Also unto You, O God, belongs mercy: for You will render unto every man according to his works." Now the expression, "Once has He spoken," is to be understood as meaning "immovably," that is, unchangeably has He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that God exists,-which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book De Natura Deorum,-or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just "the fool saying in his heart there is no God?" For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c10"><b>BOOK V</b> [X] Vnde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent, atque in his, quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. Si enim necessitas nostra illa dicenda est, quae non est in nostra potestate, sed etiamsi nolimus efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis: manifestum est voluntates nostras, quibus recte vel perperam vivitur, sub tali necessitate non esse. Multa enim facimus, quae si nollemus, non utique faceremus. Quo primitus pertinet ipsum velle; nam si volumus, est, si nolumus, non est; non enim vellemus, si nollemus. Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Neque enim et vitam Dei et praescientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper vivere et cuncta praescire; sicut nec potestas eius minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. Sic enim hoc non potest, ut potius, si posset, minoris esset utique potestatis. Recte quippe omnipotens dicitur, qui tamen mori et falli non potest. Dicitur enim omnipotens faciendo quod uult, non patiendo quod non uult; quod ei si accideret, nequaquam esset omnipotens. Vnde propterea quaedam non potest, quia omnipotens est. Sic etiam cum dicimus necesse esse, ut, cum volumus, libero velimus arbitrio: et verum procul dubio dicimus, et non ideo ipsum liberum arbitrium necessitati subicimus, quae adimit libertatem. Sunt igitur nostrae voluntates et ipsae faciunt, quidquid volendo facimus, quod non fieret, si nollemus. Quidquid autem aliorum hominum voluntate nolens quisque patitur, etiam sic voluntas valet, etsi non illius, tamen hominis voluntas; sed potestas Dei. (Nam si voluntas tantum esset nec posset quod vellet, potentiore voluntate impediretur; nec sic tamen voluntas nisi voluntas esset, nec alterius, sed eius esset qui vellet, etsi non posset implere quod vellet.) Vnde quidquid praeter suam voluntatem patitur homo, non debet tribuere humanis vel angelicis vel cuiusquam creati spiritus voluntatibus, sed eius potius, qui dat potestatem volentibus. Non ergo propterea nihil est in nostra voluntate, quia Deus praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate. Non enim, qui hoc praescivit, nihil praescivit. Porro si ille, qui praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate, non utique nihil, sed aliquid praescivit: profecto et illo praesciente est aliquid in nostra voluntate. Quocirca nullo modo cogimur aut retenta praescientia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium aut retento voluntatis arbitrio Deum (quod nefas est) negare praescium futurorum; sed utrumque amplectimur, utrumque fideliter et veraciter confitemur; illud, ut bene credamus; hoc, ut bene vivamus. Male autem vivitur, si de Deo non bene creditur. Vnde absit a nobis eius negare praescientiam, ut libere velimus, quo adivuante sumus liberi vel erimus. Proinde non frustra sunt leges obiurgationes exhortationes laudes et vituperationes, quia et ipsas futuras esse praescivit, et valent plurimum, quantum eas valituras esse praescivit, et preces valent ad ea impetranda, quae se precantibus concessurum esse praescivit, et iuste praemia bonis factis et peccatis supplicia constituta sunt. Neque enim ideo <non> peccat homo, quia Deus illum peccaturum esse praescivit; immo ideo non dubitatur ipsum peccare, cum peccat, quia ille, cuius praescientia falli non potest, non fatum, non fortunam, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsum peccaturum esse praescivit. Qui si nolit, utique non peccat; sed si peccare noluerit, etiam hoc ille praescivit. ||Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect,-as, for instance, the necessity of death,-it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself,-for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not,-for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,-for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But when any one suffers anything, being unwilling by the will of another, even in that case will retains its essential validity, -we do not mean the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and that not the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish what he willed. Therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what would be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We faithfully and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe well concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain our freedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted, and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and they are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew that they would be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things which He foreknew that He would grant to those who offered them; and with justice have rewards been appointed for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this did God foreknow.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c11"><b>BOOK V</b> [XI] Deus itaque summus et verum cum Verbo suo et Spiritu sancto, quae tria unum sunt, Deus unus omnipotens, creator et factor omnis animae atque omnis corporis, cuius sunt participatione felices, quicumque sunt veritate, non uanitate felices, qui fecit hominem rationale animal ex anima et corpore, qui eum peccantem nec inpunitum esse permisit nec sine misericordia dereliquit; qui bonis et malis essentiam etiam cum lapidibus, vitam seminalem etiam cum arboribus, vitam sensualem etiam cum pecoribus, vitam intellectualem cum solis angelis dedit; a quo est omnis modus omnis species omnis ordo; a quo est mensura numerus pondus; a quo est quidquid naturaliter est, cuiuscumque generis est, cuiuslibet aestimationis est; a quo sunt semina formarum formae seminum motus seminum atque formarum; qui dedit et carni originem pulchritudinem valetudinem, propagationis fecunditatem membroroum dispositionem salutem concordiae; qui et animae inrationali dedit memoriam sensum adpetitum, rationali autem insuper mentem intellegentiam voluntatem; qui non solum caelum et terram, enc solum angelum et hominem, sed nec exigui et contemptibilis animantis viscera nec avis pinnullam, nec herbae flosculum nec arboris folium sine suarum partium convenientia et quadam veluti pace dereliquit: nullo modo est credendus regna hominum eorumque dominationes et seruitutes a suae providentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. ||Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one), one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy through verity and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting of soul and body, who, when he sinned, neither permitted him to go unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value; from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the irrational soul has given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to these, has given intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts;-that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c12"><b>BOOK V</b> [XII] Proinde videamus, quos Romanorum mores et quam ob causam Deus verus ad augendum imperium adivuare dignatus est, in cuius potestate sunt etiam regna terrena. Quod ut absolutius disserere possemus, ad hoc pertinentem et superiorem librum conscripsimus, quod in hac re potestas nulla sit eorum deorum, quos etiam rebus nugatoriis colendos putarunt, et praesentis voluminis partes superiores, quas huc usque perduximus, de fati quaestione tollenda, ne quisquam, cui iam persuasum esset non illorum deorum cultu Romanum imperium propagatum atque servatum, nescio cui fato potius id tribueret quam Dei summi potentissimae voluntati. Veteres igitur primique Romani, quantum eorum docet et commendat historia, quamuis ut aliae gentes excepta una populi Hebraeorum deos falsos colerent et non Deo victimas, sed daemoniis immolarent, tamen "laudis avidi, pecuiniae liberales erant, gloriam ingentem, divitias honestas volebant"; hanc ardentissime dilexerunt, propter hanc vivere voluerunt, pro hac emori non dubitaverunt; ceteras cupiditates huius unius ingenti cupiditate presserunt. Ipsam denique patriam suam, quoniam seruire videbatur inglorius, dominari vero atque imperare gloriosum, prius omni studio liberam, deinde dominam esse concupiverunt. Hinc est quod regalem dominationem non ferentes "annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecerunt, qui consules appellati sunt a consulendo, non reges aut domini a regnando atque dominando"; cum et reges utique a regendo dicti melius videantur, ut regnum a regibus, reges autem, ut dictum est, a regendo; sed fastus regius non disciplina putata est regentis vel benivolentia consulentis, sed superbia dominantis. Expulso itaque rege Tarquinio et consulibus institutis secutum est, quod idem auctor in Romanorum laudibus posuit, quod "civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creuerit; tanta cupido gloriae incesserat." Ista ergo laudis aviditas et cupido gloriae multa illa miranda fecit, laudabilia scilicet atque gloriosa secundum hominum existimationem. Laudat idem Sallustius temporibus suis magnos et praeclaros viros, Marcum Catonem et Gaium Caesarem, dicens quod diu illa res publica non habuit quemquam virtute magnum, sed sua memoria fuisse illos duos ingenti virtute, diversis moribus. In laudibus autem Caesaris posuit, quod sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum mouum exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset. Ita fiebat in votis virorum virtute magnorum, ut excitaret in bellum miseras gentes et flagello agitaret Bellona sanguineo, ut esset ubi virtus eorum enitesceret. Hoc illa profecto laudis aviditas et gloriae cupido faciebat. Amore itaque primitus libertatis, post etiam dominationis et cupiditate laudis et gloriae multa magna fecerunt. Reddit eis utriusque rei testimonium etiam poeta insignis illorum; inde quippe ait: Nec non Tarquinium eiectum Porsenna iubebatAccipere ingentique urbem obsidione premebat; Aeneadae in ferrum pro libertate ruebant. Tunc itaque magnum illis fuit aut fortiter <e> mori aut liberos vivere. Sed cum esset adepta libertas, tanta cupido gloriae incesserat, ut parum esset sola libertas, nisi et dominatio quereretur, dum pro magno habetur, quod velut loquente Iove idem poeta dicit: Quin aspera Iuno,Quae mare nunc terrasque metu caelumque fatigat,Consilia in melius referet mecumque fovebitRomanos rerum dominos gentemque togatam.Sic placitum. Veniet lustris labentibus aetas,Cum domus Assaraci Phthiam clarasque Mycenas Seruitio premet ac victis dominabitur Argis. Quae quidem Vergilius Iovem inducens tamquam futura praedicentem ipse iam facta recolebat cernebatque praesentia; verum propterea commemorare illa volui, ut ostenderem dominationem post libertatem sic habuisseRomanos, ut in eorum magnis laudibus poneretur. Hinc est et illud eiusdem poetae, quod, cum artibus aliarum gentium eas ipsas proprias Romanorum artes regnandi atque imperandi et subiugandi ac debellandi populos anteponeret, ait: Excudent alii apirantia mollius aera, Cedo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore uultus, Orabunt causas melius caelique meats Describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent: Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento (Hae tibi erunt artes) pacique inponere mores, Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. Has artes illi tanto peritius exercebant, quanto minus se voluptatibus dabant et eneruationi animi et corporis in concupiscendis et augendis divitiis et per illas moribus corrumpendis, rapiendo miseris civibus, largiendo scaenicis turpibus. Vnde qui tales iam morum labe superabant atque abundabant, quando scribebat ista Sallustius canebatque Vergilius, non illis artibus ad honores et gloriam, sed dolis atque fallaciis ambiebant. Vnde idem dicit: "Sed primo magis ambitio quam auaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat. Nam gloriam honorem imperium bonus et ignauus aeque sibi exoptant; sed ille, inquit, vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit." Hae sunt illae bonae artes, per virtutem scilicet, non per fallacem ambitionem ad honorem et gloriam et imperium pervenire; quae tamen bonus et ignauus aeque sibi exoptant; sed ille, id est bonus, vera via nititur. Via virtus est, qua nititur tamquam ad possessionis finem, id est ad gloriam honorem imperium. Hoc insitum habuisse Romanos etiam deorum apud illos aedes indicant, quas coniunctissimas consituerunt, Virtutis et Honoris, pro diis habentes quae dantur a Deo. Vnde intellegi potest quem finem volebant esse virtutis et quo eam referebant qui boni erant, ad honorem scilicet; nam mali nec habebant eam, quamuis honorem habere cuperent, quem malis artibus conabantur adipisci, id est dolis atque fallaciis. Melius laudatus est Cato. De illo quippe ait: "Quo minus petebat gloriam, eo illum magis sequebatur." Quando quidem gloria est, cuius illi cupiditate flagrabant, iudicium hominum bene de hominibus opinantium; et ideo melior est virtus, quae humano testimonio contenta non est nisi conscientiae suae. Vnde dicit apostolus: Nam gloria nostra haec est: testimonium conscientiae nostrae; et alio loco: Opus autem suum probet unusquisque, et tunc in semet ipso tantum gloriam habebit et non in altero. Gloriam ergo et honorem et imperium, quae sibi exoptabant et quo bonis artibus pervenire nitebantur boni, non debet sequi virtus, sed ipsa virtutem. Neque enim est vera virtus, nisi quae ad eum finem tendit, ubi est bonum hominis, quo melius non est. Vnde et honores, quos petivit Cato, petere non debuit, sed eos civitas ob eius virtutem non petenti dare. Sed cum illa memoria duo Romani essent virtute magni, Caesar et Cato, longe virtus Catonis veritati videtur propinquior fuisse quam Caesaris. Proinde qualis esset illo tempore civitas et antea qualis fuisset, videamus in ipsa sententia Catonis: "Nolite, inquit, existimare maiores nostros armis rem publicam ex parua magnam fecisse. Si ita esset, multo pulcherrimam eam nos haberemus. Quippe sociorum atque civium, praeterea armorum et equorum maior copia nobis quam illis est. Sed alia fuere quae illos magnos fecerunt, quae nobis nulla sunt: domi industria, foris iustum imperium, animus in consuelendo liber, neque delicto neque libidini obnoxius. Pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque auaritiam, publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam; laudamus divitias, sequimur inertiam; inter bonos et malos discrimen nullum; omnia virtutis praemia ambitio possidet. Neque mirum: ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis, ubi domi voluptatibus, hic pecuniae aut gratiae seruitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in uacuam rem publicam." Qui audit haec Catonis verba sive Sallustii, putat, quales laudantur Romani ueteres, omnes eos tales tunc fuisse vel plures. Non ita est; alioquin vera non essent, quae ipse item scribit, ea quae commemoravi in secundo libro huius operis, ubi dicit, iniurias validiorum et ob eas discessionem plebis a patribus aliasque dissensiones domi fuisse iam inde a principio, neque amplius aequo et modesto iure, actum quam expulsis regibus, quamdiu metus a Tarquinio fuit, donec bellum grave, quod propter ipsum cum Etruria susceptum fuerat, finiretur; postea vero seruili imperio patres exercuisse plebem, regio more verberasse, agro pepulisse et ceteris expertibus solos egisse in imperio; quarum discordiarum, dum illi dominari vellent, illi seruire nollent, finem fuisse bello Punico secundo, quia rursus gravis metus coepit urguere atque ab illis perturbationibus alia maiore cura cohibere animos inquietos et ad concordiam reuocare civilem. Sed per quosdam paucos, qui pro suo modo boni erant, magna administrabantur atque illis toleratis ac temperatis malis paucorum bonorum providentia res illa crescebat; sicut idem historicus dicit multa sibi legenti et audienti, quae populus Romanus domi militiaeque, mari atque terra praeclara facinora fecerit, libuisse adtendere quae res maxime tanta negotia sustinuisset; quoniam sciebat saepenumero parua manu cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse Romanos, cognoverat paruis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus; sibique multa agitanti constare dixit, paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse, eoque factum ut divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret. "Sed postquam luxu atque desidia, inquit, civitas corrupta est, rursus res publica magnitudine sui imperatorum atque magistratuum vitia sustentabat." Paucorum igitur virtus ad gloriam honorem imperium vera via, id est ipsa virtute, nitentium etiam a Catone laudata est. Hinc erat domi industria, quam commemoravit Cato, ut aerarium esset opulentum, tenues res privatae. Vnde corruptis moribus vitium e contrario posuit, publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam. ||Wherefore let us go on to consider what virtues of the Romans they were which the true God, in whose power are also the kingdoms of the earth, condescended to help in order to raise the empire, and also for what reason He did so. And, in order to discuss this question on clearer ground, we have written the former books, to show that the power of those gods, who, they thought, were to be worshipped with such trifling and silly rites, had nothing to do in this matter; and also what we have already accomplished of the present volume, to refute the doctrine of fate, lest any one who might have been already persuaded that the Roman empire was not extended and preserved by the worship of these gods, might still be attributing its extension and preservation to some kind of fate, rather than to the most powerful will of God most high. The ancient and primitive Ro mans, therefore, though their history shows us that, like all the other nations, with the sole exception of the Hebrews, they worshipped false gods, and sacrificed victims, not to God, but to demons, have nevertheless this commendation bestowed on them by their historian, that they were "greedy of praise, prodigal of wealth, desirous of great glory, and content with a moderate fortune." Glory they most ardently loved: for it they wished to live, for it they did not hesitate to die. Every other desire was repressed by the strength of their passion for that one thing. At length their country itself, because it seemed inglorious to serve, but glorious to rule and to command, they first earnestly desired to be free, and then to be mistress. Hence it was that, not enduring the domination of kings, they put the government into the hands of two chiefs, holding office for a year, who were called consuls, not kings or lords. But royal pomp seemed inconsistent with the administration of a ruler (regentis), or the benevolence of one who consults (that is, for the public good) (consulentis), but rather with the haughtiness of a lord (dominantis). King Tarquin, therefore, having been banished, and the consular government having been instituted, it followed, as the same author already alluded to says in his praises of the Romans, that "the state grew with amazing rapidity after it had obtained liberty, so great a desire of glory had taken possession of it." That eagerness for praise and desire of glory, then, was that which accomplished those many wonderful things, laudable, doubtless, and glorious according to human judgment. The same Sallust praises the great men of his own time, Marcus Cato, and Caius Cжsar, saying that for a long time the republic had no one great in virtue, but that within his memory there had been these two men of eminent virtue, and very different pursuits. Now, among the praises which he pronounces on Cжsar he put this, that he wished for a great empire, an army, and a new war, that he might have a sphere where his genius and virtue might shine forth. Thus it was ever the prayer of men of heroic character that Bellona would excite miserable nations to war, and lash them into agitation with her bloody scourge, so that there might be occasion for the display of their valor. This, forsooth, is what that desire of praise and thirst for glory did. Wherefore, by the love of liberty in the first place, afterwards also by that of domination and through the desire of praise and glory, they achieved many great things; and their most eminent poet testifies to their having been prompted by all these motives:"Porsenna there, with pride elate,Bids Rome to Tarquin ope her gate;With arms he hems the city in,Жneas' sons stand firm to win."At that time it was their greatest ambition either to die bravely or to live free; but when liberty was obtained, so great a desire of glory took possession of them, that liberty alone was not enough unless domination also should be sought, their great ambition being that which the same poet puts into the mouth of Jupiter:"Nay, Juno's self, whose wild alarmsSet ocean, earth, and heaven in arms,Shall change for smiles her moody frown,And vie with me in zeal to crownRome's sons, the nation of the gown.So stands my will. There comes a day,While Rome's great ages hold their way,When old Assaracus's sonsShall quit them on the myrmidons,O'er Phthia and Mycenж reign,And humble Argos to their chain."Which things, indeed, Virgil makes Jupiter predict as future, while, in reality, he was only himself passing in review in his own mind, things which were already done, and which were beheld by him as present realities. But I have mentioned them with the intention of showing that, next to liberty, the Romans so highly esteemed domination, that it received a place among those things on which they bestowed the greatest praise. Hence also it is that that poet, preferring to the arts of other nations those arts which peculiarly belong to the Romans, namely, the arts of ruling and commanding, and of subjugating and vanquishing nations, says,"Others, belike, with happier grace,From bronze or stone shall call the face,Plead doubtful causes, map the skies,And tell when planets set or rise;But Roman thou, do thou controlThe nations far and wide;Be this your genius, to imposeThe rule of peace on vanquished foes,Show pity to the humble soul,And crush the sons of pride."These arts they exercised with the more skill the less they gave themselves up to pleasures, and to enervation of body and mind in coveting and amassing riches, and through these corrupting morals, by extorting them from the miserable citizens and lavishing them on base stage-players. Hence these men of base character, who abounded when Sallust wrote and Virgil sang these things, did not seek after honors and glory by these arts, but by treachery and deceit. Wherefore the same says, "But at first it was rather ambition than avarice that stirred the minds of men, which vice, however, is nearer to virtue. For glory, honor, and power are desired alike by the good man and by the ignoble; but the former," he says, "strives onward to them by the true way, while the other, knowing nothing of the good arts, seeks them by fraud and deceit." And what is meant by seeking the attainment of glory, honor, and power by good arts, is to seek them by virtue, and not by deceitful intrigue; for the good and the ignoble man alike desire these things, but the good man strives to overtake them by the true way. The way is virtue, along which he presses as to the goal of possession-namely, to glory, honor, and power. Now that this was a sentiment engrained in the Roman mind, is indicated even by the temples of their gods; for they built in very close proximity the temples of Virtue and Honor, worshipping as gods the gifts of God. Hence we can understand what they who were good thought to be the end of virtue, and to what they ultimately referred it, namely, to honor; for, as to the bad, they had no virtue though they desired honor, and strove to possess it by fraud and deceit. Praise of a higher kind is bestowed upon Cato, for he says of him "The less he sought glory, the more it followed him." We say praise of a higher kind; for the glory with the desire of which the Romans burned is the judgment of men thinking well of men. And therefore virtue is better, which is content with no human judgment save that of one's own conscience. Whence the apostle says, "For this is our glory, the testimony of our conscience." 2 Corinthians 1:12 And in another place he says, "But let every one prove his own work, and then he shall have glory in himself, and not in another." Galatians 6:4 That glory, honor, and power, therefore, which they desired for themselves, and to which the good sought to attain by good arts, should not be sought after by virtue, but virtue by them. For there is no true virtue except that which is directed towards that end in which is the highest and ultimate good of man. Wherefore even the honors which Cato sought he ought not to have sought, but the state ought to have conferred them on him unsolicited, on account of his virtues.But, of the two great Romans of that time, Cato was he whose virtue was by far the nearest to the true idea of virtue. Wherefore, let us refer to the opinion of Cato himself, to discover what was the judgment he had formed concerning the condition of the state both then and in former times. "I do not think," he says, "that it was by arms that our ancestors made the republic great from being small. Had that been the case, the republic of our day would have been by far more flourishing than that of their times, for the number of our allies and citizens is far greater; and, besides, we possess a far greater abundance of armor and of horses than they did. But it was other things than these that made them great, and we have none of them: industry at home, just government without, a mind free in deliberation, addicted neither to crime nor to lust. Instead of these, we have luxury and avarice, poverty in the state, opulence among citizens; we laud riches, we follow laziness; there is no difference made between the good and the bad; all the rewards of virtue are got possession of by intrigue. And no wonder, when every individual consults only for his own good, when you are the slaves of pleasure at home, and, in public affairs, of money and favor, no wonder that an onslaught is made upon the unprotected republic."He who hears these words of Cato or of Sallust probably thinks that such praise bestowed on the ancient Romans was applicable to all of them, or, at least, to very many of them. It is not so; otherwise the things which Cato himself writes, and which I have quoted in the second book of this work, would not be true. In that passage he says, that even from the very beginning of the state wrongs were committed by the more powerful, which led to the separation of the people from the fathers, besides which there were other internal dissensions; and the only time at which there existed a just and moderate administration was after the banishment of the kings, and that no longer than while they had cause to be afraid of Tarquin, and were carrying on the grievous war which had been undertaken on his account against Etruria; but afterwards the fathers oppressed the people as slaves, flogged them as the kings had done, drove them from their land, and, to the exclusion of all others, held the government in their own hands alone. And to these discords, while the fathers were wishing to rule, and the people were unwilling to serve, the second Punic war put an end; for again great fear began to press upon their disquieted minds, holding them back from those distractions by another and greater anxiety, and bringing them back to civil concord. But the great things which were then achieved were accomplished through the administration of a few men, who were good in their own way. And by the wisdom and forethought of these few good men, which first enabled the republic to endure these evils and mitigated them, it waxed greater and greater. And this the same historian affirms, when he says that, reading and hearing of the many illustrious achievements of the Roman people in peace and in war, by land and by sea, he wished to understand what it was by which these great things were specially sustained. For he knew that very often the Romans had with a small company contended with great legions of the enemy; and he knew also that with small resources they had carried on wars with opulent kings. And he says that, after having given the matter much consideration, it seemed evident to him that the pre-eminent virtue of a few citizens had achieved the whole, and that that explained how poverty overcame wealth, and small numbers great multitudes. But, he adds, after that the state had been corrupted by luxury and indolence, again the republic, by its own greatness, was able to bear the vices of its magistrates and generals. Wherefore even the praises of Cato are only applicable to a few; for only a few were possessed of that virtue which leads men to pursue after glory, honor, and power by the true way,-that is, by virtue itself. This industry at home, of which Cato speaks, was the consequence of a desire to enrich the public treasury, even though the result should be poverty at home; and therefore, when he speaks of the evil arising out of the corruption of morals, he reverses the expression, and says, "Poverty in the state, riches at home."
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c13"><b>BOOK V</b> [XIII] Quam ob rem cum diu fuissent regna Orientis inlustria, voluit Deus et Occidentale fieri, quod tempore esset posterius, sed imperii latitudine et magnitudine inlustrius, idque talibus potissimum concessit hominibus ad domanda gravia mala multarum gentium, qui causa honoris laudis et gloriae consuleuerunt patriae, in qua ipsam gloriam requirebant, salutemque eius saluti suae praeponere non dubitaverunt, pro isto uno vitio, id est amore laudis, pecuniae cupiditatem et multa alia vitia conprimentes. Nam sanius videt, qui et amorem laudis vitium esse cognoscit, quod necpoetam fugit Horatium, qui ait: Laudis amore tumes: sunt certa piacula, quae te Ter pure lecto potuerunt recreare libello. Idemque in carmine lyrico ad reprimendam dominandi libidinem ita cecinit: Latius regnes avidum domandoSpiritum. quam si Libyam remotis Gradibus iungas et uterque Poenus Seruiat uni. Verum tamen qui libidines turpiores fide pietatis impetrato Spiritu sancto et amore intellegibilis pulchritudinis non refrenant, melius saltem cupiditate humanae laudis et gloriae non quidem iam sancti, sed minus turpes sunt. Etiam Tullius hinc dissimulare non potuit in eisdem libris quod de re publica scripsit, ubi loquitur de instituendo principe civitatis, quem dicit alendum esse gloria, et consequenter commemorat maiores suos multa mira atque praeclara gloriae cupiditate fecisse. Huic igitur vitio non solum non resistebant, verum etiam id excitandum et accendendum esse censebant, putantes hoc utile esse rei publicae. Quamquam nec in ipsis philosophiae libris Tullius ab hac peste dissimulet, ubi eam luce clarius confitetur. Cum enim de studiis talibus loqueretur, quae utique sectanda sunt fine veri boni, non ventositate laudis humanae, hanc intulit universalem generalemque sententiam: "Honos alit artes, omnesque accenduntur ad studia gloria iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur." ||Wherefore, when the kingdoms of the East had been illustrious for a long time, it pleased God that there should also arise a Western empire, which, though later in time, should be more illustrious in extent and greatness. And, in order that it might overcome the grievous evils which existed among other nations, He purposely granted it to such men as, for the sake of honor, and praise, and glory, consulted well for their country, in whose glory they sought their own, and whose safety they did not hesitate to prefer to their own, suppressing the desire of wealth and many other vices for this one vice, namely, the love of praise. For he has the soundest perception who recognizes that even the love of praise is a vice; nor has this escaped the perception of the poet Horace, who says,"You're bloated by ambition? take advice:Yon book will ease you if you read it thrice." And the same poet, in a lyric song, has thus spoken with the desire of repressing the passion for domination:"Rule an ambitious spirit, and you haveA wider kingdom than if you should joinTo distant Gades Lybia, and thusShould hold in service either Carthaginian."Nevertheless, they who restrain baser lusts, not by the power of the Holy Spirit obtained by the faith of piety, or by the love of intelligible beauty, but by desire of human praise, or, at all events, restrain them better by the love of such praise, are not indeed yet holy, but only less base. Even Tully was not able to conceal this fact; for, in the same books which he wrote, De Republica, when speaking concerning the education of a chief of the state, who ought, he says, to be nourished on glory, goes on to say that their ancestors did many wonderful and illustrious things through desire of glory. So far, therefore, from resisting this vice, they even thought that it ought to be excited and kindled up, supposing that that would be beneficial to the republic. But not even in his books on philosophy does Tully dissimulate this poisonous opinion, for he there avows it more clearly than day. For when he is speaking of those studies which are to be pursued with a view to the true good, and not with the vainglorious desire of human praise, he introduces the following universal and general statement:Honor nourishes the arts, and all are stimulated to the prosecution of studies by glory; and those pursuits are always neglected which are generally discredited.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c14"><b>BOOK V</b> [XIV] Huic igitur cupiditati melius resistitur sine dubitatione quam ceditur. Tanto enim quisque est Deo similior, quanto et ab hac inmunditia mundior. Quae in hac vita etsi non funditus eradicatur ex corde, quia etiam bene proficientes animos temptare non cessat: saltem cupiditas gloriae superetur dilectione iustitiae, ut, si alicubi iacent quae apud quosque improbantur, si bona, si recta sunt, etiam ipse amor humanae laudis erubescat et cedat amori veritatis. Tam enim est hoc vitium inimicum piae fidei, si maior in corde sit cupiditas gloriae quam Dei timor vel amor, ut Dominus diceret: Quo modo potestis credere gloriam ab inuicem expectantes et gloriam quae a solo Deo est non quaerentes? Item de quibusdam, qui in eum crediderant et verebantur palam confiteri, ait euangelista: Dilexerunt gloriam hominum magis quam Dei. Quod sancti apostoli non fecerunt; qui cum in his locis praedicarent Christi nomen, ubi non solum improbabatur (sicut ille ait: Iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur), verum etiam summae detestationis habebatur, tenentes quod audierant a bono magistro eodemque medico mentium: Si quis me negaverit coram hominibus, negabo eum coram patre meo, qui in caelis est, vel coram angelis Dei, inter maledicta et opprobria, inter gravissimas persecutiones crudelesque poenas non sunt deterriti a praedicatione salutis humanae tanto fremitu offensionis humanae. Et quod eos divina facientes atque dicentes divineque viventes debellatis quodam modo cordibus duris atque introducta pace iustitiae ingens in ecclesia Christi gloria consecuta est: non in ea tamquam in suae virtutis fine quieuerunt, sed eam quoque ipsam ad Dei gloriam referentes, cuius gratia tales erant, isto quoque fomite eos, quibus consulebant, ad amorem illius, a quo et ipsi tales fierent, accendebant. Namque ne propter humanam gloriam boni essent, docuerat eos magister illorum dicens: Cavete facere iustitiam uestram coram hominibus, ut videamini ab eis; alioquin mercedem non habebitis apud patrem uestrum, qui in caelis est. Sed rursus ne hoc peruerse intellegentes hominibus placere metuerent minusque prodessent latendo, quod boni sunt, demonstrans quo fine innotescere deberent: Luceant, inquit, opera uestra coram hominibus, ut videant bona facta uestra et glorificent patrem uestrum, qui in caelis est. Non ergo ut videamini ab eis, id est hac intentione, ut eos ad vos converti velitis, quia non per vos aliquid estis; sed ut glorificent patrem uestrum, qui in caelis est, ad quem conversi fiant quod estis. Hos secuti sunt martyres, qui Scaeuolas et Curtios et Decios non sibi inferendo poenas, sed inlatas ferendo et virtute vera, quoniam vera pietate, et innumerabili multitudine superarunt. Sed cum illi essent in civitate terrena, quibus propositus erat omnium pro illa officiorum finis incolumitas eius et regnum non in caelo, sed interra; non in vita aeterna, sed in decessione morientium et successione moriturorum: quid aliud amarent quam gloriam, qua volebant etiam post mortem tamquam vivere in ore laudantium? ||It is, therefore, doubtless far better to resist this desire than to yield to it, for the purer one is from this defilement, the liker is he to God; and, though this vice be not thoroughly eradicated from his heart,-for it does not cease to tempt even the minds of those who are making good progress in virtue,-at any rate, let the desire of glory be surpassed by the love of righteousness, so that, if there be seen anywhere "lying neglected things which are generally discredited," if they are good, if they are right, even the love of human praise may blush and yield to the love of truth. For so hostile is this vice to pious faith, if the love of glory be greater in the heart than the fear or love of God, that the Lord said, "How can you believe, who look for glory from one another, and do not seek the glory which is from God alone?" John 5:44 Also, concerning some who had believed on Him, but were afraid to confess Him openly, the evangelist says, "They loved the praise of men more than the praise of God;" John 12:43 which did not the holy apostles, who, when they proclaimed the name of Christ in those places where it was not only discredited, and therefore neglected,-according as Cicero says, "Those things are always neglected which are generally discredited,"-but was even held in the utmost detestation, holding to what they had heard from the Good Master, who was also the physician of minds, "If any one shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father who is in heaven, and before the angels of God," Matthew 10:33 amidst maledictions and reproaches, and most grievous persecutions and cruel punishments, were not deterred from the preaching of human salvation by the noise of human indignation. And when, as they did and spoke divine things, and lived divine lives, conquering, as it were, hard hearts, and introducing into them the peace of righteousness, great glory followed them in the church of Christ, they did not rest in that as in the end of their virtue, but, referring that glory itself to the glory of God, by whose grace they were what they were, they sought to kindle, also by that same flame, the minds of those for whose good they consulted, to the love of Him, by whom they could be made to be what they themselves were. For their Master had taught them not to seek to be good for the sake of human glory, saying, "Take heed that you do not your righteousness before men to be seen of them, or otherwise you shall not have a reward from your Father who is in heaven." Matthew 6:1 But again, lest, understanding this wrongly, they should, through fear of pleasing men, be less useful through concealing their goodness, showing for what end they ought to make it known, He says, "Let your works shine before men, that they may see your good deeds, and glorify your Father who is in heaven." Matthew 5:16 Not, observe, "that you may be seen by them, that is, in order that their eyes may be directed upon you,"-for of yourselves you are, nothing,-but "that they may glorify your Father who is in heaven," by fixing their regards on whom they may become such as you are. These the martyrs followed, who surpassed the Scжvolas, and the Curtiuses, and the Deciuses, both in true virtue, because in true piety, and also in the greatness of their number. But since those Romans were in an earthly city, and had before them, as the end of all the offices undertaken in its behalf, its safety, and a kingdom, not in heaven, but in earth,-not in the sphere of eternal life, but in the sphere of demise and succession, where the dead are succeeded by the dying,-what else but glory should they love, by which they wished even after death to live in the mouths of their admirers?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c15"><b>BOOK V</b> [XV] Quibus ergo non erat daturus Deus vitam aeternam cum sanctis angelis suis in sua civitate caelesti, ad cuius societatem pietas vera perducit quae non exhibet seruitutem religionis, quam *latreian Graeci vocant, nisi uni vero Deo, si neque hanc eis terrenam gloriam excellentissimi imperii concederet: non redderetur merces bonis artibus eorum, id est virtutibus, quibus ad tantam gloriam pervenire nitebantur. De talibus enim, qui propter hoc boni aliquid facere videntur, ut glorificentur ab hominibus, etiam Dominus ait: Amen dico vobis, perceperunt mercedem suam. Sic et isti privatas res suas pro re communi, hoc est re publica, et pro eius aerario contempserunt, auaritiae restiterunt, consuluerunt patriae consilio libero, neque delicto secundum suas leges neque libidini obnoxii; his omnibus artibus tamquam vera via nisi sunt ad honores imperium gloriam; honorati sunt in omnibus fere gentibus, imperii sui leges inposuerunt multis gentibus, hodieque litteris et historia gloriosi sunt paene in omnibus gentibus: non est quod de summi et veri Dei iustitia conquerantur; perceperunt mercedem suam. ||Now, therefore, with regard to those to whom God did not purpose to give eternal life with His holy angels in His own celestial city, to the society of which that true piety which does not render the service of religion, which the Greeks call ?at?e?a, to any save the true God conducts, if He had also withheld from them the terrestrial glory of that most excellent empire, a reward would not have been rendered to their good arts,-that is, their virtues,-by which they sought to attain so great glory. For as to those who seem to do some good that they may receive glory from men, the Lord also says, "Verily I say unto you, they have received their reward." Matthew 6:2 So also these despised their own private affairs for the sake of the republic, and for its treasury resisted avarice, consulted for the good of their country with a spirit of freedom, addicted neither to what their laws pronounced to be crime nor to lust. By all these acts, as by the true way, they pressed forward to honors, power, and glory; they were honored among almost all nations; they imposed the laws of their empire upon many nations; and at this day, both in literature and history, they are glorious among almost all nations. There is no reason why they should complain against the justice of the supreme and true God,-"they have received their reward."
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c16"><b>BOOK V</b> [XVI] Merces autem sanctorum longe alia est etiam hic opprobria sustinentium pro veritate Dei, quae mundi huius dilectoribus odiosa est. Illa civitas sempiterna est; ibi nullus oritur, quia nullus moritur; ibi est vera et plena felicitas, non dea, sed donum Dei; inde fidei pignus accepimus, quandiu peregrinantes eius pulchritudini suspiramus; ibi non oritur sol super bonos et malos, sed sol iustitiae solos protegit bonos; ibi non erit magna industria ditare publicum aerarium privatis rebus angustis, ubi thensaurus communis est veritatis. Proinde non solum ut talis merces talibus hominibus redderetur Romanum imperium ad humanam gloriam dilatatum est; verum etiam ut cives aeternae illius civitatis, quamdiu hic peregrinantur, diligenter et sobrie illa intueantur exempla et videant quanta dilectio debeatur supernae patriae propter vitam aeternam, si tantum a suis civibus terrena dilecta est propter hominum gloriam. ||But the reward of the saints is far different, who even here endured reproaches for that city of God which is hateful to the lovers of this world. That city is eternal. There none are born, for none die. There is true and full felicity,-not a goddess, but a gift of God. Thence we receive the pledge of faith while on our pilgrimage we sigh for its beauty. There rises not the sun on the good and the evil, but the Sun of Righteousness protects the good alone. There no great industry shall be expended to enrich the public treasury by suffering privations at home, for there is the common treasury of truth. And, therefore, it was not only for the sake of recompensing the citizens of Rome that her empire and glory had been so signally extended, but also that the citizens of that eternal city, during their pilgrimage here, might diligently and soberly contemplate these examples, and see what a love they owe to the supernal country on account of life eternal, if the terrestrial country was so much beloved by its citizens on account of human glory.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c17"><b>BOOK V</b> [XVII] Quantum enim pertinet ad hanc vitam mortalium, quae paucis diebus ducitur et finitur, quid interest sub cuius imperio vivat homo moriturus, si illi qui imperant ad impia et iniqua non cogant? Aut vero aliquid nocuerunt Romani gentibus, quibus subiugatis inposuerunt leges suas, nisi quia id factum est ingenti strage bellorum? Quod si concorditer fieret, id ipsum fieret meliore successu; sed nulla esset gloria triumphantium. Neque enim et Romani non vivebant sub legibus suis, quas ceteris inponebant. Hoc si fieret sine Marte et Bellona, ut nec Victoria locum haberet, nemine vincente ubi nemo pugnaverat: nonne Romanis et ceteris gentibus una esset eademque condicio? praesertim si mox fieret, quod postea gratissime atque humanissime factum est, ut omnes ad Romanum imperium pertinentes societatem acciperent civitatis et Romani cives essent, ac sic esset omnium, quod erat ante paucorum; tantum quod plebs illa, quae suos agros non haberet, de publico viveret; qui pastus eius per bonos administratores rei publicae gratius a concordibus praestaretur quam victis extorqueretur. Nam quid intersit ad incolumitatem bonosque mores, ipsas certe hominum dignitates, quod alii vicerunt, alii victi sunt, omnino non video, praeter illum gloriae humanae inanissimum fastum, in quo perceperunt mercedem suam, qui eius ingenti cupidine arserunt et ardentia bella gesserunt. Numquid enim illorum agri tributa non soluunt? Numquid eis licet discere, quod aliis non licet? Numquid non multi senatores sunt in aliis terris, qui Romam ne facie quidem norunt? Tolle iactantiam, et omnes homines quid sunt nisi homines? Quod si peruersitas saeculi admitteret, ut honoratiores essent quique meliores: nec sic pro magno haberi debuit honor humanus, quia nullius est ponderis fumus. Sed utamur etiam in his rebus beneficio Domini Dei nostri; consideremus quanta contempserint, quae pertulerint, quas cupiditates subegerint pro humana gloria, qui eam tamquam mercedem talium virtutum accipere meruerunt, et valeat nobis etiam hoc ad opprimendam superbiam, ut, cum illa civitas, in qua nobis regnare promissum est, tantum ab hac distet, quantum distat caelum a terra, q temporali laetitia vita aeterna, ab inanibus laudibus solida gloria, a societate mortalium societas angelorum, a lumine solis et lunae lumen eius qui solem fecit et lunam, nihil sibi magnum fecisse videantur tantae patriae cives, si pro illa adipiscenda fecerint boni operis aliquid vel mala aliqua sustinverint, cum illi pro hac terrena iam adepta tanta fecerint, tanta perpessi sint, praesertim quia remissio peccatorum, quae cives ad aeternam colligit patriam, habet aliquid, cui per umbram quandam simile fuit asylum illud Romuleum, quo multitudinem, qua illa civitas conderetur, quorumlibet delictorum congregavit inpunitas. ||For, as far as this life of mortals is concerned, which is spent and ended in a few days, what does it matter under whose government a dying man lives, if they who govern do not force him to impiety and iniquity? Did the Romans at all harm those nations, on whom, when subjugated, they imposed their laws, except in as far as that was accomplished with great slaughter in war? Now, had it been done with consent of the nations, it would have been done with greater success, but there would have been no glory of conquest, for neither did the Romans themselves live exempt from those laws which they imposed on others. Had this been done without Mars and Bellona, so that there should have been no place for victory, no one conquering where no one had fought, would not the condition of the Romans and of the other nations have been one and the same, especially if that had been done at once which afterwards was done most humanely and most acceptably, namely, the admission of all to the rights of Roman citizens who belonged to the Roman empire, and if that had been made the privilege of all which was formerly the privilege of a few, with this one condition, that the humbler class who had no lands of their own should live at the public expense-an alimentary impost, which would have been paid with a much better grace by them into the hands of good administrators of the republic, of which they were members, by their own hearty consent, than it would have been paid with had it to be extorted from them as conquered men? For I do not see what it makes for the safety, good morals, and certainly not for the dignity, of men, that some have conquered and others have been conquered, except that it yields them that most insane pomp of human glory, in which "they have received their reward," who burned with excessive desire of it, and carried on most eager wars. For do not their lands pay tribute? Have they any privilege of learning what the others are not privileged to learn? Are there not many senators in the other countries who do not even know Rome by sight? Take away outward show, and what are all men after all but men? But even though the perversity of the age should permit that all the better men should be more highly honored than others, neither thus should human honor be held at a great price, for it is smoke which has no weight. But let us avail ourselves even in these things of the kindness of God. Let us consider how great things they despised, how great things they endured, what lusts they subdued for the sake of human glory, who merited that glory, as it were, in reward for such virtues; and let this be useful to us even in suppressing pride, so that, as that city in which it has been promised us to reign as far surpasses this one as heaven is distant from the earth, as eternal life surpasses temporal joy, solid glory empty praise, or the society of angels the society of mortals, or the glory of Him who made the sun and moon the light of the sun and moon, the citizens of so great a country may not seem to themselves to have done anything very great, if, in order to obtain it, they have done some good works or endured some evils, when those men for this terrestrial country already obtained, did such great things, suffered such great things. And especially are all these things to be considered, because the remission of sins which collects citizens to the celestial country has something in it to which a shadowy resemblance is found in that asylum of Romulus, whither escape from the punishment of all manner of crimes congregated that multitude with which the state was to be founded.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c18"><b>BOOK V</b> [XVIII] Quid ergo magnum est pro illa aeterna caelestique patria cuncta saeculi huius quamlibet iucunda blandimenta contemnere, si pro hac temporali atque terrena filios Brutus potuit et occidere, quod illa facere neminem cogit? Sed certe difficilius est filios interimere, quam quod pro ista faciendum est, ea, quae filiis congreganda videbantur atque servanda, vel donare pauperibus vel, si existat temptatio, quae id pro fide atque iustitia fieri compellat, amittere. Felices enim vel nos vel filios nostros non divitiae terrenae faciunt aut nobis viventibus amittendae aut nobis mortuis a quibus nescimus vel forte a quibus nolumus possidendae; sed Deus felices facit, qui est mentium vera opulentia. Bruto autem, quia filios occidit, infelicitatis perhibet testimonium etiam poeta laudator. Ait enim: Natosque pater noua bella moventesAd poenam pulchra pro libertate vocabit Infelix, utcumque ferent ea facta minores. Sed versu sequenti consolatus est infelicem: Vincit amor patriae laudumque inmensa cupido. Haec sunt duo illa, libertas et cupiditas laudis humanae, quae ad facta compulit miranda Romanos. Si ergo pro libertate moriturorum et cupiditate laudum, quae a mortalibus expetuntur, occidi filii a patre potuerunt: quid magnum est, si pro vera libertate, quae nos ab iniquitatis et mortis et diaboli dominatu liberos facit, nec cupiditate humanarum laudum, sed caritate liberandorum hominum, non a Tarquinio rege, sed a daemonibus et daemonum principe, non filii occiduntur, sed Christi pauperes inter filios computantur? Si alius etiam Romanus princeps, cognomine Torquatus, filium, non quia contra patriam, sed etiam pro patria, tamen quia contra imperium suum, id est contra quod imperaverat pater imperator, ab hoste prouocatus ivuenali ardore pugnaverat, licet vicisset, occidit, ne plus mali esset in exemplo imperii contempti quam boni in gloria hostis occisi: ut quid se iactent, qui pro inmortalis patriae legibus omnia, quae multo minus quam filii diliguntur, bona terrena contemnunt? Si Furius Camillus etiam ingratam patriam, a cuius ceruicibus acerrimorum hostium Veientium iugum depulerat damnatusque ab aemulis fuerat, a Gallis iterum liberavit, quia non habebat potiorem, ubi posset vivere gloriosius: cur extollatur, velut grande aliquid fecerit, qui forte in ecclesia ab inimicis carnalibus gravissimam exhonorationis passus iniuriam non se ad eius hostes haereticos transtulit aut aliquam contra illam ipse haeresem condidit, sed eam potius quantum valuit ab haereticorum perniciosissima pravitate defendit, cum alia non sit, non ubi vivatur in hominum gloria, sed ubi vita adquiratur aeterna? Si Mucius, ut cum Porsenna rege pax fieret, qui gravissimo bello Romanos premebat, quia Porsennam ipsum occidere non potuit et pro eo alterum deceptus occidit, in ardentem aram ante eius oculos dexteram extendit, dicens multos se tales, qualem illum videret, in eius exitium coniurasse, cuius ille fortitudinem et coniurationem talium perhorrescens sine ulla dubitatione se ab illo bello facta pace compescuit: quis regno caelorum inputaturus est merita sua, si pro illo non unam manum neque hoc sibi ultro faciens, sed persequente aliquo patiens totum flammis corpus inpenderit? Si Curtius armatus equo concito in abruptum hiatum terrae se praecipitem dedit, deorum suorum oraculis seruiens, quoniam iusserant, ut illic id quod Romani haberent optimum mitteretur, nec aliud intellegere potuerunt, quam viris armisque se excellere, unde videlicet oportebat, ut deorum iussis in illum interitum vir praecipitaretur armatus: quid se magnum pro aeterna patria fecisse dicturus est, qui aliquem fidei suae passus inimicum non se ultro in talem mortem mittens, sed ab illo missus obierit; quando quidem a Domino suo eodemque rege patriae suae certius oraculum accepit: Nolite timere eos, qui corpus occidunt,nimam autem non possunt occidere? Si se occidendos certis verbis quodam modo consecrantes Decii deuoverunt, ut illis cadentibus et iram deorum sanguine suo placantibus Romanus liberaretur exercitus: nullo modo superbient sancti martyres, tamquam dignum aliquid pro illius patriae participatione fecerint, ubi aeterna est et vera felicitas, si usque ad sui sanguinis effusionem non solum suos fratres, pro quibus fundebatur, verum et ipsos inimicos, a quibus fundebatur, sicut eis praeceptum est, diligentes caritatis fide et fidei caritate certarunt? Si Marcus Puluillus dedicans aedem Iovis, Iunonis, Mineruae falso sibi ab inuidis morte filii nuntiata, ut illo nuntio perturbatus abscederet atque ita dedicationis gloriam collega eius consequeretur, ita contempsit, ut eum etiam proici insepultum iuberet (sic in eius corde orbitatis dolorem gloriae cuuiditas vicerat): quid magnum se pro euangelii sancti praedicatione, qua cives supernae patriae de diversis liberantur et colliguntur erroribus, fecisse dicturus est, cui Dominus de sepultura patris sui sollicito ait: Seqowere aive et sine inortuos sepelire mortuos suos? Si M. Regulus, ne crudelissimos hostes iurando falleret, ad eos ab ipsa Roma reuersus est, quoniam, sicut Romanis eum tenere volentibus respondisse fertur, postea quam Afris seruierat, dignitatem illic honesti civis habere non posset, eumque Carthaginienses, quoniam contra eos in Romano senatu egerat, gravissimis suppliciis necaverunt: qui cruciatus non sunt pro fide illius patriae contemnendi, ad cuius beatitudinem fides ipsa perducit? aut quid retribuetur Domino pro omnibus quae retribuit, si pro fide quae illi debetur talia fuerit homo passus, qualia pro fide quam perniciosissimis inimicis debebat passus est Regulus? Quo modo se audebit extollere de voluntaria paupertate Christianus, ut in huius vitae peregrinatione expeditior ambulet viam, quae perducit ad patriam, ubi verae divitiae Deus ipse est, cum audiat vel legat L. Valerium, qui in suo defunctus est consulatu, usque adeo fuisse pauperem, ut nummis a populo conlatis eius sepultura curaretur? audiat vel legat Quintium Cincinnatum, cum quattuor iugera possideret et ea suis manibus coleret, ab aratro esse adductum, ut dictator fieret, maior utique honore quam consul, victisque hostibus ingentem gloriam consecutum in eadem paupertate mansisse? Aut quid se magnum fecisse praedicabit, qui nullo praemio mundi huius fuerit ab aeternae illius patriae societate seductus, cum Fabricium didicerit tantis muneribus Pyrrhi, regis Epirotarum, promissa etiam quarta parte regni a Romana civitate non potuisse deuelli ibique in sua paupertate privatum manere maluisse? Nam illud quod rem publicam, id est rem populi, rem patriae, rem communem, cum haberent opulentissimam atque ditissimam, sic ipsi in suis sdomibus pauperes erant, ut quidam eorum, qui iam bis consul fuisset, ex illo senatu hominum pauperum pelleretur notatione censoria, quod decem pondo argenti in uasis habere compertus est; ita idem ipsi pauperes erant, quorum triumphis publicum ditabatur aerarium: nonne omnes Christiani, qui excellentiore proposito divitias suas communes faciunt secundum id quod scriptum est in actibus apostolorum, ut distribuatur unicuique, sicut cuique opus est, et nemo dicat aliquid proprium, sed sint illis omnia communia, intellegunt se nulla ob hoc ventilari oportere iactantia, id faciendo pro obtinenda societate angelorum, cum paene tale aliquid illi fecerint pro conservanda gloria Romanorum? Haec et alia, si qua huius modi reperiuntur in litteriseorum, quando sic innotescerent, quando tanta fama praedicarentur, nisi Romanum imperium longe lateque porrectum magnificis successibus augeretur? Proinde perillud imperium tam latum tamque diuturnum virorumque tantorum virtutibus praeclarum atque gloriosum et illorum intentioni merces quam quaerebant est reddita, et nobis proposita necessariae commonitionis exempla, ut, si virtutes, quarum istae utcumque sunt similes, quas isti pro civitatis terrenae gloria temuerunt, pro Dei gloriosissima civitate non tenuerimus, pudore pungamur; si tenuerimus, superbia non extollamur quoniam, sicut dicit apostolus,indignae sunt passiones huius temporis ad futurum gloriam, quae reuerabitur in nobis. Ad humanam vero gloriam praesentisque temporis satis digna vita aestimabatur illorum. Vnde etiam Iudaei, qui Christum occiderunt, reuelante testamento nouo quod in uetere velatum fuit, ut non pro terrenis et temporalibus beneficiis, quae divina providentia permixte bonis malisque concedit, sed pro aeterna vita muneribusque perpetuis et ipsius supernae civitatis societate colatur Deus unus et verus, rectissime istorum gloriae donati sunt, ut hi, qui qualibuscumque virtutibus terrenam gloriam quaesiverunt et adquisiverunt, vincerent eos,qui magnis vitiis datorem verae gloriaeet civitatis aeternae occiderunt atque respuerunt. ||What great thing, therefore, is it for that eternal and celestial city to despise all the charms of this world, however pleasant, if for the sake of this terrestrial city Brutus could even put to death his son,-a sacrifice which the heavenly city compels no one to make? But certainly it is more difficult to put to death one's sons, than to do what is required to be done for the heavenly country, even to distribute to the poor those things which were looked upon as things to be massed and laid up for one's children, or to let them go, if there arise any temptation which compels us to do so, for the sake of faith and righteousness. For it is not earthly riches which make us or our sons happy; for they must either be lost by us in our lifetime, or be possessed when we are dead, by whom we know not, or perhaps by whom we would not. But it is God who makes us happy, who is the true riches of minds. But of Brutus, even the poet who celebrates his praises testifies that it was the occasion of unhappiness to him that he slew his son, for he says,"And call his own rebellious seedFor menaced liberty to bleed.Unhappy father! howsoe'erThe deed be judged by after days."But in the following verse he consoles him in his unhappiness, saying,His country's love shall all o'erbear.There are those two things, namely, liberty and the desire of human praise, which compelled the Romans to admirable deeds. If, therefore, for the liberty of dying men, and for the desire of human praise which is sought after by mortals, sons could be put to death by a father, what great thing is it, if, for the true liberty which has made us free from the dominion of sin, and death, and the devil,-not through the desire of human praise, but through the earnest desire of fleeing men, not from King Tarquin, but from demons and the prince of the demons,-we should, I do not say put to death our sons, but reckon among our sons Christ's poor ones? If, also, another Roman chief, surnamed Torquatus, slew his son, not because he fought against his country, but because, being challenged by an enemy, he through youthful impetuosity fought, though for his country, yet contrary to orders which he his father had given as general; and this he did, notwithstanding that his son was victorious, lest there should be more evil in the example of authority despised, than good in the glory of slaying an enemy;-if, I say, Torquatus acted thus, wherefore should they boast themselves, who, for the laws of a celestial country, despise all earthly good things, which are loved far less than sons? If Furius Camillus, who was condemned by those who envied him, notwithstanding that he had thrown off from the necks of his countrymen the yoke of their most bitter enemies, the Veientes, again delivered his ungrateful country from the Gauls, because he had no other in which he could have better opportunities for living a life of glory;-if Camillus did thus, why should he be extolled as having done some great thing, who, having, it may be, suffered in the church at the hands of carnal enemies most grievous and dishonoring injury, has not betaken himself to heretical enemies, or himself raised some heresy against her, but has rather defended her, as far as he was able, from the most pernicious perversity of heretics, since there is not another church, I say not in which one can live a life of glory, but in which eternal life can be obtained? If Mucius, in order that peace might be made with King Porsenna, who was pressing the Romans with a most grievous war, when he did not succeed in slaying Porsenna, but slew another by mistake for him, reached forth his right hand and laid it on a red-hot altar, saying that many such as he saw him to be had conspired for his destruction, so that Porsenna, terrified at his daring, and at the thought of a conspiracy of such as he, without any delay recalled all his warlike purposes, and made peace;-if, I say, Mucius did this, who shall speak of his meritorious claims to the kingdom of heaven, if for it he may have given to the flames not one hand, but even his whole body, and that not by his own spontaneous act, but because he was persecuted by another? If Curtius, spurring on his steed, threw himself all armed into a precipitous gulf, obeying the oracles of their gods, which had commanded that the Romans should throw into that gulf the best thing which they possessed, and they could only understand thereby that, since they excelled in men and arms, the gods had commanded that an armed man should be cast headlong into that destruction;-if he did this, shall we say that that man has done a great thing for the eternal city who may have died by a like death, not, however, precipitating himself spontaneously into a gulf, but having suffered this death at the hands of some enemy of his faith, more especially when he has received from his Lord, who is also King of his country, a more certain oracle, "Fear not them who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul?" Matthew 10:28 If the Decii dedicated themselves to death, consecrating themselves in a form of words, as it were, that falling, and pacifying by their blood the wrath of the gods, they might be the means of delivering the Roman army;-if they did this, let not the holy martyrs carry themselves proudly, as though they had done some meritorious thing for a share in that country where are eternal life and felicity, if even to the shedding of their blood, loving not only the brethren for whom it was shed, but, according as had been commanded them, even their enemies by whom it was being shed, they have vied with one another in faith of love and love of faith. If Marcus Pulvillus, when engaged in dedicating a temple to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, received with such indifference the false intelligence which was brought to him of the death of his son, with the intention of so agitating him that he should go away, and thus the glory of dedicating the temple should fall to his colleague;-if he received that intelligence with such indifference that he even ordered that his son should be cast out unburied, the love of glory having overcome in his heart the grief of bereavement, how shall any one affirm that he had done a great thing for the preaching of the gospel, by which the citizens of the heavenly city are delivered from various errors and gathered together from various wanderings, to whom his Lord has said, when anxious about the burial of his father, "Follow me, and let the dead bury their dead?" Matthew 8:22 Regulus, in order not to break his oath, even with his most cruel enemies, returned to them from Rome itself, because (as he is said to have replied to the Romans when they wished to retain him) he could not have the dignity of an honorable citizen at Rome after having been a slave to the Africans, and the Carthaginians put him to death with the utmost tortures, because he had spoken against them in the senate. If Regulus acted thus, what tortures are not to be despised for the sake of good faith toward that country to whose beatitude faith itself leads? Or what will a man have rendered to the Lord for all He has bestowed upon him, if, for the faithfulness he owes to Him, he shall have suffered such things as Regulus suffered at the hands of his most ruthless enemies for the good faith which he owed to them? And how shall a Christian dare vaunt himself of his voluntary poverty, which he has chosen in order that during the pilgrimage of this life he may walk the more disencumbered on the way which leads to the country where the true riches are, even God Himself;-how, I say, shall he vaunt himself for this, when he hears or reads that Lucius Valerius, who died when he was holding the office of consul, was so poor that his funeral expenses were paid with money collected by the people?-or when he hears that Quintius Cincinnatus, who, possessing only four acres of land, and cultivating them with his own hands, was taken from the plough to be made dictator,-an office more honorable even than that of consul,-and that, after having won great glory by conquering the enemy, he preferred notwithstanding to continue in his poverty? Or how shall he boast of having done a great thing, who has not been prevailed upon by the offer of any reward of this world to renounce his connection with that heavenly and eternal country, when he hears that Fabricius could not be prevailed on to forsake the Roman city by the great gifts offered to him by Pyrrhus king of the Epirots, who promised him the fourth part of his kingdom, but preferred to abide there in his poverty as a private individual? For if, when their republic,-that is, the interest of the people, the interest of the country, the common interest,-was most prosperous and wealthy, they themselves were so poor in their own houses, that one of them, who had already been twice a consul, was expelled from that senate of poor men by the censor, because he was discovered to possess ten pounds weight of silverplate,-since, I say, those very men by whose triumphs the public treasury was enriched were so poor, ought not all Christians, who make common property of their riches with a far nobler purpose, even that (according to what is written in the Acts of the Apostles) they may distribute to each one according to his need, and that no one may say that anything is his own, but that all things may be their common possession, Acts 2:45 -ought they not to understand that they should not vaunt themselves, because they do that to obtain the society of angels, when those men did well-nigh the same thing to preserve the glory of the Romans?How could these, and whatever like things are found in the Roman history, have become so widely known, and have been proclaimed by so great a fame, had not the Roman empire, extending far and wide, been raised to its greatness by magnificent successes? Wherefore, through that empire, so extensive and of so long continuance, so illustrious and glorious also through the virtues of such great men, the reward which they sought was rendered to their earnest aspirations, and also examples are set before us, containing necessary admonition, in order that we may be stung with shame if we shall see that we have not held fast those virtues for the sake of the most glorious city of God, which are, in whatever way, resembled by those virtues which they held fast for the sake of the glory of a terrestrial city, and that, too, if we shall feel conscious that we have held them fast, we may not be lifted up with pride, because, as the apostle says, "The sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared to the glory which shall be revealed in us." Romans 8:18 But so far as regards human and temporal glory, the lives of these ancient Romans were reckoned sufficiently worthy. Therefore, also, we see, in the light of that truth which, veiled in the Old Testament, is revealed in the New, namely, that it is not in view of terrestrial and temporal benefits, which divine providence grants promiscuously to good and evil, that God is to be worshipped, but in view of eternal life, everlasting gifts, and of the society of the heavenly city itself;-in the light of this truth we see that the Jews were most righteously given as a trophy to the glory of the Romans; for we see that these Romans, who rested on earthly glory, and sought to obtain it by virtues, such as they were, conquered those who, in their great depravity, slew and rejected the giver of true glory, and of the eternal city.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c19"><b>BOOK V</b> [XIX] Interest sane inter cupiditatem humanae gloriae et cupiditatem dominationis. Nam licet proclive sit, ut, qui humana gloria nimium delectatur, etiam dominari ardenter affectet, tamen qui veram licet humanarum laudum gloriam concupiscunt, dant operam bene iudicantibus non displicere. Sunt enim multa in moribus bona, de quibus multi bene iudicant, quamuis ea multi non habeant; per ea bona morum nituntur ad gloriam et imperium vel dominationem, de quibus ait Sallustius: "Sed ille vera via nititur." Quisquis autem sine cupiditate gloriae, qua veretur homo bene iudicantibus displicere, dominari atque imperare desiderat, etiam per apertissima scelera quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit. Proinde qui gloriam concupiscit, aut vera via nititur aut certe, "dolis atque fallaciis contendit", volens bonus videri esse, quod non est. Et ideo virtutes habenti magna virtus est contemnere gloriam, quia contemptus eius in conspectu Dei est, iudicio autem non aperitur humano. Quidquid enim fecerit ad oculos hominum, quo gloriae contemptor appareat, ad maiorem laudem, hoc est ad maiorem gloriam, facere si credatur, non est unde se suspicantium sensibus aliter esse, quam suspicantur, ostendat. Sed qui contemnit iudicia laudantium, contemnit etiam suspicantium temeritatem, quorum tamen, si vere bonus est, non contemnit salutem, quoniam tantae iustitiae est vi de spiritu Dei virtutes habet, ut etiam ipsos diligat inimicos, et ita diligat, ut suos osores vel detractores velit correctos habere consortes non in terrena patria, sed superna; in laudatoribus autem suis, quamuis paruipendat quod eum laudant, non tamen paruipendit, quod amant, nec eos uult fa lere laudantes, ne decipiat diligentes; ideoque instat ardenter, ut potius ille laudetur, a quo habet homo quidquid in eo iure laudatur. Qui autem gloriae contemptor dominationis est avidus, bestias superat sive crudelitatis vitiis sive luxuriae. Tales quidam Romani fuerunt. Non enim cura existimationis amissa dominationis cupiditate caruerunt. Multos tales fuisse prodit historia; sed huius vitii summitatem et quasi arcem quandam Nero Caesar primus obtinuit, cuius fuit tanta luxuries, ut nihil ab eo putaretur virile metuendum; tanta crudelitas, ut nihil molle habere crederetur, si nesciretur. Etiam talibus tamen dominandi potestas non datur nisi summi Dei providentia, quando res humanas iudicat talibus.dominis dignas. Aperta de hac re vox divina est loquente Dei sapientia: Per me reges regnant et tyranni per me tenent terram. Sed ne tyranni non pessimi atque improbi reges, sed uetere nomine fortes dicti existimentur (unde ait Vergilius: Pars mihi pacis erit dextram tetigisse tyranni): apertissime alio loco de Deo dictum est: Quia regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peruersitatem populi. Quam ob rem, quamuis ut potui satis exposuerim, qua causa Deus unus verus et iustus Romanos secundum quandam formam terrenae civitatis bonos adivuerit ad tanti imperii gloriam consequendam: potest tamen et alia causa esse latentior propter diversa merita generis humani, Deo magis nota quam nobis, dum illud constet inter omnes veraciter pios, neminem sine vera pietate, id est veri Dei vero cultu, veram posse habere virtutem, nec eam veram esse, quando gloriae seruit humanae; eos tamen, qui cives non sint civitatis aeternae, quae in sacris litteris nostris dicitur civitas Dei, utiliores esse terrenae civitati, quando habent virtutem vel ipsam, quam si nec ipsam. Illi autem, qui vera pietate praediti bene vivunt, si habent scientiam regendi populos, nihil est felicius rebus humanis, quam si Deo miserante habeant potestatem. Tales autem homines virtutes suas, quantascumque in hac vita possunt habere, non tribuunt nisi gratiae Dei, quod eas volentibus credentibus petentibus dederit, simulque intellegunt, quantum sibi desit ad perfectionem iustitiae, qualis est in illorum sanctorum angelorum societate, cui se nituntur aptare. Quantumlibet autem laudetur atque praedicetur virtus, quae sine vera pietate seruit hominum gloriae, nequaquam sanctorum exiguis initiis comparanda est, quorum spes posita est in gratia et misericordia veri Dei. ||There is assuredly a difference between the desire of human glory and the desire of domination; for, though he who has an overweening delight in human glory will be also very prone to aspire earnestly after domination, nevertheless they who desire the true glory even of human praise strive not to displease those who judge well of them. For there are many good moral qualities, of which many are competent judges, although they are not possessed by many; and by those good moral qualities those men press on to glory, honor and domination, of whom Sallust says, "But they press on by the true way."But whosoever, without possessing that desire of glory which makes one fear to displease those who judge his conduct, desires domination and power, very often seeks to obtain what he loves by most open crimes. Therefore he who desires glory presses on to obtain it either by the true way, or certainly by deceit and artifice, wishing to appear good when he is not. Therefore to him who possesses virtues it is a great virtue to despise glory; for contempt of it is seen by God, but is not manifest to human judgment. For whatever any one does before the eyes of men in order to show himself to be a despiser of glory, if they suspect that he is doing it in order to get greater praise,-that is, greater glory,-he has no means of demonstrating to the perceptions of those who suspect him that the case is really otherwise than they suspect it to be. But he who despises the judgment of praisers, despises also the rashness of suspectors. Their salvation, indeed, he does not despise, if he is truly good; for so great is the righteousness of that man who receives his virtues from the Spirit of God, that he loves his very enemies, and so loves them that he desires that his haters and detractors may be turned to righteousness, and become his associates, and that not in an earthly but in a heavenly country. But with respect to his praisers, though he sets little value on their praise, he does not set little value on their love; neither does he elude their praise, lest he should forfeit their love. And, therefore, he strives earnestly to have their praises directed to Him from whom every one receives whatever in him is truly praiseworthy. But he who is a despiser of glory, but is greedy of domination, exceeds the beasts in the vices of cruelty and luxuriousness. Such, indeed, were certain of the Romans, who, wanting the love of esteem, wanted not the thirst for domination; and that there were many such, history testifies. But it was Nero Cжsar who was the first to reach the summit, and, as it were, the citadel, of this vice; for so great was his luxuriousness, that one would have thought there was nothing manly to be dreaded in him, and such his cruelty, that, had not the contrary been known, no one would have thought there was anything effeminate in his character. Nevertheless power and domination are not given even to such men save by the providence of the most high God, when He judges that the state of human affairs is worthy of such lords. The divine utterance is clear on this matter; for the Wisdom of God thus speaks: "By me kings reign, and tyrants possess the land." Proverbs 8:15 But, that it may not be thought that by "tyrants" is meant, not wicked and impious kings, but brave men, in accordance with the ancient use of the word, as when Virgil says,"For know that treaty may not standWhere king greets king and joins not hand,"in another place it is most unambiguously said of God, that He "makes the man who is an hypocrite to reign on account of the perver sity of the people." Job 34:30 Wherefore, though I have, according to my ability, shown for what reason God, who alone is true and just, helped forward the Romans, who were good according to a certain standard of an earthly state, to the acquirement of the glory of so great an empire, there may be, nevertheless, a more hidden cause, known better to God than to us, depending on the diversity of the merits of the human race. Among all who are truly pious, it is at all events agreed that no one without true piety,-that is, true worship of the true God-can have true virtue; and that it is not true virtue which is the slave of human praise. Though, nevertheless, they who are not citizens of the eternal city, which is called the city of God in the sacred Scriptures, are more useful to the earthly city when they possess even that virtue than if they had not even that. But there could be nothing more fortunate for human affairs than that, by the mercy of God, they who are endowed with true piety of life, if they have the skill for ruling people, should also have the power. But such men, however great virtues they may possess in this life, attribute it solely to the grace of God that He has bestowed it on them-willing, believing, seeking. And, at the same time, they understand how far they are short of that perfection of righteousness which exists in the society of those holy angels for which they are striving to fit themselves. But however much that virtue may be praised and cried up, which without true piety is the slave of human glory, it is not at all to be compared even to the feeble beginnings of the virtue of the saints, whose hope is placed in the grace and mercy of the true God.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c20"><b>BOOK V</b> [XX] Solent philosophi, qui finem boni humani in ipsa virtute constituunt, ad ingerendum pudorem quibusdam philosophis, qui virtutes quidem probant, sed eas voluptatis corporalis fine metiuntur et illam per se ipsam putant adpetendam, istas propter ipsam, tabulam quandam verbis pingere, ubi voluptas in sella regali quasi delicata quaedam regina considat, eique virtutes famulae subiciantur, observantes eius nutum, ut faciant quod illa imperaverit, quae prudentiae iubeat, ut vigilanter inquirat, quo modo voluptas regnet et salua sit; iustitiae iubeat, ut praestet beneficia quae potest ad comparandas amicitias corporalibus commodis necessarias, nulli faciat iniuriam, ne offensis legibus voluptas vivere secura non possit; fortitudini iubeat, ut, si dolor corpori acciderit, qui non compellat in mortem, teneat dominam suam, id est voluptatem, fortiter in animi cogitatione, ut per pristinarum deliciarum suarum recordationem mitiget praesentis doloris aculeos; temperantiae iubeat, ut tantum capiat alimentorum et si qua delectant, ne per inmoderationem noxium aliquid valetudinem turbet et voluptas, quam etiam in corporis sanitate Epicurei maximam ponunt, graviter offendatur. Ita virtutes cum tota suae gloria dignitatis tamquam imperiosae cuidam et inhonestae mulierculae seruient voiuptati. Nihil hac pictura dicunt esse ignominiosius et deformius et quod minus ferre bonorum possit aspectus; et veruni dicunt. Sed non existimo satis debiti decoris esse picturam, si etiam talis fingatur, ubi virtutes humanae gloriae seruiunt. Licet enim ipsa gloria delicata mulier non sit, inflata est et multum inanitatis habet. Vnde non ei digne seruit soliditas quaedam firmitasque virtutum, ut nihil provideat providentia, nihil distribuat iustitia, nihil toleret fortitudo, nihil temperantia moderetur, nisi unde placeatur hominibus et ventosae gloriae seruiatur. Nec illi se ab ista foeditate defenderint, qui, cum aliena spernant iudicia velut gloriae contemptores, sibi sapientes videntur et sibi placent. Nam eorum virtus, si tamen ulla est, alio modo quodam humanae subditur laudi; neque enim ipse, qui sibi placet, homo non est. Qui autem vera pietate in Deum, quem diligit, credit et sperat, plus intendit in ea, <in> quibus sibi displicet, quam in ea, si qua in illo sunt, quae non tam ipsi quam veritati placent; neque id tribuit, unde iam potest placere, nisi eius misericordiae, cui metuit displicere; de his sanatis gratias agens, de illis sanandis preces fundens. ||Philosophers,-who place the end of human good in virtue itself, in order to put to shame certain other philosophers, who indeed approve of the virtues, but measure them all with reference to the end of bodily pleasure, and think that this pleasure is to be sought for its own sake, but the virtues on account of pleasure,-are wont to paint a kind of word-picture, in which Pleasure sits like a luxurious queen on a royal seat, and all the virtues are subjected to her as slaves, watching her nod, that they may do whatever she shall command. She commands Prudence to be ever on the watch to discover how Pleasure may rule, and be safe. Justice she orders to grant what benefits she can, in order to secure those friendships which are necessary for bodily pleasure; to do wrong to no one, lest, on account of the breaking of the laws, Pleasure be not able to live in security. Fortitude she orders to keep her mistress, that is, Pleasure, bravely in her mind, if any affliction befall her body which does not occasion death, in order that by remembrance of former delights she may mitigate the poignancy of present pain. Temperance she commands to take only a certain quantity even of the most favorite food, lest, through immoderate use, anything prove hurtful by disturbing the health of the body, and thus Pleasure, which the Epicureans make to consist chiefly in the health of the body, be grievously offended. Thus the virtues, with the whole dignity of their glory, will be the slaves of Pleasure, as of some imperious and disreputable woman.There is nothing, say our philosophers, more disgraceful and monstrous than this picture, and which the eyes of good men can less endure. And they say the truth. But I do not think that the picture would be sufficiently becoming, even if it were made so that the virtues should be represented as the slaves of human glory; for, though that glory be not a luxurious woman, it is nevertheless puffed up, and has much vanity in it. Wherefore it is unworthy of the solidity and firmness of the virtues to represent them as serving this glory, so that Prudence shall provide nothing, Justice distribute nothing, Temperance moderate nothing, except to the end that men may be pleased and vain glory served. Nor will they be able to defend themselves from the charge of such baseness, while they, by way of being despisers of glory, disregard the judgment of other men, seem to themselves wise, and please themselves. For their virtue,-if, indeed, it is virtue at all,-is only in another way subjected to human praise; for he who seeks to please himself seeks still to please man. But he who, with true piety towards God, whom he loves, believes, and hopes in, fixes his attention more on those things in which he displeases himself, than on those things, if there are any such, which please himself, or rather, not himself, but the truth, does not attribute that by which he can now please the truth to anything but to the mercy of Him whom he has feared to displease, giving thanks for what in him is healed, and pouring out prayers for the healing of that which is yet unhealed.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c21"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXI] Quae cum ita sint, non tribuamus dandi regni atque imperii potestatem nisi Deo vero, qui dat felicitatem in regno caelorum solis piis; regnum vero terrenum et piis et impiis, sicut ei placet, cui nihil iniuste placet. Quamuis enim aliquid dixerimus, quod apertum nobis esse voluit: tamen multum est ad nos et valde superat vires nostras hominum occulta discutere et liquido examine merita diiudicare regnorum. Ille igitur unus verus Deus, qui nec iudicio nec adiutorio deserit genus humanum, quando voluit et quantum voluit Romanis regnum dedit; qui dedit Assyriis, vel etiam Persis, a quibus solos duos deos coli, unum bonum, alterum malum, continent litterae istorum, ut taceam de populo Hebraeo, de quo iam dixi, quantum satis visum est, qui praeter unum Deum non coluit et quando regnavit. Qui ergo Persis dedit segetes sine cultu deae Segetiae, qui alia dona terrarum sine cultu tot deorum, quos isti rebus singulis singulos, vel etiam rebus singulis plures praeposuerunt: ipse etiam regnum dedit sine cultu eorum, per quorum cultum se isti regnasse crediderunt. Sic etiam hominibus: qui Mario, ipse Gaio Caesari; qui Augusto, ipse et Neroni; qui Vespasianis, vel patri vel filio, suavissimis imperatoribus, ipse et Domitiano crudelissimo; et ne per singulos ire necesse sit, qui Constantino Christiano, ipse apostatae Iuliano, cuius egregiam indolem decepit amore dominandi sacrilega et detestanda curiositas, cuius uanis deditus oraculis erat, quando fretus securitate victoriae naves, quibus victus necessarius portabatur, incendit; deinde feruide instans inmodicis ausibus et mox merito temeritatis occisus in locis hostilibus egenum reliquit exercitum, ut aliter inde non posset euadi, nisi contra illud auspicium dei Termini, de quo superiore libro diximus, Romani imperii termini moverentur. Cessit enim Terminus deus necessitati, qui non cesserat Iovi. Haec plane Deus unus et verus regit et gubernat, ut placet; et si occultis causis, numquid iniustis? ||These things being so, we do not attribute the power of giving kingdoms and empires to any save to the true God, who gives happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the pious alone, but gives kingly power on earth both to the pious and the impious, as it may please Him, whose good pleasure is always just. For though we have said something about the principles which guide His administration, in so far as it has seemed good to Him to explain it, nevertheless it is too much for us, and far surpasses our strength, to discuss the hidden things of men's hearts, and by a clear examination to determine the merits of various kingdoms. He, therefore, who is the one true God, who never leaves the human race without just judgment and help, gave a kingdom to the Romans when He would, and as great as He would, as He did also to the Assyrians, and even the Persians, by whom, as their own books testify, only two gods are worshipped, the one good and the other evil,-to say nothing concerning the Hebrew people, of whom I have already spoken as much as seemed necessary, who, as long as they were a kingdom, worshipped none save the true God. The same, therefore, who gave to the Persians harvests, though they did not worship the goddess Segetia, who gave the other blessings of the earth, though they did not worship the many gods which the Romans supposed to preside, each one over some particular thing, or even many of them over each several thing,-He, I say, gave the Persians dominion, though they worshipped none of those gods to whom the Romans believed themselves indebted for the empire. And the same is true in respect of men as well as nations. He who gave power to Marius gave it also to Caius Cжsar; He who gave it to Augustus gave it also to Nero; He also who gave it to the most benignant emperors, the Vespasians, father and son, gave it also to the cruel Domitian; and, finally, to avoid the necessity of going over them all, He who gave it to the Christian Constantine gave it also to the apostate Julian, whose gifted mind was deceived by a sacrilegious and detestable curiosity, stimulated by the love of power. And it was because he was addicted through curiosity to vain oracles, that, confident of victory, he burned the ships which were laden with the provisions necessary for his army, and therefore, engaging with hot zeal in rashly audacious enterprises, he was soon slain, as the just consequence of his recklessness, and left his army unprovisioned in an enemy's country, and in such a predicament that it never could have escaped, save by altering the boundaries of the Roman empire, in violation of that omen of the god Terminus of which I spoke in the preceding book; for the god Terminus yielded to necessity, though he had not yielded to Jupiter. Manifestly these things are ruled and governed by the one God according as He pleases; and if His motives are hid, are they therefore unjust?
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c22"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXII] Sic etiam tempora ipsa bellorum, sicut in eius arbitrio est iustoque iudicio et misericordia vel adterere vel consolari genus humanum, ut alia citius, alia tardius finiantur. Bellum piratarum a Pompeio, bellum Punicum tertium ab Scipione incredibili celeritate et temporis brevitate confecta sunt. Bellum quoque fugitivorum gladiatorum, quamuis multis Romanis ducibus et duobus consulibus victis Italiaque horribiliter contrita atque uastata, tertio tamen anno post multa consumpta consumptum est. Picentes, Marsi et Peligni, gentes non exterae, sed Italicae, post diuturnam et deuotissimam sub Romano iugo seruitutem in libertatem caput erigere temptaverunt, iam multis nationibus Romano Imperio subiugatis deletaque Carthagine; in quo bello Italico Romanis saepissime victis ubi et duo consules perierunt et alii nobilissimi senatores, non diuturno tamen tempore tractum est hoc malum; nam quintus ei annus finem dedit. Sed bellum Punicum secundum cum maximis detrimentis et calamitate rei publicae per annos decem et octo Romanas vires extenuavit et paene consumpsit; duobus proeliis ferme septuaginta Romanorum milia ceciderunt. Bellum Punicum primum per viginti et tres annos peractum est; bellum Mithridaticum quadraginta. Ac ne quisquam arbitretur rudimenta Romanorum fuisse fortiora ad bella citius peragenda, superioribus temporibus multum in omni virtute laudatis bellum Samniticum annis tractum est ferme quinquaginta; in quo bello ita Romani victi sunt, ub sub iugum etiam mitterentur. Sed quia non diligebant gloriam propter iustitiam, sed iustitiam propter gloriam diligere videbantur, pacem factam foedusque ruperunt. Haec ideo commemoro, quoniam multi praeteritarum rerum ignari, quidam etiam dissimulatores suae scientiae, si temporibus Christianis aliquod bellum paulo diutius trahi vident, ilico in nostram religionem proteruissime insiliunt, exclamantes, quod, si ipsa non esset et uetere ritu numina colerentur, iam Romana illa virtute, quae adivuante Marte et Bellona tanta celeriter bella confecit, id quoque celerrime finiretur. Recolant igitur qui legerunt, quam diuturna bella, quam variis euentis, quam luctuosis cladibus a ueteribus sint gesta Romanis, sicut solet orbis terrarum velut procellosissimum pelagus varia talium malorum tempestate iactari, et quod nolunt aliquando fateantur, nec insanis adversus Deum linguis se interimant et decipiant imperitos. ||Thus also the durations of wars are determined by Him as He may see meet, according to His righteous will, and pleasure, and mercy, to afflict or to console the human race, so that they are sometimes of longer, sometimes of shorter duration. The war of the Pirates and the third Punic war were terminated with incredible celerity. Also the war of the fugitive gladiators, though in it many Roman generals and the consuls were defeated, and Italy was terribly wasted and ravaged, was nevertheless ended in the third year, having itself been, during its continuance, the end of much. The Picentes, the Marsi, and the Peligni, not distant but Italian nations, after a long and most loyal servitude under the Roman yoke, attempted to raise their heads into liberty, though many nations had now been subjected to the Roman power, and Carthage had been overthrown. In this Italian war the Romans were very often defeated, and two consuls perished, besides other noble senators; nevertheless this calamity was not protracted over a long space of time, for the fifth year put an end to it. But the second Punic war, lasting for the space of eighteen years, and occasioning the greatest disasters and calamities to the republic, wore out and well-nigh consumed the strength of the Romans; for in two battles about seventy thousand Romans fell. The first Punic war was terminated after having been waged for three-and-twenty years. The Mithridatic war was waged for forty years. And that no one may think that in the early and much belauded times of the Romans they were far braver and more able to bring wars to a speedy termination, the Samnite war was protracted for nearly fifty years; and in this war the Romans were so beaten that they were even put under the yoke. But because they did not love glory for the sake of justice, but seemed rather to have loved justice for the sake of glory, they broke the peace and the treaty which had been concluded. These things I mention, because many, ignorant of past things, and some also dissimulating what they know, if in Christian times they see any war protracted a little longer than they expected, straightway make a fierce and insolent attack on our religion, exclaiming that, but for it, the deities would have been supplicated still, according to ancient rites; and then, by that bravery of the Romans, which, with the help of Mars and Bellona, speedily brought to an end such great wars, this war also would be speedily terminated. Let them, therefore, who have read history recollect what long-continued wars, having various issues and entailing woeful slaughter, were waged by the ancient Romans, in accordance with the general truth that the earth, like the tempestuous deep, is subject to agitations from tempests-tempests of such evils, in various degrees,-and let them sometimes confess what they do not like to own, and not, by madly speaking against God, destroy themselves and deceive the ignorant.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c23"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXXIII] Quod tamen nostra memoria recentissimo tempore Deus mirabiliter et misericorditer fecit, non cum gratiarum actione commemorant, sed, quantum in ipsis est, omnium si fieri potest hominum oblivione sepelire conantur; quod a nobis si tacebitur, similiter erimus ingrati. Cum Radagaisus, rex Gothorum, agmine ingenti et inmani iam in Vrbis vicinia constitutus Romanis ceruicibus inmineret, uno die tanta celeritate sic victus est, ut ne uno quidem non dicam extincto, sed uulnerato Romanorum multo amplius quam centum milium prosterneretur eiuS exercituS atque ipse mox captus poena debita necaretur. Nam si ille tam impius cum tantis et tam impiis copiis Romam fuisset ingressus, cui pepercisset? quibus honorem locis martyrum detulisset? in qua persona Deum timeret? cuius non sanguinem fusum, cuius pudicitiam vellet intactam? Quas autem isti pro diis suis voces haberent, quanta insultatione iactarent, quod ille ideo vicisset, ideo tanta potuisset, quia cotidianis sacrificiis placabat atque inuitabat deos, quod Romanos facere Christiana religio non sinebat? Nam propinquante iam illo his locis, ubi nutu summae maiestatis oppressus est, cum eius fama ubique crebresceret, nobis apud Carthaginem dicebatur, hoc credere spargere iactare paganos, quod ille diis amicis protegentibus et opitulantibus, quibus immolare cotidie ferebatur, vinci omnino non posset ab eis, qui talia diis Romanis sacra non facerent nec fieri a quoquam permitterent. Et non agunt miseri gratias tantae misericordiae Dei, qui cum statuisset inruptione barbarica graviora <pati> dignos mores hominum castigare, indignationem suam tanta mansuetudine temperavit, ut illum primo faceret mirabiliter vinci, ne ad infirmorum animos euertendos gloria daretur daemonibus, quibus eum supplicare constabat; deinde ab his barbaris Roma caperetur, qui contra omnem consuetudinem gestorum ante bellorum ad loca sancta confugientes Christianae religionis reuerentia tuerentur ipsisque daemonibus atque impiorum sacrificiorum ritibus, de quibus ille praesumpserat, sic adversarentur nomine Christiano, ut longe atrocius bellum cum eis quam cum hominibus gerere viderentur; ita verus dominus gubernatorque rerum et Romanos cum misericordia flagellavit, et tam incredibiliter victis supplicatoribus daemonum nec saluti rerum praesentium necessarla esse sacrificia illa monstravit, ut ab his qui non peruicaciter contendunt, sed prudenter adtendunt, nec propter praesentes necessitates vera religio deseratur, et magis aeternae vitae fidelissima expectatione teneatur. ||Nevertheless they do not mention with thanksgiving what God has very recently, and within our own memory, wonderfully and mercifully done, but as far as in them lies they attempt, if possible, to bury it in universal oblivion. But should we be silent about these things, we should be in like manner ungrateful. When Radagaisus, king of the Goths, having taken up his position very near to the city, with a vast and savage army, was already close upon the Romans, he was in one day so speedily and so thoroughly beaten, that, while not even one Roman was wounded, much less slain, far more than a hundred thousand of his army were prostrated, and he himself and his sons, having been captured, were forthwith put to death, suffering the punishment they deserved. For had so impious a man, with so great and so impious a host, entered the city, whom would he have spared? what tombs of the martyrs would he have respected? in his treatment of what person would he have manifested the fear of God? whose blood would he have refrained from shedding? whose chastity would he have wished to preserve inviolate? But how loud would they not have been in the praises of their gods! How insultingly they would have boasted, saying that Radagaisus had conquered, that he had been able to achieve such great things, because he propitiated and won over the gods by daily sacrifices,-a thing which the Christian religion did not allow the Romans to do! For when he was approaching to those places where he was overwhelmed at the nod of the Supreme Majesty, as his fame was everywhere increasing, it was being told us at Carthage that the pagans were believing, publishing, and boasting, that he, on account of the help and protection of the gods friendly to him, because of the sacrifices which he was said to be daily offering to them, would certainly not be conquered by those who were not performing such sacrifices to the Roman gods, and did not even permit that they should be offered by any one. And now these wretched men do not give thanks to God for his great mercy, who, having determined to chastise the corruption of men, which was worthy of far heavier chastisement than the corruption of the barbarians, tempered His indignation with such mildness as, in the first instance, to cause that the king of the Goths should be conquered in a wonderful manner, lest glory should accrue to demons, whom he was known to be supplicating, and thus the minds of the weak should be overthrown; and then, afterwards, to cause that, when Rome was to be taken, it should be taken by those barbarians who, contrary to any custom of all former wars, protected, through reverence for the Christian religion, those who fled for refuge to the sacred places, and who so opposed the demons themselves, and the rites of impious sacrifices, that they seemed to be carrying on a far more terrible war with them than with men. Thus did the true Lord and Governor of things both scourge the Romans mercifully, and, by the marvellous defeat of the worshippers of demons, show that those sacrifices were not necessary even for the safety of present things; so that, by those who do not obstinately hold out, but prudently consider the matter, true religion may not be deserted on account of the urgencies of the present time, but may be more clung to in most confident expectation of eternal life.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c24"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXIV] Neque enim nos Christianos quosdam imperatores ideo felices dicimus, quia vel diutius imperarunt vel imperantes filios morte placida reliquerunt, vel hostes rei publicae domuerunt vel inimicos cives adversus se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere potuerunt. Haec et alia vitae huius aerumnosae vel munera vel solacia quidam etiam cultores daemonum accipere meruerunt, qui non pertinent ad regnum Dei, quo pertinent isti; et hoc ipsius misericordia factum est,neabillo ista qui in eum crederent velut summa bona desiderarent. Sed felices eos dicimus, si iuste imperant, si inter linguas sublimiter honorantium et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non extolluntur, et se homines esse meminerunt; si suam potestatem ad Dei cultum maxime dilatandum maiestati eius famulam faciunt; si Deum timent diligunt colunt; si plus amant illud regnum, ubi non timent habere consortes; si tardius vindicant, facile ignoscunt; si eandem vindictam pro necessitate regendae tuendaeque rei publicae, non pro saturandis inimicitiarum odiis exerunt;si eandem uemam non ad inpunitatem iniquitatis, sed ad spem correctionis indulgent; si, quod aspere coguntur plerumque decernere, misericordiae lenitate et beneficiorum largitate compensant; si luxuria tanto eis est castigatior, quanto po sset esse liberior; si malunt cupiditatibus prauls quam qulbuslibet gentibus imperare et si haec olnnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter caritatem felicitatis aeternae; si prosuis peccatis humilitatis et miserationis et orationis sacrificium Deo suo vero immolare non neglegunt. Tales Christianos imperatores dicimus esse felices interim spe,postea re ipsa futuros, cum id quod expectamus advenerit. ||For neither do we say that certain Christian emperors were therefore happy because they ruled a long time, or, dying a peaceful death, left their sons to succeed them in the empire, or subdued the enemies of the republic, or were able both to guard against and to suppress the attempt of hostile citizens rising against them. These and other gifts or comforts of this sorrowful life even certain worshippers of demons have merited to receive, who do not belong to the kingdom of God to which these belong; and this is to be traced to the mercy of God, who would not have those who believe in Him desire such things as the highest good. But we say that they are happy if they rule justly; if they are not lifted up amid the praises of those who pay them sublime honors, and the obsequiousness of those who salute them with an excessive humility, but remember that they are men; if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by using it for the greatest possible extension of His worship; if they fear, love, worship God; if more than their own they love that kingdom in which they are not afraid to have partners; if they are slow to punish, ready to pardon; if they apply that punishment as necessary to government and defence of the republic, and not in order to gratify their own enmity; if they grant pardon, not that iniquity may go unpunished, but with the hope that the transgressor may amend his ways; if they compensate with the lenity of mercy and the liberality of benevolence for whatever severity they may be compelled to decree; if their luxury is as much restrained as it might have been unrestrained; if they prefer to govern depraved desires rather than any nation whatever; and if they do all these things, not through ardent desire of empty glory, but through love of eternal felicity, not neglecting to offer to the true God, who is their God, for their sins, the sacrifices of humility, contrition, and prayer. Such Christian emperors, we say, are happy in the present time by hope, and are destined to be so in the enjoyment of the reality itself, when that which we wait for shall have arrived.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c25"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXV] Nam bonus Deus, ne homines, qui eum crederent propter aeternam vitam colendum, has sublimitates et regna terrena existimarent posse neminem consequi, nisi daemonibus supplicet, quod hi spiritus in talibus multum valerent, Constantinum imperatorem non supplicantem daemonibus, sed ipsum verum Deum colentem tantis terrenis implevit muneribus. quanta optare nullus auderet; cui etiam condere civitatem Romano imperio sociam, velut ipsius Romae filiam, sed sine aliquo daemonum templo simulacroque concessit. Diu imperavit, universum orbem Romanum unus Augustus tenuit et defendit; in administrandis et gerendis bellis victoriosissimus fuit, in tyrannis opprimendis per omnia prosperatus est, grandaeuus aegritudine et senectute defunctus est, filios imperantes reliquit. Sed rursus ne imperator quisquam ideo Christianus esset, ut felicitatem Constantini mereretur, cum propter vitam aeternam quisque debeat esse Christianus: Iovianum multo citius quam Iulianum abstulit; Gratianum ferro tyrannico permisit interimi, longe quidem mitius quam magnum Pompeium in colentem velut Romanos deos. Nam ille vindicari a Catone non potuit, quem civilis belli quodam modo heredem reliquerat; iste autem, quamuis piae animae solacia talia non requirant, a Theodosio vindicatus est, quem regni participem fecerat, cum paruulum haberet fratrem avidior fidae societatis quam nimiae potestatis. ||For the good God, lest men, who believe that He is to be worshipped with a view to eternal life, should think that no one could attain to all this high estate, and to this terrestrial dominion, unless he should be a worshipper of the demons,-supposing that these spirits have great power with respect to such things,-for this reason He gave to the Emperor Constantine, who was not a worshipper of demons, but of the true God Himself, such fullness of earthly gifts as no one would even dare wish for. To him also He granted the honor of founding a city, a companion to the Roman empire, the daughter, as it were, of Rome itself, but without any temple or image of the demons. He reigned for a long period as sole emperor, and unaided held and defended the whole Roman world. In conducting and carrying on wars he was most victorious; in overthrowing tyrants he was most successful. He died at a great age, of sickness and old age, and left his sons to succeed him in the empire. But again, lest any emperor should become a Christian in order to merit the happiness of Constantine, when every one should be a Christian for the sake of eternal life, God took away Jovian far sooner than Julian, and permitted that Gratian should be slain by the sword of a tyrant. But in his case there was far more mitigation of the calamity than in the case of the great Pompey, for he could not be avenged by Cato, whom he had left, as it were, heir to the civil war. But Gratian, though pious minds require not such consolations, was avenged by Theodosius, whom he had associated with himself in the empire, though he had a little brother of his own, being more desirous of a faithful alliance than of extensive power.
| |
| − | |- valign = top
| |
| − | ||<div id="c26"><b>BOOK V</b> [XXVI] Vnde et ille non solum vivo servavit quam debebat fidem, verum etiam post eius mortem pulsum ab eius interfectore Maximo Valentinianum eius paruulum fratrem in sui partes imperii tamquam Christianus excepit pupillum, paterno custodivit affectu, quem destitutum omnibus opibus nullo negotio posset auferre, si latius regnandi cupiditate magis quam benefaciendi caritate flagraret; unde potius eum servata eius imperatoria dignitate susceptum ipsa humanitate et gratia consolatus est. Deinde cum Maximum terribilem faceret ille successus, hic in angustiis curarum suarum non est lapsus ad curiositates sacrilegas atque inlicitas, sed ad Iohannem in Aegypti heremo constitutum, quem Dei seruum prophetandi spiritu praeditum fama crebrescente didicerat, misit atque ab eo nuntium victoriae certissimum accepit. Mox tyranni Maximi extinctor Valentinianum puerum imperii sui partibus, unde fugatus fuerat, cum misericordissima veneratione restituit, eoque sive per insidias sive quo alio pacto vel casu proxime extincto alium tyrannum Eugenium, qui in illius imperatoris locum non legitime fuerat subrogatus, accepto rursus prophetico responso fide certus oppressit, contra cuius robustissimum exercitum magis orando quam feriendo pugnavit. Milites nobis qui aderant rettulerunt extorta sibi esse de manibus quaecumque iaculabantur, cum a Theodosii partibus in adversarios uehemens ventus iret et non solum quaecumque in eos iaciebantur concitatissime raperet, verum etiam ipsorum tela in eorum corpora retorqueret. Vnde et poeta Claudianus, quamuis a Christi nomine alienus, in eius tamen laudibus dixit: O nimium dilecte Deo, cui militat aether, Et coniurati veniunt ad classica venti! Victor autem, sicut crediderat et praedixerat, Iovis simulacra, quae adversus eum fuerant nescio quibus ritibus velut, consecrata et in Alpibus constituta, deposuit, eorumque fulmina, quod aurea fuissent, iocantibus (quod illa laetitia permittebat) cursoribus et se ab eis fulminari velle dicentibus hilariter benigneque donavit. Inimicorum suorum filios, quos, non ipsius iussu, belli abstulerat impetus, etiam nondum Christianos ad ecclesiam confugientes, Christianos hac occasione fieri voluit et Christiana caritate dilexit, nec privavit rebus et auxit honoribus. In neminem post victoriam privatas inimicitias valere permisit. Bella civilia non sicut Cinna et Marius et Sulla et alii tales nec finita finire voluerunt, sed magis doluit exorta quam cuiquam nocere voluit terminata. Inter haec omnia ex ipso initio imperii sui non quievit iustissimis et misericordissimis legibus adversus impios laboranti ecclesiae subvenire, quam Valens haereticus favens Arrianis uehementer adflixerat; cuius ecclesiae se membrum esse magis quam in terris regnare gaudebat. Simulacra gentilium ubique euertenda praecepit, satis intellegens nec terrena munera in daemoniorum, sed in Dei veri esse posita potestate. Quid autem fuit eius religiosa humilitate mirabilius, quando in Thessalonicensium gravissimum scelus, cui iam episcopis intercedentibus promiserat indulgentiam, tumultu quorundam, qui ei cohaerebant, vindicare compulsus est et ecclesiastica cohercitus disciplina sic egit paenitentiam, ut imperatoriam celsitudinem pro illo populus orans magis fleret videndo prostratam, quam peccando timeret iratam? Haec ille secum et si qua similia, quae commemorare longum est, bona opera tulit ex isto temporali uapore cuiuslibet culminis et sublimitatis humanae; quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Cetera vero vitae huius vel fastigia vel subsidia, sicut ipsum mundum lucem auras, terras aquas fructus ipsiusque hominis animam corpus, sensus mentem vitam, bonis malisque largitur; in quibus est etiam quaelibet imperii magnitudo, quam pro temporum gubernatione dispensat. Proinde iam etiam illis respondendum esse video, qui manifestissimis documentis, quibus ostenditur, quod ad ista temporalia, quae sola stulti habere concupiscunt, nihil deorum falsorum numerositas prosit, confutati atque conuicti connantur asserere non propter vitae praesentis utilitatem, sed propter eam, quae post mortem futura est, colendos deos. Nam istis, qui propter amicitias mundi huius volunt uana colere et non se permitti puerilibus sensibus conqueruntur, his quinque libris satis arbitror esse responsum. Quorum tres priores cum edidissem et in multorum manibus esse coepissent, audivi quosdam nescio quam adversus eos responsionem scribendo praeparare. Deinde ad me perlatum est, quod iam scripserint, sed tempus quaerant, quo sine periculo possint edere. Quos admoneo, non optent quod eis non expedit. Facile est enim cuiquam videri respondisse, qui tacere noluerit. Aut quid est loquacius uanitate? quae non ideo potest quod veritas, quia, si voluerit, etiam plus potest clamare quam veritas. Sed considerent omnia diligenter, et si forte sine studio partium iudicantes talia esse perspexerint, quae potius exagitari quam convelli possint garrulitate inpudentissima et quasi satyrica vel mimica levitate, cohibeant suas nugas et potius a prudentibus emendari quam laudari ab inpudentibus eligant. Nam si non ad libertatem vera dicendi, sed ad licentiam maledicendi tempus expectant, absit ut eis eveniat quod ait Tullius de quodam, qui peccandi licentia felix appellabatur: O miserum, cui peccare licebat! Vnde quisquis est, qui maledicendi licentia felicem se putat, multo erit felicior, si hoc illi omnino non liceat, cum possit deposita inanitate iactantiae etiam isto tempore tamquam studio consulendi quidquid voluerit contradicere et, quantum possunt, ab eis quos consulit amica disputatione honeste graviter libere quod oportet audire. ||And on this account, Theodosius not only preserved during the lifetime of Gratian that fidelity which was due to him, but also, after his death, he, like a true Christian, took his little brother Valentinian under his protection, as joint emperor, after he had been expelled by Maximus, the murderer of his father. He guarded him with paternal affection, though he might without any difficulty have got rid of him, being entirely destitute of all resources, had he been animated with the desire of extensive empire, and not with the ambition of being a benefactor. It was therefore a far greater pleasure to him, when he had adopted the boy, and preserved to him his imperial dignity, to console him by his very humanity and kindness. Afterwards, when that success was rendering Maximus terrible, Theodosius, in the midst of his perplexing anxieties, was not drawn away to follow the suggestions of a sacrilegious and unlawful curiosity, but sent to John, whose abode was in the desert of Egypt,-for he had learned that this servant of God (whose fame was spreading abroad) was endowed with the gift of prophecy,-and from him he received assurance of victory. Immediately the slayer of the tyrant Maximus, with the deepest feelings of compassion and respect, restored the boy Valentinianus to his share in the empire from which he had been driven. Valentinianus being soon after slain by secret assassination, or by some other plot or accident, Theodosius, having again received a response from the prophet, and placing entire confidence in it, marched against the tyrant Eugenius, who had been unlawfully elected to succeed that emperor, and defeated his very powerful army, more by prayer than by the sword. Some soldiers who were at the battle reported to me that all the missiles they were throwing were snatched from their hands by a vehement wind, which blew from the direction of Theodosius' army upon the enemy; nor did it only drive with greater velocity the darts which were hurled against them, but also turned back upon their own bodies the darts which they themselves were throwing. And therefore the poet Claudian, although an alien from the name of Christ, nevertheless says in his praises of him, "O prince, too much beloved by God, for you Жolus pours armed tempests from their caves; for you the air fights, and the winds with one accord obey your bugles." But the victor, as he had believed and predicted, overthrew the statues of Jupiter, which had been, as it were, consecrated by I know not what kind of rites against him, and set up in the Alps. And the thunderbolts of these statues, which were made of gold, he mirthfully and graciously presented to his couriers who (as the joy of the occasion permitted) were jocularly saying that they would be most happy to be struck by such thunderbolts. The sons of his own enemies, whose fathers had been slain not so much by his orders as by the vehemence of war, having fled for refuge to a church, though they were not yet Christians, he was anxious, taking advantage of the occasion, to bring over to Christianity, and treated them with Christian love. Nor did he deprive them of their property, but, besides allowing them to retain it, bestowed on them additional honors. He did not permit private animosities to affect the treatment of any man after the war. He was not like Cinna, and Marius, and Sylla, and other such men, who wished not to finish civil wars even when they were finished, but rather grieved that they had arisen at all, than wished that when they were finished they should harm any one. Amid all these events, from the very commencement of his reign, he did not cease to help the troubled church against the impious by most just and merciful laws, which the heretical Valens, favoring the Arians, had vehemently afflicted. Indeed, he rejoiced more to be a member of this church than he did to be a king upon the earth. The idols of the Gentiles he everywhere ordered to be overthrown, understanding well that not even terrestrial gifts are placed in the power of demons, but in that of the true God. And what could be more admirable than his religious humility, when, compelled by the urgency of certain of his intimates, he avenged the grievous crime of the Thessalonians, which at the prayer of the bishops he had promised to pardon, and, being laid hold of by the discipline of the church, did penance in such a way that the sight of his imperial loftiness prostrated made the people who were interceding for him weep more than the consciousness of offence had made them fear it when enraged? These and other similar good works, which it would be long to tell, he carried with him from this world of time, where the greatest human nobility and loftiness are but vapor. Of these works the reward is eternal happiness, of which God is the giver, though only to those who are sincerely pious. But all other blessings and privileges of this life, as the world itself, light, air, earth, water, fruits, and the soul of man himself, his body, senses, mind, life, He lavishes on good and bad alike. And among these blessings is also to be reckoned the possession of an empire, whose extent He regulates according to the requirements of His providential government at various times. Whence, I see, we must now answer those who, being confuted and convicted by the most manifest proofs, by which it is shown that for obtaining these terrestrial things, which are all the foolish desire to have, that multitude of false gods is of no use, attempt to assert that the gods are to be worshipped with a view to the interest, not of the present life, but of that which is to come after death. For as to those who, for the sake of the friendship of this world, are willing to worship vanities, and do not grieve that they are left to their puerile understandings, I think they have been sufficiently answered in these five books; of which books, when I had published the first three, and they had begun to come into the hands of many, I heard that certain persons were preparing against them an answer of some kind or other in writing. Then it was told me that they had already written their answer, but were waiting a time when they could publish it without danger. Such persons I would advise not to desire what cannot be of any advantage to them; for it is very easy for a man to seem to himself to have answered arguments, when he has only been unwilling to be silent. For what is more loquacious than vanity? And though it be able, if it like, to shout more loudly than the truth, it is not, for all that, more powerful than the truth. But let men consider diligently all the things that we have said, and if, perchance, judging without party spirit, they shall clearly perceive that they are such things as may rather be shaken than torn up by their most impudent garrulity, and, as it were, satirical and mimic levity, let them restrain their absurdities, and let them choose rather to be corrected by the wise than to be lauded by the foolish. For if they are waiting an opportunity, not for liberty to speak the truth, but for license to revile, may not that befall them which Tully says concerning some one, "Oh, wretched man! who was at liberty to sin?" Wherefore, whoever he be who deems himself happy because of license to revile, he would be far happier if that were not allowed him at all; for he might all the while, laying aside empty boast, be contradicting those to whose views he is opposed by way of free consultation with them, and be listening, as it becomes him, honorably, gravely, candidly, to all that can be adduced by those whom he consults by friendly disputation.
| |
| − | | |
| − | |}
| |
| − | [[Category:Logic Museum Parallel Texts]]
| |
